


UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO



3 1822 00134 7517







3 1822 00134 7517

D
308
A 442
1252
v. 13

HISTORY OF EUROPE

"BELLUM maxime omnium memorabile, quæ unquam gesta sint, me scripturum : quod, Hannibale duce, Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit : et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas, primo Punico conserebant bello : odiis etiam prope majoribus certârunt quam viribus : et adeo varia belli fortuna ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt."—LIVY, lib. xxi.



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation



HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM

THE COMMENCEMENT OF

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

TO THE

RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN MDCCCXV

BY

SIR ARCHIBALD ALISON, BART., D.C.L.

Tenth Edition, with Portraits

VOL. XIII.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS

EDINBURGH AND LONDON

MDCCCLX

CONTENTS OF VOL. XIII.

CHAPTER LXXXVII.

CAMPAIGN IN HOLLAND, ITALY, AND THE SOUTH OF FRANCE.

§	Page
1. Napoleon's review of his empire at this period,	1
2. Affairs of the Low Countries,	2
3. Combat of Merxem,	<i>ib.</i>
4. Investment of Antwerp,	3
5. Of which Carnot takes the command,	4
6. Progress of the war in Flanders,	6
7. Description of Bergen-op-Zoom,	<i>ib.</i>
8. Plan of the attack,	7
9. Commencement and early success of the assault,	8
10. The Guards win the rampart near the Antwerp gate,	9
11. The French rally, and defeat the assault,	10
12. Reflections on this assault,	11
13. Causes of its failure, and reflections on the conduct of the commanders on both sides,	12
14. Concluding movements of the campaign in Flanders,	13
15. Affairs of Italy. Retreat of Eugene to the Mincio,	14
16. Reasons which led Eugene to give battle,	15
17. Battle of the Mincio,	<i>ib.</i>
18. Evacuation of Tuscany by the French,	16
19. Secret views of Fouché in this,	18
20. Operations of Lord W. Bentinck on the coast of Tuscany,	19
21. Umbrage taken by Murat at the proclamation of the Prince of Sicily,	<i>ib.</i>
22. Successes of Eugene on the Po,	20
23. Affairs at Lyons,	21
24. Combats in Savoy,	22
25. Augereau resumes the offensive in the Jura and Savoy,	23
26. Displeasure of Napoleon at the direction of these attacks,	<i>ib.</i>
27. Notwithstanding which, Augereau does nothing more,	25
28. Augereau's operations in the Jura,	<i>ib.</i>
29. Battle of Limonct, and fall of Lyons,	26
30. Great effects of this victory,	28
31. Concluding operations of Wellington in the south of France,	29

§	Page
32. Extraordinary difficulty experienced by the British government in furnishing specie for the army,	30
33. Plan of employing Wellington in Flanders,	<i>ib.</i>
34. His reasons against it,	31
35. Still greater difficulties of Soult,	32
36. Reduction of Soult's army, and increase of Wellington's,	33
37. Rejection of the treaty of Valengay by the Cortes,	34
38. Arrival of the Duc d'Angoulême at Wellington's headquarters,	35
39. Wellington's proclamation against the insurrection in Baigorry,	36
40. Reflections on this proclamation,	37
41. Position of Soult around Bayonne,	38
42. Wellington's plan for forcing the passage of the Adour,	39
43. He drives back the French left,	<i>ib.</i>
44. Passage of the Gave de Mauléon,	40
45. And of the Lower Adour,	41
46. Entrance of the flotilla into the Adour, and investment of Bayonne,	42
47. Description of the French position and force at Orthes,	43
48. Wellington's order of march and attack,	44
49. His indefatigable efforts to maintain discipline,	45
50. Battle of Orthes. Preparatory movements,	<i>ib.</i>
51. Beresford carries St Boes, but is arrested on the ridge beyond it,	46
52. Wellington's dispositions to regain the battle,	48
53. Which at length prove successful,	<i>ib.</i>
54. Soult orders a general retreat,	49
55. Which is ere long turned into disorderly flight,	50
56. Great effects of this victory,	51
57. Soult retires towards Tarbes and Toulouse,	52
58. Proceedings of the Royalists at Bordeaux,	53
59. The English arrive at Bordeaux, and Louis XVIII. is proclaimed,	54
60. Arrival of the Duc d'Angoulême at Bordeaux,	55
61. Soult's counter-proclamation, and resumption of hostilities,	57
62. Soult resumes the offensive, and finally retreats to Toulouse,	59
63. Combat of Tarbes,	60
64. Rapid retreat of Soult to Toulouse,	<i>ib.</i>
65. General result of the campaign,	61
66. Moral lustre of the campaign,	62
67. General state of affairs in Catalonia,	<i>ib.</i>
68. Failure of Clinton at Molinos del Rey, and general retreat of Suchet,	63
69. Stratagem by which Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon are recovered by the Spaniards,	64
70. But which fails at Tortosa,	<i>ib.</i>
71. Arrival of Ferdinand and termination of the war in Catalonia,	65
72. But the blockade of the fortresses there still continues to the close of the war,	66
73. Siege of Santona, and close of the war in the Peninsula,	<i>ib.</i>
74. Description of Toulouse,	67
75. Military position of Soult there,	68
76. Ineffectual attempt to attack Toulouse by passing above the town,	69
77. But the passage above the town is at length effected,	<i>ib.</i>
78. Beresford, with the left wing, is thrown across below Toulouse,	70
79. His danger, and suppression of Soult,	71

%	Page
80. Advantages of the French position,	72
81. Wellington's plan of attack,	73
82. Position of the French,	74
83. Forces on both sides,	<i>ib.</i>
84. Battle of Toulouse,	76
85. Defeat of the Spaniards in the centre,	77
86. Picton also is repulsed at the bridge of Juncau,	78
87. Soult attacks Beresford,	79
88. Beresford carries the redoubts on the French right,	80
89. Soult's dispositions to restore the battle,	81
90. Beresford storms the redoubts in the centre,	82
91. Retreat of Soult behind the canal,	83
92. Results of the battle,	84
93. Soult evacuates Toulouse,	85
94. Wellington's triumphant entry into Toulouse, and proclamation of Louis XVIII.,	86
95. Convention which terminates the war in the south of France,	87
96. Sally from Bayonne,	88
97. Sir J. Hope is made prisoner, but the sally is repulsed,	89
98. Concluding operations at Bordeaux,	90
99. Reflections on this campaign,	91
100. Errors of Wellington,	92
101. Absurdity of the French claiming the victory at Toulouse,	<i>ib.</i>
102. Bentinck's operations against Genoa,	94
103. Which capitulates after the external forts had been stormed,	<i>ib.</i>
104. Concluding operations of the Allies in Italy,	95
105. State and final surrender of the fortresses in Germany still held by the French,	96
106. Operations under Benningsen against Davoust in Hamburg,	97
107. Reflections on the impolicy of Napoleon's clinging so tenaciously to these fortresses,	98
108. Its disastrous effect on his fortunes in the last result,	99
109. Final terms proposed to Napoleon at Châtillon,	100
110. Counter-statement by Napoleon,	101
111. His able argument against the allied terms,	102
112. Caulaincourt at length gives in a counter-project,	103
113. Answer of the Allies to the ultimatum of France,	104
114. And to the counter-project of Napoleon,	105
115. Anxiety of Metternich for Napoleon to accede to these terms,	106
116. Reflections on the dissolution of the Congress,	107
117. Unconquerable obstinacy of Napoleon at this period,	109

CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

FALL OF NAPOLEON.

1. Alarming situation of Paris,	110
2. Napoleon marches against Schwartzemberg, and towards the Aube,	111
3. And falls unawares on the Grand Army,	112
4. Napoleon moves aside, and Schwartzemberg resumes the offensive,	113
5. Napoleon and Schwartzemberg both march on Arcis,	114

§	Page
6. Napoleon is still incredulous as to the Austrian advance, . . .	115
7. Effect of these movements on both sides, . . .	<i>ib.</i>
8. Commencement of the battle of Arcis-sur-Aube, . . .	116
9. Positions of the parties, . . .	117
10. Imminent danger of Napoleon, and firmness of the French, . . .	119
11. Order of battle for the following day, . . .	<i>ib.</i>
12. The French at length retreat, . . .	120
13. The French rearguard is attacked, . . .	121
14. Napoleon's reasons for the march to St Dizier, . . .	122
15. Napoleon's march to St Dizier, . . .	123
16. Extreme discouragement of the army, . . .	124
17. The Allies follow the enemy, and gain intelligence of his designs, . . .	<i>ib.</i>
18. Important council of war at the allied headquarters, . . .	126
19. Volkonsky's advice to march to Paris, which is adopted by Alexander, . . .	127
20. It is adopted by Schwartzemberg and the King of Prussia, . . .	128
21. Orders given for the march of the troops to Paris, . . .	129
22. Winzingerode is detached after Napoleon, . . .	130
23. Enthusiasm of the troops on advancing to Paris, . . .	131
24. Judicious measures of Ertel in the rear of the Grand Army, . . .	<i>ib.</i>
25. Movements of Marmont and Mortier, . . .	132
26. They cross the country to join Napoleon, . . .	133
27. Approach of both armies to Fère-Champenoise, . . .	134
28. Battle of Fère-Champenoise, . . .	135
29. Second combat at Fère-Champenoise, . . .	136
30. Heroic resistance of the French, . . .	137
31. Their final destruction, . . .	138
32. Results of these combats, . . .	139
33. Reflections on the importance of cavalry in war, . . .	140
34. Retreat of Marmont and Mortier towards Paris, . . .	<i>ib.</i>
35. Their narrow escape, . . .	141
36. Splendid appearance of the allied army on the march to Paris, . . .	142
37. Attack on Winzingerode by Napoleon, . . .	143
38. Defeat of Winzingerode, . . .	144
39. Napoleon learns of the advance of the Allies towards Paris, and sets out after them, . . .	145
40. Passage of the Marne by the Allies, . . .	146
41. Alexander's efforts to preserve discipline in the army, . . .	147
42. Their important effect, . . .	148
43. First sight of Paris by the allied army, . . .	149
44. Extreme agitation in Paris during this period, . . .	150
45. Ineffectual attempts to organise a defence, . . .	151
46. Deliberation in the Council of State, as to whether the Empress and King of Rome should remain in Paris, . . .	152
47. Joseph produces an order by Napoleon for their removal, . . .	<i>ib.</i>
48. Mournful scene at the departure of the Empress, . . .	153
49. Description of Paris as a military station, . . .	154
50. Description of the buildings of Paris, . . .	155
51. Its architectural splendour, . . .	156
52. Forces of the French on the line of defence, . . .	157
53. And of the Allies, . . .	158
54. Schwartzemberg's proclamation to the inhabitants of Paris, . . .	<i>ib.</i>

S	Page
55. Commencement of the action, and allied disposition of attack,	160
56. Repulse of the Russians in the centre,	161
57. Heroic resistance of the Russians there,	162
58. The Emperor brings up the Guards, which restores the battle there,	<i>ib.</i>
59. Appearance of the army of Silesia on the right,	163
60. And of the Prince of Würtemberg on the left,	164
61. Storming of the heights which command Paris,	165
62. A suspension of arms is agreed to on both sides,	166
63. General occupation of the heights,	167
64. Storming of Montmartre, which closes the battle,	168
65. Results of the battle,	169
66. Napoleon receives intelligence of the allied advance,	170
67. His rapid return to the neighbourhood of Paris,	<i>ib.</i>
68. His conversation on hearing of the fall of Paris,	172
69. Preparation of the Allies for entering Paris,	173
70. Final conclusion of the capitulation,	<i>ib.</i>
71. Interview of Alexander with the magistrates of Paris,	174
72. State of public feeling at Paris during this period,	175
73. First movements of the Royalists,	176
74. Entrance of the allied sovereigns into Paris,	177
75. Universal transports of the people,	178
76. Extraordinary scene in the Place Louis XV.,	179
77. Striking moral retribution which now fell on Paris,	180

CHAPTER LXXXIX.

RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS, AND CONCLUSION OF THE WAR.

1. Great difficulty in the choice of Napoleon's successor,	181
2. Important meeting of the sovereigns at Talleyrand's hotel,	182
3. Account of the deliberations,	183
4. Which terminates in the determination to restore the Bourbons,	184
5. Declaration of the Allies that they would no longer treat with Napoleon nor his family,	185
6. Immense effect of this declaration,	186
7. Establishment of a provisional government by the Senate,	<i>ib.</i>
8. Generous conduct of the Emperor Alexander, who liberates all the French prisoners,	187
9. The Senate dethrone Napoleon,	189
10. General adherence to the new government,	191
11. Defection of Marmont,	192
12. Caulaincourt's mission to Alexander,	193
13. Which terminates in disappointment,	194
14. Napoleon at first refuses to abdicate,	195
15. But at length agrees to do so in favour of his son,	196
16. Napoleon's proclamation against Marmont and the Senate,	198
17. The mission of Caulaincourt to establish a regency fails,	199
18. The cause of the Restoration had become irresistible at Paris,	200
19. Increasing fervour in favour of the Bourbons,	201
20. Napoleon's final and unconditional abdication,	204

§	Page
21. General and base defection from Napoleon,	205
22. Treaty between Napoleon and the allied powers,	207
23. Abortive attempt of Napoleon to poison himself,	208
24. Universal desertion of the Empress, and dispersion of Napoleon's family,	210
25. Honourable fidelity of a few at Fontainebleau,	212
26. The Emperor's last speech at Fontainebleau,	214
27. Napoleon's journey to Frejus, and dangers which he ran,	215
28. His narrow escape at Orgon and St Canat,	216
29. Death of Josephine,	218
30. Character of the Emperor Alexander,	219
31. He became great in misfortune,	220
32. His private character and disposition,	<i>ib.</i>
33. His ambition, and character as a sovereign,	221
34. Character of Talleyrand. His early history,	223
35. His ruling principle in life,	224
36. His appointment as minister of foreign affairs,	225
37. His great abilities,	226
38. And profound dissimulation,	<i>ib.</i>
39. Solemn thanksgiving in the Place Louis XV.,	228
40. Louis XVIII. is called to the throne,	229
41. Entry of the Comte d'Artois into Paris,	230
42. Entry of Louis XVIII. into London,	231
43. And into Paris,	232
44. Convention of April 23, for the abandonment by France of all her conquests,	233
45. Prodigious extent of the possessions thus ceded by France,	234
46. Fortresses which she abandoned, and vast amount of their garrisons,	235
47. Treaty of May 30 at Paris,	<i>ib.</i>
48. Secret articles of the treaty,	237
49. Reflections on the treaty of Paris,	238
50. And on the generosity of the allied sovereigns,	<i>ib.</i>
51. Return of the Pope to Rome,	239
52. Extraordinary spectacle which Paris exhibited at this period,	240
53. Universal religious feelings of the allied troops,	241
54. Grand review of the allied troops at Paris,	243
55. Visit of the allied sovereigns to England,	244
56. Remarkable circumstance which led to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg coming to England,	245
57. Which led to the Saxe-Coburg dynasty ascending the throne of England,	246
58. Reflections on the decisive movement on St Dizier,	247
59. Difference between France and the other European monarchies, as regards the effect of the occupation of their capitals,	248
60. Causes of this difference,	<i>ib.</i>
61. It is that individual advancement was the mainspring of the Revolution,	249
62. Wide difference from the fidelity of the monarchy,	250
63. It was misfortune alone which rendered Napoleon unpopular,	251
64. Any restoration of the revolutionary system was impossible at this period,	<i>ib.</i>
65. A pacific career was impracticable to Napoleon,	252
66. Napoleon's views of the compulsion under which he acted,	253
67. View of the progressive phases of the Revolution,	255
68. Agency by which the Divine government of nations is carried on,	256

§	Page
69. Universal downward progress of sin,	257
70. Gradual and deceitful progress of vice,	258
71. And ascending career of virtue,	259
72. How alone can this downward progress be averted?	260
73. Is a free government possible in France?	261
74. Reasons which must prevent it,	262

CHAPTER XC.

AMERICA—ITS PHYSICAL, MORAL, AND POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

1. Vast outlet for mankind in the American continent,	263
2. Enchanting aspect of the West Indian Islands,	264
3. Its noble forests and natural riches,	<i>ib.</i>
4. Character of North America,	265
5. Prodigious activity of nature in its forests,	266
6. Cooper's description of the American forests,	267
7. Geographical divisions of the United States,	268
8. The Prairies and Rocky Mountains,	270
9. Character of the eastern bank of the Mississippi,	<i>ib.</i>
10. Prodigious number of animals which are there assembled,	271
11. Description of Canada,	272
12. Vast inland navigation which its lakes afford,	273
13. Superficial extent and probable capabilities of Canada,	274
14. Vegetable productions of the Canadas,	275
15. Immense rivers of the United States,	<i>ib.</i>
16. The Delta of the Mississippi,	277
17. Extraordinary spectacle which it exhibits,	<i>ib.</i>
18. Primitive forest of the southern provinces,	278
19. Character of the American Indians,	279
20. Their striking peculiarities of disposition,	280
21. Extraordinary growth of the Anglo-Saxon race in America,	281
22. Prospects of the growth of the American population,	282
23. Prodigious increase in the valley of the Mississippi,	283
24. Which is mainly owing to immigration from Europe and the American coast,	285
25. Immense stream of immigration across the Alleghany Mountains,	<i>ib.</i>
26. First settlers or squatters. Their habits and mode of life,	287
27. Striking appearances of the progress of cultivation in the forests,	<i>ib.</i>
28. Extraordinary progress of the stream of emigration,	289
29. Effects of steam navigation and paper credit on the United States,	290
30. Vast paper circulation of the United States,	<i>ib.</i>
31. Dreadful disasters with which it has been attended,	292
32. Means by which this ruin is repaired,	<i>ib.</i>
33. General wellbeing of the people,	293
34. Proportion of agricultural to other classes in Great Britain and America,	295
35. Which demonstrates the increasing power of man over subsistence as society advances,	296
36. General attachment of men to their landed possessions,	297
37. Universal migratory turn of the Americans,	298

§	Page
38. Causes of this peculiarity. The general custom of dividing land among children,	299
39. The regarding of agriculture as a vulgar profession,	300
40. Effect of the continual rise in the value of land in the newly-cleared parts of America,	<i>ib.</i>
41. Extraordinary activity of the Americans,	301
42. Ardent and impetuous character of the people,	302
43. Universal discontent in America,	303
44. General thirst for wealth,	305
45. Commercial cities of America,	306
46. Progress of American commerce and shipping,	307
47. Their present naval establishment,	309
48. Their military force,	310
49. Revenue and expenditure of the United States,	311
50. Revenues and debt of the separate states,	312
51. Sketch of the American constitution,	313
52. The Senate and House of Representatives: their constitution and powers,	315
53. Powers of the President,	316
54. Sovereignty of the people,	<i>ib.</i>
55. Religion in the United States,	318
56. Dependence of the clergy on their flocks,	319
57. Want of a national provision for religion,	<i>ib.</i>
58. Ruinous effects of the dependence of the clergy on their flocks,	321
59. How has this democracy worked?	323
60. Irresistible power of the majority,	<i>ib.</i>
61. Total absence of originality or independence of thought,	325
62. Test of real freedom of thought,	326
63. Prodigious effects of the revolutionary law of succession,	328
64. Spoliation of the commercial classes already effected,	329
65. Insecurity of life and order in America,	331
66. Frequent acts of violence in the legislature,	332
67. Peculiarity of the American cruelties in this respect,	335
68. Real reproach of the Americans on this head,	336
69. External weakness of the Americans,	337
70. Want of foresight in the ruling majority is the cause of this,	338
71. Banishment of higher talent or station from the public service,	339
72. The rich have taken refuge in exclusive society,	340
73. State of dependence of the bench,	<i>ib.</i>
74. Tenure by which the judicial office is held in the different states,	342
75. Literature and the press,	345
76. Character of its legislation,	347
77. Great eminence of the American legal writers,	348
78. Cause of this excellence,	<i>ib.</i>
79. Great extent of slavery in the United States,	349
80. Vehement resistance made against its abolition,	350
81. Morals and manners of the Americans,	351
82. Their admiration for rank and titles,	353
83. How has America escaped its political dangers?	<i>ib.</i>
84. Political state of Canada and its population,	355
85. Loyalty of the Canadians,	357
86. The <i>abolition</i> of Lower Canada,	358

§	Page
87. Their disinclination to expand in the woods,	359
88. Ruinous effect of the constitution of 1791,	360
89. Evils arising from the diversity of race in Canada,	361
90. Vast importance of the North American colonies to Great Britain,	362
91. Vital difference between foreign and colonial trade,	364

CHAPTER XCI.

AMERICAN WAR.

1. Real causes of the disastrous issue of the first American war,	367
2. Corruption and inefficiency of the army,	368
3. Fatal operation of these causes on the war,	369
4. Efforts of Washington to maintain peace with Great Britain,	369
5. Progress of the maritime dispute with America,	370
6. The Berlin and Milan decrees, and British Orders in Council,	371
7. Effect of these decrees upon the neutral trade,	372
8. Origin of the dispute with America,	373
9. Hostile measures of the Americans against the British,	374
10. Affair of the Chesapeake,	375
11. Mr Erskine's negotiation with Mr Madison,	376
12. Which the British government refuses to ratify,	376
13. Storm of indignation in the United States at this disavowal,	377
14. Neither France nor England will repeal their obnoxious decrees,	379
15. Affair of the Little Belt and President,	380
16. Threatening aspect of the negotiations,	381
17. Violent measures of Congress preparatory to a war,	382
18. War declared by America, though the Orders in Council are repealed,	383
19. Diminutive scale of the American preparations for war,	385
20. Reflections on this circumstance,	386
21. Invasion of Canada by General Hull, and his surrender,	387
22. Armistice on the frontiers, which is disavowed by the American govern- ment, and dissatisfaction the disavowal excites,	388
23. Total defeat of the Americans at Queenstown,	389
24. A third invasion of Canada is repelled,	390
25. Success of the Americans at sea,	391
26. Capture of the Guerrière by the Constitution,	391
27. Frolic and Wasp,	392
28. Capture of the Macedonian by the United States,	393
29. Action between the Java and Constitution,	395
30. Desperate defence of the former,	395
31. The Peacock taken by the Hornet,	397
32. Prodigious moral effect of these victories,	397
33. Reflections on the causes which gave rise to them,	398
34. They demonstrated an equality in American and British seamanship,	399
35. Vigorous efforts made in England to repair the disasters,	400
36. Good effects of these efforts, and supineness of the American government,	401
37. The Shannon and Chesapeake,	402
38. Approach of the two vessels,	402
39. The Chesapeake is boarded,	403

S	Page
40. Desperate conflict by which she was carried,	404
41. Great moral effect of this victory,	405
42. Combats of lesser vessels. The Boxer and Enterprise, the Pelican and Argus,	406
43. Naval operations in Chesapeake Bay,	<i>ib.</i>
44. Operations by land, and American preparations for the war, . .	407
45. Invasion and defeat of General Winchester, and capture of Ogdenburg,	409
46. Capture of York, the capital of Upper Canada,	<i>ib.</i>
47. Success at the fords of Miami,	411
48. Repulse at Sackett's Harbour,	<i>ib.</i>
49. Gallant but vain efforts of Prevost,	412
50. Reduction of Fort George by the Americans,	413
51. The Americans are defeated at Stony Creek, Beavers' Dams, and Black Rock,	414
52. Blockade of Fort George, and repulse of Proctor at Sandusky, . .	415
53. Success of the British on Lake Champlain, and at Plattsburg, . .	<i>ib.</i>
54. Defective state of the British flotilla on Lake Erie,	416
55. Desperate action on Lake Erie, and defeat of the British, . . .	417
56. Retreat and disaster of General Proctor,	418
57. Disaster on Lake Ontario, and raising of the siege of Fort George,	420
58. Preparations for a grand invasion of Canada,	<i>ib.</i>
59. Defeat of the invasion of Lower Canada,	421
60. Gallant defence of Fort Michilimackinac by Colonel McDowall, . .	422
61. Total defeat of the enemy in Upper Canada, and evacuation of Fort George,	423
62. Defeat of Hull, and burning of Buffalo,	424
63. General result of the campaign,	425
64. Its honourable character to Sir G. Prevost,	426
65. Capture of the Essex by the Phoebe,	<i>ib.</i>
66. The Frolic taken by the Orpheus, and the Reindeer by the Wasp, .	428
67. Action between the President and the Endymion,	429
68. Capture of the former by the British,	430
69. Lesser actions which closed the war,	431
70. Financial measures of the American government,	432
71. Repeal of the Non-importation Act,	433
72. Symptoms of a breaking up of the Union,	434
73. Preparations in Canada, and among the Indians,	435
74. Storming of Fort Oswego, and failure at Sandy Creek,	<i>ib.</i>
75. Capture of Fort Erie, and battle of Chippewa,	436
76. Second battle of Chippewa,	437
77. Awful circumstances of the action,	438
78. Results of the battle,	440
79. Unsuccessful assault on Fort Erie,	<i>ib.</i>
80. Operations in Chesapeake Bay,	441
81. Preparations for the attack on Washington,	442
82. Preparations for its defence,	443
83. Battle of Bladensburg,	444
84. Capture of Washington,	445
85. Reflections on this expedition,	446
86. Unjustifiable use made by the British of their victory in destroying the public buildings of Washington,	447

§	Page
87. Capture of Fort Washington and Alexandria,	448
88. Victory of the British near Baltimore,	<i>ib.</i>
89. Attack on the town abandoned,	449
90. Lesser actions on the coast,	450
91. Sir George Prevost's expedition against Plattsburg,	451
92. Miserable state of the naval force to co-operate with it,	452
93. Success of the expedition in the outset,	<i>ib.</i>
94. Preparations for the naval combat, and relative forces on the two sides,	453
95. Commencement of the action between the two squadrons,	454
96. Total defeat of the British squadron,	455
97. Retreat of Sir George Prevost,	456
98. Reflections on this expedition,	458
99. And on Sir George Prevost's conduct,	<i>ib.</i>
100. What if Sir George Prevost had stormed the blockhouses?	459
101. Sortie from Fort Erie, and its evacuation by the Americans,	460
102. The British acquire the superiority on Lake Ontario,	461
103. Expedition against New Orleans,	462
104. Description of the American position,	463
105. Preparatory movements of the British,	<i>ib.</i>
106. Dreadful slaughter in the British columns during the assault,	464
107. Final repulse of the British attack,	465
108. Success of Thornton on the other bank, but which leads to nothing,	466
109. Re-embarkation of the troops, and capture of Fort Boyer near Mobile,	467
110. Conclusion of peace at Ghent,	<i>ib.</i>
111. Reflections on this treaty,	469
112. Reflections on the battle at New Orleans,	470
113. Immense losses of the Americans during the war,	471
114. Total ruin of the American resources during the contest,	472
115. Pernicious effects of this war to the manufacturing interests of Great Britain,	473
116. Evils which a rupture with the United States would produce,	474
117. Danger of it notwithstanding, and real sources of it,	475
118. Aggressive disposition of the Americans, as of all democratic states,	476
119. Weakness of America in the outset, and vigour in the end,	477
120. Necessity of concentrating the British forces in such a war,	478
121. Military force by which we are likely to be opposed,	479
122. All attack on private property should be avoided,	480
123. Absolute necessity of maintaining a superiority on the Lakes,	481
124. Necessity of timely preparations of the British to counterbalance the superior advantages of the Americans for shipbuilding on the lakes,	482
125. Errors of the British government in the late war,	<i>ib.</i>
126. There is little danger of Canada being conquered by America,	483
127. The Americans are not likely to become a great naval power,	484
128. Danger from colonial defection,	486
129. True principle of colonial government,	487

CHAPTER XCII.

CONGRESS OF VIENNA, AND RETURN OF NAPOLEON FROM ELBA.

§	Page
1. Extraordinary and unanimous enthusiasm in Great Britain after the peace,	489
2. Views of different parties on the war,	490
3. Anticipations of the friends of freedom on the results of the Revolution,	<i>ib.</i>
4. Very different was the real issue of events,	491
5. Munificent grant to the Duke of Wellington and his chief generals,	492
6. Wellington's reception by the House of Commons, and the Speaker's address,	493
7. Solemn thanksgiving in St Paul's for peace,	494
8. Interference of Great Britain to force the annexation of Norway to Sweden,	495
9. Argument on the subject of Norway by the Opposition,	496
10. Denmark had no right to transfer the allegiance of Norway,	497
11. The conduct of Sweden had deserved no such recompense,	498
12. Impolicy of this step,	499
13. Answer of the Administration,	<i>ib.</i>
14. Legality of the transfer, and its consonance with ordinary usage,	500
15. Value of the services of Sweden, and policy of the measure,	501
16. Continued resistance of the Norwegians,	502
17. Failure of all attempts at a negotiation,	503
18. Conquest of Norway by Sweden,	504
19. Reflections on this subject,	505
20. And the true ground on which it is to be rested,	506
21. Historical sketch of the Corn Laws,	507
22. Progress of exportation and importation during the last hundred years,	508
23. Pressing reasons for a protection to native agriculture,	509
24. Mr Huskisson's and the Government's arguments in favour of the Corn Laws,	510
25. Great fluctuation of prices in consequence of the existing state of the law,	<i>ib.</i>
26. Probable effects of increased importation,	511
27. Argument on the other side by Mr Rose and its opponents,	512
28. Security of the farmer against foreign competition,	513
29. Alleged onesidedness of the proposed enactment,	514
30. Progress of the bill, which is at length carried,	<i>ib.</i>
31. Reflections on this subject,	515
32. Great benefit which protection to home agriculture affords to home manufactures,	516
33. Extraordinary difficulties which beset Louis XVIII. in France,	518
34. Commencement of divisions in his councils,	<i>ib.</i>
35. Views of the King, and formation of the Constitution,	519
36. Injudicious expressions used by the King's ministers in the legislative body,	520
37. Leading articles of the Charter,	521
38. Its provisions in favour of public freedom,	522
39. Its obvious defects,	523
40. Real difficulties of the Restoration,	525
41. Terrors of the regicides and army,	526
42. Penury and embarrassments of Government,	527
43. System of government which the Bourbons pursued,	528

§	Page
44. Their great errors, especially in regard to the army,	529
45. Errors of their civil administration,	531
46. Injudicious regulations regarding the army,	532
47. Character of the ministers of the Restoration,	533
48. General cause of complaint alleged against the Government,	534
49. Extraordinary financial difficulties,	535
50. Commencement of the Congress of Vienna,	537
51. Preliminary questions which were discussed,	<i>ib.</i>
52. Points on which the great powers were united,	538
53. Alexander demands the whole of Poland as a separate monarchy, of which he was to be the head,	539
54. Views of Prussia on Saxony,	540
55. Views of England, France, and Austria on the proposals made,	541
56. Military preparations on both sides,	542
57. Secret treaty between Austria, France, and England,	543
58. Effect of this treaty on the negotiations,	544
59. Formation of the German Confederacy,	545
60. Formation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands,	546
61. Treaty between England and the Kingdom of the Netherlands,	547
62. Settlement of the affairs of Switzerland,	<i>ib.</i>
63. And of Saxony,	548
64. Acts of the Congress for the free navigation of the Rhine, and the aboli- tion of the slave trade,	549
65. Affairs of Italy, and alarm of Napoleon's return,	551
66. Conference for the removal of Napoleon from Elba, when he leaves that island,	552
67. Prodigious sensation excited in the Congress by this event,	553
68. Decided measures of the Congress against Napoleon,	554
69. Military preparations of the allied powers,	556
70. Settlement of the affairs of Poland,	557
71. Situation of Napoleon at Elba. Commencement of a conspiracy in France in his favour,	558
72. Its great ramifications in the army,	559
73. Napoleon's correspondence with Murat. His profound dissimulation, and life in Elba,	560
74. Napoleon's astute confidence to Sir Neil Campbell,	561
75. Napoleon's preparations for embarking from Elba,	562
76. He leaves Elba, and steers for the Gulf of St Juan,	563
77. Voyage, and landing there,	564
78. He marches by Gap to Grenoble,	565
79. Napoleon's varied language to the soldiers and people,	566
80. Defection of Labédoyère, and his character,	568
81. Memorable meeting of Napoleon with the troops,	569
82. His entry into Grenoble,	570
83. His decrees from thence,	<i>ib.</i>
84. His noble proclamation to the troops,	571
85. Measures taken at Paris on the news being received,	572
86. Ineffectual attempt to stimulate a Royalist resistance,	574
87. Soult's and Ney's protestations of fidelity,	575
88. Dismissal of Soult, and failure of the Comte d'Artois at Lyons,	577
89. Advance of Napoleon to Lyons,	578

§	Page
90. Important decrees issued from that city,	578
91. Flagrant treason of Marshal Ney,	579
92. General defection of the army,	581
93. Conduct of the court in the last extremity,	582
94. The universal defection of the troops compels the King to fly,	583
95. The King retires from Paris, and goes to Ghent,	584
96. Napoleon arrives at Fontainebleau, and reaches Paris at night,	585
97. Universal transports among the Imperial party,	586

CHAPTER XCIII.

HUNDRED DAYS : TO THE CLOSE OF THE BATTLE OF LIGNY.

1. Great difficulties of Napoleon,	588
2. His great difficulty in filling up his appointments,	589
3. His civil and military appointments,	590
4. General stupor of the people over France,	591
5. Efforts of the Duc and Duchesse d'Angoulême to stimulate a Royalist resistance in the south,	592
6. Termination of the civil war in the southern provinces,	593
7. Progress of the war near Lyons,	594
8. Termination of the civil war in the southern provinces,	595
9. Military treaties between the Allies,	596
10. And immense force at their disposal,	597
11. Preparations of the British government for the war,	598
12. Finances and budget of Great Britain,	600
13. Subsidies granted to foreign powers by England,	601
14. Napoleon's difficulties,	602
15. His military preparations,	603
16. His efforts to obtain arms and replenish the arsenals, and forces which he collected for the campaign,	603
17. Fouché, Carnot, and other Republicans : their great influence,	604
18. Constant's account of Napoleon's conversation with him at this time,	606
19. Financial measures of Napoleon,	607
20. Formation of a Constitution,	608
21. Violent opposition which it excites,	609
22. Ineffectual attempt of the French diplomacy to open a negotiation with the allied powers,	610
23. Murat commences hostilities, and advances to the Po,	612
24. His defeat and overthrow at Tolentino, and restoration of the Bourbons to the throne of Naples,	613
25. Louis XVIII. at Ghent. Chateaubriand and his writings,	613
26. War in La Vendée,	614
27. Measures of Napoleon to crush it,	616
28. Defeat of the Vendéans, and pacification of La Vendée,	617
29. Composition of the Chamber of Deputies,	618
30. The Champ de Mai at Paris,	618
31. Napoleon's speech on the occasion,	620
32. Great division of opinion at Paris,	621

§	Page
33. Napoleon sets out for the army,	622
34. Formation of a government for the Emperor's absence,	623
35. The Emperor discovers Fouché's treachery, but is obliged to dissemble and keep him in power,	624
36. Napoleon's plan of the campaign,	625
37. And disposition of his troops,	626
38. Wellington's plan of the campaign,	ib.
39. Napoleon's plan of operations,	628
40. Disposition and force of the French troops, and Napoleon's address to them,	629
41. Positions and views of Wellington and Blücher,	630
42. Delay in collecting the English army,	632
43. Positions and preparations of the Allies, and reasons of their inactivity,	635
44. The French army crosses the frontier,	637
45. Description of the field of Ligny, and Blücher's force and dispositions,	640
46. Force and plan of attack of Napoleon,	642
47. Battle of Ligny. Desperate conflict in the village of that name,	ib.
48. Napoleon's attack on the centre,	644
49. Desperate conflict in and around St Amand,	645
50. Final and decisive charge of Napoleon's Guards,	646
51. Movements before the battle of Quatre Bras,	647
52. Battle of Quatre Bras,	650
53. Vehement charge on the British squares,	651
54. Desperate conflicts in the fields, and in the wood of Bossu,	653
55. Noble combat of Picton and Kempt,	654
56. Arrival of Alten's division to aid the Allies,	655
57. Arrival of the Guards restores the battle,	656
58. Desperate resistance of the British,	ib.
59. Loss on both sides,	657
60. Retreat of the Prussians to Wavre,	658
61. Retreat of Wellington to Waterloo,	659
62. Sharp conflict at Genappe between the English and French horse,	661
63. Results of the campaign in favour of Napoleon,	662
64. The concentric retreat of the allied armies had restored them the advantage,	663
APPENDIX,	665

HISTORY OF EUROPE.

CHAPTER LXXXVII.

CAMPAIGN IN HOLLAND, ITALY, AND THE SOUTH OF FRANCE.
JANUARY—APRIL, 1814.

ALTHOUGH Napoleon allowed a few days' repose to his wearied troops, he gave none to his own indefatigable mind. Though he witnessed around him the wreck of a world, he stood undaunted amidst its ruins, realising thus the well-known lines of the Roman poet—

“ Si fractus illabatur orbis,
Impavidum ferient ruinae.”*

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.
1.
Napoleon's
review of
his empire
at this pe-
riod.

During these days of physical repose, he was indefatigable in the cabinet. The varied concerns of his still vast empire passed before his view: despatches from all quarters were received; and his final resolution to reject the terms offered by the Allies at Châtillon was taken. This brief intermission in military operations, both at the headquarters of the Emperor Napoleon, of Marshal Blücher, and of the Grand Army, affords a favourable opportunity for reviewing, with the now straitened conqueror, the varied condition of the remoter parts of his empire, preparatory to detailing the grand catastrophe of his fall.¹

* “Should the world itself break in pieces,
Fearless will the ruins strike him.”—HORACE.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

2.
Affairs of
the Low
Countries.

Atlas,
Plate 4.

Dec. 21,
1813.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1814, 152,
153. Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
39, 40.
Koch, i.
115. Die
Grosse
Chron. iii.
265, 267.

3.
Combat of
Mexem.

² Ante, ch.
LXXXIII, § 18.

Jan. 13.

From Antwerp and Flanders the accounts were on the whole satisfactory. After the expulsion of the French from Holland, in the middle of the preceding December, the tricolor flag waved only on Bergen-op-Zoom, Boisle-Duc, Gorcum, and one or two lesser forts, the main strength of the French forces in that quarter being concentrated in Antwerp, which Napoleon justly classed with Mayence on the Rhine, and Alessandria in Piedmont, as the principal bulwarks of his empire. To impose upon the Allies, by the sound at least of military preparations, the Emperor, by a decree in the end of December, had ordered the formation of an army of fifty-five battalions, the command of which was bestowed on Comte Maison. This respectable force, however, like most of the others of which Napoleon had the direction at this period, existed in great part only on paper; and when that general arrived at Antwerp in the end of December, he found that he could not reckon on twenty thousand men for the defence of the whole Low Countries. In fact it was apparent that, so far from thinking of the reconquest of Holland, it would be all he could do to provide for the defence of Flanders, now threatened on its maritime quarter by the English, and on the side of the Meuse by the Russians and Prussians. He therefore strengthened the garrisons of Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom, and made every possible provision for the victualling, arming, and providing of these fortresses.¹

Meanwhile, an English division, six thousand strong, under the orders of Sir Thomas Graham, who had resigned his command in Spain the day after the victorious passage of the Bidassoa, on the 7th October preceding,² landed in South Beveland, and concerted measures with Bulow, who had crossed the canal and advanced towards Antwerp. A general forward movement in consequence commenced on the 10th January, which, after a variety of minor actions, brought on a warm contest on the 13th, when a combined attack was made on

the village of Merxem, near Antwerp, by the British under General Mackenzie in front, and the Prussians under Thumen in flank. The 78th Highlanders headed the assault, led by their brave colonel, McLeod, and the French were driven out of the village and back into Antwerp in the most gallant style, with the loss of a thousand men killed and wounded. The Allies, however, suffered nearly as much from the heavy fire which the enemy kept up at the entrance of the village; and as they were ignorant of the strength of the garrison of Antwerp, and not prepared at that period to commence the investment of the place, they withdrew at night to their former positions, although they had approached so near to it that their bombs already fell in the suburbs and docks of the fortress.¹

On the night of the 25th, aided by the inhabitants, Bulow made a successful attack on Bois-le-Duc, which was taken by escalade, with its garrison of six hundred men. This enabled the Prussian general to turn his whole forces against Maison; and the latter, not feeling himself in sufficient strength to keep the field against the superior forces of the Allies, left Antwerp to its own resources, threw a garrison of a thousand men into Malines, and took post at Louvain, as a central point from which he might be able to observe the numerous enemies who now inundated the Low Countries. They were very formidable; for, in addition to Bulow and Graham on the side of Antwerp, Winzingerode, with his numerous corps of Russians, was exciting the utmost alarm, as already mentioned, by his unresisted march from the Rhine, by Liege, towards the old French frontier. No sooner was Antwerp left to its own resources than Bulow approached its walls, and completed the investment; and three thousand additional troops having arrived from England, and a small battering train been obtained from Holland, operations of a vigorous character were commenced against the place. The great

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Graham's
Obliged Des-
patch, Jan.
14, 1814.
Ann. Rec.
153, Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
39, 40.
Koch, i.
115, 127.
Plötho, iii.
200. Die
Grosse
Chron. iii.
270, 271.

4.
Investment
of Antwerp.
Jan. 31.

Jan. 27.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1814.

object was not to breach and carry its ramparts, for which the battering train as yet at the disposal of the Allies was wholly inadequate, but to bombard the town, and burn the great fleet constructed there by Napoleon, by means of which he had so long flattered himself he would effect the subjugation of Great Britain. Extraordinary precautions had, however, been taken by Admiral Mis-siessy, who commanded the squadrons, to render nugatory the effects of a bombardment, by blinding the ships in the docks with turf, wet blankets, and a variety of other articles, which rendered them impervious to the heaviest shells, as had been done at Malta in the year 1799.

Feb. 1.

On the 1st of February a general attack was made on the French advanced posts beyond the works, by the combined Prussian and British forces; and although the former experienced a bloody repulse near the village of Duerne, the British pushed back the enemy from Braeschaet to Merxem, and next day carried the latter village by assault, driving the French, with severe loss, entirely into the works of the place on that side. They immediately commenced the construction of mortar batteries behind the dikes of St Ferdinand: and with such vigour were the approaches advanced during the night, that next morning a heavy fire was commenced upon the shipping.¹

Feb. 2.
¹ Koch, ii.
122, 136.
Graham's
Desp. Feb.
6, 1814.
Ann. Reg.
1814, p.
156. App.
to Chron.
Ploto, iii.
201, 204.

5.
Of which
Carnot takes
the com-
mand.

It was at this moment that Carnot took the command at Antwerp. This stern republican—who had lived in retirement since the fall of Robespierre, resisted all the offers of Napoleon during the zenith of his power to lure him from his retreat, and almost singly voted against his being made Emperor²—now came forward, with true patriotic devotion, to offer him, in his adversity, what remained of strength at sixty-four years of age, for the defence of the country.* Napoleon knew how to appre-

² Ante, ch.
xxxviii. §
45.

* "The offer is little, without doubt, of an arm sixty years old; but I thought that the example of a soldier, whose patriotic sentiments are known, might have the effect of rallying to your eagles a number of persons hesitating

ciate grandeur of character, even in the most decided political opponent. He immediately said, upon receiving the letter, "Since Carnot offers me his services, I know he will be faithful to the post which I assign to him: I appoint him governor of Antwerp." The sturdy veteran arrived at the fortress, and entered by one of the southern gates the very day the bombardment commenced. He found the garrison fifteen thousand strong; but, nevertheless, anticipating a long siege, and deeming it necessary to husband his resources, he immediately withdrew all his outposts within the outworks, so that the Prussians approached, without resistance, so near the place as to be able to take a part in the bombardment. It produced, however, very little effect. By the admirable precautions of Carnot and Missiessy, the fire, which was repeatedly raised in different quarters of the city and harbour, was immediately extinguished; the vessels of war in the docks were so protected as to be almost impervious to shells; the mortars which the English made use of, brought from Holland, though well served, soon became for the most part unserviceable, from too frequent discharges; and after the bombardment had been kept up three days, it was discontinued from failure of ammunition. At the same time, Bulow received orders to raise the siege of the place, and advance with his corps into France, to take part in the great operations in contemplation against Napoleon, in which, as already mentioned, he rendered the most essential service. The British, not half the strength of the garrison of the place, were in no condition to maintain their ground before it; and accordingly Sir Thomas Graham retired to his former cantonments, between Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom;¹ and Carnot, in conformity with his principle of reserving the strength of the garrison for ulterior

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
— 1814.

Feb. 2.

Feb. 6.

¹ Graham's
Desp. Feb.
6, 1814.
Ann. Reg.
1814, p.
156. App.
to Chron.
Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
42, 43.
Mém. sur
Carnot,
136, 139.

as to the part which they should take, and who might possibly think that the only way to serve their country was to abandon it."—CARNOT to NAPOLEON, 24th Jan. 1814; *Mémoires sur Carnot*, p. 135.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

operations, made no attempt to disquiet them in their retreat.

1814.

6.
Progress of
the war in
Flanders.

Though Bulow, however, had passed on into France, and the English had retired to the frontiers of Holland, yet there was no intermission in the deluge of allied troops which rolled over Flanders. Wave after wave succeeded, as in those days when the long-restrained might of the northern nations found vent in the decaying provinces of the Roman empire. The Prince of Saxe-Weimar, reinforced by Borstell's brigade of Prussians, kept the field at the head of fifteen thousand foot and two thousand horse; Brussels was soon evacuated; and Maison, who retired to Tournay, was watched by the Allies, whose headquarters were at Ath. Goreum, however, having surrendered, and the blockading force, under the Prussian General Zielenksi, having reinforced the Prince of Saxe-Weimar, he advanced against the French general, who retired towards Quesnoy and Maubeuge. Nothing of moment occurred in this quarter till the 8th of March, when the prince made an attack on Maison's troops with twelve thousand men, and drove them from the positions they occupied in front of Courtray, under the cannon of Lille; so that, with the exception of Antwerp, Bergen-op-Zoom, Ypres, Condé, and Maubeuge, which were still in the hands of the French, the whole of Austrian Flanders was wrested from the arms of Napoleon.¹

1 Vict. et
Camp. xxiii.
44, 48.
Koch, ii.
137, 151.
Die Grosse
Chron. iii.
273, 277.
Thiers, xvii.
357, 358.

7.
Description
of Bergen-
op-Zoom.

But an important event occurred at this period in Holland, which deserves to be more particularly noticed, both on account of the admirable skill with which it was projected by the English general, and the combined gallantry on the part of the French, and remissness on that of the British, which rendered a successful attack ultimately abortive. This was the assault of BERGEN-OP-ZOOM by Sir Thomas Graham. That celebrated fortress, well known in the wars of the Low Countries, and strengthened by the successive labour of many centuries, was justly

regarded by the Dutch as their principal bulwark on the side of the Netherlands. It was in every respect the worthy antagonist of Antwerp, to which it was directly opposite at the distance only of fifteen miles. On its works the famous Cohorn had exhausted all the resources of his art; and though the town is inconsiderable, containing not more than six thousand souls, the works were so extensive that they could only be adequately manned by a garrison of twelve thousand men. In addition to this, an immense system of mines and subterraneous works rendered all approach by an enemy to the ramparts hazardous in the extreme. The place is divided into two parts—the town, properly so called, and the port—which are separated from each other by internal walls, but both included in the external ramparts. The former has three gates, those of Steenberg, Breda, and Antwerp; the latter but one, called the Water Gate. The garrison, nominally four thousand five hundred strong, but of whom not more than two thousand seven hundred were effective, under General Bizanet, was inadequate to the manning of the extensive outworks, some of which were negligently guarded: some of the scarps were out of repair, and the hard frost which had so long prevailed had entirely frozen over the wet ditches lying in front of its ravelins and ramparts.¹

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1614.

¹ Personal
observation.
Vide, et
Comp. xxiii.
49, 50.
Koch, ii.
151, 152.

Encouraged by these circumstances, which seemed to offer a favourable opportunity for surprising the place, Graham, who had secret intelligence with several of the inhabitants, almost all of whom were seafaring people, heartily desirous of being delivered from the French yoke, in secret made his preparations for a general attack. He fixed the execution of the attempt for the 8th of March, being the day before the Prince of Orange's birthday. The troops, three thousand three hundred strong, were divided into four columns. The first, under General Lord Proby, mustering about a thousand bayonets, was ordered to attempt forcing an entrance by escalade

8.
Plan of the
attack.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

between the Antwerp and Water gates; the second, under Colonel Morrice, twelve hundred strong, was to attack to the right of the Water gate; the third, led by Colonel Honey, consisting of six hundred men, was to distract the enemy by a feint at the Steenberg gate; and the fourth, headed by Skerret and Gore, consisting of eleven hundred men, to assault the mouth of the harbour, which was fordable at low water. For this reason, the attack was fixed for half-past ten o'clock at night. General Cooke commanded the whole. The troops employed in the four columns amounted in all to three thousand three hundred men in the assault, and six hundred in the feint. The instructions to Generals Cooke and Gore, upon whom the weight of the assault would depend, were, as soon as they got to the top of the rampart, to incline towards each other, if possible unite, and immediately force open the Antwerp gate. Scaling-ladders of adequate height were provided for the men; the utmost secrecy was enjoined on the assaulting columns; no light was allowed among them: while that intrusted with the false attack on the Steenberg gate was instructed to raise as much noise, and keep up as sharp a rattle of musketry as possible.¹

¹ Sir T. Graham's Desp. March 10, 1814. Ann. Reg. 1814, p. 170. App. to Chron. Vict. et Cong. xxiii. 49, 50. Koch, 153, 154.

9.
Commence-
ment and
early suc-
cess of the
assault.

These orders were punctually obeyed. Shortly before ten o'clock, a loud fire of musketry was heard at the Steenberg gate. It proceeded from the third column, which, having surprised the advanced guards and out-works, was arrested at the drawbridge of the chief moat and port of the rampart by a discharge of small-arms. Thither the garrison reserves were immediately directed, and the assailants repulsed with great loss. Meanwhile the fourth column successfully made its way into the harbour mouth, unobserved in the dark, and after winding its painful course among the numerous iron crow's-feet scattered in the bottom of the channel, at a quarter before eleven reached the top of the rampart without the loss of a man, and seized and forced open the Water

gate. At the same time, detachments, under Colonel Carleton and General Skerret, were sent to the ramparts on the right and left, which were almost wholly undefended. As soon as the alarming progress of the assailants in this quarter was known, the remaining reserves of the garrison were directed to the bastions adjoining the Water gate; and after a sharp conflict Colonel Carleton, who commanded the detachment which moved to the right along the ramparts, was repulsed and driven back towards that entrance.¹

At the same time, however, Colonel Morrice, with his column, made his way across the ice, and reached the counterscarp undiscovered, near the Breda gate; but the garrison there being well prepared, a severe fire of grape and musketry from the summit of the rampart prevented them from crossing the ditch, or getting into the body of the place. Hardly was the danger arrested in this quarter, when a still more formidable attack was made between the Antwerp and Water gates. This came from the Guards under Lord Proby, who, after being diverted from their original point of attack by the ice, which, weakened by the tide, gave way under their weight, had turned aside, and, following the foot of the wall to a place where the passage was practicable, had at length reached the summit of the rampart on the left of the Antwerp gate. The guards were there formed under the immediate direction of General Cooke, and a detachment was sent on the one side to the Antwerp port, and on the other to gain intelligence of Skerret and Gore at the Water gate and harbour. The strength of the Antwerp gate, however, was such as to defy all their efforts to force it open; and though Gore's detachment, in the first instance, defeated a column of the garrison which advanced against it, yet the French reserves came up, and in the end overpowered it.² But at this moment Morrice's column, which had been repulsed at its own point of attack, came round by the foot of the glacis, mounted the walls by Lord Proby's

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1811.

¹ Koch, ii.
153, Jones,
ii. 307.
Vand. ii.
140.

10.
The Guards
win the
rampart
near the
Antwerp
gate.

² Jones's
Sieges, ii.
307, 317.
Koch, ii.
153, 155.
Burgh, 283,
284. Vand.
ii. 140.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

ladders, and formed on the ramparts to the left of the Guards.

1814.

11.
The French
rally, and
defeat the
assault.

To all appearance Bergen-op-Zoom was now taken ; and with an ordinary garrison and governor it would have been so. Seven hundred and fifty men were in battle array on the ramparts adjoining the Water gate, and had possession of that gate, and fifteen hundred on those between it and the Antwerp gate : in all, they occupied fourteen of the sixteen fronts of the bastions of the place. The fortress was considered as so completely carried, that the detachment which had made the false attack on the Steenberg gate retired to their cantonments, and a brigade of Germans, which had advanced from Tholen at the first firing, countermarched and returned home. The French troops, of no greater strength than the assailants, withdrew for the most part to the market-place, in the centre of the town, fully expecting to surrender at daybreak. But as the night wore on, matters essentially changed. The excessive cold benumbed the British troops, and chilled the first ardour of success : some of them broke into spirit-shops adjoining their position, and became intoxicated ; no reinforcements were sent to them from without, and the French, as day dawned, discovered the small number of their antagonists, and perceived that one third of them at the Water gate were separated from the remaining two-thirds on the bastions of the Antwerp gate. The governor, accordingly, directed his whole efforts, in the first instance, against Skerret's detachment on the bastions near the Water gate, and having driven them into a low situation, where they were exposed to a raking fire from two faces of the rampart, compelled them to lay down their arms, but not before Gore and Skerret had both fallen, bravely combating at the head of their troops. He then formed his whole force for an attack on the British, fifteen hundred strong, on the summit of the Antwerp bastions.¹ The contest here was long and bloody ; but at length General Cooke,

¹ Jones's
Sieges, ii.
317, 324.
Graham's
Official
Account,
March 10,
1814. Ann.
Reg. 1814,
171. App.
to Claren,
Koch, ii.
155, 156.
Le Grand,
32, 37.

having learned the destruction of Skerret and Gore's detachments, and finding his men wasting away without any chance of success, was compelled to surrender. In this brilliant though disastrous affair, the British lost above nine hundred killed and wounded, and eighteen hundred men laid down their arms, though they were next day exchanged by convention with the French governor.

Such was the termination of this extraordinary assault, doubly memorable, both from the circumstance that one of the strongest fortresses in the world had its ramparts carried by storm, when the governor was aware of the enemy's intention, and prepared to repel it, without any approaches, or attempt to breach the walls, by an assaulting force of little greater strength than the garrison; and from the still more marvellous result, that this assaulting column, victorious on the ramparts, was in the end obliged to lay down its arms to an equal force of the enemy, but in possession of the guns of the place. It excited, accordingly, a vivid interest in the mind of Napoleon, who frequently recurred to it, both at Elba and St Helena. He admitted that Graham's plan was both daring and well conceived; and imputed the failure of the enterprise to the energy of the French governor, the courage of his troops, and the want of due support to the attacking columns.¹ In truth, the slightest consideration must be sufficient to show, that it is to the last circumstance that the failure of this boldly conceived and gallant enterprise is principally to be ascribed. The English general had at his command nine thousand British or German troops, of whom not more than four thousand at the utmost were engaged in the assault.² If a reserve of two thousand had been stationed near the walls, and advanced rapidly to the support of their comrades, the moment the ramparts of the Antwerp gate were taken, not a doubt can exist that the town must have fallen. Nay, if the troops who retired from the

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1811.

12.
Reflections
on this
assault.

1 of Memoirs,
ii. 171.

² Jones's
Sermon, &c.
305.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

13.
Causes of its
failure, and
reflections
on the con-
duct of the
commanders
on both
sides.

feigned attack on the Steenberg gate had been sent round to the support of Skerret and Gore by the Water gate, of which the latter had possession, it is probable the enterprise would have been crowned with success.

Of the ease with which fresh troops from without might have effected an entrance, even without blowing open that gate, we have decisive evidence in the fact, that Morrice's whole division, at one in the morning, ascended by Lord Proby's ladders, and formed on the summit without the loss of a man. But why was not a petard or a field-piece brought up, when the British were in possession of that gate, to blow it open, as has so often been done with such success in India? These considerations show, that the hero of Barossa, the gallant veteran who had first planted the British standards on the soil of France, inured to a long course of triumphs, was on this occasion inspired with an undue contempt for his enemies, and forgot the first rule of tactics, that of having a reserve at hand, and vigorously advancing it to support the columns which had gained what, by such aid, might have been rendered a decisive success. On the other hand, the highest praise is due to the resolution and skill of the French governor, and to the intrepidity of his troops, who, undismayed by reverses which in general crush a garrison, found in their own energy the means of obviating them, and converting incipient disaster into ultimate victory. The conduct of both to the prisoners taken, and the readiness with which they agreed to and observed an armistice for burying the dead, proves that in this, as in all other cases, humanity is closely allied to the warlike virtues. From the whole events of this extraordinary assault, the young soldier may take a lesson of the highest daring and skill in designing an enterprise, of the most undaunted resolution and energy in repelling it. He may from them impress the momentous truth on his mind, that the best-conceived attacks may often in the end mis-

carry, from want of prudence and foresight in executing them, or an undue contempt of the enemy against whom they are directed; and that, even in circumstances apparently hopeless, vigour and resolution will sometimes retrieve the most formidable disasters.

This bloody check paralysed the operations of the British in the Low Countries, whose efforts were thenceforward limited, with the assistance of an inconsiderable body of Prussians, to the blockade of Bergen-op-Zoom and Antwerp. Carnot continued to exert his great talents in the preparations for the defence of Antwerp, and made more than one excursion with part of the garrison from its walls; but as the siege was not resumed, there was no opportunity of putting his system to the test. In the middle of March, however, General Thielman brought up a powerful reinforcement of fifteen thousand Saxons to the support of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar. This raised the forces of the latter to thirty-seven thousand men, of whom twenty-seven thousand were disposable, with forty-one pieces of cannon. The opposing armies were now no longer equal; Maison was unable to keep the field, and, after throwing a thousand men into the fortress of Maubeuge, retired into an intrenched camp under the cannon of Lille, whither he was speedily followed by the Saxons under Thielman. A *coup-de-main*, attempted by the Duke of Saxe-Weimar on the 21st on Maubeuge, was repulsed, after three days' fighting, by the combined efforts of the little garrison and the brave inhabitants; while an incursion of Thielman to push his parties up to the gates of Lille, was defeated by Maison himself, two days afterwards. In fine, Flanders was lost to Napoleon; but the vigour and activity of the French general supplied the deficiency of numbers, and promised a tedious succession of sieges before the iron frontier of old France was on this side finally broken through.¹

From Italy the accounts which Napoleon received at Rheims were less encouraging. It has already been men-

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
- 1-14.

14.
Concluding
movements
of the cam-
paign in
Flanders.

March 21.

March 23.
1 Viet. et
Comp. xxiii.
59, 53.
Koch, ii.
157, 163.
Plötho, iii.
472, 475.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

15.
Affairs of
Italy. Re-
treat of Eu-
gene to the
Mincio.

Atlas,
Plate 12.

¹ Ante, ch.
lxxxiv. § 63.

Feb. 3.
2 Viet. et
Cong. xxiii.
191, 196.
Koch, ii.
163, 179.
Ploto, iii.
384.
Eugene's
Memoires,
x. 12, 13.

tioned, that in the end of December Eugene Beauharnais had retired to the line of the Adige, which he occupied with thirty-six thousand combatants, of whom three thousand were horse; while the Austrian troops opposed to them under Bellegarde were above fifty thousand, besides the detached corps of Marshall, which observed Venice and Palma-Nuova in the rear.¹ This disproportion of force was the more alarming, that the forces of the Viceroy were for the most part new levies from the plain of Lombardy, on whom very little reliance could be placed to meet the shock of the Transalpine bayonets: while a considerable part of the Austrians were old troops, and they were all animated, from the recent successes in Germany, with the very highest spirit. Eugene in consequence was already taking measures for a retreat, when the proclamation of Murat against Napoleon, already mentioned, on the 19th January, and his consequent occupation of the Roman states, by exposing his right flank and communications, rendered an immediate retrograde movement a matter of necessity.* He commenced his retreat, accordingly, from the Adige, and fell back to the Mincio, where he stationed his troops behind that classic stream, with the right resting on Mantua, and the left on Peschiera; while the Austrians, following him, took post in a corresponding line opposite, from Rivoli to the neighbourhood of Mantua.²

No position could be more advantageous than the

* Murat's defection from Napoleon did not take place without the warmest remonstrance from his high-spirited Queen. A year before his celebrated proclamation against his brother-in-law and benefactor appeared, she wrote to him:—"Your letters have caused me great pain. How! you can yield to another the glory of aiding the Emperor! You can commit the blunder of abandoning him before he has appointed a successor to you! No, my friend, I am sure you will not do that. Courage! I feel what you suffer. I share your annoyances and evils; but for the sake of that glory of which you are so jealous, I implore you to support him still." CAROLINE to MURAT, 15th January 1813. This was shortly after the Moscow retreat, when Murat had left the command of the army to Eugene. How often are the counsels of women, in extreme circumstances, dictated by feeling and generous sentiments, more noble, and withal wiser, than those of men influenced chiefly by considerations of expedience or ambition!—See BIGNON, xiii. 149.

defensive one thus assumed by the Viceroy to resist the incursions of the Imperialists in his front; but it was by no means equally well protected against the army of Murat on his flank, which, without any actual declaration of war, was now approaching so near as to give serious cause for uneasiness. This monarch, preferring the chance of a throne to duty and honour, had concerted his measures with the Austrian and English commanders; and after entering the Ecclesiastical States, with twenty-three thousand men, was to operate on the Po, in conjunction with a British expedition under Lord William Bentinck, which, embarking from Sicily, received orders to make for Leghorn, and threaten Genoa and the maritime coasts of Napoleon's Italian dominions. Desirous of ridding himself of one enemy before he encountered another, Eugene adopted the bold, but yet, in his circumstances, prudent resolution of marching forward, with a view to give battle to Bellegarde, and if possible throw him across the Adige before Murat's troops could reach the theatre of action. His resolution was just taken in time; for at that very moment a convention had been signed with Murat, who had advanced to Bologna and declared war against France, fixing on combined operations on both banks of the Po. Thus both parties at the same time were preparing offensive movements against each other; and their mutual and simultaneous execution of their designs brought on one of the most singular actions that ever was fought.¹

The two armies, assuming the offensive at the same time, mutually passed each other, and the advanced guard of the one, from the way in which they were marching, came first in contact with the rearguard of the other. The Austrian right, early in the morning, crossed the Mincio at Borghetto, and drove back Grenier's division, which formed the French left, in the direction of Magnano. Eugene was advancing with his right to cross the same river, his right wing, debouching

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

16.

Eugene as
well as L.
Eugene
give battle.Feb. 15.
¹ Koch, ii.
172, 181.
Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
193, 195.
Botta, iv.
478. Eu-
gene, x.
141, 145.17.
Battle of
the Mincio.
Feb. 8.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

from Goito and Mantua, already over, when the cannonade on the left was heard. The moment that he received intelligence of what was there going forward, he conceived the bold idea of suddenly changing his front on both sides of the river, and assailing the enemy in flank while half across it, and in the course of their march little prepared for a battle. It was an exact repetition of Napoleon's perpendicular attack at Austerlitz, or Wellington's at Salamanca. An irregular action in consequence ensued, the French army advancing with great resolution in two lines, with their cavalry on the two flanks; the Austrians, surprised in their march, suddenly wheeling about and fronting the enemy wherever they came upon them. The hottest fighting was around Valeggio, where several desperate charges of cavalry and bloody combats of infantry took place, which occasioned severe loss on both sides; but at the close of the day both parties maintained nearly the ground on which they had commenced the action, though upon the whole the advantage was rather on the side of the French, who accumulated a preponderating force on the decisive point at Valeggio, and made fifteen hundred prisoners. Three thousand were killed and wounded on both sides.

Feb. 9.

On the day following, the Viceroy retreated across the Mincio at Goito, and Bellegarde immediately pushed over some divisions in pursuit. But they were so rudely handled, although they gained some success in the outset at Borghetto, Salò, and Gardone, that the Austrian general, after a few days' skirmishing, withdrew his troops entirely across the Mincio; alleging as an excuse, that the King of Naples was not as yet in a condition to take his part in the proposed operations.¹

Feb. 10.
and 14.
¹ Botta, iv.
478, 479.
Koch, ii.
181, 193.
Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
195, 199.
Eugene, x.
13, 31.

18.
Evacuation
of Tuscany
by the
French.

But although success was thus balanced on the Mincio, affairs were rapidly going to wreck in other quarters: and everything presaged the speedy expulsion of the French from the Italian peninsula. The castle of Verona surrendered to the Austrians on the 14th February; Ancona,

after a siege of twenty-five days, and a bombardment of forty-eight hours, capitulated to Murat's forces on the 16th; and the Italian troops in Eugene's service, despairing of the cause of Napoleon, and unable to endure the fatigues and hardships of a winter campaign, deserted in such numbers, that it was found indispensable to station the few that remained in the fortresses of Peschiera and Mantua. The arrival at Eugene's headquarters, of nearly all the French in the service of the King of Naples, after his declaration of war against Napoleon, was far from counterbalancing this great defalcation; and the Viceroy, unable to maintain his extended position on the Mincio, drew nearer to the Po, and brought up his whole reserves from the Milanese states. He still, however, remained firm to the Emperor Napoleon, and refused the most brilliant offers, on the part of the Allies, if he would desert his benefactor.* Meanwhile Pisa was threatened by Pignatelli's division, forming part of Murat's army, which, being now disengaged from Ancona, was able to invade in force the Tuscan provinces. Its governor, Pouchain, upon that summoned seven hundred of the garrison of Leghorn to his support; and as this entirely denuded the maritime districts, Fouché, who held a general commission from the Emperor, in his quality of governor of Rome, to arrange the affairs of central Italy, concluded a convention with the Neapolitan general, in virtue of which the citadels of Pisa, Leghorn, and Lucca, in the Tuscan territories, were delivered up to the Allies; and the garrisons of Volterra, Civita-Vecchia, Florence, and the castle of St Angelo, were to be withdrawn, and transported by sea to the south of France.¹

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.
Feb. 16.

Feb. 20.
1 Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
202, 203.
Koch, ii.
194. Fouché,
ii. 262.
Eugene, x.
141, 159.

The old revolutionist, the author of the *mitrailleurs* at Lyons, the arch-director of Napoleon's police, had his own

* "The King of Sardinia said to the Princess Stephanie of Baden that they had proposed to the Viceroy to recognise him as King of Italy, if he would separate himself from the Emperor; but that he had rejected the proposal."—*Rapport Confidentiel de M. Bignon, à l'Empereur, 29th December 1813*; BIGNON, xiii. 169.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

19.

Secret views
of Fouché
in this.
Feb. 24.

views in this convention; it led to a secret conference between him and Murat, a few days after, at Modena, in which he congratulated the Neapolitan monarch upon having extricated himself so adroitly, by joining the Coalition, from the wreck of his imperial brother-in-law's fortune, and persuaded him to issue his celebrated proclamation against Napoleon. He also contrived to extract from him, before the meeting broke up, a hundred and seventy thousand francs (£6800) of arrears of pay due to him as governor of Rome, and three hundred thousand francs (£12,000), in bills of exchange, for the cession of his rights on the duchy of Otranto. Having accomplished this object, the wary statesman next proceeded, with all possible expedition, across the Alps into the south of France, and thence cautiously drew near to Paris, anxious to have a hand in the convulsion in that capital which he foresaw was approaching; hastening, like the vulture, to the spot where revolutionary cupidity was to feast on the carcass of imperial greatness.^{1*}

¹ Viet. et
Conq. xiii.
202, 203.
Koch, ii.
194, 195.
Fouché, ii.
262, 275.

* "I had a secret conference with Murat at Modena. There I made him sensible, since he had a decisive part to take, that he ought to declare himself. 'If you,' said I, 'had as much firmness in your character as you have noble sentiments in your heart, you would be more powerful in Italy than the Coalition.' He still hesitated; I then communicated to him *my most recent news from Paris*. Determined by their import, he intrusted to me the proclamation which he soon afterwards issued against Napoleon. . . . Soon after, I had a secret interview with Eugene, at the time when he received the intelligence of the Emperor's recent success over Blucher at Champagne. 'Return to Eugene,' said the Emperor to the aide-de-camp who bore the intelligence; 'tell him how I have settled with these gentlemen here: they are a set of rascals whom I will put to flight with strokes of the whip.' All the world at the Viceroy's headquarters were in transports at this intelligence: I took Eugene aside, and told him such rodomontade could impose on none but enthusiastic fools: that all reasonable persons saw the imminent danger in which the imperial throne was placed; and that it was not the nation which was wanting to Napoleon, but Napoleon, by his despotism, who had destroyed the spirit of the nation. I gave some good counsel to Eugene, and set out for Lyons; and there, as I saw the spirit of resistance was alive only in the public functionaries, I announced that a million of men were pouring into France, the defection of the King of Naples, and that it was impossible to reinstate affairs but by a great political change. I soon saw that the authorities had secret instructions regarding me, and in effect I was soon after obliged to set out for Valence and Dauphiné instead of Paris, the only destination to which I was at that juncture inclined." — *Mémoires de Fouché*, ii. 263, 275.

Meanwhile Lord William Bentinck, at the head of a considerable expedition from Sicily, amounting to seven thousand men, of whom, however, only one-half were British soldiers, set sail from Palermo on the last day of February, and arrived off Leghorn on the 8th of March. The troops were immediately landed, the French garrison having been previously transported to the south of France, in virtue of the convention concluded with Murat : and the English general immediately issued a proclamation, in which he called on the Tuscans to rise and join his troops in liberating Italy from the oppressors. At the same time the hereditary prince of Sicily, who accompanied the expedition, issued of his own authority a proclamation, in which he openly brought forward his claims to the throne of Naples, and announced to the Sicilian troops in the expedition that he was about to assert them by force of arms. This injudicious and ill-timed effusion immediately gave umbrage to Murat, who had declared for the Allies only in order to preserve that throne ; and it not only had the effect of making him suspend his operations on the Po against the Viceroy, and concentrate his troops in order to be ready for any contingency, but produced such an effect on his mind, as had well-nigh thrown him back again into the arms of Napoleon.¹

Bentinck had an interview with him, and insisted upon the evacuation of Tuscany by the Neapolitan troops ; but he failed in appeasing his wrath or gaining that object, and a rupture seemed inevitable, when it was fortunately prevented by the seasonable interposition of the British government, who disavowed the hereditary prince's proclamation, and relinquished the demand for the evacuation of Tuscany. Meanwhile the English general, finding combined operations with the King of Naples in his present temper impossible, moved his troops from Pisa and Lucca to the banks of the Magra, in order to co-operate with the second division of the expedition, which had landed in the gulf of la Spezia,² in a general attack on

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

20.

Operations
of Lord W.
Bentinck on
the coast of
Tuscany,
Murat.

March 10.

¹ Koch, ii.
203. Botta,
iv. 430.21.
Umbrage
taken by
Murat at
the procla-
mation of
the Prince
of Sicily.
March 23.² Botta, iv.
480, 481.
Ann. Reg.
32, 33.
Koch, iii.
208, 210.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

Genoa. It did not take place, however, till after the fall of Napoleon ; and though entirely successful, as will afterwards appear, was accompanied by declarations on the part of Lord William, which proved in no small degree embarrassing in the final settlement of Europe at the Congress of Vienna.

22.
Successes of
Eugene on
the Po.

Feb. 24.

Feb. 27.

March 1.

March 2.

March 3.

March 6.

March 7.

Several minor operations at this period demonstrated again, for the hundredth time, the inability of the Neapolitan soldiers to withstand the shock of the Transalpine bayonets. Murat, having pushed forward a brigade under Colonel Metzko to Casal-Maggiore on the Po, commenced the construction of a bridge there ; but Metzko was surprised three days afterwards by Bonnemain, with a division of Eugene's men, driven from the place, and the whole boats which had been collected were taken. The Neapolitans upon this retired ; and Eugene, having crossed the river at Borgoforte with a detachment, chased them with great loss from Guastalla ; while General Grenier, who had been pushed with his division, entirely French, over the same river at Placentia, forced the passage of the Taro, appeared before Parma, and routed the allied troops which occupied it. In this affair Metzko's Neapolitan brigade was entirely dispersed ; sixteen hundred men, chiefly Austrians, were taken in the town of Parma, and Grenier, following up his success before the enemy could recover from their consternation, made himself master of Reggio, and threw the Neapolitans back to the foot of the Apennines. Murat, however, discovering some days afterwards that this town was only occupied by three thousand men, pushed forward his advanced guard, composed entirely of Austrians, and carried Rubiera, where a detachment was placed, by assault, driving the garrison back to Reggio. Encouraged by this success, he advanced to the attack of the latter town ; and Severoli, who commanded the troops which occupied it, had the imprudence to deliver a pitched battle before its walls, against a German force nearly three times superior, in which, after a gallant resistance,

he was worsted. Having been obliged to leave the field severely wounded, his successor in the command, Ram-
 bourg, withdrew into the town, and soon after entered
 into a convention with Murat for its evacuation. The
 King of Naples, in consequence, entered Reggio on the
 following day, and pushed his vanguard on to Parma;
 but there the advance of the Neapolitans was arrested,
 by the proclamation of the hereditary prince of Sicily
 already mentioned. The concentration of the Neapolitan
 troops in Tuscany enabled Eugene again to assume a
 menacing aspect on the Mincio, against Bellegarde: and
 the whole remainder of March passed away without any
 enterprise of note taking place on the part of any of the
 three armies which now contended for the empire of
 Italy.¹

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1844.

March 8.

¹ Viet. et
 Comq. xxiii.
 207.
 Ko h. ii.
 195, 206.
 Bot. in. 479.
 Eugene, x.
 146, 155.

Events of no ordinary importance had also at this
 period occurred at Lyons and its vicinity, where Augereau
 had been left, as already mentioned, to make head against
 the Austrian corps of Count Bubna. It has been noticed,
 also, that Geneva was occupied by the Austrian com-
 mander in the beginning of January without resistance; and
 such was the state of destitution in which the military
 force and fortresses of France at that period were, that if
 they had pushed on, they might with ease have made
 themselves masters of Lyons and the whole course of the
 Upper Rhone before the middle of that month. The
 progress of the Austrians, however, was so slow, that it
 was not till the 14th of January that their advanced
 posts even appeared before Lyons; and on that very day
 Augereau arrived from Paris to take the command. At
 that period there were only seventeen hundred regular
 troops in the garrison, inadequately supported by some
 thousand National Guards. Despairing of arresting the
 attack of the enemy with such feeble means, Augereau
 proceeded on to the south, to Valence, in order to hasten
 the armaments and organise troops in that direction;
 leaving General Musnier in command of the slender

^{23.}
 Affairs at
 Lyons.

Jan. 1.

Jan. 14.

² Ko h. ii.
 211, 219.
 Viet. et
 Comq. xxiii.
 207, 210.
 Pothoy iii.
 452.

CHAP. garrison at Lyons, with instructions to retard the enemy
LXXXVII. as much as possible, but not to expose the city to the
1814. horrors of an assault.

24. The imminent danger that Lyons, the second city in
Combats in the empire, would speedily fall before the Austrian general, who had twenty thousand men around its walls, joined to the urgent representations of Augereau as to the total inadequacy of the means at his disposal for its defence, induced Napoleon to take the most vigorous measures for its relief. Augereau sent a thousand men in post carriages from Valence, who arrived during the night of the
Jan. 18. 18th; and reinforcements having come in from other
Jan. 20. quarters soon after, the Austrians, who were ignorant of the real weakness of the garrison, and had not heavy artillery to undertake a siege, retired to Montluel on the
Jan. 21. road to Geneva, where they remained inactive till the end of January. This retrograde movement, coupled with the daily arrival of some hundred conscripts from the depots in the south and west within their walls, revived the spirit of the Lyonese, who in the first instance had despaired altogether of the possibility of resistance; and the National Guard soon raised the effective force in the garrison to eight thousand men. The Austrians now gave up all thoughts of an immediate attack on Lyons; and, extending themselves from Geneva towards the valleys of
Jan. 20. Savoy, entered Chambery after some successful combats, and got possession of the well-known and romantic defile of Echelles, the only direct though steep and rugged
Jan. 31. entrance from the plain of the Rhone into the Alpine heights. At the same time Babna pushed a considerable
1 Plotoz, iii. body of troops towards Chalons-sur-Saone, made himself
453, 457. master of that town, and the whole country between the
Koeh, ii. Aisne and the Saone. He everywhere disarmed the inhabitants, and applied the resources of the district to the
211, 225. supply of the allied forces.¹
Viet, et
Cong. xviii.
211, 215.
Die Grosse
Chron. iii.
181, 184.

The efforts of Napoleon, however, to reinforce the army at Lyons, at length produced the desired effect. Ten

thousand men were drawn from Suchet's army in Catalonia, transported by post to Nismes, and thence forwarded, with every sabre and bayonet which could be collected in Languedoc, to the threatened city. These great reinforcements raised the troops under Augereau, who had now re-established his headquarters in Lyons, to twenty-one thousand men, who were divided into two corps, one of which, twelve thousand strong, under the command of the marshal in person, acted on the right bank of the Rhone, while the other, of nine thousand, led by Marchand, operated on the left. This force was much greater than any which Bubna could bring against it; and as this accumulation on the side of Lyons occurred at the very time when Napoleon enjoined a vigorous offensive to Augereau, after his own defeat of Blucher, and resumption of operations against the Grand Army at Montereau, in order to threaten its flanks and rear, the marshal immediately commenced active hostilities on both sides of the Rhone. Gradually the Austrians were forced back on the road from Lyons to Geneva; Mâcon, Bourg, and Nantua were recovered; Marchand forced the pass of Echelles after a bloody conflict, and drove the enemy in confusion to Chambery, where, nearly surrounded, they were glad to escape to Aix on the lake of Bourget, between that town and Geneva, where they took up a strong position, with the lake on one flank, the precipitous mountains on the other, and a morass in front. There, however, they were soon attacked by the French, now flushed with victory; the position was carried, Aix taken, and the Austrians, after several unsuccessful combats, were thrown back to the heights in front of Geneva.¹

Considerable as these successes were, they were very far from either answering the expectations, or carrying out the views of the French Emperor. It was on the banks of the Seine, and not either in Savoy or on those of the Rhone, that the contest was to be decided. Napoleon intended Augereau to threaten the flanks and

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

114.

25.

Augereau resumes the offensive in the Jura and Savoy.

Feb. 14.

Feb. 19.

Feb. 20.

Feb. 15.

Feb. 19.

Feb. 22, 23, and 26.

¹ Viet. et

Conq. xxiii.

214, 220.

Koch, ii.

226, 232.

Ploto, iii.

454, 455.

Die Grosse

Chron. iii.

184, 191.

Thiers, xvii.

359.

26.

Displeasure of Napoleon at the direction of these attacks.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1814.

¹ Fain, 116.
Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
219. *Ante*,
ch. xx. §
106.

rear of the Grand Army at the very time that he assailed it in front ; and every movement on that marshal's part was therefore eccentric, and to be deprecated, which did not bring him close upon Schwartzenberg's rear. He was no sooner informed, accordingly, of the direction of the French forces from Lyons into Savoy, than he wrote to his lieutenant that it was towards Geneva and the Pays de Vaud that his march should be turned, as they lay on the communications of the Grand Army ; that it was by massing his troops together, and acting at one point, that great things were to be done ; and that he should forget he was fifty-six years old, and think only of his brilliant days at Castiglione.^{1*}

Augereau, however, was fearful of engaging his troops, of whom not more than one-half were thoroughly disciplined and experienced, in a distant warfare in the

* "Count Bubna has not ten thousand men under his command to oppose to you - miserable troops, who will disappear like a mist before the sun at the aspect of your old bands from Catalonia. France and Switzerland have their eyes upon you ; the inhabitants of the Pays de Vaud and Argovia have sixteen battalions of militia ready to range themselves on your side : the cantons of St Gall, Soleure, and a part of Zurich, only await your standards to declare themselves in favour of the French. Forget that you are fifty-six years old, and think only of your brilliant days at Castiglione." And a few days after he wrote, "The Emperor is not satisfied with your dispositions, in pushing detachments in this manner wherever the enemy has forces, instead of striking at his heart. He directs me in consequence to reiterate the orders you have already three times received. You are to *unite all your forces into one column*, and march either into the Pays de Vaud or the Jura, according as the enemy is in most force in the one or the other. It is by concentrating forces in masses that great successes are obtained. I have the best reasons for assuring you that the enemy is seriously alarmed at the movements he supposes you are to make, and which he was bound to expect ; he would be too happy if he could assure himself that you would merely send out detachments in different directions, all the while remaining yourself quiet at Lyons. It is by putting yourself at the head of your troops, as the Emperor wishes, and acting vigorously, that you can alone effect a great and useful diversion. The Emperor conceives it to be altogether immaterial that the battalions of reserve from Nismes are ill-clothed and equipped, since they have muskets and bayonets. He desires me to tell you that the corps of Gerard, which has done such great things under his eyes, is composed of conscripts half-naked. He has at this moment four thousand National Guards in his army, with round hats, with peasants' coats and waistcoats, and without knapsacks, armed with all sorts of muskets, on whom he puts the greatest value ; he only wishes he had thirty thousand of them." DUC DE FELLRE (CLARKE) *à* M. LE DUC DE CASTELLONE, Feb. 22 and 23, 1814. *Victoires et Conquêtes*, xxiii. 219, 220.

defiles of the Jura; and he remained almost inactive till the end of February, content with the successes he had already gained on the side of Savoy -- a degree of torpor, considering the vital interests which were then at stake in the headquarters of Schwartzberg's army, and the terror which this movement from Lyons had already excited amongst the Austrian generals, which the French military historians may well denominate fatal. Meanwhile the allied sovereigns, as already mentioned,¹ directed the reserves of the Grand Army towards Chalons and Mâcon, in the direction of Lyons, and the formation of an army to be called the army of the south, forty thousand strong, on the banks of the Saone; and Napoleon, to counterbalance this great detachment, ordered Suchet to reinforce Augereau with ten thousand additional veterans from the army of Catalonia, and Prince Borghese to send eight thousand, with all possible expedition, across Mont Cenis to Lyons; so that, by the beginning of April, the contending armies on the Rhone would each amount to nearly fifty thousand men.²

Roused at length from his ruinous inactivity at Lyons by the repeated exhortations of the Emperor, Augereau, in the beginning of March, put himself in motion for Nyon in the direction evidently pointed out by the strategetical operations going forward on the banks of the Seine. Desaix and Marchand made a combined attack on the Austrian positions in front of Geneva; and, after a series of obstinate engagements, drove them back into that town, with the loss of a thousand men. Fort Ecluse was captured next day; and the victorious French, instead of following up their successes by the capture of Geneva, or extending themselves along the margin of the Lemane lake, were directed by Augereau to detach the best part of their forces, to support him in an attack on the corps of Lichtenstein, which lay in the neighbourhood of Besançon. This diversion of force saved Geneva, and extricated Bubna from great difficulties. Meanwhile the powerful reserves

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

27.

Notwithstanding which Augereau does nothing more.

¹ Antec, ch. lxxxvi. § 5.

² Fain, 116. Viet. et Comp. xxii. 219, 221. Koeh, ii. 237. 239. Vaudl. 431, 438; ii. 143, 144. Grosse Chron. iii. 191, 198.

23.

Augereau's operations in the Jura. Feb. 27 and 28.

March 2.

March 3.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

March 7.

March 9.

March 11.

March 18.

¹ Koch, ii.

240, 254.

Vict. et

Conq. xxiii.

226, 229.

Ploto, iii.

459, 460.

Vaud, ii.

151, 157.

Die Grosse

Chron. iii.

199, 204.

which the Allies were directing towards the Saone, under Bianchi, from the rear of the Grand Army, round his left flank, compelled Augereau to concentrate his forces on the right bank of the Rhone, in order to make head against them and cover Lyons. With this view, he collected the bulk of his men from both banks of the river at Lons-le-Saulnier, and gradually fell back towards Lyons, which he re-entered on the 9th March. The exposed situation of an Austrian detachment at Mâcon, induced him, two days afterwards, to order an attack by Musnier on that town; but Bianchi, advancing in person to its support, opened a warm fire from thirty pieces of artillery on the attacking column, and they were defeated with the loss of seven hundred men and two cannon. Disconcerted by this check, the French forces fell back towards Lyons, closely followed by the allied troops, as well in the Jura as in the valley of the Saone; and on the 18th, the Austrians, under Prince Hesse-Homburg, forty-three thousand strong, made a general attack on the French position at St Georges. Bianchi and Wimpffen, with twenty-two thousand,* assailed their right, while the Prince of Wied-Runket, at the head of twenty-one thousand, turned their left by the road of Beaujeau. The French combated with great bravery, and in some points, particularly Lage-Longsart, gained, in the first instance, considerable advantages. But Wimpffen restored the combat, and Wied-Runket having threatened their left, Augereau retreated to Limonet, on the road to Lyons, with hardly any hope of preserving that city from the enemy.¹

Determined, however, to retard the Allies as much as possible, in order to give time for the arrival of the great reinforcements, eighteen thousand strong, ordered in the beginning of March from Catalonia and Turin, above two thousand of which had already come up—Augereau took

29.

Battle of

Limonet,

and fall of

Lyons.

March 20.

* 13,288 infantry and 3714 cavalry.—*Oesterische Militairzeitung*, viii. 116, 117.

post across the great road near Limonet, barring all access to Lyons on that side. Musnier's division was established near Limonet, on the heights between the Saone and the Lyons road, and from thence the line extended by the plateau to Dardilly. The Prince of Hesse-Homburg made the following dispositions. Bianchi, after passing the defile of Dorieux, was to form between Dommartin and Salvagny, and push on direct for Lyons; Wimpffen was to support Bianchi as soon as sufficient room was made for him to deploy; while Mumb, at the head of a brigade, was to follow the crest of the ridge which extends towards Lyons from Chasselay, and threaten the rear of the enemy. The whole Austrian force was forty-three thousand one hundred and eighty-five strong.¹ All these attacks proved successful. At noon, Musnier, seeing Mumb's brigade rapidly gaining the ridge in his rear, conceived himself cut off, and fell back towards Lyons; while Bianchi, without much difficulty, made himself master of the plateau of Dardilly, and, extending his lines along its summit, soon gained room for Wimpffen to pass the defile in his rear, and form on his right. The battle seemed already gained, as the French right and centre had abandoned their position, and were falling back towards Lyons, when the aspect of affairs was unexpectedly changed by two thousand foot and three hundred horse, who made so vigorous an attack on Wied-Runket, near the road to Moulins, that they not only arrested his advance, but gave time for Augereau to rally his other divisions, in full retreat towards Lyons, and bring them back to the charge. A furious combat now took place along the whole line, and continued with various success till nightfall: but at the close of the action the progress of the enemy, though not decisive, was distinctly marked on all sides;² and Augereau, despairing of being able any longer to defend Lyons, evacuated the city at midnight, taking the road to Valence, in

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Die Grosse
Chron. iii.
201.

² Plötho, iii.
410, 461.
Koch, ii.
276, 263.
Viet. et
Cong. xxiii.
227, 232.
Die Grosse
Chron. iii.
215, 223.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

30.

Great efforts
of this victory.

order to gain the line of the Isère. Next day the Austrians entered, and the second city in the empire saw the allied colours waving on its walls.

In these actions, from the 16th to the 20th inclusive, the Allies lost two thousand nine hundred men, killed, wounded, and prisoners. The French loss, as they were defending positions, did not exceed two thousand; but they left behind them twenty-two pieces of cannon, and large military stores of all kinds, including twenty-four thousand cannon-balls, in Lyons. The effects of this conquest were immense. It immediately liberated Bubna, who had for three weeks been nearly besieged by the French in Geneva; Marchand, so recently victorious, was obliged to retire in haste to Grenoble, closely followed by the Austrians, who retaliated upon him all that they had recently suffered in their own retreat. To complete their misfortunes, the united French force, now reduced to twenty thousand combatants, had hardly taken post behind the Isère—thus abandoning entirely the passes of the Simplon and Mont Cenis, the great gates from France into Italy—when the crushing intelligence reached Augereau of the capture of Bordeaux by the British, accompanied by a pressing order from Napoleon, that six of the ten thousand men who had been promised him from Suchet's army, should be directed to the reinforcement of Soult. This last blow broke the spirit of the veteran marshal. Deeming the cause of Napoleon now all but hopeless, he wrote to Eugene, informing him of the full extent of the Emperor's disasters, and conjuring him, in the name of their common country, to hasten with his yet unbroken army across the Alps, and if he could not avert its misfortunes, at least share its fate.¹ Meanwhile he stationed his troops in echelon down the line of the Rhone, from Valence to the Pont St Esprit, in order to establish an interior line of communication with Marshal Soult, and be in a situation to join him before the Prince of Hesse-Homburg could

¹ Koeh, ii.
263, 267.
Plötho, iii.
461, 463.
Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
232, 234.
Die Grosse
Chron. iii.
222, 223.

stretch across the south of France to unite with the victorious standards of Wellington on the banks of the Garonne.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1314.

While the empire of Napoleon was thus crumbling away in Flanders, Italy, and on the Rhone, disasters attended with still more serious consequences, as leading directly to his dethronement, had occurred in the south of France. The concluding and bloody operations of Wellington and Soult on the Nive, already detailed,¹ were succeeded by a considerable rest to both armies. This, however, was far from being a period of repose to Wellington himself. On the contrary, his difficulties seemed to multiply even in the midst of his triumphs; and he never had more obstacles to encounter than now, when they seemed to be all vanishing before him. The noble and heroic system of protection to others and self-denial to himself, by which, in the eloquent words of an eyewitness, "order and tranquillity profound, on the edge of the very battle-field, attended the march of the civilised army which passed the Bidassoa,"² necessarily, when a hundred thousand men were to be provided for, occasioned an extraordinary strain on the British finances. Such were the demands on the English treasury at this period,—from their having come under an engagement to give £11,000,000 sterling in subsidies to the allied powers during a single year, besides arming nearly the whole of their vast warlike arrays, maintaining the contest at once in the south of France, Flanders, and Italy, and supporting a most expensive war by sea and land against America,—that it was with the utmost difficulty that government could find the means of answering them, even out of the boundless resources, and sustained by the now exalted spirit, of England.³

31.
Concluding
operations of
Wellington
in the south
of France.

¹ Ante, ch.
lxxxiii.

² Napier, vi.
453.

³ Gurw. xi.
425, 427,
387. Nap.
vi. 470-472.

Above all, the difficulty of furnishing *specie* in sufficient quantity for an army of such magnitude, which paid everything in ready money, and levied no contributions on the conquered territory, especially at a time when the

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

32.

Extraordi-
nary diffi-
culty expe-
rienced by
the British
government
in furnish-
ing specie
for the
army.

prodigious armies on the Rhine had absorbed nearly the whole circulating medium of the Continent, had become excessive. The utmost that government could furnish was £100,000 in gold and silver coin a-month; but though this steady drain was felt as so severe at home, that the under-secretary of state, Colonel Bunbury, was sent out to endeavour to reduce it, yet it was very far indeed from meeting Wellington's necessities. Some of his muleteers were two years in arrear; the soldiers, in general, had been seven months without pay; the debt owing by the English authorities in every part of the country was immense, although in the last year £2,572,000 had passed in specie through the military chest; and the creditors, long kept out of their money, were becoming importunate. Sixteen thousand of the Peninsular troops could not be brought into France, because there were no funds either to feed or pay them. Extraordinary obstacles were opposed by the democratic Spanish authorities to the establishment of hospitals in the rear, even when thirty thousand men, wounded during the campaign in their service, required attendance; and although great benefits had been experienced by declaring St Jean de Luz a free port, yet the French too were constantly receiving supplies at Bayonne by sea; and, strange to say, the mistress of the ocean was unable to check the coasting trade of a contemptible naval force of the enemy.¹

1 Wellington to Earl Bathurst, Jan. 8, 1814. Gurw. xi. 387, 425, 427. Nap. vi. 470, 472.

33.

Plan of
employing
Wellington
in Flanders.

So forcibly were the British government impressed at this period with the enormous expense at which the contest in the south of France was carried on, that, deeming the independence of the Peninsula now secured, and conceiving that the decisive point in the struggle which remained was to be found nearer Paris than the banks of the Adour or the Garonne, they seriously entertained, and transmitted to Wellington a proposal, first suggested by the Emperor of Russia, for transporting his army by sea to the Netherlands, and causing it to form the right wing of the vast array which, from the Alps to the ocean, was

now invading France. It must be admitted that this project presented, at first sight, several advantages. The independence of the Peninsula appeared to be secured, and the black ingratitude of its democratic rulers held out no inducement towards making any further efforts in its behalf; the vicinity of Flanders to the British shores would enable government to augment at pleasure the army to almost any amount; an act of parliament had recently passed, authorising three-fourths of the militia to volunteer for foreign service, and there could be little doubt they would crowd round Wellington's standards on the Scheldt; while the defenceless condition of the French barrier towns, and total absence of any considerable military force on the frontiers of Picardy, seemed to promise to the Peninsular hero, as the reward of his toils, a triumphant and almost unresisted march to Paris.¹

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1811.

¹ Grew, xi.
364, 365.

But while Wellington, with his usual patriotic spirit, professed his willingness to serve his king and country wherever government might direct, he justly advanced in reply, that with a British force never exceeding thirty thousand men in the field, he had maintained his ground in the Peninsula against two hundred thousand French, and finally driven them over the Pyrenees; that the frontier now invaded by him was the most vulnerable quarter in which France could be assailed; that if he could put twenty thousand Spaniards into the field, he would take Bayonne – if forty thousand, he would have his posts on the Garonne; that the latter event would shake Napoleon incomparably more than if forty thousand British troops were besieging the Dutch fortresses; and that the consequence of withdrawing the British army would be, that a hundred thousand veteran troops, of a quality superior to any the Allies had yet had to deal with, would be at once put at Napoleon's disposal to act against their armies on the Seine and the Rhone, besides an equal force of reserves now forming in the southern

24.
His reasons
against it.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Wellington to Earl Bathurst, Dec. 21, 1813. *Gaz.* xi. 384, 385.

provinces, and who, possessing an interior line of communication, could be brought into action long before the British could be brought up, after their shipment and landing, on the other side ; and that their army, by such a changing of the scene of action, would for the next four months, big with the fate of the world, be put entirely *hors-de-combat*. These considerations prevailed with the English government, and they resolved to follow their general's advice as to continuing the war in the south of France : though a considerable part of the reinforcements destined for his army were turned aside into Holland, and formed the gallant though ill-fated corps which suffered so fearfully on the ramparts of Bergen-op-Zoom.¹

^{35.}
Still greater difficulties of Soul.

But if Wellington's difficulties were great, those of his antagonist were still greater ; for he had to contend on behalf of a falling cause and a tottering empire ; to restrain treachery, and yet avoid severity ; to enforce requisitions, and not exasperate selfishness ; to inspire military spirit, and avoid exciting civil indignation. To do these things perfectly had now become impossible. The hour of punishment and retribution had struck, and no human power could avert its bitterness. In vain he exerted himself to the utmost to collect resources, and assemble a respectable military force to resist the further advance of the English general ; all his efforts were like rolling up the stone of Sisyphus. The urban cohorts indeed were readily formed as the means of creating a police force, and the conscripts obeyed the imperial authorities, and repaired to the points assigned for their organisation. But the people were sullen and apathetic : the whole class of proprietors were openly opposed to the war, to which they saw no end, and from the continuance of which they could not derive any possible advantage. They feared victory even more than defeat ; for from it they anticipated nothing but a fresh series of warlike aggressions on the part of their chief. The Royalist com-

mittees were already active in the rear, and preparing to take advantage of the crisis which all foresaw was approaching, to re-establish the exiled family ; and, above all, the forced requisitions excited universal indignation, and inclined the peasantry, at all hazards, to desire the termination of so execrable a system. France now felt what it was to make war maintain war: her people experienced the practical working of that system, which, when applied to others, had so long been the source, to themselves, of pride and exultation. The people of Béarn learned what it was, as so many provinces of Spain had so long done, to feed, clothe, lodge, and pay, an army of eighty thousand of Napoleon's soldiers. Such was the magnitude of the requisitions, and so unbounded the exasperation produced by them, especially standing as they did in bright contrast to the strict discipline of the English army, and the invariable payment for every article taken by them, that numbers of the peasantry passed with their horses, carts, and implements of husbandry into the British lines, to obtain an enemy's protection from the rapine of their own government ; and one of the commissioners at the moment wrote from Bayonne — “ The English general's policy, and the good discipline he maintains, does us more harm than ten battles. *Every peasant wishes to be under his protection.*”¹

Soult employed the two months of respite to warlike operations which was afforded by the excessive rigour of the season, after the battle of the Nive, in the middle of December, in diligently instructing his conscripts in the military art ; and, under the shelter of the ramparts of Bayonne, he was able to effect this without molestation. But the necessities of the Emperor, after the battle of la Rothière, compelled him to make a large draft from the army of the south ; and, in the beginning of February, the French general had the mortification to receive an order which compelled him to send off two divisions of infantry, two thousand detached veterans, and six regi-

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Nap. xi.
505, 507.
Pellot,
Guerre des
Pyrénées,
54.^{36.}
Reduction
of Soult's
army, and
increase of
Wellington's.
Feb. 4.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

ments of dragoons, to reinforce the host which was combating on the banks of the Seine. About the same time, reinforcements to the amount of five thousand men, including twelve hundred horse, arrived at Wellington's headquarters from England: and the whole cavalry of the army, which had been sent back, from want of forage, to the banks of the Ebro, was now, with the returning spring, brought up again to those of the Adour. Thus Soult's effective troops in the field, after deducting the garrison of Bayonne and other forts which he was obliged to defend, were reduced to forty thousand men; and a considerable part of this force was composed of conscripts who, though disciplined, were not inured to war, and could not be relied upon either to withstand the fatigues or confront the dangers of the serious struggle which was impending. On the other hand, the Anglo-Portuguese troops, by the morning state on 13th February, when the advance commenced, amounted to seventy thousand men, of whom ten thousand were cavalry, and the Spaniards were thirty thousand more: in all a hundred thousand, with a hundred and forty pieces of cannon—a prodigious force to be collected at one point, under the command of a single general: and, considering the discipline and spirit of the greater part of the troops, and the talents and experience of their chief, the most formidable army which had ever been put forth by the power of England.^{1*}

¹ See Morning Star, Feb. 13, 1814. Nap. v. 706; and v. 596, 597, 525. Koch, ii. 268, 275. Vaud, ii. 160, 162. Thiers, xvii. 365.

37.

Rejection of the treaty of Valençay by the Cortes.

The security which the English general felt in commencing his military operations was much augmented by the rejection, by the Cortes at Madrid, of the treaty of Valençay, insidiously extorted at this period from the weak and captive Ferdinand. This resolution gave, as well it might, the highest satisfaction to Wellington; demonstrating in the clearest manner, that with whatever republican ambition the government of Spain, elected under the impulse of universal suffrage, might be infected,

* See Appendix A, Chap. LXXXVII.

they had not yet forgotten their patriotic resistance to Gallic aggression, nor were prepared to accept a despot from the prisons of a desolating conqueror. He was not a little embarrassed, however, shortly after, by an event as unforeseen as it was perplexing, and which at once involved him in those difficult questions concerning the future government of France, which the allied sovereigns even felt themselves unable to determine, and which, by common consent, they left to time and the course of events to resolve.¹

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1811.

¹ Bismarck,
ii. 40, 41.
Guthrie, vi.
517, 518.

The partisans of the Bourbons in La Vendée and the western provinces had for some time past been in secret communication with the English general, although he took the utmost pains to guard them against committing themselves prematurely, not merely from the total uncertainty in which he was as to the intentions of the allied sovereigns with respect to the future government of France, but from the advice which he had given the British cabinet, to accede to any peace with Napoleon which might afford to the rest of Europe reasonable security against aggression.* Matters, however, were at length brought to a crisis, by the Duc d'Angoulême suddenly arriving at headquarters. In the critical cir-

33.
Arrival of
the Duc
d'Angou-
lême at
Wellington's
head-quarters.

* "The people here all agree in one opinion—viz. that the sentiment throughout France is the same as I have found it here—an earnest desire to get rid of Buonaparte and his government, from a conviction that, as long as he governs, they will have no peace. The language common to all is, that although the grievous hardships and oppression under which they suffer are intolerable, they dare not have the satisfaction even of complaining; that, on the contrary, they were obliged to pretend to rejoice, and that they are allowed only to lament in secret and in silence their hard fate. They say that the Bourbons are as unknown in France as the princes of any other sovereign house in Europe. I am convinced more than ever that Napoleon's power stands upon corruption, and that he has no adherents in France, but the principal officers of his army, and the *employés civils* of his government, with some of the new proprietors. Notwithstanding this, I recommend your Lordship to make peace with him, if you can acquire all the objects which you have a right to expect. All the powers require peace even more than France; and it would not do to found a new system of war upon the speculations of any individual, on what he sees and hears in a corner of France. If Buonaparte becomes moderate, he is probably as good a sovereign as we can desire in France; if he does not, we shall probably have another war in a few years."—WELLINGTON to LORD BATHURST, 21st Nov. 1813; GURWOOD, xxii. 304, 305.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.
Feb. 25.

cumstances which ensued, Wellington acted with his wonted judgment and delicacy. While showing the most marked attention to the illustrious prince, he insisted upon his remaining incognito till the intentions of the allied sovereigns were distinctly pronounced; advised him, for the interests of his royal house, "neither to anticipate public opinion nor precipitate matters;" and would not allow him to leave St Jean de Luz to accompany the army in active operations. At the same time, when he perceived, after the advance of the British to Orthes, that the spirit of the country was more openly manifesting itself, he made no scruple in informing the British government of the change, and apprising them, that "any decided declaration from them against Napoleon would spread such a flame through the country, as would infallibly overturn him."¹

¹ Wellington to Lord Liverpool, March 4, 1814; and to Duke of Angoulême, Feb. 25, 1814. *Clare*, xi. 547, 549. *Bentley*, ii. 49, 44.

² Wellington's proclamation against the usurpation in Baigorri.

Previous to commencing active operations, there was one growing evil in his rear which it was the peculiar care of Wellington to abate, and which his mingled firmness and humanity succeeded in removing. The mountainous districts of Baigorri and Bidarray, at the foot of the Pyrenees, had suffered severely from the rapine of Mina's troops before they were sent back into Spain; and several able French generals, especially General Harispe, who was a native of that district, had in consequence succeeded in rousing a national war among the peasants of those valleys, which did very serious injury to the allied army. To crush this dangerous example, which it had been the grand object of the English general to prevent, he issued a proclamation to the people in the French and Basque languages, which happily, on this painful and delicate subject, steered the middle course between savage cruelty and ruinous lenity.² Without forbidding the peasants to take up arms to defend their country—as Napoleon had so often done in Spain, Italy, and the Tyrol—and denouncing the penalty of death in case of disobedience, he contented himself

² *Wellington's* proclamation to the people of Baigorri, *Clare*, xi. 547, 549. *Bentley*, ii. 49, 44.

with declaring that, if they wanted to be soldiers, they must leave their homes and join the regular armies; in which case they should, if taken, be treated as prisoners of war, and their dwellings and families protected; but that he would not permit them with impunity to play the part alternately of a peaceable inhabitant and of a soldier.*

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
—
1-14.

In this proclamation there was nothing in the slightest degree unjust: it trenched on none of the natural rights of man to defend his country. It merely denounced as pirates and robbers those who, claiming and enjoying the benefits of hostile discipline, insidiously turned their arms against those to whom they owed these blessings, and neither yielded the submission which is the condition of protection to the citizen, nor assumed the profession which gives the privileges of the soldier. Perhaps it was impossible on this difficult subject, fraught with such dreadful consequences on either side, to steer the middle course more happily. The effect corresponded to such intentions, for the insurrection was speedily appeased; and though Wellington desired his officers to inform the people that, if any further outrages continued, he would treat them as the French had done the villages in Spain and Portugal—that is, he would destroy the houses and hang the inhabitants—yet it was not necessary to carry any of these menaces into effect.

40.
Reflections
on this pro-
clamation.

Although Soult's regular force in the field was little

* “The conduct of the people of Bidarray and Baigorry has given me the greatest pain: it has been different from that of all the other inhabitants of the country, and they have no right to act as they have done. If they wish to make war, let them join the ranks of the enemy; but I will not permit them to play the part alternately of peaceable inhabitants and soldiers. If they remain quietly at home, no one will molest them; they shall be, on the contrary, protected, like all the other inhabitants of this country which my armies occupy. They ought to know that I have done everything in my power to fulfil the engagements which I have undertaken towards the country; but I give them warning that, if they persist in making war, they must join the enemy's ranks and become soldiers: they must not remain in their villages.”—*Proclamation by WELLINGTON, 28th January 1814*; GURWOOD, xi. 485. What a contrast to the savage proclamations of Soult, Augereau, Bessières, and Napoleon, in similar circumstances.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

41.
Position
of Soult
around
Bayonne.

more than half of what his adversary could bring to bear against him, yet his situation, with the advantage of the now strong and fully-armed fortified town of Bayonne, at the confluence of the Nive and Adour, to protect his right, was such as in a great degree to counterbalance the inequality of numbers. The fortress itself, which could be rendered in great part inaccessible by inundations of the Lower Adour, could only be besieged in form by crossing that river, and breaking ground on the right bank; and this was no easy matter to accomplish in the face of a powerful flotilla of gun-boats collected to obstruct the passage, and the efforts of an army of forty thousand men, sheltered by the guns of the place. Deeming his right sufficiently secured by this strong *point-d'appui*, Soult, during the course of January, drafted off the bulk of his forces to his left, between the Adour and the mountains towards St Jean Pied-de-Port, and strengthened his position there by field-works. But he had no confidence in his ability to maintain his ground under the cannon of the fortress when the Upper Adour should be gained, as he foresaw it speedily would, by the enemy; and therefore he wrote to Napoleon, strongly counselling him to abandon all lesser objects, and concentrate his whole disposable forces from all quarters in a great army on the Seine, to prevent Paris from falling into the hands of the Allies. For this purpose, he proposed that Bayonne should be left to its own resources, with a garrison of fourteen thousand men; that Clausel, with two divisions, should be left in the Pyrenees to act on the rear of the invading force; and that the whole remainder of the army should march under his own command to Paris. Perhaps this was the only plan which, in the desperate state of the Emperor's fortunes, promised a chance of success. But, such as it was, it was disapproved of by him as contravening his favourite political system of giving nothing up;¹ and he commanded Soult to maintain himself as long as

1 See Chap.
Napoleon's
Policy.
Vol. III. Chap.
vi. §§ 11, 111.

he could, in any defensive position he could find, on the banks of the Adour.

Having completed his operations, Wellington determined to force the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, and for this purpose he collected at the mouth of the river forty large sailing boats of thirty or forty tons burden each, professedly for the commissariat, but in truth laden with planks and other materials for the purpose of building a bridge between that point and the fortress. The better to conceal his real designs from the enemy, he determined at the same time to threaten the French left with Hill's corps, and turn it by the sources of the rivers at the foot of the mountains, while Beresford, with the main body, menaced their centre. By this means, if his left, which was under the direction of Hope, succeeded in forcing the passage of the river, he hoped to cut Soult off entirely from Bordeaux, and drive him from under the cannon of Bayonne towards the Upper Garonne. A hard frost having at length rendered the deep clayey roads of Béarn, practicable, the troops were all put in motion at daybreak on the 14th of February. Hill marched with twenty thousand men, directing one column against Harispe, who lay at Hellette with five thousand men, while another column moved towards the Joyeuse stream-^{let.}¹

After a slight combat, the French general, wholly unable to resist such a superiority of force, fell back, and the fortress of St Jean Pied-de-Port was immediately invested by Mina's battalions. Meanwhile the allied centre, under Beresford, advanced against the French centre under Clausel, who, in obedience to his orders, fell back across the Joyeuse to the Bidouze, behind which he took up a position. At the same time, however, Jaca, commanding the pass from that quarter into Aragon, being left to its own resources by this retreat of the French left, capitulated. But Harispe having taken post in a strong posi-

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

42.

Wellington
took place
for the passage
of the
Adour.

1. W. Hillz.
ton to Lord
Barhurst,
Feb. 26,
1814. Gar.
xi. 522.
Nap. B.
527.

43.
He drives
back the
French left.

Feb. 17.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Feb. 26, 1814. *Gen. xi. 522. Nap. ii. 527, 535. Viet. et Conq. xxiii. 237, 239. Koch. ii. 276, 279.*

tion on the Garris mountain, in front of the Bidouze, Wellington, who had ridden up late in the evening to the spot, struck with the necessity of driving the enemy from such a post before Soult had time to reinforce the troops who occupied it from its centre, gave orders for its immediate attack. He observed to the 28th and 30th regiments, who headed the assaulting column, "You must take the hill before dark." With loud shouts these gallant regiments rushed forward into the gloomy and woody ravine at its foot, and, clambering up the opposite side, carried the height almost immediately. The enemy, however, seeing they were unsupported, returned twice to the charge, striving to regain the hill with the bayonet; but they were beat off with the loss of three hundred killed and wounded, and two hundred prisoners, while the British were only weakened by a hundred and sixty.¹

44.
Passage of
the Gave de
Mauléon.

Soult upon this drew back his troops across the Bidouze river by the bridge of St Palais, which he destroyed. But Hill immediately repaired it: and on the 17th the French on the English right were driven across the Gave de Mauléon, without having time to destroy the bridge of Arrivereta, in consequence of the 92d—ever foremost where glory was to be won—having discovered a ford above the bridge, and dislodged two battalions of French infantry posted to guard it. In the night of the 17th, the French at all points retired across the Gave d'Oleron, and took up a strong position near Sauveterre. Hill in consequence pushed forward his advanced posts, and was next morning on that river; but as the bridges were all broken down, it could not be passed till the pontoon train arrived, which occasioned, as the roads had become impassable from snow, a delay of several days. These decided movements on the right, however, had the desired effect of withdrawing Soult's attention from the Lower Adour, and inducing him to concentrate the bulk of his forces on the ridge of Sauveterre on his left, to defend the passage of the Gave d'Oleron.² The

Feb. 22.
² Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814. *Gen. xi. 538. Nap. xi. 564, 568. Viet. et Conq. xviii. 249. Koch. ii. 276, 277.*

time, therefore, having arrived for the attempt to force the passage of the Adour below Bayonne, Hope, on the night of the 22d, cautiously moved the first division, rocket-brigade, and six heavy guns, to the sand-hills near the mouth of the river; and at daybreak on the following morning, although the stormy contrary winds and violent surf on the coast prevented the arrival of the gun-boats and *classe-matées*, which were intended to have co-operated in the passage, he gallantly resolved to attempt the forcing of the passage alone.

The French, however, were aware of what was going forward. No sooner were the scarlet uniforms seen emerging from the shelter of the sand-hills, than their flotilla, which, from the British gun-boats not having got up, had the undisputed command of the river, opened a tremendous fire upon them. The British heavy guns and rocket-brigade, which on this occasion was for the first time introduced in the Peninsular war,* replied with so quick and sustained a discharge, that a sloop and three gun-boats were speedily sunk; and the rest of the flotilla, in consternation at the awful aspect and rush of the rockets, drew off out of the reach of fire, further up the river. Upon this, sixty of the Guards were rowed across in a pontoon, in face of a French detachment, which was so terrified by the rockets whizzing through their ranks, that they also took to flight. A raft was then formed with the remainder of the pontoons, and a hawser having been stretched across, six hundred of the Guards and the 66th regiment, with part of the rocket-brigade, were passed over. They were immediately attacked by a French brigade under Macomble; but the assailants were struck with such consternation at the unwonted sight and sound of the rockets, that they too fled at the first discharge.¹ The British continued to pass troops and artillery over the whole night; and by noon next day they

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

15.
And of the
Lower
Adour.

Feb. 23.

¹ Nap. vi.
533, 744.
Bonnish,
ii. 276, 281.
Koch, ii.
296, 297.

* Rockets had been used, for the first time in war, by the British brigade at Leipsic, on October 18, 1813.— *Vide Ante*, Chap. LXXXI. § 69.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

46.

Entrance of
the flotilla
into the
Adour, and
investment
of Bayonne.

were solidly established on the right bank, in such force as to render any attack hopeless.

To complete their security, the British flotilla, under Admiral Penrose, at this time appeared off the mouth of the river: and the boats of the men-of-war, with characteristic gallantry, instantly dashed into the raging surf to share the dangers of their comrades ashore. Captain O'Reilly, who led the whole, was thrown by the waves on the beach, with his whole boat's crew, and only saved by the soldiers picking them up when stretched senseless on the sand. The whole flotilla, when the tide rose, advanced in close order; but the long swell of the Bay of Biscay, impelled by a furious west wind, broke with such terrific violence on the shore, that several of the boats were swallowed up, with their gallant crews. Another and another came on, rowing bravely forward to what seemed certain destruction; and at length Lieutenant Cheyne of the Woodlark caught the right line, and safely passed the bar. Captain Elliot of the Martial, who came next, with his launch and crew, were wrecked and all lost, and three other vessels stranded and lost several of their men, notwithstanding the utmost efforts on the part of the troops to save them. At length, however, the greater part of the flotilla was safely anchored inside the bar. Next morning a bridge was constructed by the indefatigable efforts of Major Todd, who directed the officers and men of the Royal Engineers and Royal Staff corps. By their exertions, the troops and artillery were safely passed over.^{1*} Finding himself thus supported, Hope, two days,

¹ Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 26, 1814. *Gen.* xi. 538. *Nap.* vi. 539, 545. *Ke h.* ii. 297. *Beam.* ii. 278, 287. March 26.

* A curious circumstance occurred at the construction of this bridge, characteristic of the extraordinary intelligence and quickness which long campaign-
ing had given to the British soldiers. Major Todd, who constructed the bridge, assured Colonel Napier, the Peninsular historian, that in the labours connected with it, though great part of the work was of a nautical kind, he found the soldiers, whose minds were quickened by extended experience, more ready of resource and of greater service than the seamen. It must be added, however, that the land forces employed in this operation were the Royal Engineers and Royal Staff Corps, who had been sedulously instructed in the management of boats, mooring them in line, and crossing rivers, in the Medway. I am indebted for this information to my valued friend, Major-General Pasley, who has done

afterwards, commenced the investment of Bayonne, which after some sharp fighting, that cost the Allies five hundred killed and wounded, was effected chiefly by the admirable steadiness of the King's German Legion, upon whom the weight of the contest fell.

While the left wing of the army was thus establishing the investment of Bayonne, the centre and right, under the command of Wellington in person, were pursuing the career of victory on the Gave d'Oleron. The pontoons having arrived on the evening of the 23d, preparations were immediately made for the passage of that river, behind which a formidable French force, thirty-five thousand strong, was now assembled at Sauveterre. Early on the 24th, Hill effected his passage at the head of three divisions at Villenave, while Clinton passed near Monfort with the sixth division. Soult, not deeming the position of Sauveterre tenable against the superior masses which by these movements threatened its left flank, drew back his whole force, leaving Bayonne, garrisoned by six thousand men, to its own resources, and took post a little way further back at ORTHES, behind the Gave de Pau, and upon the last cluster of heights which presented a defensible position before the hills, shooting off to the northward from the Pyrenees, sank altogether into the plain of the Garonne. The army was here assembled on the summit of a ridge of a concave form facing the south-west, stretching from the neighbourhood of Orthes on the left, to the summit of the heights of St Boes, between it and Dax, on the right. D'Erlon, with the divisions of Foy and d'Armagnac, and the division Villatte in reserve, formed the centre; Reille, with the divisions Taupin and Maransin, having the brigade Paris in reserve, occupied St Boes and its neighbouring summits on the extreme right; while the divisions Daricau and Harispe stretched out on the left to the town of Orthes, guarding the noble bridge over

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1-14.

47.
Description
of the
French
position
and force
at Orthes.

Atlas,
Plate 99.

so much to improve the instruction of the British army in the engineering department. — See NAPIER, vi. 512.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Nap. vi.
545, 546.
Koch, ii.
233, 234.
Vaud. ii.
160. Viet. et
Conq. xxiii.
240, 241.
Thiers, xvii.
515.

48.
Wellington's order
of march
and attack.

² Garw. xi.
535. Nap.
vi. 545.
Koch, ii.
235. Viet. et
Conq. xxiii.
239.

the Gave de Pau at that place, the strength of which had defied all attempts, even by the able French engineers, for its destruction. The whole cavalry, with the exception of some small detachments, was collected in the low grounds in front of Orthes, where alone it could act with advantage, under the orders of General Pierre Soult. Thus the French marshal had now assembled in one battle-field eight divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, which, according to their former strength in the palmy days of the empire, would have presented at least sixty thousand combatants; but in the present wasted condition of the Emperor's forces, they hardly mustered forty thousand sabres and bayonets, with forty guns.¹*

Wellington approached this formidable position in three columns. He had thirty-seven thousand men of all arms, of whom four thousand were horse, all Anglo-Portuguese and veteran troops, and forty-eight guns; the Spaniards being in the rear under Mina and Murillo, investing St Jean Pied-de-Port and Navarreins, and two divisions under Hope before Bayonne. Clinton and Hill, with the right wing and right centre, advanced by the great road from Sauveterre to Orthes; Sir Stapleton Cotton, with the cavalry, crossed the Gave de Pau by the fords of Caunelle and La Honton; Picton, with the left centre, by that of Berenx; Beresford, with the left in the field, though forming the centre of the whole army, crossed the same river below its junction with the Gave d'Oleron, at Peyrehorade, by means partly of fords and partly of pontoons, and moved along its right bank towards Orthes.² This approach to an enterprising and powerful enemy, lying in a strong and concentrated

* See NAPIER, vi. 569, who quotes the numbers given above from Soult's official correspondence with the war-office at Paris. The French writers (Vaud. *et* *Conq.* ii. 160, and *Viet. et* *Conq.* xxiii. 236) make the numbers which fought on their side 30,500 infantry and 2900 horse. But Soult's correspondence shows that this was independent of 7000 conscripts who took part in the action; and five thousand of them were good troops. This is confirmed by THIERS. See THIERS, xvii. 515.

position, in three columns, extending in a mountainous country over an extent of twenty miles, presented no ordinary dangers: but the admirable quality of the troops he commanded, as well as the enfeebled spirit of the French army, made the English general hazard it without fear.

He was in great anxiety, however, lest, against his army thus dispersed, an insurrectionary movement should spring up in the rear; and therefore, not content with reiterating his former orders against plundering or disorders of any kind, he issued a proclamation, authorising the people of the country, under their respective mayors, to arm themselves for the preservation of order, and arrest all stragglers or marauders. Nor did his proclamation remain a dead letter; for on the night of the 25th, the inhabitants of a village on the high-road leading from Sauveterre, having shot one British soldier who had been plundering, and wounded another, he caused the wounded man to be hanged, and sent home an English colonel who had permitted his men to destroy the municipal archives of a small town on the line of march. "Maintain the strictest discipline; without that we are lost," said he to General Freyre. By these means tranquillity was preserved in his rear during this critical movement; and the English general now reaped the fruits of the admirable discipline and forbearance he had maintained in the enemy's country, by being enabled to bring up all his reserves, and hurl his undivided force upon the hostile army. Having collected his troops in front of the enemy on the evening of the 26th, he gave orders for an attack, on the following morning, upon the line along its whole extent, from the heights of St Boes to the bridge of Orthes.¹

At daybreak on the 27th, Beresford, with the left wing, consisting of the fourth and seventh divisions, and Vivian's cavalry, commenced the action by turning the enemy's extreme right near St Boes, and gaining the

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1814.

49.
His defeat
leads to
military
discipline.

¹ Wellington to Lord
Bathurst,
March 1,
1814. *Gaz.*
xi. 535.
Nap. vi.
543, 555.
570. *Viet. et*
Conq. xliii.
239, 249.
Koch. ii.
265, 286.

50.
Battle of
Orthes. Pre-
paratory
movements.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1814.

road to Dax beyond it; while, at the same time, Picton—who moved along the great road from Peyrehorade to Orthes with the third division, supported by Cotton's and Somerset's cavalry, and was to be joined by the sixth and light divisions under Clinton, who came to his support from the right by the ford of Berenx—assaulted the enemy's centre. Hill, with the second British and Le Cor's Portuguese brigade, was to endeavour to force the passage at Orthes, and attack the enemy's left. There was an alarming interval of a mile and a half between Beresford's and Picton's men; but in it was a conical hill, nearly as high as the summit of Soult's position opposite, upon the top of which, on the mouldering ramparts of an old Roman camp, Wellington with his staff took his station, having the whole scene of battle spread out like a map before him. Soon the fire of musketry was heard, and volumes of smoke were seen issuing from the ravines below, as Beresford's and Picton's columns drove the enemy's pickets before them, while Clinton's men wound their devious and intricate way from the river through hollows, which a few men only could pass abreast, up towards the enemy's position. The moment was critical; and Picton, who was unsupported on either flank, felt for a time not a little anxious. Clinton's troops got through, however, without being seriously disquieted; and Wellington, who had eagerly watched their movements, as soon as they emerged into the open country, reinforced Picton by the sixth division, and drew the light division into the rear of the Roman camp, so as to form a connecting link between Beresford and Picton, and a reserve to either in case of need.¹

¹ Nap. vi. 559, 560. Picton's Mem. ii. 272, 273. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814. *Gaz.* xi. 534. Koeh. ii. 287, 288. Bign. xiii. 122.

51. Beresford carries St Boes, but is arrested on the ridge beyond it.

Beresford having gained and overlapped the extreme French right, commenced a vigorous attack in front and flank on the village of St Boes. The combat at this point was very violent. Reille's men, all tried veterans, stood firm: St Boes was strongly occupied, and the musketry rang loud and long on the summit of the ridge

without any sensible ground being won by the assailants. At length, when he got all his troops up, the English general made so vehement an onset with Cole's division, that the village was carried, and the victors, pursuing the beaten columns of the enemy, began to move along the narrow elevated ridge, which extended from that point to the centre of their position. Here, however, all their efforts failed. The French troops, slowly retiring along the narrow neck of land, kept up an incessant rolling fire upon the pursuers; while Reille's batteries, skilfully disposed so as to rake on either flank the pursuing column, occasioned so dreadful a carnage that its advance was unavoidably checked. It was the counterpart of the terrific slaughter on the plateau of Craone. The fourth division, however, long inured to victory, and accustomed to see almost insuperable obstacles yield to their enthusiastic valour, returned to the charge, and pressed on with stern resolution. The long train of killed and wounded which marked their advance proved the heroic valour with which they were animated. But a Portuguese brigade, torn in pieces by the terrible discharges of the cannon, every shot of which ploughed with fearful effect through their flank, at length gave way, and commenced a disorderly retreat along the narrow summit. The French with loud shouts, and all the triumph of returning victory, pressed upon their rear; the fourth division, overwhelmed by the mass of fugitives which rushed into its ranks, reeled beneath the storm; and nothing but the subsequent timely charge of part of the light division on Reille's flank, prevented a serious disaster on that part of the line. At the same time, a detachment which Picton sent forward to endeavour to gain a footing on a tongue of land, jutting out from the lofty ridge on which the enemy's centre was posted, was repulsed with loss; and Soult, seeing his troops victorious at both extremities of his line that was engaged, smote his thigh in exultation, exclaiming, "At last I have him!"¹

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1-14.

¹ Picton, ii. 279, 280. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814. Gur. xi. 536. Nap. vi. 556, 559. Koch, ii. 267, 288.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

52.
Wellington's dispo-
sitions to
regain the
battle.

But the eagle eye of Wellington was fixed on the decisive point. No sooner did he perceive, from the pause in the advance of the British along the ridge, and the continued and stationary fire which was going on, that a desperate conflict had taken place on the summit, than he made the requisite dispositions, by a vigorous front attack in the centre, to facilitate the progress of that part of the line. The third and sixth divisions were instantly ordered to advance with all possible expedition up the hill, to attack the right of the centre; while Barnard's brigade of the light division was moved up to assail the left of their right wing, and interpose between it and the centre. The 52d, under Colonel Colborne,* led the way, and quickly reached the marsh which separated the enemy's ridge from the hill on which Wellington stood. Soon that gallant corps crossed the swamp, with the water up to the soldiers' knees, and, mounting the hill unobserved amidst the smoke and din on the summit, with a loud shout and crushing fire rushed forward into the opening between Taupin's and Foy's divisions, at the very moment that the former, following up their success against Beresford, were driving violently through St Boes, pushing the fourth division before them. At the same moment Picton, at the head of his two divisions, mounted the ridge where the enemy's right-centre was placed, and resolutely assailed Foy and d'Armagnac on their almost impregnable position. The effect of these simultaneous attacks, skilfully directed and gallantly executed, against two-thirds of the enemy's line, was decisive.¹

1 Gur. xi.
536, 537.
Robinson's
Picton, ii.
280. Nap.
xi. 559, 560.
Koch, ii.
233.

53.
Which at
length prove
successful.

Foy and d'Armagnac, hard pressed themselves, were unable to send any succours to Reille's wing, which—thus cut off by Colborne's happy irruption, and assailed on one flank by his victorious troops, and on the other by Beresford's men, who, hearing the turmoil in the enemy's rear, returned with the discipline of veterans to

* Now Lord Seaton.

the charge—fell into confusion, and were driven headlong down the hill, with the loss of part of their cannon. Cole's men now rushed with loud shouts along the narrow strait, strewn with so many of their dead, and joined with Barnard's brigade, so as completely to make themselves masters of that important part of the enemy's position. At the same time Poy was struck down, badly wounded, in the centre; and his division, falling into confusion, retreated down the hill on the opposite side, and of necessity drew after it Taupin's and Maransin's. Wellington immediately pushed forward the seventh division, hitherto held in reserve, and two batteries of artillery, which ascended to the narrow ridge, now occupied by the fourth division and Barnard's brigade. At the same time Picton, with the third and sixth divisions, reached the summit of the ridge in the middle, driving d'Armagnac before them down the other side: and his guns, established on a commanding knoll in the centre, thundered with dreadful effect from the height, and sent a storm of balls through the enemy's masses from one end of his position to the other.¹

The victory was now secure; and it was rendered more decisive by the simultaneous success of Hill on the extreme right, who had forced the passage of the Gave by the ford of Souars near Orthes, seized the heights above, won the great road from thence to Pau, and thus not only cut off his best and only direct line of retreat, but prevented Harispe, on the extreme French left, from sending any succours to the hard-pressed right and centre. Soult, seeing this, ordered a general retreat; and the wild heathy hills which stretched out in the rear both afforded abundant room for his retiring columns, and presented several strong positions, of which he skilfully availed himself, for retarding the advance of the pursuing army. With admirable discipline, the French, having regained their order at the foot of the ridge on which they had been posted during the battle, retired in the

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Wellington to Lord
Bathurst,
March 1,
1814. *Genl.*
xi. 556, 557.
Viet. et
Genl. xxiii.
245, 246.
Picton, iii.
260, 261.
Nap. xi.
550, 561.
Koch, ii.
268.

54.
See also
a general
retreat.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

finest array, the rearguard constantly facing about and obstinately resisting, whenever the intervention of a ridge afforded a favourable opportunity for making a stand. But the rugged and desolate hills, as they retired, gradually melted into the plain; and five miles from the field of battle they required to cross the stream of the Luy de Béarn, only to be reached by a single road, and traversed by a single arch at the bridge of Sault de Navailles. The English infantry was pressing on in close pursuit, with a deafening roll of musketry and cannon; Hill, on their left, was rapidly making for the only bridge in their rear; and Sir Stappleton Cotton and Lord Edward Somerset's dragoons, closely following in the low grounds on their flank, were preparing to charge the moment they descended into the plain.¹

¹ Gurw. xi.
597. Robin-
son's Pic-
ton, ii. 281.
Koch, ii.
239. Nap.
vi. 563, 564.
Thiers, xvii.
517.

55.
Which is
ere long
turned into
disorderly
flight.

In these circumstances, although Paris with his division at first with heroic constancy sustained the onset of the pursuers, and gained time for the army to retire, yet after some miles were passed the soldiers became sensible of their danger, and, first quickening their pace as they saw Hill moving parallel and threatening to anticipate them at the bridge, at length began to run violently. Hill's men set off at full speed also, each party striving which should first reach the bridge; and although the French gained the race, and so secured the passage of their army, yet great part of their troops fell into irretrievable confusion in the disorderly rush, and the fields were covered with scattered bands. Cotton charged, on the only occasion which presented itself, at the head of Somerset's dragoons and the 7th hussars, three battalions of the enemy, which he broke, and made three hundred prisoners; but although two thousand more threw down their arms in an enclosed field, the greater part contrived to escape across the river, which was not far distant. At length the scattered bands, after wading the stream, reassembled on the opposite bank, with that readiness for which the French troops have ever been distinguished;²

² Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814. Gur. xi. 537. Viet. et Conq. xi. 242, 243. Koch, ii. 239, 240. Nap. xi. 563, 564. Picton, ii. 261, 282.

and the wearied British soldiers formed their bivouacs on its southern shore.

Though the battle of Orthes was not graced by the same military trophies taken on the field as those of Salamanca or Vitoria, it was inferior to none of Wellington's great victories in the moral consequences with which it was attended. The enemy lost three thousand nine hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners, on the field, and six guns—the Allies two thousand three hundred. But the moral effects of the victory were much greater than its material results. The discouragement and demoralisation introduced into the French army by its consequences were extreme. The conscripts, in great part ill affected, and all desponding in the cause, threw away their arms and deserted by hundreds; disorganisation and confusion prevailed in their retreat, insomuch that, a month afterwards, the stragglers and missing were found, by an official statement, to be still three thousand. Thus Soult was weakened by this victory, and its effects, to the extent of fully seven thousand men—a grievous and irreparable loss, when he was already painfully contending against superior numbers and growing despondency. But its ultimate effects upon the south of France were still more important, and, in the critical state of the Emperor's fortunes, proved decisive. By the line of Soult's retreat, which was in the direction of Toulouse, the great road to BORDEAUX was left open. Bayonne and St Jean Pied-de-Port were already closely invested: no force capable either of withstanding the invaders or of controlling public opinion, existed from the Pyrenees to the Garonne; and the Royalists in the southern provinces, relieved from the fetters which for twenty years had restrained them, were left at liberty to give expression to their inclination, which soon found vent in a general revolt.¹

Soult, after refreshing his army with a few hours' sleep at Sault de Navailles, on the right bank of the Luy

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

56.

Great effects
of this vic-
tory.

¹ Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 1, 1814. *Gaz.* xl. 549. *Koch ii.* 299. *Behm.* i. 277. *Vict.* et *Conq.* xviii. 242. *Nap.* vi. 504, 505. *Thiers*, xvii. 518.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

57.

Soult retires
towards
Tarbes and
Toulouse.

de Béarn, continued his retreat along the Agen road to St Sever on the Adour, breaking down all the bridges over the numerous mountain torrents which he crossed, as soon as he had passed them. Their great number sensibly retarded the pursuit of the victors, although Wellington, regardless of a slight wound he had received on the preceding day, was on horseback at daylight on the 28th, and continued to follow the enemy with the utmost vigour. From St Sever the French marshal retired towards Tarbes by both banks of the Adour; a bold, but yet judicious, movement, which, albeit abandoning Bordeaux to the enemy, yet secured for his beaten and dejected army, on one flank at least, the support of the mountains, and preserved for him, in case of need, a secure junction with the forces of Suchet from Catalonia. There was not the slightest reason to fear that Wellington would advance far into the interior of France, while such a force remained on his flank to menace his rear and communications: Frederick the Great saved his own states from invasion after the raising of the siege of Olmütz, by marching into Bohemia. The British army, accordingly, instead of moving in a body upon Bordeaux, wisely followed the retiring footsteps of their antagonists; and after taking possession of the magazines at Mont Marsan, which were abandoned by the enemy, and crossing over the bulk of his forces to the right bank of the Adour by the bridge of St Sever, which he repaired, Wellington detached Hill by the left bank to make himself master of the great magazines at Aire. Villatte's and Harispe's divisions were drawn up on a strong ridge in front of that town, and made so vigorous a resistance to the attack, that the Portuguese were driven back, and the action was well-nigh lost. But Stewart, with the British left, having meanwhile won the heights on the French right, immediately detached Barnes, with the 50th and 92d, to the aid of the Portuguese. Their vigorous charge soon altered the state of affairs; the French reeled in their turn; ¹ Byng's brigade

March 1.

¹ Nap. vi.

564, 568.

Hill's Report, March

3, 1814.

Garw. xi.

518. V. i. c.

Comp. xxvii.

213, 214.

K. i. 7.

203, 204.

gradually came up, and ultimately, after a severe combat, in which great bravery was displayed on both sides, the enemy were driven entirely out of Aire, the whole magazines in which fell into the hands of the British. CHAP.
LXXXVII.
14.

The pursuit was not continued at this time further in this direction, for great events had occurred in another; and an opportunity presented itself for striking a decisive blow against the power of Napoleon in the third city of the empire, which was not neglected by the English general. Bordeaux, which through the whole Revolution had been distinguished by its moderate or Royalist feelings, had been in the greatest state of excitement since the advance of the English army into the south of France promised to relieve its inhabitants, at no distant period, from the iron yoke of the Revolution. These feelings rose to a perfect climax when the battle of Orthes opened the road to that city to the victorious British arms, and constrained Soult to an eccentric retreat in the direction of Toulouse. The Royalist committee, which since March 1813 had secretly existed in it, and which comprised a large portion of the most respectable and influential citizens, were indefatigable in their endeavours to take advantage of this favourable state of things, and bring about a public declaration from the inhabitants in favour of the Bourbon dynasty. Cautiously they revealed their designs to M. Lynch, the mayor of the city, who instantly and warmly entered into their views, and declared his earnest desire to be the first to proclaim Louis XVIII. By their united efforts matters were so far arranged that, immediately after the battle of Orthes, the Marquis de Larochejaquelein was despatched to Wellington's headquarters, to request the assistance of three thousand men in support of their cause. Wisely judging that a small British force was not to be lightly hazarded on so momentous and distant an enterprise, and appreciating the importance of the movement which was now ready to take place, Wellington, instead of three thousand, sent 15.
Proceedings
of the Royal
Society of
Bordeaux.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Nap. vi.
592, 593.
Viet. et
Conq. xxiii.
246, 247.
Beauch. ii.
52, 57.
Koch. ii.
300, 301.
Wellington
to Beres-
ford, March
7, 1814.
Gurw. xi.
557. Thiers,
xvii. 519.

them twelve thousand men, under the command of Lord Beresford. But as he was aware that the allied powers were still negotiating with Napoleon at Châtillon, and that peace might be any day concluded, he was careful to inform the deputation of the chances of such an event occurring, distinctly warning them at the same time, that in the event of a declaration in favour of Louis XVIII. taking place, and peace following with Napoleon, it would be beyond his power to afford them any protection. Beresford's instructions were, to take no part in any political movement which might occur, and neither to support nor repress it; to say the British wished well to Louis XVIII., but were negotiating with Napoleon; and, if a revolt occurred, to supply the people with arms and ammunition from the magazines at Dax.¹

59.

The English
arrive at
Bordeaux,
and Louis
XVIII. is
proclaimed.

Beresford, with the fourth and seventh divisions, set out from the main army on the 8th, and after crossing the wild and heathy *landes* without opposition, arrived on the 12th before Bordeaux. He had been preceded, two days before, by the Marquis de Larochejaquelein, who had announced the speedy arrival of the English divisions, and urged the Royalist committee to declare at once in favour of the descendant of Henry IV. Great hesitation, as is usual in such a decisive moment, prevailed among the leaders; and many were anxious to recede from their professions, now that the time for action had arrived. But equal apprehensions were felt by the imperial military authorities, who, unable to make head against the coming storm, secretly withdrew, one by one, to the opposite side of the Garonne, leaving the slender garrison without any leaders. Part of the troops in this emergency followed the example, and crossed over to the other side, after burning a few ships of war on the stocks; and a battalion of conscripts which remained voluntarily laid down their arms. At half-past twelve, the English standards approached the town, long the capital of the Plantagenet sovereigns in France, and the favourite resi-

March 12.

dence of the Black Prince, but where they had not been seen for nearly five hundred years. The mayor and civic authorities, in the costume of their respective offices, came out to meet them at a short distance from the suburbs, dressed in their imperial garb, but with white cockades secretly in their pockets; and the former delivered an address, in which he professed the joy which the people felt at being delivered from their slavery, and at the arrival of their liberators. His speech was frequently interrupted with cries of “*A bas les Aigles!*”—“*Vivent les Bourbons!*” and at its close he took off his tricolored scarf, as well as the badge of the Legion of Honour, and mounted the white cockade. All his attendants immediately did the same; enthusiastic cheers rent the sky; and the British troops, surrounded by an ever-increasing multitude of the people, entered the ancient capital of their Plantagenet sovereigns, hailed as deliverers and friends, to re-establish the throne of the royal race with whom they had for so many centuries been engaged in almost ceaseless hostility. Thus had England, first of all the allied powers, the glory of obtaining an open declaration from a great city in France in favour of their ancient but exiled monarch—twenty years and one month after the contest had begun, from the murder of the best and most blameless of his line.¹

The Duc d'Angoulême soon after arrived, and was received with unbounded enthusiasm; a prodigious crowd assembled to greet his entrance. White handkerchiefs waved from every window; the white flag was to be seen on every steeple; all classes felicitated each other on the change; the day was passed as a brilliant fête; and a revolution, the most important in its consequences which had occurred in Europe since the breaking out of the bloody drama of 1789, passed over without one tear falling in sorrow, or one drop of blood being shed. But amidst all these transports, arising rather from the prospect of cessation to immediate and pressing evils, than

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1514.

¹ Beresford to Lord Wellington, March 12, 1814, Gurw. xi. 577. Baccamp, ii. 92, 96. Koch, ii. 301, 303. Talbot, xvii. 520.

60.
Arrival of the Duc d'Angoulême at Bordeaux.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

from any distinct hopes or anticipations for the future, there were not wanting many far-seeing men, even amongst those unconnected with the imperial government, who, without denying the intolerable evils to which it had given rise, felt profoundly mortified at this fresh proof of the instability of their countrymen, and who anticipated little eventual benefit to France from a restoration which was ushered in by the victorious bayonets of foreign powers. Meanwhile, however, the Duc d'Angoulême and Beresford remained in peaceable possession of Bordeaux; the threatening incursions of the imperial troops on the other side of the river were repressed by three thousand British soldiers who crossed over; and although Wellington was at first not a little annoyed by a proclamation issued by the mayor of Bordeaux, in which he declared that "the English, Spaniards, and Portuguese were united in the south, as the allied sovereigns were in the north, to destroy the scourge of nations, and replace him by a monarch, the father of his people," and wrote in the strongest possible terms to the Duc d'Angoulême disowning it,* yet events succeeded each other with such rapidity, that this source of disquietude was soon removed, and the words of M. Lynch seemed to have been prophetic of the approaching fall of Napoleon.¹

Soult and Wellington during this period remained in

¹ Beauch, ii. 96, 102.
Wellington to Duc d'Angoulême, March 16, 1814.
Gurw. xi. 561, 565.
Nap. vi. 595, 602.
Thiers, xvii. 520.

* "It is not to subject our country to the yoke of strangers that the English, Spaniards, and Portuguese have approached our walls. They have united in the south, as the other people have in the north, to destroy the scourge of nations, and replace him by a monarch, the father of his people; it is by him alone that we can appease the wrath of a neighbouring nation, whom we have oppressed with the most perfidious despotism. The Bourbons are unstained by French blood; with the testament of Louis XVI. in their hand, they forget all resentment: everywhere they proclaim and prove that tolerance is the first principle by which they are actuated. It is in deploring the terrible ravages of the tyranny which license induced, that they forgot errors caused by the illusions of liberty. The short and consoling expressions addressed to you by the husband of the daughter of Louis XVI., 'No more tyrants; no more war; no more conscription; no vexatious imposts,' have already proved a balm to every heart. Possibly it is reserved for the great captain, who has already merited the glorious title of the *liberator of nations*, to give his name to the glorious epoch of such a happy prophecy." *Proclamation*, 12th March 1814, by M. LYNCH, *Mayor of Bordeaux*; BEAUCHAMPE, ii. 101, 102.

a state of inactivity, each supposing that the other was stronger than himself; for the detachment of twelve thousand men to Bayonne, and of as many to Bordeaux, beside those employed in the blockade of St Jean Pied-de-Port and Navarreins, had now reduced the opposite armies as nearly as possible to an equality. The forces at the command of the French general were reduced, by the desertion and disorganisation consequent on the battle of Orthes, to twenty-eight thousand sabres and bayonets, with thirty-eight guns. On the side of the English, only twenty-seven thousand combatants were in line, with forty-two guns, in consequence of the large detachments made. But the quality and spirit of the troops were decidedly superior to those of the French army. The astounding intelligence of the defection of Bordeaux, however, and proclamation of Louis XVIII. there, made Soult sensible that some great effort was necessary to counteract the growing disaffection of the southern provinces, and prevent his army from melting away, as it had recently done, from the despondency and discontent of the newly-embodied conscripts. This was the more necessary, as the admirable discipline and prompt payment for supplies of all sorts which prevailed in the British camp, contrasted so fearfully with the forced requisitions to which he was obliged to have recourse from the capture of all his magazines, and the general license in which his troops indulged after the retreat from Orthes. Indeed, at this time, he wrote to the minister of war at Paris, that "he wanted officers who knew how to respect property; and that the people seemed more disposed to favour the invaders than to second the French army." Influenced by these considerations, the French marshal no sooner learned the events at Bordeaux, and the proclamation of the Duc d'Angoulême, than he issued a counter address, couched in energetic language, and strains of no measured invective against the English policy and government. While a calm retrospect of the past has now demonstrated,

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

61.

Soult's
counter
proclama-
tion, and
resumption
of hostili-
ties.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.
1 Nap. vi.
580, 581,
587. Beau-
champ, ii.
430, 431.
Soulé to
war minis-
ter, March
14, 1814.
Nap. vi.
580.

even to the French themselves, that great part of his reproaches were unfounded, and may make us smile at the vehemence of some of his expressions ; yet candour must recollect the critical and unparalleled circumstances in which Soult was placed when this proclamation was issued, and do justice to the firmness which, amidst the general wreck of the imperial fortunes, remained unshaken, and the fidelity which, surrounded by defection, nailed its colours to the mast.^{1*}

This proclamation produced a considerable impression,

* "Soldiers ! at the battle of Orthes you did your duty ; the enemy's losses surpassed yours, and his blood moistened the ground he gained. He has had the indecency since to provoke you and your countrymen to revolt and sedition. He speaks of peace, but firebrands of sedition follow him. Thanks to him for making known his intentions ; our forces are thereby multiplied a hundred-fold : he has rallied round our standards all those, who, deceived by appearances, believed our enemies would make an honourable war. No peace with that disloyal and perfidious nation ! No peace with the English and their auxiliaries, until they quit the French territory ! They have dared to insult the national honour ; they have had the infamy to excite Frenchmen to become perjured towards the Emperor. Wash out the offence in blood. To arms ! Let this cry resound through the south of France ; the Frenchman that now hesitates abjures his country, and belongs to its enemies. Yet a few days, and those who believe in English honour and sincerity will learn, to their cost, that cunning promises are made to abate their preparations, and subjugate them. They will learn to their cost, that if the English pay and are generous to-day, to-morrow they will retake, and with interest, in contributions, what they disburse. Let the pusillanimous beings who calculate the cost of saving their country recollect, that the English have in view to reduce the French to the same servitude as the Spaniards, Portuguese, and Sicilians. History shows the English at the head of all conspiracies, all odious plots and assassinations ; aiming to overthrow all principles, to destroy all great commercial establishments, to satisfy their insatiable cupidity. Does there exist, upon the face of the globe, a point known to the English, where they have not destroyed, by seditions and violence, all manufactures which could rival their own ? Thus will they do to the French if they prevail. Be obedient, and yield to discipline, and reserve your implacable hatred for the traitors and enemies to the French peace. War to the death against those who would divide in order to destroy us, and to those cowards who desert the imperial eagles to range themselves under another banner !" — See GERWOOD, xi. 594 ; NAPIER, vi. 587, 589. This proclamation is one of the most curious and instructive monuments of the Revolution. The magnanimous policy of Wellington, which, aiming at moving the moral affections, coerced so effectually the disorders of his troops ; the generous forbearance of England, which, an enemy only to the Revolution and its spoiliations, proposed to leave France untouched, could not be conceived by the French general. He thought it was the homage which vice in hypocrisy pays to virtue. It is interesting to contrast this furious tirade with Soult's unbounded praises of England, at the London dinner, on occasion of the coronation of Queen Victoria in 1839 ; yet both were probably sincere at the time.

at least upon the old soldiers in his army ; and Soult, CHAP. LXXXVII. anxious to take advantage of the excitement, and of the 1-14. absence of so large a portion of the English troops at 62. Bordeaux, determined to resume offensive operations. Soult resumes the offensive, and finally retreats to Toulouse: March 12. Accordingly, on the 12th March, he put his troops in motion : and as Wellington's main body was concentrated round Aire and Barcelona, yet divided in two by the Adour, he concentrated his forces on the side of Maubourguet, in the direction of the high table-land between Pau and Aire, designing to strike a blow at the English divisions on the left bank of that river. On the 7th he had March 7. made an attempt on Pau, intending to arrest the nobles who had assembled to welcome the Duc d'Angoulême ; but he was stopped by Fane, who anticipated him, and the attempt failed. Some lesser skirmishes of cavalry took March 14. place in front of Aire, in which the Portuguese horse sustained a trifling loss. But Wellington, as soon as he heard of this incursion, brought over the third and sixth divisions across the Adour to support Hill, and at the same time gave orders to Freyre's Galicians and Giron's Andalusians to issue from the valley of the Bastan, where they had been hitherto kept to prevent plundering, and come up to his support. By this means he collected thirty-six thousand men, including the troops on the other side of the Adour, to withstand the irruption ; and Soult, fearing to attack such a force, and hearing of the fall of Bordeaux, determined to retire. He sent forward, accordingly, his conscripts at once to TOULOUSE, being resolved to try once more the fortune of arms in the strong position which was presented in the environs of that city, and commenced a rapid retreat. The British army as swiftly followed in pursuit, on both banks of the Adour, but the great bulk of their force was always on the left bank.¹ A sharp combat took place at Vic-Bigorre on the 19th, when d'Armagnac and Paris were only compelled at length to fall back, after each side had sustained a loss of two hundred and fifty men. Unhappily that on the side

March 19.

¹ Nap. vi.

606, 617.

Koch, ii.

324, 307.

Vict. et

Chap. XVIII.

250, 251.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1814.

of the British included the able and accomplished Colonel Sturgeon of the Engineers, whose efforts and genius had been so signally evinced through the whole course of the Peninsular war.

63.
Combat of
Tarbes,
March 20.

A more serious action took place when the army approached Tarbes. The light division and hussars were still on the right bank of the Adour, and they had been reinforced by Clifton's division (the sixth) and Freyre's Spaniards; but when they approached that town, which stands on the upper part of that stream, a simultaneous movement was made by Hill with the right wing, and Clinton on the left, to envelop and cut off Harispe's and Villatte's divisions, which formed the French rearguard in occupation of it. The combat began at twelve o'clock, by a violent fire from Hill's artillery on the right, which was immediately re-echoed in still louder tones by Clinton's on the left; while Alten, with the light division, assailed the centre. The French fought stoutly, and, mistaking the British rifle battalions, from their dark uniform, for Portuguese, let them come up to the very muzzles of their guns. But the Rifles were hardy veterans, inured to victory; and at length Harispe's men, unable to stand their deadly point-blank fire, broke and fled. If Clinton's troops on the left had been up at this moment, the French would have been totally destroyed; for Hill on the right had at the same moment driven back Villatte, and the plain beyond Tarbes was covered with a confused mass of fugitives, closely followed by the shouting and victorious British.¹

¹ *Genw.* xi. 596. *Koch.* ii. 597. *Genw.* *Vict.* et *Comp.* xviii. 251. *Nap.* vi. 616.

64.
Rapid re-
trograde of
St. Jean to
Toul-use.

But Clinton's soldiers, notwithstanding the utmost efforts, had not been able to get up; the numerous ditches and hedges which intersected the plain rendered all pursuit by the cavalry impossible; and thus the French, though utterly broken, succeeded, with very little loss, in reaching a ridge three miles distant, where Clausel, who with four divisions was drawn up to receive them, immediately opened a heavy fire from all his batteries upon

the Allies. This at once checked the pursuit; and in the night Soult retired in two columns, one on the high road, the other on the left, guided by watch-fires on the hills. Such was the rapidity of his retreat— as he was now making by rapid strides for Toulouse, where his great depots were placed, and on which all his future combinations were based—that he reached that town in four days, though ninety miles distant, and arranged his army in position before it on the 25th. Wellington, encumbered with a great artillery and pontoon train, and obliged to keep his men well in hand, from the uncertainty when Suchet's great reinforcement from Catalonia, which he believed to be approaching, might join the enemy, did not arrive on the Toudou, facing the French in front of Toulouse, till the 27th.¹

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1814.

¹ Wellington to Lord Bathurst, March 20, 1814. *Gen. xi.* 303. *Nap.* vi. 616, 619. *Reich.* ii. 337, 339. *Viet.* et *Cont.* xviii. 251, 252.

Thus, within six weeks after the campaign opened, Wellington had driven the French from the neighbourhood of Bayonne to Toulouse, a distance of two hundred miles; had conquered the whole country between the Pyrenees and the Garonne; had passed six large and several smaller rivers; driven the enemy's forces from two fortified *têtes-de-pont*, and many minor field-works; defeated them in one pitched battle, besides lesser combats; crossed the raging flood of the Adour in the face of the garrison of Bayonne, below that fortress, and laid siege to it as well as to St Jean Pied-de-Port and Navarrens; and finally brought about a revolution at Bordeaux, and a declaration in favour of the Bourbon dynasty from the third city in the empire. These great successes, too, had been gained by an army composed of so many and such discordant nations, that the French themselves were astonished how it was held together; nearly a third of which, from the fierce passions with which it was animated, and the marauding habits which it had acquired, had not yet been brought across the frontier; which, though considerably superior when the campaign commenced, was so wasted down by the necessity of investing

65.
General result of the campaign.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

so many fortresses, and occupying such an extensive tract of country, that the active force in the field was from the very first little, if at all, superior to that of the enemy; and against an army in great part composed of the iron Peninsular veterans, the best troops now in the French service, and a general second only to Napoleon in the vigour and ability with which he maintained a defensive warfare.

66.
Moral lus-
tre of the
campaign.

It must be confessed that there are few periods in the military annals of the British empire fraught with brighter glory to its army or its chief. The brows of Wellington and his followers, loaded with military laurels, are yet encircled with a purer wreath, when it is recollected that these advantages had been gained without the slightest deviation from the strict principles of justice on which they had throughout maintained the contest; that no wasting contributions, scarcely any individual plunder, had disgraced their footsteps; that to avoid the pillage of their own troops, the requisitions of their own generals, the peasants of France sought refuge within the sanctuary of the British lines; and that this admirable discipline was enforced by the commander, and obeyed by his soldiers, when heading a vast military array of the Peninsular forces, hastily levied, imperfectly disciplined, burning with resentment for the six years' wasting and desolation of their own country, and whose services it was frequently necessary to forego, to avoid the retaliation which they so naturally endeavoured to inflict on their oppressors.¹

¹ Nap. vi.
568, 569.

67.
General
state of
affairs in
Catalonia.

Atlas,
Plate 43.

² Anst. ch.
lxxxvii § 12.

While these decisive blows were paralysing the imperial strength in the south of France, the progress of events in Catalonia, though of far inferior importance, was also tending to the same general result. Since the junction of the armies of Catalonia and Aragon, and the retreat of the allied force under Lord William Bentinck to Tarragona, in September 1813, already noticed,² the opposite hosts had remained in a state of total inactivity. Clinton, who had succeeded Lord William in the com-

mand, with the British and German division from Sicily, ten thousand strong, with nine thousand of Sarsfield's Spaniards, lay on the right bank of the Llobregat, from its mouth to the mountains; Elio, with sixteen thousand ill-disciplined Spanish troops, observed Gerona from Vich; while Copons' men, about twelve thousand more, besieged Peniscola, and blockaded Lerida, Mequinenza, and the lesser forts still occupied by the enemy in the rear. On the other hand, Suchet had still sixty-five thousand admirable troops, the best in Spain, under his command, and, without drawing a man from the fortresses, he could bring thirty thousand sabres and bayonets into the field. Offensive operations upon an extended scale, with ten thousand British troops, and such a disjointed rabble of Spaniards, without discipline or magazines, and generally starving, under generals acting almost independently of each other, were of course out of the question; and the English general found that, even for lesser enterprises which offered a fair prospect of success, no reliance whatever could be placed on their co-operation.

From a failure on Copons' part to take the share assigned him, a well-conceived attack of Clinton, with six thousand men, on the French posts at Molinos del Rey, failed of obtaining complete success. At this very time, however, Napoleon, alarmed by the formidable invasion of the Allies, recalled ten thousand soldiers and eighty guns from the army of Catalonia: upon which Suchet increased the garrison of Barcelona to eight thousand men: prepared to retire himself to the line of the Fluvia, near the foot of the Pyrenees; sent secret instructions to the garrisons in his rear to make their escape the best way they could, and join him near Figueras: and strongly recommended to Napoleon to send Ferdinand VII., under the treaty of Valençay,¹ as speedily as possible into Catalonia, in order to give him a decent pretext for evacuating all the fortresses, except Figueras, in that province, and thereby enable him to march with twenty

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1814.

68.
Failure of
Clinton at
Molinos del
Rey, and
general re-
treat of
Suchet.
Jan. 16.

¹ Suchet, ii.
261, 268.
Vict. et
Géog. XVIII.
252, 253.
Nap. vi.
475, 487.
Koch, ii.
309, 312.
Tellers, xvii.
394.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

five thousand additional veterans to the succour of the Emperor.

1814.

69.

Stratagem
by which
Lerida,
Mequi-
nenza, and
Monzon
are recover-
ed by the
Spaniards.

The return of part of these garrisons, however, was accelerated by a fraudulent stratagem, unworthy of military honour, by which the Spaniards now recovered some of the fortresses, in much the same way as the French had, six years before, got possession of them. There was, at this time, in the French service, a Spaniard of Flemish descent, Van Halen, who, during his employment in the staff of Suchet, had contrived to make himself master, not only of the power of exactly imitating his writing, but of his private seal and the cipher which he made use of in his most confidential despatches. He had even dived so deep into his mysteries, as to have discovered the private mark by which Suchet had desired all his chief officers to distinguish his genuine from forged despatches—viz. the inserting a slender light-coloured hair in the ciphered paper. Having possessed himself of this secret information, he entered into communication with the Baron d'Erolles, and they drew up orders addressed, in Suchet's name, to the governors of all the towns held by the French in the rear of the allied army, directing them to evacuate the fortresses and march towards him, with a view of joining the Emperor in the heart of France.¹

¹ Suchet, ii.
270. Koch,
ii. 314.
Vict. et
Conq. xviii.
254. Nap. xi.
487, 491.

70.

But which
falls at
Tortosa.

History has little interest in recording the means by which fraud and artifice overreach valour and sincerity. Suffice it to say, that the orders fabricated by Van Halen were so precise and articulate, the forgeries so well executed, and the preventions taken against discovery so complete, that they deceived the governors of Lerida, Mequinenza, and Monzon, which thus fell into the hands of the Spaniards. Clinton at first refused to have anything to do with the matter, but finally agreed to intercept the garrisons when they had left the fortresses. The French, pressed by the Spaniards under Copons in rear, and finding their advance barred by Clinton in front,

were compelled, to the number of two thousand six hundred men, with four guns and a military chest, to lay down their arms. But the stratagem failed at Tortosa, and a disaster to the Spaniards was only avoided by the Spanish general Sans, to whom the French governor Robert, feigning to fall into the snare, had written to come with two battalions to take possession of the place, not having had courage to do so. But having received orders from Napoleon to send off a second draft of ten thousand men to Lyons, Suchet surrendered Gerona to the Spaniards, and drew back all his troops in the field to the neighbourhood of Figueras, there to await the issue of the crisis which was approaching.¹

Meanwhile Barcelona continued closely blockaded: and a sally which Habert made on the 23d February was repulsed with great loss by Sarsfield, who commanded the blockading force. The place continued closely invested till the 20th March, when Ferdinand VII. arrived on the frontier from Perpignan, accompanied by his brother Don Carlos, and Don Antonio his uncle. He was received on the banks of the Fluvia with great pomp, and in presence of both the French and Spanish armies, who made a convention for a suspension of arms on this interesting occasion. Indeed, hostilities everywhere ceased in Catalonia; both parties with reason regarding the war as terminated by the treaty of Valençay. Ferdinand continued his journey in perfect tranquillity towards Madrid, all honours being rendered to him equally by the French as by the Spanish garrisons; and Clinton, in obedience to orders received from Wellington, broke up his army: part being embarked at Tarragona to join Lord William Bentinck, who was engaged in operations against Genoa, and part marching across Aragon, to join Wellington on the Garonne.²

The treaty of Valençay, however, not having been ratified by the Cortes, the blockade of the fortresses still held by the French continued; and so late as the 18th

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1814.

March 3.
¹ Suchet, ii.
370, 376.
Nap. vi.
487, 493.
Vict. et
Conq. xliii.
254, 255.
Koch, ii.
314, 315.

71.
Arrival of
Ferdinand,
and termination of
the war in
Catalonia.
March 20.

² Koch, ii.
317. Nap.
vi. 495, 496.
Suchet, ii.
376, 384.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

72.

But the
blockade
of the for-
tresses
there still
continues to
the close of
the war.
April 20.

April, long after peace had been concluded at Paris, Habert, in ignorance of that event, made a vigorous effort to cut his way out of Barcelona; and though repulsed and driven in again, the encounter was very bloody, and cost the Spaniards eight hundred men. Intelligence of the pacification at Paris arrived four days afterwards, and terminated the contest in that quarter; and then appeared, in the clearest colours, both the strength of the hold which the Emperor had taken of Spain, and the disastrous effect of the grasping system which made him, even in the last extremity, persist in retaining what he had once acquired. When the French soldiers in Spain hoisted the white flag, the symbol of universal peace, they still held, by the positive order of Napoleon, Barcelona, Figueras, Tortosa, Morilla, Peniscola, Saguntum, and Denia; and in these fortresses were shut up no less than twenty-two thousand veteran soldiers, which, with the like force under Suchet's immediate command on the Fluvia, would have given Napoleon, when the scales hung all but even on the banks of the Seine, a decisive superiority over all the forces of the allied sovereigns.¹*

¹ Suchet, ii.
376, 387.
Koch, ii.
317, 319.
Viet. et
Conq. xxiii.
255, 256.
Nap. vi.
495, 498.

73.

Siege of
Santona,
and close
of the war
in the Pen-
insula.

The war terminated somewhat sooner on the western coast of Spain. The only stronghold still held by the French there, after the storming of San Sebastian, was Santona, which, situated on the rocky extremity of a long sandy promontory on the coast of Biscay, had long been an object of violent contest between the contending parties; and still, in the vicinity of a reinstated monarchy, hoisted the tricolor flag. After the battle of Vitoria it was invested by the Galicians by land, and by the British cruisers by sea; but the latter blockade was maintained

* "Undoubtedly it is deplorable that twenty-two thousand excellent troops, who might have been of great service, have been thus uselessly scattered in a dozen places; but Suchet acted thus *in virtue of positive orders*, and no one has thought of blaming him for it. All opportunities of withdrawing these garrisons were missed. The orders were either given or forwarded too late."—SUCHET, *Mémoires*, ii. 371; BIGNON, xiii. 114.

so negligently, and the Spanish land troops were so inefficient, that Wellington at first gave orders to Lord Aylmer's brigade to proceed thither. Though this intention was not carried into effect, yet Captain Wells, with some British sappers and miners, was sent to accelerate their operations. As usual, however, the Spaniards were so dilatory and ill-prepared, that nothing effectual was done till the middle of February, when the Fort of Puertal, Feb. 13. outside the place, was carried. On the night of the 21st, Feb. 21. the outworks were stormed; and the direction of the approaches being now intrusted to Captain Wells, he pushed his operations so vigorously that the Fort Laredo, which commanded the harbour, was taken. Lameth, the French governor, upon this offered to capitulate in April, on condition of being sent back to France. Wellington refused to agree to these terms; but hardly had his declinature arrived, when intelligence was received of the pacification at Paris, which closed hostilities, and the place, with the tricolor flag still waving on it, was in terms of the treaty given over to the Spaniards.¹

To conclude the narrative of the Peninsular war, it only remains to notice the last and bloody struggles on the Garonne and Adour, which, though not occurring in chronological order till after the capitulation of Paris, shall be here detailed, in order not to break the account of the decisive events which led to that catastrophe. TOULOUSE, in which the French army under Soult was now concentrated, and before which the British army lay, on the left bank of the Garonne, was well known to Marshal Soult, as he had been born and bred in its vicinity; and he had long fixed upon it as the post where his final stand for the south of France was to be made. That ancient capital of the southern provinces of the monarchy, so celebrated in poetry and romance, though much fallen from its former greatness, still numbered fifty thousand inhabitants within its walls; and being situated on both banks of the Garonne, of which it commanded the prin-

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1811.

¹ Nap. vi.
499, 504.
Behm. iv.
260.

74.
Description
of Toulouse.
— —
Atlas,
Plate 100.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹Choumara,
Bataille de
Toulouse,
174, 176,
Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
348.

cipal passage, and the centre of all the roads in that part of the country, it was a strategetical point of the very highest importance, both with a view to obtaining facilities for his own, and keeping them from the enemy's army. Posted there, the French general was master of a line of retreat either toward Suchet by Carcassonne, or toward Augereau by Alby; while the ample stream of the Garonne wafted supplies of all sorts to his army, and the walls of the city itself afforded a protection of no ordinary importance to his soldiers.¹

75.
Military
position of
Soult there.

That river, flowing on the west of the city, properly so called, presented to the Allies a deep curve, at the bottom of which the town is placed, connected, by a massy stone bridge of ancient architecture, with the suburb of St Ciprien, situated on its left bank. This suburb, which first presented itself to the attack of an enemy coming from the side of Bayonne, was defended by an old brick wall, flanked by massy towers; and beyond this rampart Soult had erected outer field-works. The city itself, on the other bank, was also surrounded by a thick brick wall, strengthened with towers of such dimensions as to bear four-and-twenty pounders. The great canal of Languedoc, which unites the Garonne to the Mediterranean sea, wound round the town to the east and north, and joined the river a few miles below it: forming in this manner, with the Garonne itself, a vast wet ditch, which, on every side except a small opening to the south-east, encircled its walls at the distance of three quarters of a mile. The suburbs of St Etienne and Guillemerin, which stretched out across the canal to the eastward from the walls, were strengthened with fieldworks at the points where they crossed the canal; and beyond them, on the other side of the canal, rose the steep ridge of Mont Rave, the outer face of which, whereby alone it could be assailed on that side by the enemy, being exceedingly rugged and difficult of access.²

²Choumara,
Bat. de Tou-
louse, 174,
177, Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
348. Nap.
vi. 624, 626.

From this description of Soult's position, it was clear

that an attack on the town from the west, and through the suburb of St Ciprien, was out of the question. The suburb itself, flanked on either side by a deep and impassable river, defended by a wall and external redoubt, could not be forced but at an enormous loss; and even if taken, the town was only to be reached from that quarter by a long bridge, easily susceptible of defence. The passage above the town presented difficulties apparently formidable; for it would bring the Allies into the deep and heavy country around the Arrege, the cross-roads of which, from the recent rains, had become all but impassable. But nevertheless Wellington resolved to attempt it, because, if successful, such a movement would detach Soult from the succours he expected from Suchet, throw back the latter general into the Pyrenees, by enabling the British to cut off his retreat by Narbonne, open up the communication with Bubna at Lyons, and compel Soult to abandon the line of the Garonne. He commenced the formation of a bridge at Portet, six miles above Toulouse, which appeared the most advantageous site that could be selected; but the stream was found to be too broad for the pontoons, and no means of obviating the defect existed.¹

This delayed the passage for some days: at length Hill discovered a more favourable point near Pensaguel, about two miles above the confluence of the Arrege, and nine above Toulouse, where a bridge was speedily laid down; and he immediately crossed over with two British divisions and Murillo's Spaniards, in all thirteen thousand men, with eighteen guns. This detachment was to seize the bridge of Cintegabelle over the Arrege, and advance towards Toulouse by its right bank, while Wellington with the main body threatened the faubourg St Ciprien on the left bank of the Garonne;² and Soult, not knowing on which side he at first was to be assailed, kept the bulk of his forces in hand within the walls of

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

76.

Ineffectual
attempt to
attack Tou-
louse by
passing
above the
town.

March 26.

¹ Gurw. xi.
626. Vaud.
iii. 100.
Behn. i.
289.

77.

But the pas-
sage above
the town is
at length
effected.

² Wellin-
ton to Lord
Bathurst,
April 1,
1814. Gur.
xi. 620.
Nap. vi.
627, 631.
Vaud. iii.
100, 103.
Behn. i.
289.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

the town, only observing Hill with light troops. But the roads on either side of the Arrege were found to be altogether impassable; and as everything depended on rapidity of movement, Hill wisely renounced the project of an attack on that side; recrossed the Garonne on the night of the 1st April, took up his pontoon bridge, and returned to the headquarters on the left bank of the river.

73.

Beresford,
with the
left wing,
is thrown
across be-
low Tou-
louse.
April 3.

Wellington now determined to make the attempt below the town; but this change in the line of attack, though unavoidable in the circumstances, proved of the most essential service to the French general. For, seeing that the passage would be made on that side, he set his whole army, and all the male population of Toulouse, to work at fortifications on the Mont Rave, by which alone the town could be approached in that quarter; and with such diligence did they labour during the nine days' respite afforded them before the allied army could finally effect their passage, that a most formidable series of field-works was erected on the summit of that rugged ridge, as well as at all the bridges over the canal and entrances of the suburbs of the town. Though, however, every hour was precious, yet such was the flooded state of the Garonne, from the torrents of rain which fell, and the melting of the snows in the Pyrenees, that the English general was compelled, much against his will, to remain inactive in front of St Ciprien till the evening of the third. Then, as the river had somewhat fallen, the pontoons were carried in the night to Grenade, fifteen miles below Toulouse; and a bridge having been quickly thrown over, a battery of thirty guns was established to protect it, and three divisions of infantry and three brigades of cavalry immediately passed over, which captured a large herd of oxen intended for the French army. But meanwhile a catastrophe, threatening the most terrible consequences, ensued.¹ The river rose again in raging torrents: the light division, and Span-

April 4.

¹ Behm, i.
231. Nap.
vi, 631, 632.
Vaud, iii.
104, 105.
Vict. et
Conq. xviii.
359. Wel-
lington to
Lord Ba-
thurst, April
12, 1814.
Görw. xi.
632.

iards, intended to follow the leading division, could not be got across; the grappling-irons and supports were swept away; and, to avoid total destruction, it became necessary to take up the pontoons and dismantle the bridge, leaving Beresford, with fifteen thousand foot and three thousand horse, exposed alone to the attack of the whole French army, of at least double their strength.

Soult was immediately made acquainted with this passage, but he was not at first aware of the small amount of force which was got across; and when he did learn it, he deemed it more advisable to await the enemy in the position he had fortified with such care at Toulouse, than to incur the chance of a combat, even with such superior forces, on the banks of the Garonne. He remained, accordingly, from the 4th to the 8th, immovable in his intrenched position, and thereby lost one of the fairest opportunities of attempting a serious, if not decisive, blow against the British army, which had occurred. Wellington, during this terrible interval, remained tranquil on the other side, ready to cross over in person by boat the moment Beresford was attacked. He was confident in his troops, even against twofold odds: and, having done his utmost to avert danger, calmly awaited the result. He has since been heard to say that he felt no disquietude, and never slept sounder in his life than on those three nights. At length, on the morning of the 8th, the river having subsided, the bridge was again laid down. Freyre's Spaniards and the Portuguese artillery were crossed over; and Wellington, taking the command in person, advanced up the valley of the Ers to Fenouillet, within five miles of Toulouse. Hill, with two divisions, was left to menace the suburb of St Ciprien on the left bank of the river; and the pontoon bridge was brought higher up, so as to facilitate the communication between him and the main body of the army. In the course of the advance towards the town, a sharp cavalry action took place at the bridge of Croix d'Auroute,

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1-14.

79.

His danger,
and superes-
ness of
South,
April 8.

1 Wellington
to Lord
Bathurst,
April 12,
1814. *Gaz.*
xi. 633.
Nap. vi.
632, 633.
Vaud. iii.
104, 105.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

80.
Advantages
of the
French
position.

over the Ers, where Vial's dragoons were overthrown by the 18th hussars, led by Major Hughes, the bridge carried, and a hundred prisoners taken, with hardly any loss to the British troops.

From the heights to which Wellington had now advanced, he had a distinct view of the French position, which he carefully studied. The whole of the next day was spent in bringing up the troops, which was not completely effected till the evening of the 9th, and in preparing for the battle. It must be admitted that Soult's measures had been conducted with great ability, and that his judicious selection of Toulouse as his battle-field had almost restored the chances of success in his favour. He had gained seventeen days of perfect rest for his troops, during which they had been sheltered from the weather, and both their physical strength and spirit essentially improved. He had brought the enemy to fight with an equality of force; for one-third of the British army was on the opposite bank before St Ciprien—a fortress so strong in front, and secure in flank, that a small body of conscripts might be there securely left to combat them. The main body, under Soult's immediate command, was posted on the rugged summit of Mont Rave, called the plateau of Calvinet, in an elevated position about two miles long, and strengthened on either flank by strong field-works. This formidable position could be reached only by crossing first a marshy plain, in some places impassable from the artificial inundations of the Ers, and then a long and steep hill, exposed to the fire of the artillery and redoubts on the summit. All the bridges of the Ers, except the Croix d'Auroute, were mined; and it was therefore necessary for the British army to make a flank-march under fire, so as to gain the eastern slope of the Mont Rave, and ascend the hill from that side.¹ If the summit of the ridge should be carried, there remained the interior line, formed by the canal, with its fortified bridge, houses, and suburbs, and within it again

¹ Nap. vi.
636, 637.
Vaud, ii.
107, 109.
Koch, iii.
641, 643.
Wellington
to Lord Bathurst, April
12, 1814.
Gurw. xi.
633.

a third line, formed of the walls of the ancient city, CHAP. LXXXVII. planted with cannon, which it was scarcely possible to carry without regular approaches or an enormous slaughter. 1514.

Having carefully examined the enemy's ground, Wellington adopted the following plan of attack. 81. Wellington's plan of attack. Hill, on the left bank, was to menace St Ciprien, so as to distract the enemy's attention in that quarter, and prevent their sending any succours to the right bank of the river; Picton and Alten, with the third and light divisions, Freyre's Spaniards, and Bock's heavy dragoons, were to advance against the northern extremity of the enemy's line, and if possible carry the hill of Pujade, so as to restrain the enemy in that quarter; but they were not to endeavour to carry the summit of the ridge. Meanwhile Beresford, with the fourth and sixth divisions, with Ponsonby's dragoons, and three batteries of cannon, after crossing the Ers at the Croix d'Auraote, was to defile along the low ground between Mont Rave and the marshy banks of the Ers, and having gained the extreme French right, to wheel into line, ascend the hill there, and assault the redoubts of St Sypière on the summit. This plan of operations was perhaps unavoidable, and it certainly promised to distract the enemy by three attacks—at St Ciprien, the hill of Pujade, and St Sypière at once. But it was open to the serious disadvantage of dividing the main body of the army into two different columns, separated by above two miles from each other; while the enemy, in concentrated masses, lay on the hill above them, and might crush either separately before the other could come to its assistance. 1 Ante, ch. xl. § 129. 2 Ante, ch. lxxviii. § 71. 3 Soult's Official Despatch, April 11. 1811. Belm. 714. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, April 12, 1814. Gurney, xl. 633. It was exactly a repetition of the allied cross-march, on the flank of which Soult had fallen with such decisive effect at Austerlitz;¹ or of Marmont's undue extension to his left, towards Ciudad Rodrigo, of which Wellington had so promptly availed himself, to the ruin of the French, at Salamanca;² Singular coincidence!³ that in the very

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1814.

last battle of the war, the one commander should have repeated the hazardous movements which, when committed by his adversary, had proved fatal to the French cause in the Peninsula; and the other failed to take that advantage of it by which he himself had formerly, under Napoleon's direction, decided the contest in Germany.

82.
Position of
the French.

Secure under cover of his numerous intrenchments on the long summit of the Mont Rave, and in the suburb of St Ciprien, Soult calmly awaited the attack. Reille, with the division Maransin, was in St Ciprien, opposed to Hill in the external defences of that suburb on the other side of the river; d'Erlon occupied the line on the right bank, from the mouth of the canal to the plateau of Calvinet; Daricau extending from the canal to the bridge of Matabian, and d'Armagnac being in reserve behind the northern extremity of the Mont Rave. Villatte was on the summit of the hill of Pujade, at the northern corner of the plateau; Harispe's men occupied the redoubts of Calvinet in the centre; and a brigade under Leseur manned the works on the summit of St Sypière on the extreme right, with Taupin's division in reserve in their rear. This division was originally posted in St Ciprien, but was early in the day moved to the more menaced point on the right. Berton's cavalry were in the low grounds near the Ers, to observe the movements of the enemy; Travot's division, composed chiefly of conscripts, held the fortified suburb of St Michel to the bridge of Demoiselles; and the National Guard of Toulouse lined the ramparts, and performed the service of the interior of the town.¹

¹ Koch, iii.
638, 640.
Vaub. ii.
107. Nap.
vi. 670.
Jones, ii.
372.

83.
Forces on
both sides.

The forces on the opposite sides were unequal in point of numbers, but nearly matched in military strength: the Anglo-Portuguese around Toulouse being fifty-two thousand, including seven thousand horse and sixty-four pieces of cannon; but of these twelve thousand were Spaniards, who could not be relied on for a serious shock. The French had nearly forty thousand, of whom thirty-eight thousand were brought into the field, includ-

ing Travot's reserve, but exclusive of the National Guard of Toulouse; and they had eighty pieces of cannon, some of them of very heavy calibre. The superiority in respect of numbers was clearly on the side of the Allies; but this might be considered as compensated in point of effective force by the great strength of the French position, their local advantage—as lying in the centre of a vast circle of which the Allies moved on the circumference—the triple line of intrenchments on which they had to fall back in case of disaster, the heavy artillery which crowned their field-works, and the homogeneous quality of their troops, all French, and containing that intermixture of young and veteran soldiers which often forms not the worst foundation for military prowess.^{1*} Both

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Nap. vi.
670. Koch,
iii. 641.
Vaud. ii.
107. Jones,
ii. 372.

* The battle of Toulouse being the last in the Peninsular contest, and a pitched battle of no ordinary interest and importance, has given rise to much discussion between the military historians of France and England. The former have laboured hard to diminish the effective French force in the field, while they magnified the British; and one of them, Choumara, has even gone so far as to claim for Marshal Soult and his countrymen the merit of a victory on the occasion. The British numbers in the field are exactly known, as the Morning State of the whole army on 10th April is extant, and has been published by Colonel Napier, vol. vi. 710. The French numbers cannot be so accurately ascertained, as no imperial muster-rolls subsequent to December 1813 remain. The statement in the text is founded on the detail of their army, as given by the able and impartial military historian, Koch; with the amount of Travot's reserve from Vaudoucourt, iii. 107.

I. ALLIED FORCE.

	Present, Effective.
4th Division, Cole, . . .	4,613
6th Division, Clinton, . .	4,877
24 Division, Platon, . . .	3,924
Light Division, Alten, . .	3,709
2d Division, Stewart, . .	5,000
Le Cor's Portuguese, . . .	3,307
Rank and File, bayonets, .	26,420
Officers, Sergeants, &c. .	2,872
Infantry,	29,292
Artillery,	6,832
Cavalry,	3,600

British and Portuguese,	39,724
Spaniards,	12,000

51,724

II. FRENCH FORCE.

	Present, Effective.
Infantry,	20,000
Cavalry,	3,000
Travot's reserve,	4,000
Artillery and drivers, . .	1,480
Total,	38,480

—*Morning State*, 10th April 1814; NAPIER, vi. 670; KOCH, iii. 639, and Tableau, xiv. for the details.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

84.

Battle of
Toulouse,
April 10.

sides were animated with the most heroic resolution : for they were alike aware that their long struggle was drawing to a termination, and that victory or defeat now would crown the glories of the one, or partially obliterate the humiliation of the other.

Wellington gave the signal for the commencement of the battle at seven o'clock in the morning. Picton and Alten drove the French advanced posts between the river and the hill of Pujade back to their fortified positions on the canal ; Hill forced them into their exterior line at St Ciprien ; while Clinton and Cole, at the head of the 4th and 6th divisions, rapidly defiled over the bridge of Croix d'Auracte, and wheeling to their left, after driving the enemy out of the village of Mont Blanc, continued their march along the margin of the Ers, sheltered by Freyre's Spaniards, who established themselves on the summit of the Pujade, from whence the Portuguese guns opened a heavy fire on the more elevated fortified heights of the Calvinet. The way having been thus cleared, Beresford, with Cole and Clinton's divisions, preceded by the hussars, continued their march at as swift a pace as they could, along the level ground between the foot of the ridge and the Ers. But the plain was found to be extremely marshy, and in many places intersected by water-courses, which retarded the troops not a little ; while Berton's cavalry vigorously skirmished with the British horse in front, and a fierce fire from the summit of Mont Rave in flank often tore their ranks by its repeated discharges. Nothing could be more critical than this flank-march, with less than thirteen thousand men, in such a hollow way, with a superior force strongly posted on the ridge on their right, and an impassable morass and river on their left. Fortune seemed to have thrown her choicest favours in the way of the French marshal ; and to complete the danger of Beresford's situation, a disaster, well-nigh attended with fatal consequences, soon occurred on his right,¹ which

¹ Wellington to Lord
Bathurst,
April 12,
1814. *Gen.
xi. 634.*
Soult to
Duc de Fel-
tre, April
11, 1814.
*Edin. J.
7. 4. 2. p.
vi. 949, 952.*
*Vand. m.
114, 115.*

seemed to render nearly the whole force on the summit of the Calvinet disposable to crush the column painfully toiling on at its foot.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1611.

While Arentschild's guns were replying by a distant cannonade from the lower summit of the Pujade to the elevated works on the Calvinet, Freyre's Spaniards advanced in good order to assault the northern angle of the redoubts on the latter heights. They were about nine thousand strong, and mounted the hill at first with great resolution, driving before them a French brigade, which retired skirmishing up to the works in the rear. But when the Spaniards came within range of grape-shot, the heavy artillery on the summit, sweeping down a smooth sloping glacis, which enabled every shot to take effect, produced such a frightful carnage in front, while the great guns from the redoubt at Matabian tore their flank, that the first line, instead of recoiling, rushed wildly forward, with the instinct of brave men, to gain the shelter of a hollow road which ran like a dry ditch in front of the works. In great confusion they reached this covered way ; but the second line, seeing the disorder in front, turned about and fled. Upon this the French, leaping with loud shouts out of their works, ran down to the upper edge of the hollow, and plied the unhappy men who had sought refuge there with such a deadly fire of musketry that it was soon little more than a quivering mass of wounded or dying. Freyre and the superior officers, with extraordinary gallantry, strove to rally the fugitives, and actually brought back the second line in tolerable order to the edge of the fatal hollow. But there they suddenly found themselves torn in flank by the discharge of a French brigade, which they had not hitherto seen : the fire from above was so violent, and the spectacle beneath them so horrid, that, after hesitating a moment, they broke and fled in wild confusion down the slope towards the bridge of Croix d'Auraote, closely followed by the French, plying them with an

15.
Defeat of
the Span-
iards in the
centre.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

1 Nap. vi.
640, 641.
Jones, ii.
270, 271.
Wellington
to Lord Ba-
thurst, April
12, 1814.
Gurw. xi.
634. Vaud.
iii, 116,
117.

86.

Picton also
is repulsed
at the bridge
of Jumeau.

incessant fire of musketry.* Such was the panic, that the fugitives poured in wild disorder to the bridge, and the French would have made themselves masters of it, thus entirely isolating Beresford from the rest of the army, had not Wellington, who was there, checked the pursuit by the reserve artillery and Ponsonby's horse; while a brigade of the light division, wheeling to its left, threw in its fire so opportunely on the flank of the pursuers, that they were constrained to return to their intrenchments on the summit of the hill.¹

This bloody repulse, which cost the Spaniards fully fifteen hundred men, was not the only disaster on the right. Picton, with the third division, had been instructed merely to engage the enemy's attention by a false attack; but when he beheld the rout on the hill to his left, and the rush of the French troops down the slope after the Spaniards, he conceived the design of turning his feigned into a real attack, supposing that this was the only way of drawing back the enemy, and avoiding total ruin in that quarter of the field. Accordingly, he advanced vigorously, and pushed on to the edge of the counterscarp of the redoubt which defended the bridge of Jumeau over the canal. There, however, all further progress was found to be impracticable, by reason of the extraordinary height of the opposite scarp. Nevertheless Picton's men ran forward, descended into the fosse, and tried, by mounting on each others shoulders, to reach the top of the wall. All their efforts, however, were fruitless. The troops being below the range of the guns on the rampart, were overwhelmed by a shower of large stones, arranged for that express purpose along the parapet, and at last driven entirely back, with the loss of five hundred killed

* One Spanish regiment, the Tiradors de Cantabria, in the midst of this terrific carnage retained their post in the hollow way under the redoubts, when their comrades were routed, till Wellington ordered them to retire.--WELLINGTON to LORD BATHURST, 12th April 1814; GURWOOD, xi. 635; and TORENO, v. 463.

and wounded. Thus, all along its northern front, the French position had been found, by dear-bought experience, to be impregnable; and although Hill had, by a vigorous attack, made himself master of the exterior line of fortifications of St Ciprien, and the Portuguese guns on the hill of Pujade, and Beresford's pieces—which it had been found impossible to drag through the miry ground on the edge of the Ers—with the guns of the light division near Matabian, kept up a prodigious concentric fire on the redoubts of Calvintet, yet the French cannon on the works above, of heavier calibre, and firing down, replied with superior effect, and the strength of the position on two of the sides yet assailed was unshaken.¹

Everything now depended on the success of Beresford on the extreme British left; yet he was so situated, that it was hard to say whether his divisions were not in greater danger than any other part of the army. Separated now by more than two miles from the remainder of their Allies, with their artillery of necessity left behind at Mont Blanc, out of cannon-shot, from the impossibility of dragging it forward—with their rear to an impassable morass and river, and a line of formidable intrenchments in their front—they had to ascend a sloping hill, above a mile in length, exposed all the way to the raking fire of a powerful array of artillery, backed by a formidable army on the summit. But the danger soon became still more pressing, and these two divisions were brought into such straits that there remained only victory or destruction. Soult, relieved by the repulse of the Spaniards from the pressure on his left, and seeing distinctly his advantage, concentrated his troops in hand for a desperate attack on Beresford, whom he hoped by a sudden irruption down the hill to cut in two, and sever altogether from the remainder of the army.* He had fifteen thou-

* "Beresford's divisions marched in three lines with their flank to us: they presented, in consequence, an extended body: the moment appeared favourable to destroy them. With that view I ordered Taupin, whose division was formed on the plateau, to advance at the *pas de charge* against the enemy, to

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1-14.

140, 167,
Mém. i.
519, 541,
Vaub. 14,
115, 118,
Nap. vi.
641, 642,
Jones, i.
271, Vaut.
et Conq.
xxiii. 353,
354, Koch,
iii. 641, 643.

87.
Soult at-
tacks Beres-
ford.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Soult to
Duc de Fel-
tre, April
11, 1814.
Behn. i.
715. Nap.
vi. 642, 643.
Vau l. iii.
118, 120.
Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
353, 354.

83.
Beresford
carries the
redoubts on
the French
right.

sand infantry and twelve hundred horse to make the attack, which promised decisive success. The orders were speedily given. Taupin's division, now established on the summit of the Mont Rave, and one of Maransin's brigades from St Ciprien, were brought forward, supported by Vial's and Berton's dragoons on either flank of the enemy, and directed to fall with the utmost fury on Beresford's men, now entirely destitute of artillery; while a brigade of d'Armagnac's division supported them as a reserve, and the guns on the summit thundered on the devoted mass below.¹

Taupin's division speedily appeared pouring down from the summit of the hill, flanked by clouds of cavalry, and half concealed by the volumes of smoke which issued from the redoubts above, which now redoubled their fire. Their generals and field-officers were seen in front of the line on horseback, waving their hats amidst the shouts of the multitude, which, mingled with the thunder of the cannon above, resembled the roar of the ocean breaking on an iron-bound shore. Impressed, but not panic-struck, with the sight, the British troops halted in their advance up the hill and deployed. The 79th and 42d Highlanders waved their bonnets in the air, and returned the shouts with three cheers: their light company, dispersed as tirailleurs in front, by a well-directed fire, brought down several of the gallant officers who led the enemy's advance, and the French column halted. They immediately discharged a volley into the British lines, and advanced amidst a deafening roar of mus-

pierced through his line, and cut off all who were thus imprudently advanced. His division was supported by the division d'Armagnac; it was aided by the fire of the works on the right of the line, in which General Danton was posted with the 9th light infantry; while General Soult* received orders to move down with a regiment of cavalry, to cut off the communication on his right between the enemy's column and the remainder of his army, and two other regiments of horse assailed his left flank. These dispositions promised the happiest result; seven or eight thousand English and Portuguese could hardly fail to be taken or destroyed." -SOULT TO DUC DE FELTRE, 11th April 1814; BEHNS, i. 715.

ketty and cannon. The French in column, as usual, found they could not withstand the British in line, being unable, from a few companies alone in front, to make any adequate resistance to the deadly volleys of musketry by which they were assailed. The British returned the fire, and advanced to the charge. Lambert's brigade of the sixth division, with Anson's of the fourth, dashed forward with a terrible shout, and the opposite lines seemed madly rushing at each other in the midst of smoke, which on both sides obscured the view. But in that dreadful moment the native superiority of the British courage was apparent. The French quailed before the shock; the lines never met; and when the clouds of smoke cleared away, they were seen wildly flying over the summit of the ridge, closely followed by the British, the 42d and 79th in front, who with loud shouts carried, in the confusion, the redoubt of Sypière. Taupin was killed while bravely endeavouring to rally his men; Vial's horsemen, after being repulsed by the 79th, whom they furiously charged, were swept away in the general rout; while Cole's division, stoutly ascending the hill on Clinton's left, completed the defeat of the enemy in that quarter, and not only solidly established the two divisions on the summit of the ridge on its extreme right, but threatened the enemy's communication by the bridge of Demoiselles with the town of Toulouse.¹

CHAP.
LXXVII.
1814.

¹ *Reminiscences of Camp, in Foy's* *Essays*, 293, in *Mem. of late War*, vol. iii. *Nap.* vi. 643, 644. *Jones*, ii. 272. *Vand.* iii. 129. 121. *Vict. et Camp.* xviii. 251, 255. *Belm.* i. 284. *Koch*, ii. 640, 642.

Thus, by the undaunted resolution of Beresford, seconded by the heroic valour of his troops, he had not only extricated himself from a situation of uncommon embarrassment and danger, but established his divisions in force on the right of the enemy's position, and threatened to take all their defences in flank. It was now Soult's turn to feel alarmed, and he instantly made fresh dispositions to guard against the danger. His whole defeated right wing was re-formed, d'Annagnac's reserve brigade brought up with Harispe's division, and a new line of defence taken up, facing outwards, stretching from the heights of

89.
Soult's dispositions to restore the battle.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Ante, ch.
xliv. § 70.

² Jones, ii.
273. Nap.
vi. 646.
Beamish, ii.
295, 296.
Soult to
Duc de Fel-
tre, April
11, 1814,
i. 716.

90.
Beresford
storms the
redoubts in
the centre.

Calvinet on his left to the intrenchments at the bridge of Demoiselles on his right ; while the remaining portion of the line still retained its old ground, facing the Spaniards and light division, on the northern front of the position. It was the same sort of line forming the two sides of a square, both facing outwards, which the Russians at Eylau, after having repulsed Augereau's attack on their right, found themselves compelled to adopt when suddenly turned by Davoust's successful irruption on their left.¹ Some hours, however, elapsed before the combat could be renewed ; for Beresford, being now firmly planted on the heights, waited, before he again commenced his attack, till he got up his guns from Mont Blanc, which he at length effected. Meanwhile Wellington made all the dispositions in his power to take advantage of his success ; but he had no reserve in hand save the light division and Ponsonby's dragoons, as the Spaniards could not be relied on for fresh operations, so that the weight of the remaining contest still fell on Beresford's wing.²

About three o'clock, the artillery having joined Clinton and Cole's division, Beresford gave orders to advance along the level summit, towards the redoubts in the centre on the Calvinet. Clinton was on the top of the ridge, Cole on the slope down towards Toulouse ; while at the same time the Spaniards under Freyre, now re-formed, advanced again to assault the northern end of the Calvinet, and Picton resumed his attack on the bridge of Jumeau. Pack had obtained from Clinton, for the 42d, the perilous honour of heading the assault, and soon the whole advanced in column to the charge. No sooner, however, were the Highland feathers seen rising above the brow of the hill, than so terrible a fire of grape and musketry opened from the works above, that the men involuntarily wheeled by the right into line, and rushed impetuously forward towards the redoubts. They were defended by bastions fronted with ditches full of water ; but so vehement was the rush of the Highland brigade, that the enemy aban-

done them before the British got up, and the 42d entered the redoubt by its gorge. The French, however, rallied bravely. Harispe's men, led by their gallant commander, headed the attack, and soon the taken redoubt was surrounded by a surging multitude, which broke into the work, put a large part of the 42d to the sword, and again got possession of that stronghold. The remains driven out, however, rallied on the 71st, 79th, and 92d; and these four Highland regiments, charging to the brow of the hill, fought shoulder to shoulder with such desperate resolution, though sorely reduced in number, that Harispe's men were never able to push them down the slope. Meanwhile Clinton's other brigades came up to their assistance: the French, still furiously fighting, were forced back: Harispe and Baurot both fell, badly wounded; the redoubt was retaken by the 79th; and the whole French column, like a vast mass of burning lava, amidst volumes of smoke and fire, was hurled down the hill towards Toulouse.¹

The battle was now gained: for although the Spaniards were repulsed in their fresh attack on the northern angle of the Calvinet, and Picton also failed in his renewed assault on the bridge of Jumeau, yet three-fourths of the Mont Rave was won: its central and southern works were in the hands of the enemy, and his guns commanded the whole suburb of St Etienne, as far as the old walls of the city. In these circumstances, at four o'clock, Soult abandoned the whole remaining works on the Calvinet, and withdrew his troops at all points within the second line of defence, formed by the canal of Languedoc, with its fortified bridge and intrenched suburbs. The Spaniards, seeing the heights abandoned, pressed up the slope which had been the theatre of such sanguinary contention in the earlier part of the day, and the whole allied forces, crossing the ridge, fell on the retiring columns of the enemy:² but they were arrested by the fire of the *têtes-de-pont*, and at seven o'clock the whole French forces were

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Journal of
42d Mem. of
late War,
ii. 297, 299.
Nap. vi.
646, 648.
Jones, ii.
273, 274.
Vaud. iii.
123, 124.
Viet. et
Cenq. XXIII.
355.

91.
Retreat of
Soult be-
hind the
canal.

² Wellington to Lord
Richmond,
April 12,
1814. Gagn.
xi. 636, 637.
Jones, ii.
273, 276.
Nap. vi.
648, 649.
Vaud. iii.
125, 127.
Viet. et
Cenq. XXIII.
355, 356.
Kneass, i.
665, 666.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

ranged behind the canal, which formed the line of demarcation between the two armies. At the same time, Hill drove the enemy from their exterior line of intrenchments, within the old city wall, on the other side of the Garonne; and Picton pushed the third division up close to the bridge-head of the canal next that river; while Wellington, having thus cooped the enemy up within the city, and established his army in proud array on the blood-stained summits of the Mont Rave, despatched his cavalry along the banks of the Ers, so as to threaten the Carcassone road, the only remaining issue which was still in the hands of the enemy.

92.

Results of
the battle.

Such was the bloody battle of Toulouse, in which, although the victory unquestionably was on the side of the British,* it is hard to say to which of the two gallant armies the prize of valour and devotion is to be awarded. Situated as the French army was, assailed by superior forces, and depressed by a long course of defeats, the heroic stand they made on the Calvignet was among the most honourable of their long and glorious career. It is with a feeling of pride, not for England alone, but for the human race, that the British historian has now to take leave of the renowned antagonists of his country in the Peninsula. Nor was the conduct of the British and their Allies less worthy of the highest admiration, assailing a force inferior in number, but in a concentrated intrenched position, and strengthened with the greatest possible advantages of nature and art. The loss on both sides was very severe, and heavier on that of the Allies than

* "The battle of Toulouse, in which the Duke of Dalmatia and the Duke of Wellington both claim the victory, was, beyond all question, lost by the former. But it was so dearly bought that the English general was in no condition to follow up his success, and might have been brought into a critical situation, if the French general had known how to avail himself of the advantages he still possessed."—Vauboncourt, iii. 128, 129. Three days before the battle, Soult wrote to Suchet:—"If by misfortune I should be compelled to abandon Toulouse, my movements will naturally be directed towards you." The abandonment of the town, says Bignon, in his opinion could only be the result of a defeat. See BIGNON, xiii. 137.

the French, as might naturally be expected in the attack of intrenchments of such strength and so defended. The former lost four thousand five hundred and fifty-eight men, of whom one thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight were Spaniards, six hundred and seven Portuguese, and two thousand one hundred and fourteen British. The French loss was three thousand two hundred killed, wounded, and prisoners, on the field; and one thousand six hundred men were taken prisoners on the 12th, in Toulouse, including Generals Harispe, Baurot, and St Hilaire, who were severely wounded.¹

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Wellington to Lord Bexford, April 12, 1814. *Gaz.* xi. 639. *Vaud.* iii. 128. *Knox's* iv. 696.

Soult, four days before the battle, was aware of the taking of Paris on the 29th March preceding;* but, like a good soldier and faithful servant, he was only confirmed by that disaster in his resolution to defend Toulouse to the last extremity, hoping thus to preserve for the Emperor the capital of the south; and at the same time he wrote to Suchet, urging him to combine measures for ulterior operations in Languedoc. On the day after the battle he expected to be attacked, and his troops were posted at all points along the canal to resist an assault. But Wellington wisely determined not to trust to chance what was certain by combination. The strength of the enemy's defensive fortifications at the bridge-heads of the canal had been fatally proved on the preceding day: ammunition for the cannon was wanting for a protracted struggle, till supplies were got up from the other side of the river; and the whole of the 11th was occupied in bringing it across. The attack was fixed for daylight on the 12th; and meanwhile the troops and guns were brought up to the front, and the cavalry pushed on to the heights of St Martin, menacing Soult's line of retreat to Carcassonne. How unwilling soever to relinquish the great

93.
Soult evacuates Toulouse.

* "M. Ricard was with me when I received the distressing intelligence of the entry of the Allies into Paris. That great disaster confirms me in my resolution to defend Toulouse, happen what may. The maintenance of that place, which contains establishments of all kinds, is of the last importance." —SOULT to SUCHET, 7th April 1814; *BELMAS*, i. 712, 713.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Nap. vi.
650, 651.
Vaud. iii.
127, 128.
Wellington
to Lord Bathurst, April
12, 1814.
Gurw. xi.
632, 639.

94.
Wellington's triumphant entry into Toulouse, and proclamation of Louis XVIII.

and important city of Toulouse, containing his hospitals, magazines, and depots of all sorts, the French general felt that it was no longer tenable, and that, by persisting in retaining it, he would run the hazard of ruining his whole army.* Wherefore, making his arrangements with great ability, he left sixteen hundred wounded, including the gallant Harispe and two other generals, to the humanity of the British general, besides eight heavy guns; and, defiling silently out at nightfall, managed his retreat so expeditiously, that before daybreak he was at Ville Franche, two-and-twenty miles off, on the road to Carcassonne.¹

Wellington entered Toulouse in triumph at noon on the 12th, and met with the most brilliant reception. A large proportion of the inhabitants, including the whole better classes, had already mounted the white cockade, though the intelligence of the dethronement of Napoleon had not yet been received. The people, who the day before had been under mortal apprehensions at being subjected to the horrors of an assault, suddenly found themselves delivered at once from their alarm and their oppression, and the reign of a pacific monarch proclaimed amidst the combined shouts of their enemies and their defenders. Wellington, however, who had hitherto only heard of the capture of Paris, but not of the dethronement of Napoleon and restoration of the Bourbons, expressed no small uneasiness at the declaration thus made in favour of the exiled prince, when, so far as he knew, the allied powers were still negotiating with Napoleon. "The royal cockade," replied Count Hargicourt, "is in my hat: it shall not fall from it but with my head." Loud applause followed this intrepid declaration; white scarfs immediately waved from every hand, tears glistened in many

* "I am under the necessity of retiring from Toulouse, and I fear I shall be obliged to fight at Bazieg, whither the enemy has directed a column to cut off my communication. To-morrow I shall take position at Ville Franche, and I hope nothing will prevent me from getting through the day after to-morrow at Castelmaudery." SOULT to SUCHET, 11th April 1814; BELMAS, i. 721.

eyes, and the tricolor flag was supplanted on the city hall by the fleur-de-lis and the white flag. Wellington still trembled for the devoted zeal of the people ; but at five o'clock despatches arrived from Paris, announcing the dethronement of Napoleon by the conservative senate, and the proclamation of Louis XVIII. All restraint was now at an end, and the English general could securely give open vent to the feelings which he had long privately entertained. He assumed the white cockade amidst thunders of applause : all his officers did the same. The news circulated in a few minutes through the town : the British soldiers were everywhere decorated with the Royalist colours by fair hands trembling with agitation ; and in the close of one of the longest and bloodiest wars recorded in history, was exhibited the marvellous spectacle of the white flag, the emblem at once of loyalty and peace, uniting in common transports the victors and the vanquished.¹

These astonishing events, which in effect terminated the war in the south of France, were immediately followed by a formal convention for the termination of hostilities between the rival commanders. Wellington lost no time in making Soult acquainted with the changes at Paris : but the French marshal, faithful to his trust, declined to come to an accommodation till he received official intelligence that the Emperor had really abdicated the throne. Having at length obtained that information, in a way which left no doubt of its authority, he concluded on the 18th a convention with Wellington, by which hostilities were immediately to cease, and the limits of the department of the Haute Garonne, with the departments of the Arrege, Aude, and Tarn, were to separate the two armies. The convention stipulated also the cessation of hostilities at Bayonne, Navarreins, and Bordeaux, as well as on the Catalonian frontier, in which last quarter the boundaries of France and Spain were to be the separating line between the two armies ; and the immediate evacuation of

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Beauch. ii.
460, 471.
Lab. ii. 431,
434. Gurw.
xi. 620.
Wellington
to Sir J.
Hop. April
16, 1814.
Gurw. ix.
648.

95.

Convention
which termi-
nates the
war in the
south of
France.
April 18.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1814.

1 Conven-
tion, April
18, 1814.
Guerw. xi.
653, 654.
Nap. vi.
651, 652.
Suchet, ii.
395, 396;
and Report
to Minister
of War,
June 11,
1814. *Ibid.*
ii. 517.

all the fortresses yet held by the French in Spain. Suchet, who had entirely withdrawn from Spain immediately before the battle of Toulouse, had already hoisted the white flag before he received intelligence of the convention concluded by Soult on his behalf. Twenty thousand veterans, in the best possible state, and of the utmost experience, were drawn from the fortresses held by the French in Catalonia and Valencia alone, after the conclusion of the convention—a surprising proof of the tenacity with which Napoleon, even in his last extremity, clung to those distant, and to him pernicious strongholds. But before the intelligence could be communicated to Bayonne, a deplorable event had taken place, which threw a gloom over the glorious termination of the Peninsular war.¹

96.
Sally from
Bayonne,
April 14.

After the departure of Wellington and the main army for the Upper Garonne, and the successful passage of the Adour, which has already been mentioned, Hope exerted himself with the utmost zeal and diligence to forward the siege of Bayonne; the works before which were in such forwardness, that he was ready to attack the citadel when rumours of the events at Paris reached him on the 7th April; but as he had not yet received any official communication on the subject, he of course continued his operations. Official accounts from Paris, however, at last reached the British camp, and were by Hope forwarded to Thouvenot, the governor of the fortress, who returned for answer, that the besiegers should hear from him on the subject before long. It would appear he had resolved on finishing the war with a brilliant exploit, which was the more likely to succeed, as the British, considering the contest as virtually at an end, might be supposed to be somewhat off their guard. Accordingly, at three o'clock on the morning of the 14th, the French, commencing with a false attack on the left of the Adour as a blind, suddenly poured out of the citadel to the number of three thousand men, broke through the line of pickets, and

with a violent rush and loud shouts carried the whole village of St Etienne, with the exception of a house occupied by a picket of the 38th under Captain Forster, which with heroic valour maintained its ground till General Hinuber came up with some of the German Legion. Soon after a battalion of Portuguese arrived, who retook the village after a tremendous struggle, at the point of the bayonet, and drove the enemy back towards the works. Meanwhile the guns of the citadel, guided by the flashes of musketry, fired incessantly on the scene of combat: the gun-boats, which had dropped down the stream, opened upon the flanks of the fighting columns, without being able to distinguish friend from foe; and amidst the incessant clang of small arms, and alternate cheers of the combatants, the deep booming of a hundred guns added to the horrors of this awful nocturnal combat.¹

On the right the conflict was still more terrible. The pickets and reserves were forced back by the vehement fury of the onset; the troops on both sides, broken into small bodies by the enclosures, and unable to recover their companies or even their regiments during the darkness, fought bayonet to bayonet, sword to sword, man to man, with the most determined resolution. Never had such fury been exhibited on both sides during the whole course of the war; never were wounds of so desperate a character inflicted on the warriors engaged. In the midst of this scene of horror, Sir John Hope, ever foremost where danger was to be met or heroism displayed, was hurrying to the front in a hollow way, when he met a British picket retiring before a large body of French. "Why do you retreat?" cried he. "The enemy are yonder," was the answer. "Well, then, we must drive them back," he replied, and spurring his charger, himself led them again to the attack. The French immediately gave a point-blank discharge, the general fell, wounded in two, his horse in eight, places, and he was made prisoner.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1814.

¹ Howard's
Official
Accounts,
April 15,
1814. *Gaz.*
xi. 667.
Note, Nap.
vi. 653, 655.
Subaltern,
chap. 24.
Beamish,
ii. 301, 303.
Vand. 13,
132, 133.

97.
Sir J. Hope
is made pri-
soner, but
the sally is
repulsed.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

But now the day was beginning to dawn; the troops rallied in all directions; and the reserve brigade of the Guards, led by General Howard, rushed forward in the finest order with the bayonet, and drove the broken and almost frantic mass, with terrible slaughter, back into the works. In this melancholy combat, fought after peace had been concluded, the British lost eight hundred and thirty men, including the gallant General Hay, who fell early in the fight; but the French loss was nine hundred and ten—a catastrophe severely felt by the limited numbers of the garrison, which, if the war had continued, must speedily have led to the fall of the place.¹

¹ Vaud. iii.
133. Nap.
vi. 655, 656.
Beamish,
ii. 302, 303.
Subaltern,
chap. 24,
pp. 350, 353.
Gurw. xi.
668.

98.
Concluding
operations
at Bor-
deaux.

The convention prevented serious hostilities being renewed on the Lower Garonne. Napoleon had collected a considerable force on the other side of that river; and Lord Dalhousie, who had succeeded to the command of the British force at Bordeaux, crossed it on the 4th of April to attack them. The combat was soon decided: the enemy, about two thousand strong, fled on the first onset, and the British cavalry, charging, made three hundred prisoners. At the same time Admiral Penrose, ascending the river in spite of the batteries at its mouth, burned a large flotilla at Castillon; so that the whole line of the Garonne, from Toulouse to the sea, with the intermediate country from thence to the Pyrenees, had, before the war ceased, with the exception of the fortress of Bayonne, been wrested from the French. Decaens, who had collected eight thousand men in La Vendée and the western provinces, could not have made head against Dalhousie, who commanded above twelve thousand. The whole infantry of the British army embarked at Bordeaux, some to America, some for Great Britain, loaded with honours, immortal in fame; Wellington and his staff soon after proceeded to Paris, to take part in the momentous negotiations there going forward;² and the British cavalry, in number above seven thousand, marched in

² Nap. vi.
656. Jones,
ii. 27.

triumph by Orleans across France, and embarked for their own country from the harbour of Calais.

Though both the rival commanders displayed the most consummate ability in the short but active campaign which preceded the battle of Toulouse, it may yet be doubted whether the conduct of either, at or shortly before the battle, is not open to criticism. On occasion of the three divisions of the British army, not more than sixteen thousand strong, even including cavalry and artillery, being left for three days close to Soult, who had thirty thousand disposable troops wherewith to assail them—on the opposite side of the Garonne from the remainder of the army, without the possibility of sending over succours to them, from the flooded state of the river—the French marshal lost an opportunity of striking a decisive blow, such as is rarely presented to the most fortunate commander. Picton, who commanded one of the divisions which had crossed, always said that the French general evinced on that occasion a degree of vacillation which he could not have expected from his well-known abilities.¹ Nor did he, on the field of battle itself, act with the vigour or decision which was requisite to obtain the proper advantage, from the extraordinary facilities of his situation. When Beresford moved with his two divisions so far to the left, and separated by two miles from the rest of the army, if Soult had thrown his whole disposable forces at once upon him, he would probably have achieved as decisive a success as Wellington did in a similar situation at Salamanca. When he did make the attack, he sent forward only Taupin's division and one of d'Armagnac's brigades, a force inadequate to the encounter in the open field of twelve thousand British troops; and by their defeat he lost the battle. Half measures here, as they do everywhere else, ruined everything: by sending this limited force, hardly half of what at the moment he had at his disposal, out of his redoubts, he

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

99.

Reflections
on this cam-
paign.

¹ Picton's
Memoirs,
ii. 299.

CHAP. LXXXVII. paralysed the fire of their guns, lest they should destroy
 1814. their own men, while he brought forward no sufficient
 body to crush the enemy in the open field.

100. Wellington's measures appear, on the field at least, to
 Errors of have been somewhat inconsiderate. To push Beresford
 Wellington. forward with thirteen thousand men by a long flank
 march, immediately under the eye of Soult, posted on the
 heights above with a larger amount of disposable troops,
 seems at least a very questionable proceeding. If Soult
 in person, with the iron arm of Napoleon, had struck at
 this detached corps when two miles off, at the head of
 twenty thousand men, where would the British army
 have been? The policy is not very apparent of intrust-
 ing the attack of the redoubts of Mount Calvinet, the key
 of the whole position, to the brave but unsteady Spanish
 troops; while Picton, with his heroic third division, and
 Hill, with another British division, were engaged, the one
 in a false attack on the bridge of Jumeau, the other in a
 distant and immaterial operation against the suburb of St
 Ciprien. The truth appears to be, that Soult, by a long
 train of disasters, had become timorous and distrustful of
 his troops, in all but the defence of fortified positions;
 and Wellington, from an uninterrupted career of victory,
 had almost forgotten that his men could ever be put to
 the hazard of defeat. Perhaps this circumstance affords
 the best vindication of both; for experience had too sorely
 impressed upon the one his apprehensions, and success
 almost justified any anticipations of triumphant extrica-
 tion from difficulties to the other.

101.
 Absurdity of
 the French
 claiming
 the victory
 at Toulouse.

The endeavour, however, which is made by an inge-
 nious French writer, to convert the battle of Toulouse
 into a victory for the arms of his country, is altogether
 hopeless. It is ridiculous to see such an attempt made in
 the face of Soult's written admission three days before the
 battle, already quoted, that the preservation of Toulouse
 was of such incalculable importance to him, as containing
 his magazines and establishments of all sorts; and of his

admission in his letter to Suchet, the day after the battle, that he could no longer maintain it, followed by his evacuation of the town, and forced march of twenty-two miles that very night. The ridge of the Mont Rave was the elevated ground for which both parties fought: when it was carried by the British, Toulouse was as indefensible as Paris was when Montmartre and Belleville had fallen. The case of Wellington retiring from the ridge of Busaco, the day after the battle at that place,¹ to which Chomara² wishes to parallel it, is not an analogous but an opposite instance, and brings out the true distinction on the subject. The whole ridge of Busaco was maintained by the British, despite Massena's attack: and the turning their position by the pass of Sardao, and forcing them to fall back to Coimbra, was in no way whatever the consequence of the battle. At Toulouse, the carrying of the ridge of the Mont Rave and the redoubts of Calvinet rendered Soult's position in that town wholly untenable; for the British guns commanded the city, and their cavalry cut off the only French communications left to them with Carcassonne and Suchet's forces. It was the possession of the heights of the Mont Rave, won by Beresford, that alone gave Wellington this advantage. If Massena had won the ridge of Busaco, and driven the British to a position half way down the mountain on the other side, and thus menaced the pass of Sardao, and forced them to retreat, no British writer would have thought of claiming the victory. Nor would they do so at Toulouse, if Beresford had been repulsed as Picton and the Spaniards were, and the works of Calvinet had remained in the hands of the French, and they had evacuated them two days afterwards, only in consequence of a flank movement of Wellington threatening the French general's communication with Suchet.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1-14.

¹ Ante, ch.
lxiii. § 71.

² Chomara,
sur la Ba-
taille de
Toulouse,
202.

All that remains to narrate, before describing the final catastrophe at Paris, is the concluding operations of Lord

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

102.

Bentinek's
operations
against
Genoa.

Atlas,
Plate 11.
March 29.

April 8.

April 16.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1814, p. 191.
Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
345, 346.
Botta, iv.
481. Koch,
ii. 628.

103.

Which capi-
tulates after
the external
forts had
been storm-
ed.

April 18.
² Bentinek's
Official
Account,
April 20,
1814. Ann.
Reg. p. 191.
App. to
Chron. Vict.
et Conq.
xxii. 345.
347. Botta,
iv. 481, 482.
Koch, ii.
630, 631.

William Bentinek and the Anglo-Sicilian army on the coast of Italy. The second detachment of the expedition having arrived from Catalonia, Bentinek, being now at the head of twelve thousand men, moved forward by the coast of the Mediterranean to La Spezia, which was occupied on the 29th March. Thence he advanced by the coast road, through the romantic defiles of the Apennines, so well known to travellers, to Sestri, where the enemy's forces, about six thousand strong, were posted. From this strong position, however, the French were driven with great loss on the 8th; and from thence the Allies advanced, fighting at every step, and gradually forcing their way through the ravines in the mountains, till the 13th, when General Montresor established himself in an advanced position near the town; and on the 16th the whole army was concentrated in front of Genoa. The enemy were there very strongly posted behind the Sturla, on the almost inaccessible ridges which surround that noble city, supported by forts and external works, their left resting on the castles of Richelieu and Tecla, their centre in the village of San Martino, and their right on the sea; the whole line passing through a country thickly studded with gardens, villas, enclosures, and all the impediments of suburban scenery.¹

Such, however, was the vigour of the attack on the day following, being the 17th, that the whole position was speedily carried. The second battalion of the third Italian regiment stormed Fort Tecla; another battalion of the same regiment, with a body of Calabrese, surmounted the rocky heights above Fort Richelieu, and compelled the garrison to capitulate. The French upon this retired within the town, and the Allies took up a position within six hundred yards of the ramparts, where preparations were immediately made for establishing breaching batteries, and carrying the place by assault.² To prevent such a catastrophe, the governor proposed to capitulate; and after some difficulties about the terms, a convention

was concluded, in virtue of which the French garrison was to march out with the honours of war and six pieces of cannon, and retire to Nice. The same day the British took possession; and thus was this magnificent fortress, which, under Massena in 1800, had held out so long against the Austrians, at once carried by the English forces, with immense stores of every kind, and two ships of the line and four brigs; all with the loss only of forty killed and a hundred and sixty wounded.

In the proceedings which immediately followed this important acquisition, Bentinck, without any authority from his government, gave the inhabitants reason to believe that it was the intention of the Allies to restore them to their former state of independence and republican government, as they had existed before the French Revolution.* These announcements excited unbounded joy and gratitude at the time, and proportional dissatisfaction arose, when considerations of general policy, and, in fact, absolute necessity, rendered it unavoidable to incorporate them, even against their will, with the Sardinian monarchy. Meanwhile, the Austrian general Bellegarde signed a convention with Murat, providing for the more vigorous prosecution of the war on the Po, and the final expulsion of the French from Italy. But the King of Naples, anxious to gain time, and to see the course of events on the Seine before he adopted a decisive course on the Po, adjourned, on various pretexts, the performance of his part of the contract; and it was not till the 13th that Bellegarde succeeded in prevailing upon him

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

164.
Concluding
operations
of the Allies
in Italy.

April 7.

April 13.

* "Warriors of Italy! only call and we will hasten to your relief; and then Italy, by our united efforts, shall become what she was in her most prosperous period, and what Spain now is."—LORD W. BENTINCK'S *Proclamation*, March 14, 1814. "Considering that the general wish of the Genoese is to return to their ancient form of government, I declare: 1. That the constitution of the Genoese States, such as it existed in 1797, with those modifications which the general wish, the public good, and the spirit of the original constitution of 1797 seem to require, is re-established."—LORD W. BENTINCK'S *Proclamation*, April 26, 1814; *Parl. Deb.* xxx. 393, 394. These proclamations were at variance with Bentinck's instructions, which were to do nothing that might fetter the hands of the Allies, in the final disposal of the Genoese territories.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

April 14.

to put his troops in motion. On that day, however, he forced the Taro, after a vigorous resistance on the part of the French general Maucune; and on the day following the passage of the Nura was also effected, after a sharp conflict. These actions, in which the French lost fifteen hundred men, were of sinister augury to the cause of the Viceroy in Italy; but the further prosecution of hostilities was prevented by the intelligence which arrived next day, of the capitulation of Paris and dethronement of Napoleon. A convention was immediately concluded with the Austrian generals; in virtue of which Palma-Nuova, Osopo, Venice, and Legnago, were immediately surrendered to their troops. Eugene's armaments were soon after dissolved; everything was placed on a new footing; the whole of Lombardy was occupied by the Germans; and in the first week of May the French troops FINALLY REPASSED THE ALPS, not without casting from the summit of Mount Cenis a "longing, lingering look behind" at that classic land, which they had won by their valour and lost by their oppression.¹

¹ Koch, ii.
632. Viet. et
Conq. xxiii.
346, 348.
Botta, v.
479. Eugene, x.
161, 179.

105.

State and
final sur-
render of
the for-
tresses in
Germany
still held by
the French.

To complete the picture of the French empire, as it was submitted to the consideration of Napoleon at Rheims in the middle of March, when he took his final determination as to the congress of Châtillon, it only remains to cast a last glance over the vast fortresses, once the bulwarks of his mighty dominions, which still remained in the hands of his generals on the other side of the Rhine. Glogau, blockaded since the 17th August 1813, capitulated from want of provisions on the 10th April, and the garrison, still three thousand three hundred strong, became prisoners of war. Cüstrin fell on the 30th March, with its garrison of three thousand. Wittenberg had been more actively besieged: trenches were opened against it in the beginning of January; and it was carried by assault on the 15th, fifteen hundred men having been made prisoners. The citadel of Würtzburg fell, as did the two of Erfurth, long closely blockaded—the former

April 10.

March 30.

Jan. 15.

on the 21st March, with fifteen hundred men; the latter, with two thousand, in the beginning of May. Magdeburg, with its garrison, now swelled by stragglers from the French army, who had sought refuge within its walls after the retreat from the Elbe, to eighteen thousand men, presented a more important object. The blockade was loosely maintained by successive bodies of allied troops as they advanced from Russia, or were equipped in the adjoining provinces of Prussia, from the 26th of October till the final capitulation took place in the middle of May. Several sorties were made to collect provisions, particularly in the beginning of January, and on the 1st of April: on which last occasion, eight thousand men were engaged in the attack, and were not repulsed without considerable difficulty. An armistice was concluded on the 14th April, as soon as the events at Paris were known; but it was not till the 19th May that the place was finally evacuated, when General Lemarrois led back to France the divisions Lanusse and Lemoine, still fourteen thousand strong, besides four thousand Italians, Spaniards, and Croats, who were dismissed to their respective homes.¹

Davoust, in Hamburg, as already noticed, had been blockaded by Benningsen, with a large part of the Russian army of reserve, immediately after the battle of Leipsic. General Strogonoff at first had the command, but he was replaced in the end of January by Benningsen in person, who thenceforward took the direction of that important operation. On the 20th January, a serious attack took place on the fort of Harburg, and the island of Wilhelmsburg: the first proved successful, but in the latter the Russians were repulsed with the loss of seven hundred men. The hard frost which now succeeded, so well known and severely felt over all Europe, having completely frozen the Elbe, the Russian general resolved to take advantage of it to effect the reduction of the island of Wilhelmsburg, without the command of which he had become sensible that no operations, with any degree

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1814.

¹ Plötho, iii.
502, 513.
Vaud. 136,
139. Viet.
et Cong.
xxiii. 349,
350.

106.
Operations
under Ben-
ningsen
against
Davoust in
Hamburg.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.
Feb. 9, 17,
24, and Mar.
5, 11.

April 18.

¹ Plottho, iii.
515, 521.
Vaud, iii.
139, 141.

107.
Reflections
on the im-
policy of
Napoleon's
clinging so
tenaciously
to these for-
tresses.

of certainty, could be carried on against the body of the fortress. Repeated attacks took place on the 9th, 17th, and 24th of February, and on the 5th and 11th of March. But such was the tenacity of Marshal Davoust, and the vigour of his resistance, that, although the Russians repeatedly got footing in the island, they were always, in the end, repulsed with very severe loss. Upwards of four thousand men were lost to both sides in these bloody combats, which led to no decisive results; and at length Benningsen, despairing of dispossessing the enemy by main force, strengthened the blockade, and trusted to the slower and more certain effects of disease and scarcity. The city, already pillaged and woe-struck to an unparalleled degree by the merciless exactions of the French marshal, was now threatened with the combined horrors of plague, pestilence, and famine, when a period was fortunately put to its sufferings by the fall of Napoleon, which was followed by a suspension of arms on the 18th April. In consequence of that event, the garrison, in the end of May, still thirteen thousand strong, besides three thousand sick and wounded in the hospitals, set out on their return to France. Wesel, with its garrison of ten thousand men, long blockaded by Borstel's Prussians, was finally evacuated on the 10th May.¹

Thus, while Napoleon at Rheims, with his heroic band of followers, not forty thousand strong, was maintaining a doubtful struggle with the vast masses of the allied forces, above seventy thousand of his veteran troops were blockaded in the fortresses still held by his lieutenants beyond the Rhine and the Pyrenees*—an extraordinary

* Viz. :—

In Catalonia and Santona (<i>Ante</i> , Chap. LXXXVII. § 72),	21,500
Hamburg,	16,000
Wesel,	10,000
Cüstrin,	3,000
Wittenberg,	1,500
Magdeburg,	18,000
Würzburg,	1,500
Erfurth,	2,000
Total,	73,500

VAUDENOURT, iii. 136, 141; SUCHET, ii. 517.

fact, and speaking volumes as to the disastrous effect which the obstinate retention of those distant strongholds had upon the fortunes of the empire. Nothing can be more evident than that it was his determination to abandon nothing that made him lose everything. Nor is there any foundation for the remark, that if the Emperor had withdrawn these garrisons to augment his forces in the interior, the blockading troops would have formed an equal or greater addition to the armies of the Allies. For these besieging corps, though very numerous, were for the most part composed of landwehr and new levies, wholly unfit for operations in the field, though perfectly adequate to the duties of a blockade, while the garrisons they held in check were the best troops at that period in the French service. The armies, too, with which the Allies invaded France, were so numerous, that it was with the utmost difficulty they could find subsistence, and an additional host of mouths would have been an encumbrance rather than an advantage ; whereas seventy thousand veterans added to Napoleon's armies in the plains of Champagne, might have hurled back the Allies with disgrace to the Rhine.

It was want of men—the utter exhaustion of his military resources—which in the end proved his ruin. And yet, at that very time, he had veteran soldiers in abundance, voluntarily exiled by him from their country. Perplexed and wearisome as the details of the breaking up, in all its extent, of so immense a dominion necessarily are, the pains of investigating them will not be deemed lost when it leads to such a result as this ; and demonstrates the decisive influence which the necessity of nowhere receding, and maintaining to the last the principle “*tout ou rien*,” had upon the ultimate fate of the Revolution. Dark and mournful, however, as was the intelligence which on every side pressed on the Emperor at Rheims, it had no effect in shaking his determination. The disasters which have been enumerated, which accumulated “round a sinking throne and falling empire.”

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1814.

108.
Its disastrous effect on his fortunes in the last result.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Fain, 170,
171.

were all, with the exception of the taking of Lyons and Genoa, and the battle of Toulouse, known to him when he took his final resolution to refuse the terms proposed to him at Châtillon; but still he would not consent to abandon Antwerp and the frontier of the Rhine.¹

109.
Final terms
proposed to
Napoleon at
Châtillon,
Feb. 17.

The terms which the allied sovereigns proposed to Napoleon in the close of the conferences at Châtillon, were the cession, by Napoleon, of the whole conquests made by France since 1792: the abandonment of the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of Switzerland, and King of Italy: the reconstruction of all the countries adjoining France in an independent form: in particular, the organisation of Germany in a federal union; of Italy in independent states, between the Austrian possessions and the French frontier: the independence of Switzerland as a separate republic: the formation of a kingdom in Holland and Belgium for the house of Orange; and lastly, the restoration of the Peninsular thrones to the houses of Braganza and Bourbon. In return for these demands, the British government consented to restore the whole French colonies conquered by them during the war, with the exception of the isles of Saintes and Tobago in the West, and the isles of Mauritius and Bourbon in the East Indies. Malta was to remain in the hands of the English; but Sweden and Portugal were to restore Guadaloupe and Cayenne. So noble and disinterested was the use which Great Britain made of the immense sacrifices and unbounded ultimate triumphs of the war, that all the exactions she required of France were for the security of her Continental Allies; and peace was to bring to Napoleon a restitution of fully four-fifths of the conquests which Great Britain had made of his transmarine possessions. On these terms the Allies offered to recognise Napoleon as Emperor of France, and immediately conclude peace, leaving him as great an empire as had been enjoyed by Louis XIV.; and to possess which, Frederick the Great said, was "the

brightest dream which a sovereign could form."* Metternich, who was sincerely desirous of an accommodation, was careful throughout to warn the Emperor, that he need not expect the cabinet of Vienna to detach itself from the other allied powers in this negotiation. "It is impossible," said he to Caulaincourt, "to be more united than we are in thoughts, views, and principles. If the Emperor Napoleon, in the present grave circumstances, listens only to the voice of reason: if he seeks his glory in the happiness of his people, renouncing his former ideas of political supremacy, the Emperor Francis will look back with satisfaction to the moment when he confided to him the daughter of his heart. If a fatal blindness renders your master deaf to the unanimous voice of his people and the wish of Europe, the Emperor of Austria will deplore the fate of his daughter, but not swerve from his path."¹

Napoleon having declined to accede to these conditions, Caulaincourt, after a great many delays thrown in the way, to gain time for the military successes of the Emperor to influence in the manner he desired the progress of the negotiations, at length on the 10th March—the very last day which the Allies would allow him for that purpose—gave in what he termed a counter-project: but which, in effect, was nothing but an able argument on the part of the French government against the terms proposed by the Allies. In this he contended that the preliminaries of the 17th February were a violation of a positive engagement undertaken by them towards France, she

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1514.

¹ Project of
Allies, Feb.
9. Koch, ii.
236, 343.
Cap. x. 377.
Fain, 327.
Bign. xiii.
308. Thiers,
xvii. 397.

110.
Counter-
statement
by Napo-
léon.

March 10.

* "I will always hold to you the same language; it should be appreciated by men of sense who really desire the good of their country. We have but one wish, that of peace; but that peace is impossible, if you will not make the sacrifices necessary to regain your possessions beyond the seas. To arrive at that peace, it is necessary to be equally prepared for the means by which it is to be obtained, and not to forget that England disposes *alone* of all the compensations possible; and that, in agreeing to denude herself in favour of France, *of almost the whole of her acquisitions*, she is entitled to insist that France shall be replaced on a level with the other great powers on the Continent."—METTERNICH to CAULAINCOURT, *March 8th*. 1814; FAIN, 395, 396; *Pièces Just.*

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

(France) having accepted the Frankfort propositions which they had themselves proposed. “The powers declared,” continued he, “only three months ago at Frankfort, that they wished to establish a just equilibrium in Europe. They profess the same desire now. To maintain the same *relative* position which she always enjoyed, is the only real wish of France. But Europe does not at this time resemble what she was twenty years ago. At that period the kingdom of Poland, already partitioned, disappeared entirely; the immense empire of Russia received vast and rich provinces; six millions of men were added to dominions already more extensive than any sovereign in Europe enjoyed; while nine millions fell to the lot of Austria and Prussia. Soon the face of Germany was changed. The ecclesiastical states and most of the free cities were divided among the secular princes; Prussia and Austria received the greater part of them. The ancient republic of Venice became a province of Austria: two millions of subjects, with new territories and new resources, were given to Russia by the treaty of Tilsit, by that of Vienna, by that of Yassi, by that of Abo. On her own side, and during the same period, England has not only acquired the Dutch possessions of Ceylon and Trinidad, but she has doubled her territories in India, and gained an empire there which two of the greatest monarchies in Europe would hardly equal.

111.
His able
argument
against the
allied terms.

“If the population of that empire cannot be considered as an addition to the inhabitants of Great Britain,—on the other hand, she has acquired by their sovereignty and commerce an immense increase of riches, the other great element of power. Russia and England have preserved all that they have acquired; Austria and Prussia have, it is true, sustained losses; but do they abandon all thoughts of repairing them? or will they be now contented with the possessions which they enjoyed before the war? When all has thus changed around France, can it maintain the same relative power, if it is reduced to its

original limits? Replaced in its original state it would be far from enjoying the same influence or security, when the power of its neighbours has so immensely increased. England can only be attacked by sea: Russia, backed by the Pole, and flanked on either side by inaccessible and boundless solitudes, can be invaded, since the acquisition of Finland, only on one side. France, half-commercial and half territorial, is open to attack on all sides both by sea and land, on both which elements she is brought immediately in contact with valiant nations.”¹

The allied plenipotentiaries, upon receiving this counter-project, declared that this memoir was no answer to their ultimatum, and were on the point of breaking up the conferences; when Castlaincourt, overwhelmed with apprehension at the immediate and probable result of such a rupture, proposed verbally, on the part of the Emperor, that he should renounce all supremacy or constitutional influence in countries beyond the limits of France: recognise the independence of Spain in its old limits, under the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII.; admit the independence of Switzerland, under the guarantee of the allied powers, that of Germany under its native princes, and that of Holland under the sovereignty of the Prince of Orange.* This was followed three days afterwards by a more detailed counter-project on the part of Napoleon,

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ *Contre-projet de Castlaincourt*, Mar. 10, 1814. Fain, 525. Thiers, xvii. 506. *Castlaincourt Despatch*, ix. 553, 558.

112.

Castlaincourt at length gives in a counter-project.

March 13.

* The allied plenipotentiaries were about to break up the conferences “when M. de Castlaincourt drew from his portfolio a paper, and said, ‘J’ai encore une déclaration à faire!’ which he read as follows, and said he did it *verbalement* to pursue our own form. ‘Le plénipotentiaire de France déclare verbalement que l’Empereur des Français est prêt à renoncer par le traité à conclure à tout titre exprimant de rapports de souveraineté, de suprématie, protection, ou influence constitutionnelle, avec les pays hors des limites de la France; et à reconnaître l’indépendance de l’Espagne dans ses anciennes limites sous la souveraineté de Ferdinand VII.; l’indépendance de l’Italie: l’indépendance de la Suisse, sous la garantie des grandes puissances; l’indépendance de l’Allemagne; et l’indépendance de la Hollande, sous la souveraineté du Prince d’Orange. Il déclare encore que si pour écarter des causes de mésintelligence, rendre l’amitié plus étroite et la paix plus durable entre la France et l’Angleterre, des cessions de la part de la France au-delà des mers peuvent être jugées nécessaires, la France sera prête à les faire moyennant équivalent raisonnable.’”—CASTLEREAGH *Despatches*, ix. 559.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

¹ Contre-
projet of
Caulain-
court, Mar.
10 and 13,
1814. Fain,
335, 359.
Thiers, xvii.
506, 507.
Castlereagh
Desp. ix.
559, 566.

of the same general tenor, but in which he still eluded any answer to the requisition of the Allies, that France should be restored to its limits as in 1792, and held out for the possession of Antwerp, Flanders, and the frontier of the Rhine. He insisted also that the Ionian Islands should be annexed to the kingdom of Italy, and that both should be settled on Prince Eugene and his descendants, with the Adige as a boundary on the side of Austria: that Saxony should be restored entire: that the sovereignty of Lucca and Piombino should be secured to his sister the Princess Eliza: the principality of Neuchâtel to Berthier; and that all the colonies taken during the war, except Saintes, should be restored by Great Britain.¹

113.

Answer of
the Allies to
the ultima-
tum of
France.

This counter-project of Napoleon was met by the following answer on the part of the allied powers:—“Europe, allied against the French government, wishes only the re-establishment of a general peace, continental and maritime. Such a peace can alone give the world repose, of which it has so long been deprived; but that peace cannot subsist without a due partition of force among the different powers. No view of ambition has dictated the proposals made on the part of the Allies in the sitting of 17th February last. France, even when restored to her limits of 1792, is still, from the central nature of her situation, her population, the riches of her soil, the strength of her frontiers, the number and distribution of her fortified places, on a level with the greatest powers on the Continent; the other powers, in consenting to their own reconstruction on a proportional scale, and to the establishment of intermediate independent secondary states, prove at once what are the principles which animate them. England restores to France her colonies, and with them her commerce and her marine.

* Thiers, after enumerating the concessions made by France, says, “Mais cette énumération précise des concessions faites par la France, impliquait naturellement qu’elle entendait garder le Rhin et les Alpes, c’est à dire, Anvers, Cologne, Mayence, Chambéry, Nice, puisqu’elle ne déclarait pas les abandonner.” —THIERS, xvii. 507.

England does more : in denuding herself of nearly the whole of the conquests which she has made during so many years, she is far from advancing any pretensions to the exclusive dominion of the seas, or any right inconsistent with the free enjoyment of commerce by others. Inspired with a spirit of justice and liberality worthy of a great people, England throws into the balance of the Continent acquisitions beyond the sea, of which the possession would secure her for long the exclusive dominion of it. In restoring to France her colonies, in making great sacrifices for the restoration of Holland, which the spirit of the Dutch people renders worthy to resume its place in the European family, the British government are entitled to expect that such sacrifices on their part shall purchase a real and effectual, not a merely nominal equilibrium in Europe ; that the political state of Europe shall be such as to afford her a guarantee that these concessions have not been a pure loss on her part, that they will not be turned against Europe and herself.

“The counter-project of the French plenipotentiary proceeds on entirely different principles. According to them, France will retain a territory more extensive than experience has shown to be consistent with the peace of Europe. She will retain those salient points and offensive positions, by the aid of which she has already overturned so many of the adjoining states ; the cessions which she proposes to make are only apparent. The principles still announced by the actual sovereign of France, and the dear-bought experience of many years, have proved that adjoining secondary states possessed by members of his family can be independent only in name. Were they to deviate from the principles on which their project of the 17th February rests, the allied sovereigns would have done nothing for the peace or safety of Europe ; the efforts of so many sovereigns leagued together for one end would be lost ; the weakness of their cabinets would turn at once against themselves and their subjects ;

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

114.
And to the
counter-
project of
Napoleon.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

Europe, and France itself, would soon become the victims of new convulsions; Europe would not conclude peace, she would only disarm. The allied courts, therefore, considering the counter-project of France as essentially at variance, not merely with the details, but with the spirit of the basis proposed by them, regard any further prolongation of the congress at Châtillon as useless and dangerous: useless, because the proposals of France are opposed to the conditions which the Allies consider necessary to the equilibrium of Europe, and to the reconstruction of the social edifice, to which they are determined to consecrate all the forces with which Providence has intrusted them: dangerous, because the prolongation of sterile negotiations would only inspire the people of Europe with vain expectations of peace. The allied powers, therefore, with regret regard the congress of Châtillon as dissolved; and they cannot separate without declaring that *they make no war upon France*: that they regard the proper dimensions of that empire as one of the first conditions of a proper balance of power; but that they will not lay down their arms until their principles have been recognised and admitted by its government.”¹

¹ Protocol, March 18, 1814. Fain, 357, 361. Koch, ii. 360, 363.

115.
Anxiety of Metternich for Napoleon to accede to these terms.

So anxious was Metternich to induce Caulaincourt to make peace on the terms proposed, that on the very morning of the day on which the last meeting of the congress took place, he wrote to him as follows: “The day when peace may be finally concluded, under the necessary sacrifices, has at length arrived: come to conclude it, but without attempting inadmissible projects. Matters have now come to such a pass, that you can no longer write romances without the greatest risks to the Emperor Napoleon. What risks, on the other hand, do the Allies run? None but being obliged to evacuate the territory of old France; and what would that avail the Emperor Napoleon? The whole left bank of the Rhine will speedily be raised against him: Savoy is in arms: attacks entirely personal will soon be made on the Emperor,

without the possibility of arresting them. I speak to you with sincerity; I am ever on the same path. You know my views, my principles, my wishes. The first are entirely European, and therefore not alien to France; the second point to retaining Austria interested in the wellbeing of France: the third are in favour of a dynasty so intimately united to our own. I speak to you, my dear duke, in the most entire confidence. To put an end to the dangers which menace France, it depends only on your master to make peace. Matters, if he does not do so, will ere long be beyond his reach. The throne of Louis XIV. with the additions of Louis XV. is too high a stake to put upon a single throw. I will do my utmost to retain Lord Castlereagh a few days: the moment he is gone, all hope of peace has vanished." Caulaincourt replied on the 20th — "If it depended on me, your hopes would speedily be realised; I should have no doubt they would, if I was sure that yourself and Lord Castlereagh were the instruments of that work, as glorious as it is desirable." It was all in vain: Napoleon positively refused to recede from his counter-project, and the allied plenipotentiaries left Châtillon. Like a rock projecting far into the stormy main, he stood alone, firm and immovable, while the waves were beating around him.^{1*}

Thus was finally dissolved the famous congress of Châtillon: thus departed the last chance which Napoleon had of preserving his revolutionary dynasty on the throne of France. Caulaincourt next day delivered an answer to the note of the allied sovereigns: it contained nothing but a repetition of the arguments he had formerly urged, but without abating in any degree the pretensions which France had advanced; and the congress was declared terminated. It broke off from no verbal distinctions or diplomatic casuistry. Real substantial interests were

CHAP.
LXXXVII.
1814.

¹ Metternich to Caulaincourt, March 18, 1814; and Caulaincourt to Metternich, March 20, 1814. Fain, 311, 313. Theirs, xvii. 539, 542.

116.
Reflections on the dissolution of the Congress.

March 19.

* "Ille velut pelagi rupes immota resistit:
Ut pelagi rupes magno veniente fragore,
Quæ sese multis circumlatrantibus undis
Mole tenit: scopuli nequiquam et spuma circum
Saxa fremunt." — *Æneid*, vii. 585.

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

involved in the matters at issue ; it was the life or death of the French supremacy in Europe which was at stake. With Flanders and the Rhenish provinces remaining part of the French empire ; with the kingdom of Italy and the Elector of Saxony for external dependants ; with one hand resting on Antwerp and another on Mantua, and a ready ingress at all times prepared into the heart of Germany through Mayence, — the revolutionary dynasty, impelled alike by internal discontent and external ambition, would never have ceased to disturb the peace of Europe. But of all these great keys to European dominion, it was Antwerp to which the Emperor most strongly held ; it was the dread of losing it which made him, with fifty thousand men, renew a contest with two hundred thousand, almost at the gates of Paris. “Antwerp,” says Napoleon, “was to me a province in itself ; it was the principal cause of my exile to St Helena ; for it was the required cession of that fortress which made me refuse the terms offered at Châtillon. If they would have left it to me, peace would have been concluded.”¹ Strange, that within twenty years of the time when this great man had preferred risking the crown of France to the surrender of that outwork against England, and in the full knowledge of his opinion as to its importance for their overthrow, the British government, in a paroxysm of political madness, should have lent the aid of their fleet to the French army to wrest that noble fortress from their natural allies the Dutch, and restore it to a revolutionary dynasty and the rule of the tricolor flag !^{2*}

¹ Las Cases, vii. 43, 44, 56, 57.

² Protocol, March 19, 1814. Fain, 361, 368. Castlereagh Desp. ix. 571, 573.

* So intent was Napoleon on the preservation of Antwerp, that on the 17th March, the very day before the ultimatum of the Allies was delivered, declining the proposals of France, Maret, by his orders, wrote from Rheims:—“The abandonment of all their conquests by the English is a real concession which his Majesty approves, *especially if it can be combined with leaving us Antwerp*. If the negotiation is to be broken off, it is expedient that it should be on the cession of our strongholds, and the evacuation of our territory. If you are obliged to abandon Antwerp, the Emperor requires that you shall insist on the restitution of all our colonies, including the Isle of France, and the adherence to the basis of Frankfort so far as regards Italy.”—MARET to CAULAINCOURT, *Rheims*, 17th March 1814: FAIN, 307, 308. This letter did not reach Caulaincourt till the congress was dissolved.

Napoleon's conduct at this crisis was strikingly characteristic of the indomitable firmness of his mind, and of that mixture of confidence in his powers and unbending rigidity of disposition, which had so long contributed to his elevation. On all sides his empire was crumbling around him. Above a third of France had been wrested from him by the Allies, without firing a shot : Holland and Flanders were lost, Spain had been torn from his arms, Italy was melting from his grasp, and Soult, driven from the Pyrenees, was hardly able to defend the line of the Garonne from the victorious arms of the English and Spaniards. Surrounded by a host of enemies, the most formidable and inveterate which Europe had ever seen, France was reduced to its ancient and narrow limits, when Laon was its frontier, the Garonne its barrier stream, before Philip Augustus and Louis XI. extended its frontiers to the Rhine and the Pyrenees. Napoleon was at the head only of a gallant army of eighty thousand men in the east of France, and fifty thousand in Languedoc, when four hundred thousand effective soldiers were assembled in the heart of France to beat him to the ground. Yet in this desperate situation he abated nothing of his haughty bearing : broke off the congress of Châtillon, rather than surrender Antwerp and Mantua ; retained seventy thousand of his best troops in the garrisons of Spain and Germany, to preserve the means of renewing his conquests ; and voluntarily risked dethronement, rather than purchase peace by the reduction of his empire to the limits which had satisfied the ambition of Louis XIV. He preferred endangering all, in his own words, "to sitting down with a diminished empire, and on a dishonoured throne."

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

1814.

117.

Un coup :
able of sta-
nary of Nas-
poleon at
this period.

" Et qui règne un moment, aime à régner toujours :

Mais si l'essai du trône en fait durer l'envie

Dans l'âme la plus haute à l'égal de la vie,

Un roi né pour la gloire, et digne de son sort,

A la honte des fers sait préférer la mort."—CORNÉLIE.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

FALL OF NAPOLEON.

IN the midst of the general wreck of his empire, it was on Paris, the seat of his power, and the centre of all his political ramifications, that the attention of the Emperor was fixed. The accounts from that capital were sufficiently alarming. Slowly, indeed, but perceptibly, and at last in an alarming manner, the vast hosts of the Grand Army were approaching. The long diversion produced by Blücher's irruption towards Meaux, had in a manner left the road to Paris open to Schwartzemberg. MacDonald, Oudinot, and Gerard, since their defeat at Bar-sur-Aube, were hardly a match for a single corps of the allied army; Troyes had been reoccupied; the passage of the Seine had been forced at Nogent; their light cavalry again appeared at Fontainebleau and Nemours; Provins was threatened; and the whole body of their forces might be at Paris on the 20th. The near approach of such formidable masses, the absence of Napoleon, the issue of the battles of Craone and Laon, the fall of Lyons, the occupation of Bordeaux, and proclamation of Louis XVIII. there, had both excited unbounded consternation among the imperial functionaries, and awakened enthusiastic hopes among the Royalist party. Their committees were in motion in all the provinces; Paris itself was no stranger to their movements; many of the strongest heads there regarded the restoration of the Bourbons

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

1.
Alarming
situation
of Paris.

Atlas,
Plate 93.

March 12.

March 14.

March 15.

as the only means of extricating France from the abyss into which it had fallen; many more of the basest hearts looked to it as the securest means of preserving, amidst the ruin of their country, their individual fortunes. Talleyrand, the Abbé de Pradt, the Duke of Dalberg, M. de Jaucourt, were in secret correspondence with the allied headquarters; and M. de Vitrolles had communicated to the Emperor Alexander the feeling entertained at Paris as to Napoleon's being the only bar to peace, and on the necessity of a restoration. Alarmed at the dangers which were accumulating on all sides, Prince Joseph urged the Empress to write secretly to her father; but she refused to do so without the knowledge of the Emperor. Consternation or hope was painted in every visage; a restless disquietude kept the people in the streets; and that general quiver in thought was perceptible, which is the invariable precursor of revolution.¹

Amidst so many dangers which pressed on all sides, it was against the army of Schwartzenberg that the Emperor deemed it first expedient to march; for its columns, if not arrested, might be in Paris in three days. To guard against the danger of a surprise by the light troops of Blücher, while he himself was engaged in combating the Grand Army, he despatched on the 16th secret orders to Joseph, to send off the Empress and King of Rome to the other side of the Loire, in the event of Paris being threatened. Having taken this precaution, he, on the day following, left Marmont and Mortier at Bery-au-Bac and Rheims with twenty thousand men, of whom five thousand were cavalry, and sixty pieces of cannon, to make head against Blücher on the Aisne, with instructions to retard his advance as much as possible, and fall back, always drawing nearer to him, towards Paris. Meanwhile, he himself set out with the remainder of his army, about twenty-six thousand strong (including seven thousand on their road from Paris under Lefebvre Desnouettes), of which seven thousand were cavalry, to

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

¹ Fain, 170,
172. Cap.
x. 436, 437.
Beauch. ii.
106, 107.
Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
267, 269.
Thiers, xvii.
394, 401,
511, 514.

2.
Napoleon
marches
against
Schwartz-
zenberg, and
towards the
Aube,
March 17.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

join Macdonald and Oudinot, and drive back the Grand Army on the banks of the Seine. These marshals had thirty-five thousand under their orders, of whom ten thousand were cavalry; so that to attack Schwartzberg, who had above a hundred thousand combatants under his command, Napoleon had only sixty thousand men, of whom seventeen thousand were horse. On the Aisne the disproportion was still greater: for there Blücher, with above a hundred thousand, was opposed only by Marmont and Mortier with twenty thousand—in all, eighty thousand against two hundred thousand: a fearful disproportion, especially when the long course of previous victories and admirable quality of the allied troops were considered. Yet was it not so decisive as to relieve the generals from serious anxiety, when the central position of Napoleon was taken into account, the devoted valour of his followers, the secrecy and force of the blows which he dealt out in all directions, the resources which he could command in his own dominions, and their own distance from their reserves, their parks of ammunition, and supplies of provisions.¹

3.
And falls
unawares on
the Grand
Army.

The French troops rested the first night at Epernay: the inhabitants emptied their cellars to refresh their defenders; and for a few hours the delicious wines of Champagne made the soldiers forget their fatigues, the officers their anxieties. On the 18th the march continued towards the Aube, and the army slept at Fère-Champenoise. Napoleon there received intelligence of the state of the negotiations at Châtillon; and the great probability that on that very day Caulaincourt's counter-project had been rejected, and the congress broken up. Nothing disconcerted by this intelligence, which cut off his last hope of an accommodation, the Emperor held on his route, hoping to fall on the communications and rear of Schwartzberg's army, which, loosely extended over a vast front nearly eighty miles in breadth, from Fère-Champenoise to Sens, promised to present some of

¹ Fain, 171, 174. Koch, ii. 57, 59. Vaud. ii. 268, 211. Vict. et Conq. xxiii. 174, 175. Dan. 250, 261. Plotho, iii. 314, 315. Die Grosse Chron. iii. 636, 637. Thiers, xvii. 514, 521. Marm. vi. 326, 329.

its corps, isolated from the rest to his strokes. Intelligence of the approach of the French Emperor was soon conveyed to the allied generals by the admirable horsemen who formed the eyes of their army; but it was long before they would give any credit to the intelligence, deeming him fully occupied, or closely followed, by Blücher. At length, on the evening of the 18th, the accounts of the approach of large bodies having the ensigns of the Imperial Guard among them, were so alarming that the Emperor Alexander, accompanied by Prince Volkonsky, came up with all imaginable haste from Troyes to Arcis, where Schwartzberg lay confined to bed by the gout. Meeting General Toll, the quartermaster-general, in the antechamber, Alexander said with warmth—"What are you about here? we may lose the whole army." "It is a great blessing," replied Toll, "your majesty has come; we could not persuade the generals of that; but now you will set all to rights." By Alexander's command, orders were instantly despatched in all directions for the army to concentrate between Troyes and Pongy; Wrede's corps being withdrawn to the left bank of the Aube, so as to keep possession of Arcis, and the bridge over the river there, with all his troops.¹

Had Napoleon been at the head of a large force, or even been aware, with the troops he actually had, of the disjointed state of the allied army, and the panic which prevailed at headquarters, he might possibly, by pursuing his march direct on Arcis, have routed Wrede, and fallen headlong, by the great road to Troyes, into the very centre of the allied army. In the critical state of the negotiations at Châtillon, and the known timidity of the Austrian councils, the effect of such a success might have been incalculable. Ignorant, however, of the prize almost within his grasp, or deeming himself not strong enough to snatch it, Napoleon, instead of descending the course of the Aube, and moving direct on Arcis, turned aside to

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1-11.

¹ Dan. 261,
263. Fain,
177, 178.

Vand. ii.
211, 213.

Koch. ii. 60,
61. Plötho,
iii. 316, 317.

Burgk. 208,
210. Valen-

tin. ii. 179,
181. Thiers,

xvii. 521,
523.

4.
Napoleon
moves
aside, and
Schwart-
zenberg re-
sumes the
offensive.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

his right to Planey, in order to secure his junction with Macdonald and Oudinot, who, having received orders to meet him near Arcis, had marched that morning from the neighbourhood of Provins. The French light cavalry passed the Aube, crossed the Seine at Mery, traversed the yet smouldering ruins of that town, and at Chatres regained the great road from Troyes to Paris. The junction of his troops was now secure, and Napoleon would soon be at the head of fifty-five thousand men, and prepared, when Lefebvre Desnouettes came up, with seven thousand more, to give battle. But the surprise was over; his plan of attack was seen; the allied corps were rapidly concentrating; and Schwartzberg, ably repairing his former error of undue extension, had stopped the retreat, and given orders to the troops to unite in advance, between Arcis and Planey, and attack the enemy during his passage of the Aube. By this vigorous and well-timed change of operations, the initiative was taken from Napoleon and gained by the allied generals; the concentration of their army was effected in advance instead of retreat; and they were put in a condition at once to bring the enemy to a general battle, with every advantage on their side arising from a decisive superiority of numbers.¹

5.
Napoleon
and Schwar-
zenberg
both march
on Arcis.

Napoleon was not prepared for this sudden resumption of the offensive by the Austrian general. He had expected, from the information communicated by Macdonald and Oudinot, to have found the enemy at the gates of Paris; and well knowing the Austrian nervousness about being turned, he had calculated, not without reason, on arresting them by falling on their communications. Now, however, the stroke had failed: the turn to the right at Planey had given them time to concentrate their army, and all hope of reaching their rear was postponed, if not lost. Persuaded, however, that it was by such a manœuvre only that their enormous masses could be forced back, the Emperor still clung to the idea of turning their right;² and therefore he resolved to push for-

March, 20.
2. Fabm, 160.
Dan, 265.
Burch, 213.
Plato, 71.
321. 160.
Gros, 1.
Chron, iv.
55, 57.
1160, xvii.
523.

ward his left, remount the course of the Aube by Arcis, as far, if necessary, as Bar-sur-Aube; and thus at once threaten Chaumont and their communications with the Rhine, and recover his own with his garrison on that river and the Meuse. On the 20th, accordingly, the whole army marched by the right bank of the Aube, up the stream, and the advanced guard came opposite to Arcis at ten o'clock.

That town was immediately occupied; and Napoleon, who had ascended the left bank from Plancy, with a body of cavalry, coming up at one o'clock in the afternoon, held a council of war with his principal marshals and generals as to the course which should be pursued. The report of the inhabitants was unanimous that the retrograde movement of the Allies had been arrested; that Schwartzberg, with the greater part of his forces, was within a few miles, screened only by the intervening hills; and that before two hours had elapsed Arcis would be attacked on all sides by their columns. Napoleon, conceiving it impossible that the Austrian generalissimo could have adopted so able and vigorous a resolution as that of suddenly stopping his retreat, and converging with all his force to the decisive point, persisted in maintaining that they were in full retreat, and that the troops before him were only a rearguard: he summoned up accordingly all his troops, crossed them over the Aube at Arcis as they arrived, and gave orders to continue the pursuit with the utmost vigour on the road to Troyes. He was only convinced of his mistake when, on the firing of three guns from a short distance in the rear of the enemy's cavalry, the heads of his columns, converging on all sides towards Arcis, suddenly appeared on the summit of the swelling hills lying on the westward of the town.

In effect, Schwartzberg's dispositions had now brought the whole Grand Army upon Napoleon; and the movement of the latter upon Arcis, instead of directing his forces upon the flanks and rear of a retreating and dis-

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1-11.

6.
Napoleon is
still more
delicious as to
the Austrian
advance.
March 20.

1 Edin. 180.
181. Dan.
265, 266.
Vaub. 31.
215, 217.
Burgh. 213,
214. Plötho.
31, 321, 323.
Die Grosse
Chron. iv.
58, 59.
Koch, iii. 65.
Thiers, xvi.
524, 526.

7.
Effect of
these move-
ments on
both sides.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

jointed host, as he expected, had placed him immediately against the front of a superior and concentrated advancing one. The Prince-Royal of Würtemberg, Raefskoi, and Giulay had marched at daybreak from Troyes upon Planey, while Wrede occupied Arcis with an advanced guard, and the Guards and reserve came up to Onjon. At ten o'clock, Wrede's advanced guard, agreeably to orders, evacuated that town, and retired towards the south by the road of Troyes; and this retrograde movement it was which made Napoleon conceive that he had only a slender rearguard before him. Meanwhile, Alexander and the King of Prussia arrived on the heights of Ménil-la-Comtesse, where the Russian Guards were posted; and the former, immediately dismounting, walked backwards and forwards with Barclay de Tolly. "These gentlemen," said the Emperor, looking to the Austrian generals, "have made my head half grey. Napoleon will amuse us here with insignificant movements, and meanwhile march the main body of his forces on Brienne, and fall on our communications." His anxiety the preceding two nights had been excessive, and he had rightly divined the French Emperor's intentions; but the digression of the latter to Planey had given Schwartzenberg time to concentrate, and a vigorous offensive was about to terminate the long irresolution of the Austrian councils.¹

¹ Dan. 265,
296; Benach.
ii. 110, 111.
Koch, ii. 67,
68. Burgh.
212, 214.
Jom. ix. 596.
Die Grosse
Chron. iv.
62, 63.

8.
Commence-
ment of the
battle of
Arcis sur-
Aube.

Act 8.
Page 101.

Napoleon's position was now in the highest degree critical. He had not above twenty thousand men in hand. Ney's infantry on the left were pushed on to Torcy; Sebastiani's cavalry in the centre were in front of Arcis; Friant's division of the Old Guard was close at hand; but that was all. The battle commenced by a skirmish on the outposts between the cavalry of the Allies under Kaisaroff and that of the French led by Sebastiani. Gradually several batteries of horse-artillery were brought up on both sides, fresh squadrons advanced to the support of either party, and in the end a serious cavalry action took place. The French horsemen, though inferior to none in the

world in audacity and prowess, were overmatched in number by their opponents, and driven back in great confusion to the bridge of Arcis. Napoleon, who was on the other side, instantly rode forward to the entrance of the bridge, already all but choked up with fugitives, and, drawing his sword, exclaimed, "Let me see which of you will pass before me." These words arrested the flight; and at the same time the division Friant passed the bridge, traversed the streets of Arcis in double-quick time, formed at its other extremity, and by their heavy fire drove back the allied horse. Meanwhile a bloody combat had commenced on the French left, between Wrede and Ney; the former endeavouring to storm, the latter to defend, the village of Torey. An Austrian battalion, in the first instance, made itself master of that important post, which would have opened to the allied right under Wrede the direct road to Arcis; but Ney's men speedily drove them out. Wrede again retook it with three battalions; but Napoleon immediately brought up a body of his Guards, which a second time regained it, and maintained their post until nightfall, despite the utmost efforts of the Bavarians and Austrians.¹

The position of the French was now extremely strong, and well calculated to counterbalance the superiority of numbers which the Allies enjoyed. Their army occupied a semicircular position facing outwards, with each flank resting on the river Aube, so as to be secure against being turned; while in their rear was the town of Arcis, which would form a secure place of defence in case of disaster. The Allies formed a much larger concave semicircle facing inwards—Wrede being on the right, the Russian reserves and Guards under Barclay in the centre, Kaisaroff, with the allied horse, on the left. If the whole left had been able to get up in time to take a part in the action around Arcis, the battle would have been as general, and possibly as decisive, as that of Leipsie, to which, as regarded the respective positions of the French and

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

¹ Dan. 237,
268, 367.
Jom. 367.
Fehn, 183.
181. Koch,
ii. 63, 69.
Buz. 217.
Vollers-
dorf, iv. 3,
204, 205.
Thiers, xvii.
527, 531.

²
Positions of
the parties.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

Allies, it bore a very close resemblance. But the corps of the Prince-Royal of Würtemberg was absent on the side of Planey, opposed to the French cavalry of the Guard, where it was engaged only in an inconsiderable skirmish, which terminated in the capture on his part of a few pontoons. Thus nearly a third of the allied army was absent till the very close of the day.* Napoleon took advantage of that circumstance to maintain his position before Arcis till nightfall, and seventy guns, placed in front of his right, ploughed with fearful effect through the squadrons of the Allies. As soon, however, as the Prince-Royal of Würtemberg was known to be approaching, Schwartzberg ordered the Guards and reserve to advance; the cannon were all hurried to the front, and a general attack commenced. As the Russian batteries of the Guard passed the Emperor at full speed, he bade them remember Leipsic; and soon the thunder of their guns was heard above the loudest roar of the combat. The sun was now setting, darkness was stealing over the heavens, Arcis and Torcy were wrapped in flames, the Russian horse-artillery on the allied left reduced the French cannon to silence, and their long array of guns, advancing to the front of the semicircle of heights which surround the town, played with terrible effect on the dense columns of the French which encircled its walls. The Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia now descended from the heights of Ménil-la-Comtesse, and followed the reserves into action; behind them came a brigade of the Prussian, and the red Cossacks of the Russian Guard, making the air resound with their trumpets and the war-songs of the desert.¹

On the side of the French the scene was as mournful as on the allied it was animating. Motionless, but undaunted, the troops stood under the terrible cannonade; with the instinct of discipline the ranks closed up as fast

¹ Ficht. 181.
Diet. 269.
Beauch. ii.
121. Plötho,
iii. 327, 328.
De Grosse
Chron. iii.
9, 79.

*The Prince Royal of Wurtemberg commanded the corps of Radzskoi and Gienay as well as his own.

as chasms were made; the officers exposed themselves like the privates, the generals as the officers. Napoleon was repeatedly in imminent danger, both from the charges of cavalry and fire of artillery: many of his staff were killed or wounded; a bomb fell at his side, he calmly waited its explosion, which covered him with smoke and dust, and wounded his horse; he mounted another and maintained his position. "Fear nothing," said he to the generals, who urged him to retire; "the bullet is not yet cast which is to kill me." He seemed to court rather than to shrink from death; his air was resolute, but sombre; and as long as the battle raged, by the light of the burning houses behind, and the flash of the enemy's guns in front, he continued with undaunted resolution to face the hostile batteries. This dreadful cannonade continued till ten at night, when it died away from mutual exhaustion, and the arrival of Lefebvre Desnouettes with a reinforcement of seven thousand men, together with a nocturnal irruption by Sebastiani on Kaisaroff, which was repulsed, terminated the day.¹

Both parties slept on the field of battle, and neither could claim any decided advantage; for if, on the one hand, the French had been stopped in their advance, and thrown back on the defensive around the walls of Arcis; on the other, the Allies, though greatly superior in number, had not been able to force their position there, or drive them over the Aube. On the side of the Allies, great efforts were made to bring up all their remote detachments, and concentrate their army; and a general and decisive battle on the succeeding day was universally anticipated. At daybreak the whole army was in line, and stood in the following order:—Wrede was at Chaudré, in front of the blood-stained ruins of Torcy; the hereditary Prince of Würtemberg at the hamlet of Ménil, Giulay on his left, and then Raefliskoi with his Russians.² The grenadiers and cuirassiers were in the second line, behind the centre, at Ménil-la-Com-

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

114.

10.

Imminent

danger of

Napoleon,

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

114.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

tesse. On the side of Napoleon, the troops stood on the same ground, in a semicircle around Arcis, which they had occupied on the preceding day, with but little addition; * for though Oudinot had come up during the night, and Macdonald was approaching, yet their forces, nearly thirty thousand strong, were still stationed on the opposite side of the river.

12.
The French
at length
retreat.

It was an awful and yet animating sight when the rising sun glittered on the low swelling hills which surrounded the town of Arcis. A hundred and fifty thousand men on the two sides, trained to the most perfect discipline, but animated by burning passions, were drawn up, gazing at each other, at a very short distance, without moving from the spot on which they were placed. The soldiers stood at ease, but with their muskets at their shoulders: the cavalry were for the most part dismounted, but every bridle was over the horseman's arm; the slow matches were burning at the guns in front of the lines; a word from either commander would at once have let slip the dogs of war, and roused a dreadful combat. Yet not a sound was to be heard, scarcely a movement seen, in either army. Motionless, yet ever in perfect array, the vast masses stood fronting each other; not a gun was fired, not a voice was raised; it seemed as if both hosts, impressed with the solemnity of the moment which was to decide the conflict of twenty years, were too deeply affected to disturb the stillness of the scene. But hour after hour passed away without any movement being attempted on either side, until the long suspense had made the very hearts of the soldiers to ache, and their spirit to sink within them at danger long fronted, hope long deferred.† At one time a large part of

* Lefebvre Desnouette's detachment, 7000 strong, had joined them; but, on the other hand, the loss in the day's fighting had been severe. —THIERS, xvii. 532.

† The great road from Arcis-sur-Aube to Chaumont passes through the centre of the allied position, in the winding sweep which it makes to surmount the heights that bound the valley of the Aube to the south-west of the town. Of the innumerable travellers who pass over the field, how few think

Oudinot's corps was brought across, and there seemed every appearance of the action commencing: but that was only a feint: a second bridge had meanwhile been thrown over the Aube; and at one in the afternoon the equipages were seen defiling to the rear, and decided symptoms of a retreat were manifested. No movement could be conceived more hazardous in presence of nearly a hundred thousand men, ready to fall on and crush the rearguard after half the army had passed. Such was the respect, however, inspired by the very name of Napoleon, and the imposing array which his forces made around Arcis, that it was not till three o'clock that Schwartzenberg gave the signal for attack.¹

The troops on all sides immediately advanced, preceded by a hundred pieces of cannon, which opened their fire at the same instant. Pahlen, with Raefskoi's cavalry, attacked on the allied left, the Prince of Würtemberg in the centre: and soon the moving batteries approached so near that their balls crossed each other in all directions over the town: bombs fell in several streets and on both the bridges, and many houses took fire. If the Austrian general had advanced two hours earlier to the attack, it must have been a repetition of the triumph which, in a similar situation at Friedland,² Napoleon had gained over an army of Russians of much the same strength as that he himself now commanded.* But the attack had been deferred too late for decisive success: a large part of the French army had passed over before the combat became serious: and the rearguard under Oudinot maintained so gallant a resistance that it was dark before the allied troops approached Arcis.³ Prince Eugene of Würtemberg's men at length drove back Oudinot, and broke into the town close after the French rearguard, which rushed

CHAP.
LXXVIII.
1814.

¹ Dan. 272,
273. Eain.
181, 182.
Koch. 175,
77. Vaucl.
ii. 229, 230.
Burgh. 216,
217. Planch.
i. 334.
Vauban, ii.
3, 107.
Thiers, xvi.
532.

13.
The French
rearguard is
attacked.

² Vaucl. ch.
xvi. § 56.

³ Eain. 182,
183. Dan.
273, 274.
Koch. 18, 71,
61. Burgh.
217. Vaucl.
ii. 229, 230.
Fischer. iii.
329, 334.
Die Grosse
Charte. v.
82, 84.
Thiers, xvi.
533.

of the memorable scene, decisive of the fate of Napoleon and the Revolution, of which it was the theatre!—*Personal observation.*

* The relative strength of the French and Russians at Friedland was almost exactly the same as that of the Allies and French at Arcis; the French had eighty thousand, and the Russians fifty thousand.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

towards the bridges ; their cavalry crossed at a ford ; the bridge was blown up ; a desperate conflict took place in the streets ; and numbers were drowned in trying to swim across after the arch was cut away. During the whole night, however, the French kept up so heavy a cannonade from the opposite bank that all attempts to restore it proved ineffectual ; and before morning dawned, Napoleon was far advanced on the road to Vitry, leaving only a powerful rearguard in front of Arcis to retard the passage of the river. *

14.
Napoleon's
reasons for
the march to
St Dizier.

Though the battle of Arcis-sur-Aube was not attended with any brilliant trophies taken in the field, yet it was followed by decisive effects on the fortunes of Napoleon. The loss of the French was about four thousand men, of whom eight hundred were prisoners, and six pieces of cannon ; that of the Allies was as great. But its immediate result was to throw Napoleon upon the eccentric line of operations which immediately led to his fall. His meditated project of falling upon the rear and communications of the Grand Army had wholly failed : his cross-march to Plancy had given them time to concentrate, and he had been repulsed in the attempt to penetrate by main force into the allied lines. It had been completely proved that his strength was unequal to hurtling against their immense masses when drawn together. Nothing remained but still to threaten their communications ; to draw near to the garrisons of the frontier, from which those supplies of veteran troops could be obtained which were no longer to be found in the heart of France, and to further the efforts of the insurgent bodies of peasantry, who, inflamed by a patriotic spirit, and irritated by the pillage of the allied troops, were waiting only the signal of his advance to commence a murderous guerilla warfare on their flanks and rear.† To do this, however, required an immense

* On leaving Arcis, Napoleon sent two thousand francs from his private purse to the *Secours de la Charité*, by the *Comte de Turenne*, to assuage the sufferings of the wounded. FAIR, 182. note.

† Napoleon first conceived this design when he moved against Blücher before

sacrifice it was necessary to march direct towards the Rhine, and abandon the defence of Paris: for the Emperor's army was so sorely reduced in numbers, that to divide was to destroy it. Moreover, the success of the measure depended entirely on the formation, by the aid of the disengaged garrisons, of such an imposing force on the enemy's communications as would command attention, and entirely withdraw them from any movement on the capital. Impressed with these ideas, on which he had long meditated, and which, situated as he was, were unquestionably well founded, Napoleon, on leaving Arcis, instead of taking the road either to Chalons, from whence he had come, or to Paris, by which it was expected he would retire, moved on the *chaussée* of Vitry direct towards the Rhine, and sent orders to Marmont and Mortier to join him by Chalons.¹*

The Emperor's first day's march was to the environs of Vitry. Ney was sent up to the walls of the town to summon it to surrender, threatening at the same time to put the whole garrison, in the event of resistance, to the sword. After some hesitation, however, the governor, who was at the head of a garrison of five thousand men and forty pieces of cannon, resolved to stand the hazard of an assault, and manfully held out. This check, which Napoleon had not anticipated, disarranged his plans: for he was in no condition either to batter its walls or attempt an escalade.² Turning aside, therefore, from this unprofitable attempt, he next day continued his march, and reached St Dizier, where headquarters were estab-

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

¹ Fain, 164, 165. Dan., 275. Jom., iv. 570, 571. Koch, ii. 64, 64. Vand., ii. 234, 240. Chaus., 342. 448. Pichot., iii. 355, 356. Thiers, xv. 4, 534, 535.

15.

Napoleon's march to St Dizier.

March 22.

Atlas,
Plate 93.

March 23.

² Jom., iv. 573. Koch, ii. 64, 87. Fain, 185, 186. Die

Grosse

Chron., iv. 97. Pichot., iii. 388.

Thiers, xvii. 557, 541.

the battle of Craonne, and orders were at that time sent to the garrisons to hold themselves in readiness to join him. The defeat of Laon rendered its immediate execution impossible. But at Rheims he matured his plan, and, still aghast, diverted from it at the moment by Schwartzemberg's advance towards Paris, he now proceeded to put it in execution.—See THIBAUD, xvii. 438, 512, 534.

* "I marched on St Dizier," said Napoleon afterwards at Elba to General Kohler, the Austrian commissioner, "because twenty experiments had convinced me that I had only to send a few hussars on your line of communication, in order to spread dismay amongst you. On this occasion I stood on it with my whole army, but you never troubled your heads about me: 'twas because the devil had possession of you." DANIELSKY, 279.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

lished for the night. He was there joined by Caulaincourt, with intelligence of the dissolution of the congress of Châtillon. This portentous event, combined with the hopelessness of the war, and seeming extravagance of the march towards the Rhine, completed the discouragement of the generals and officers.

16.
Extreme
discourage-
ment of the
army.

They saw no end to the campaign, no fruit for their toils or their blood. Instead of defending Paris, they were marching towards Germany: the capital of their country, their homes, their hearths, would become the prey of the enemy; while all that was dear to them was lost, they were plunging anew into an endless warfare, to which they could see neither an issue nor an object. A revolution was openly spoken of, even at headquarters, as a possible, perhaps a probable contingency; the obstinacy which had refused the terms offered by the Allies was universally condemned; many doubted the Emperor's sanity of mind. "Where is this to end? Whither are we marching? If he falls, shall we fall with him?" was universally asked. Disregarding these murmurs and discontents, with the existence of which he was only partially acquainted, Napoleon spread out his wings on either side from St Dizier to Bar-sur-Aube, headquarters being established at Doulevant; and the light cavalry having got on the great road to Langres, in the rear of the Allies, and on their principal line of communication, entered Chaumont, captured a pontoon train and a considerable quantity of baggage and ammunition, and spread terror from Troyes to Vesoul.¹

March 24.
March 25.
Fain, 185.
187. Vaucl.
ii. 247, 249.
Join, iv.
573. Koch,
ii. 34, 90.
Plösch, iii.
341, 342.

17.
The Allies
follow the
columns, and
see, iii. The
genre of Li-
des ges.

Great was the astonishment in the allied army when they beheld the French columns retreating, not towards the capital, but the Rhine. A Cossack who first brought in the intelligence, was so confounded that he said, "The enemy is retreating, not on Paris, *but on Moscow*." It soon, however, became evident that the French line of march was decidedly taken; and Schwartzemberg, suspecting it was a feint, and desirous at all events to be

near the enemy and keep his own troops together, crossed the greater part of his army over at Arcis, and the adjacent fords, leaving Giulay alone, with the rearguard, to retain possession of the bridge. On the day following his troops continued to pursue the enemy's rearguard; and some squadrons of cavalry having succeeded in routing a detachment of French horse at Sommepeuis, which guarded a park of guns, the pieces, in number three-and-twenty, were taken, and four hundred prisoners. But what was of far more importance, despatches from Napoleon's headquarters were intercepted, which left no doubt of his design of moving on St Dizier, and falling on the communications of the Grand Army. On these letters being taken, they were straightway forwarded to Prince Schwartzberg, who deemed them of such importance that he immediately had them forwarded to the Emperor Alexander at Pongy. A council of the allied chiefs was immediately held, when it was decided to move towards Chalons, and unite, in rear of Napoleon, with Blucher, whose advanced guard was known to be approaching that place. The next morning, as the Russian Emperor and Prince Schwartzberg were on the march, two more intercepted letters were brought to them. They proved to be a secret despatch from Savary, giving the most deplorable account, both of the total exhaustion of resources and the shaken state of the public mind at Paris, and a private letter from Napoleon to Marie Louise, announcing his intended movement on St Dizier, and design to draw near to the strong places on the frontier.¹*

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

Mact. 22.

1 Dan. 275,
278; Barab.
226, 227.
Plothe, iii.
329, 342.
Die Grosse
Chron. ii.
109, 110.
Thiers, xvi.
544, 550.

* Napoleon's letter to the Empress Marie Louise was in these terms:—"My love! I have been for some days constantly on horseback; on the 20th I took Arcis-sur-Aube. The enemy attacked me there at eight o'clock in the evening; I beat him the same evening; I took two guns, and retook two. The next day the enemy's army put itself in battle array to protect the march of its columns on Brienne and Bars-sur-Aube; and I resolved to approach the Marne, and its environs, in order to drive them further from Paris, by approaching my own fortified places. This evening I shall be at St Dizier. Farewell, my love! Embrace my son!" See BUCHENAU'S *Operations of the Allied Army in France*, 322, No. 14; and DAVIL PISKY, 285. It is remarkable

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

18.

Important
council of
war at the
allied head-
quarters.

These important letters reached Alexander at Dampierre at one o'clock in the morning. They had hardly been read over, when despatches arrived from Count Pahlen, with intelligence of his having, on the road from Arcis to Chalons, fallen in with Chernicheff at the head of Blucher's advanced guard; and that the army of Silesia had advanced from Laon to Rheims and Epernay, and occupied Chalons. Thus at the very moment that Napoleon had withdrawn from the protection of Paris, and marched towards the Rhine, the heads of Schwartzberg's and Blucher's armies had effected a junction in his rear, and a hundred and eighty thousand men stood between him and the capital! Accounts at the same time arrived of the occupation of Bordeaux by the British troops, and the proclamation of Louis XVIII., with the general concurrence of the inhabitants. This extraordinary combination of important events led the Emperor Alexander, who had come on to Somme puis, musing on them by the way, to call in Prince Volkonsky, Count Barclay, and Generals Diebitch and Toll, who all took part in the memorable council which followed. Alexander, adhering to the opinion which he had all along maintained, that the real object of the war was to destroy the military power of Napoleon, at first stated that he thought the most advisable course would be to unite with Blucher at Vitry, pursue the French Emperor, and attack him wherever they should find him. "We have to choose, however, between that," he added, "and, concealing our movements from him, to march straight to Paris.

that the important despatches which announced to Hannibal the arrival of Hasdrubal in Italy, and led to the march of the consul Nero, and decisive victory of the Metaurus, were in like manner intercepted by the Roman light-horse. "Hasdrubal's horsemen," says Arnold, "fell in with some foragers of the army of Quintus Claudius, and were made prisoners. The Praetor instantly sent them under a strong escort to Nero. They were the bearers of a letter from Hasdrubal to his brother, containing the whole plan of their future operations. It was written not in cipher, but in the common Carthaginian language and character; and the interpreter read its contents in Latin to the consul. Nero took his resolution on the instant."—Livy, xxvii. 13; Arnold, iii. 397.

What is your opinion, gentlemen?" turning to Barclay de Tolly. "We had better," said the field-marshal, after looking at the map, "follow Napoleon and attack him." All agreed in this opinion, coming as it did from the first in rank and the first in reputation, except Diebitch and Volkonsky. The former said that it would be more advisable, in his opinion, while the united armies were following Napoleon, for Bulow, who was lying at Soissons, to make a dash at Paris.¹ To this Volkonsky replied in these memorable words:—

"It is well known that there are at Paris forty thousand National Guards and fragments of regiments; and, in addition to these, at a short distance from the capital, are the two corps of Marmont and Mortier. Their united force will be at least seventy thousand strong; consequently we cannot expect that Bulow, with his thirty thousand, could effect anything of importance; on the contrary, he would expose himself to danger by attacking an enemy so greatly superior to him in numbers. On the other hand, if we follow Napoleon, we must leave a considerable rearguard to ward off the attack of these two marshals. In these circumstances, I am of opinion that it would be advisable first to unite with the Silesian army, and then to detach against Napoleon a numerous body of cavalry and some regiments of infantry, with instructions everywhere to prepare accommodation for the Emperor, that it may be believed we are following with the whole army. We ought then to march straight to Paris through Fère-Champenoise, and Blucher through Etoges, keeping up an uninterrupted communication between the two armies. Following this route, we must attack Marshals Marmont and Mortier wherever we meet them. But we shall beat them, because we are stronger than they; and each day will place two marches between us and Napoleon." Alexander warmly approved this advice, which coincided entirely with the spirit of the vigorous councils he had always supported. "If it is

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
111.

1 Dan, 256,
287. — *Jon.*
ix, 577.
E. 35, 224.
Thiers, xviii,
549, 550.

19.
Volkonsky's advice to march to Paris, which is adopted by Alexander.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

your Majesty's intention," said Diebitch, "to re-establish the Bourbons, it would certainly be better to march with both armies to Paris." "We are not now talking of the Bourbons," replied Alexander, "but of pulling down Napoleon." It was then calculated how long it would take to reach Paris; and it was found it would be possible to assemble both armies, take possession of the capital, and destroy Napoleon's power there, before he could get back to its relief, if he should attempt to regain it. The plan was then unanimously agreed to by all present; but the Emperor, before finally adopting it, expressed a wish to communicate it to the King of Prussia and Prince Schwartzberg, and for that purpose mounted his horse and rode off towards Vitry, accompanied by General Toll.¹

¹ Dan. 287,
289. Die
Grosse
Chron. iv.
127, 128.

20.
It is adopt-
ed by
Schwart-
zenberg and
the King of
Prussia.

It was on the high-road from Sommepuis to Vitry, five miles from the former place, that the Emperor met the King of Prussia and Prince Schwartzberg, who were on their way to him. They all immediately dismounted, and ascending a knoll on the roadside, from whence Vitry and the whole adjacent plain were in view, the Emperor desired General Toll to unrol the map on the grass, and leaning over it, explained Volkonsky's views, which he had now adopted as his own. The King and the Prince at once assented to the plan, the former observing that it entirely coincided with his own wishes; the latter, that he would indeed in this way lose his magazines at Chaumont, and would suffer for some time from the interruption of his communications; but that this evil, such as it was, had been already incurred, and that the proposed change of operations should meet with his cordial support. This was at eleven o'clock in the morning of the 24th of March, on a height within sight of Vitry, whither the troops were seen marching on all sides, over fields just beginning to put forth the first colours of restored nature. The sun shone with unclouded brilliancy; a balmy freshness, succeeding to the long and

dreary frost which had preceded it, softened the air : all nature seemed to be reviving under the breath of spring. Alexander, pointing in the direction of the capital, said aloud, "Let us all march to PARIS."* These words were the DEATH-WARRANT OF THE REVOLUTION, twenty-five years after it had first begun by the convocation of the States-General, in March 1789; and exactly that day one year and nine months since, on the 24th June 1812, Napoleon, at the head of five hundred thousand men, had beheld, in the pride of apparently irresistible strength, his superb army cross the Niemen to invade the Russian territories. The intercepting of a letter, and the omission to write it in cipher, were the immediate cause of the ruin of Napoleon, as they had been of Hannibal, and determined the contest between France and England, as they had done that between Rome and Carthage.¹

Although the resolution to march on Paris was thus formally adopted, it required some time before the necessary orders could be prepared, and a change of direction communicated to a hundred and eighty thousand men, who, over an extent of above seventy miles in breadth, overspread the plains of Champagne. Alexander and Schwartzemberg, with the King of Prussia, rode on to Vitry, where headquarters were established for the remainder of the day, and couriers were sent off in all directions with the requisite instructions to the commanders of corps. Shortly after the Emperor had taken up his quarters at Vitry, Chernicheff arrived with Blucher's advanced guard, and, being immediately admitted to the Emperor, earnestly enforced the propriety of an immediate advance to Paris. "Ask Volkonsky," replied Alexander, smiling, "what resolution we came to only half an hour ago."² Meanwhile the whole corps of the Grand Army were grouped around Vitry, with the exception of Giulay, who still

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1-14.

¹ Dan. 258,
239. Burgh.
222, 225.
Plut. iii.
344. Claus.
v. 443.
Tiers, xvii.
551.

21.
Orders
given for the
march of the
troops to
Paris.

² Plut. iii.
343, 348.
Burgh. 224,
225. Dan.
291, 292.
De Grasse
Chron. iv.
111, 113.
Tiers, xvii.
556.

* The spot where these words were spoken, may be seen on a little knoll on the right of the road from Sommepeux to Vitry. — *Personal observation.*

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1811.

remained in guard of the bridge of Arcis. The following orders were then issued. At daybreak on the next morning, the Grand Army was to march direct by the high-road through Fère-Champenoise to Meaux; while the Silesian army was to advance to the same place from Chalons, by Montmirail. The united armies were to advance direct from Meaux upon the capital, which it was expected they would reach by the 29th.

22.
Winzingerode is detached after Napoleon.

Meanwhile a column of eight thousand horse, with forty-six pieces of horse-artillery, under Winzingerode, were sent in the direction of St Dizier after Napoleon. His instructions were to detach Chernicheff with a large body of Cossacks to the right, towards Montiérender, to patrol the country between the Marne and the Aube; and Tettenborn to the left towards Metz, to observe whether Napoleon was making any movement in the direction of that fortress. His grand object was to be to conceal the movements of the Allies from the French, and to give his own headquarters accurate information of the direction of Napoleon. The better to conceal what was going forward, Winzingerode received instructions everywhere to give orders for the reception of the Emperor of Russia. Flying detachments were at the same time sent out; Kaisaroff and Sislavin to scour the country, the former to the southward, in the direction of Brienne and Montiérender, the latter in that of Montmirail and Montereau, in order, if possible, to prevent any communication passing between Paris and the French Emperor. All the troops were directed to march in fighting order, all the battalions being in columns of attack. At three in the afternoon, Winzingerode, with his numerous corps of cavalry, marched out of Vitry towards St Dizier; all became quiet in the former town, where the Emperor Alexander's headquarters alone remained, and soon the sky was illuminated by the blaze of innumerable bivouacs along the banks of the Marne, where the rude warriors of the East reposed around their humble watch-fires.¹

¹ D. n. 291,
293, B. n. ch.
221, 225,
P. n. ch. 11,
374, Die
Grosse
Chron. 18,
109, 114.

No words can convey an idea of the enthusiasm which prevailed throughout the whole allied army when, at daybreak on the 25th, it became evident, from the routes assigned to the different corps, that a general march on Paris had been resolved on. The joyful news spread from rank to rank; the transports of the soldiers rose to the highest pitch. By a natural transition, the minds of the Russians reverted to the days of their own humiliation—to the disastrous time when, at the close of their long-continued retreat, they had, with bursting hearts, abandoned their capital to the invader. The staff-officers who now wrote the march-routes for the troops were the same as those who, in 1812, when Moscow was relinquished, had framed the instructions for the army when it marched out by the Riazan road. The same hands which had then written Bogorodsk, Kassimoff, Serpukoff, and Podolsk, now put down Etoges, Epernay, Fère-Champenoise, and Vertus. An age seemed to have separated the two periods, yet were they only distant eighteen months! The Russian veterans with the medal of 1812 on their bosoms, reverted to the dreadful war of that year; they remembered the ghastly horrors of the field of Borodino, the circular night march round Moscow by the light of its flames; and mingled with the exultation, shared with them by their younger comrades, a deeper spirit of thankfulness for the marvellous protection afforded by Providence to their country.¹

Although serious disasters might have been expected from the irruption of Napoleon with his whole force on the communications of the Grand Army, yet the mischief done was by no means considerable. Such was the activity displayed by General Ertel, the head of the military police, in the rear, that on the approach of the French he collected the wounded, regimental waggons, parks, and waggons of treasure, and retired to Chaumont, where the Emperor's baggage joined him. He then retreated towards Langres and Vesoul, with such regularity and

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

23.

Enthusiasm
of the troops
on advancing
towards Paris.

¹ Dan, 293.

24.

In Ertel's
measures of
Ertel in the
rear of the
Grand
Army.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

expedition, that, with the exception of a pontoon train, some couriers, and twenty carts, hardly anything was taken. At the same time, out of the least hurt among the wounded he formed a corps at Altkirch, of six thousand men, which, daily augmented by the reinforcements coming up through Germany, soon became so considerable as not only to secure the depots from insult, but sufficient to repress every attempt at insurrection in the adjacent country. Nay, by the able dispositions of General Koller, the adjutant-general of the Austrian army, the capture of the magazines at Chaumont was prevented. Meanwhile Winzingerode encountered Napoleon's rearguard at Thiéblemont, which confirmed the Emperor in the belief that the Grand Army was pursuing him. Conceiving now that all danger to Paris was averted, he anxiously looked for Marmont and Mortier, to whom he had sent orders to join him through Vitry.¹

¹ Dan. 263,
294. Burgh.
222. Marm.
vi. 224.

25.
Movements
of Marmont
and Mortier.

March 18.

March 19.

These two marshals had occupied the position assigned to them at Soissons and Rheims, till the 18th March; when Blücher, having at length obtained from the Low Countries in his rear those supplies of provisions from the want of which, ever since the battle of Laon, he had so grievously suffered,* and having received intelligence of the departure of Napoleon to operate against Schwartzberg on the Aube, made a forward movement, and crossed the Aisne, after some resistance, at Bery-au-Bac and the ford of Neufchatel: the bridge at the former point being blown up when abandoned by Marmont, who fell back towards Fismes, and summoned Mortier to join him there from Rheims. Having thus accomplished the passage of that important river, the Prussian marshal detached his left wing, under Winzingerode, against Mortier at Rheims, who evacuated it at his approach. Marmont, however, having joined him at Jouchery before he had got far

* "I am struggling with the greatest want of provisions; the soldiers have been for some days without bread; and I am cut off from Nancy, so that I have no means of procuring it."—BLÜCHER to SCHWARZENBERG, 17th March 1814; DANILEFSKY, 258.

from the town, it was suddenly resolved to reoccupy a post of such importance before it was taken possession of in strength by the enemy. It was held accordingly that day, and Winzingerode was making preparations for an escalade, when, in the night, Mortier again evacuated it; and the two marshals, retiring together, took a position, intending to accept battle, at Fismes. Blucher, however, desirous of re-establishing his communications with the Grand Army, and of operating to the relief of Schwartzberg, rather than the threatening of Paris, instead of advancing in pursuit of the two marshals, extended himself from Rheims towards Epernay and Vatry; while Marmont and Mortier, abandoning Soissons to its own resources, with a garrison of three thousand men, resolved to keep the field as long as possible in the neighbourhood of Fismes.¹

On the 21st, however, they received Napoleon's orders to join him in the environs of Vitry. Regretting then that they had so easily abandoned Rheims, they had no alternative but to make the prescribed march by cross roads to Chateau-Thierry, and endeavour to thread their devious way through the allied columns, to join the Emperor on the banks of the Marne. They set out accordingly; but meanwhile General Vincent, who lay at Epernay with seven hundred men, was attacked by Tettenborn with two regiments of Cossacks, and, after a stout resistance, driven out of the town with the loss of half his forces. Deeming, from this check, the great chaussée by Epernay strongly occupied, the marshals resolved to seek their way through by the other road which passes by Montmirail and Etoges, little dreaming that in so doing they would fall at once into the jaws of the Grand Army, which was advancing by that very road to the capital. Meanwhile Blucher, despairing of being able, on his side, to prevent the junction of the two marshals with the Emperor, took the resolution of marching with the bulk of his forces across

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

March, 20.
 1 Buzb.
 227, 229.
 Viet. et
 Comp. XXXII.
 157, 158.
 Ko. h. i. 195.
 157, 158.
 Grosse
 Chron. iv.
 113, 115.
 Mem. vi.
 222, 224.
 Thiers, xviii.
 557, 559.

26.

They cross
 the country
 to join Na-
 poleon.
 March 21.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

¹ Koch, ii.
95, 112.
Vaud, ii.
270, 278.
Burgh, 227,
228. Vict.
et Conq.
xxiii. 187,
189. Die
Grosse
Chron. iv.
115, 117.
Ploto, iii.
375. Marm.
vi. 224.

from Rheims, by Chalons to Vitry, to join the Grand Army, leaving only the corps of Kleist and York to observe them. Thus by a singular combination of circumstances, the whole hostile armies were, by the separate resolutions of their chiefs, unknown to each other, concentrating into two masses in close proximity, and mutually crossing to effect that object; the Allies uniting from Vitry to Chalons, and marching towards Paris; the other striving for a point of rendezvous at Vitry, to carry the war towards the Rhine. But the latter required, to effect that object, to pierce with part of their force through the heart of the enemy's army.¹

27.
Approach of
both armies
to Fère-
Champenoise,
March 24.

The march of the two marshals met at first with no interruption; on the 22d they reached Montmirail, on the 23d Etoges, and on the 24th Vatry and Soude-St-Croix, where they rested for the night. Intelligence of the occupation of Chalons by the enemy, and of their converging towards Paris, here reached them; and Count Bordesoult, with Marmont's advanced guard, even reported that at Coste he had fallen in with the videttes of the Bavarians belonging to Wrede's corps. The marshals gave no sufficient credit, however, to the information, being persuaded that the Grand Army was following on the traces of Napoleon; and they were not even awakened from their delusion by the vast illumination of the sky to the eastward, produced by the countless bivouacs of the now united allied host, which was not eight miles distant. At daybreak on the 25th, both armies were in motion—the Allies marching towards Paris, the French from Paris towards Vitry—both on the same road. The common rendezvous of Blücher's and Schwartzberg's troops was Fère-Champenoise. Marmont had just debouched on a plateau near Soude-St-Croix, at eight o'clock in the morning, when Schwartzberg's advanced guard came in sight. Marmont's videttes hastily retired on seeing the masses which were approaching; and the marshal himself, now

seriously alarmed, drew back to Sommesous, where he took up a position, and sent an urgent request to Mortier to come to his support. The latter marshal had encountered the cavalry of Doctoroff, forming the advanced guard of Blücher, at Dommartin-Létrée; and finding every avenue by which he could proceed blocked up by the enemy, he hastened to obey the summons, and by a cross march joined Marmont near Lenharée. Both corps then retreated, combating vigorously all the way. But the rapidly increasing numbers of the enemy, and the repeated charges of the Russian horse, threw them into a certain degree of confusion, and several guns had been lost before they reached Conantray, painfully toiling to gain the heights of PIRE CHAMPENOISE.¹

The force of the two marshals was twenty-two thousand men, of whom nearly five thousand were horse, with eighty-four guns. Of the allied troops none but cavalry and artillery had yet got up; but they were very numerous, and embraced the flower of the Russian and Austrian army. Twenty thousand horse, including the cuirassiers and chevaliers of the Guard, with a hundred and twenty-eight guns, thundered in close pursuit; and though the French cavalry gallantly struggled against the overwhelming odds by which they were assailed, and their infantry formed square and retreated at first with great regularity, yet, from the long continuance of the fight, and the necessity of constantly retiring when surrounded by the enemy's squadrons, they at last fell into confusion. Several squares were broken by the Russian Chevalier Guards and cuirassiers; the gallant French horse, who had just arrived from Spain, strove to disengage their comrades on foot, but they too were overthrown by a charge of the Russian and Austrian cuirassiers, headed by the Grand-duke Constantine and General Nostitz, who took twenty-four guns; Pahlen's horse, under Prince Eugene of Würtemberg, captured twenty more; while another large

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

134.

1. Dac. 107.

2. Dac. B. 106.

228, 229.

Vict. 1.

Camp. xviii.

270, 271.

Vand. 1.

217, 270.

Philo. 11.

380, 381.

Di. Geese

Chen. 15.

134, 137.

Marm. vi.

229, 231.

Thier. xvii.

559, 563.

29.

Battle of

Fere-Cham-

penoise.

Atlas.

Plate 101.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

¹ Ante, ch.
lxxx. § 31.

² Dan. 367,
309. Koch,
iii. Burgh.
229, 231.
Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
271, 272.
Vand. ii.
276, 281.
Die Grosse
Chron. iv.
140, 142.
Marm. vi.
234, 235.
Thiers, xvii.
563, 565.

body of cavalry appeared suddenly on their extreme left, and threatened to cut off their retreat. At the same time a violent storm of wind and rain arose, which, blowing right in the face of the French infantry, as it had done in that of the Austrians at Dresden,¹ prevented great part of the muskets from going off. A sudden panic now seized the French army: horse, foot, and artillery, breaking their ranks, rushed in a tumultuous torrent towards Fère-Champenoise; numbers of guns and caissons were taken; and it was only the gallant countenance of a regiment of heavy cavalry, under the brave Le Clere, who opportunely came up at the moment, and, charging out of the town right through the fugitives, stopped the horse under Nostitz, that gave the two marshals time to re-form their troops on the other side of its buildings, and with the approach of night saved them from total ruin.²

While these glorious and important successes were gained by the advanced guard, the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia had left Vitry with Schwartzberg at nine in the morning, following the same great road by Soude-St-Croix, Sommesous, and Conantray. They heard the distant firing as they approached Fère-Champenoise; and, hurrying forward to the front, at length reached that town just as the sun was about to set. Instead of halting there, the Emperor, accompanied by Schwartzberg and a slender suite, set out for the advanced posts, whence a dropping and receding fire was still to be heard. They had not proceeded far when they descried on the right a considerable body of troops, having in convoy a large train of artillery, who were moving for Fère-Champenoise. From the direction they were taking, and the circumstance of their advancing without hesitation towards that town when in the hands of the Allies, they were first thought to be part of Blucher's army. But they soon proved to be French, and were in effect General Paethod's division, protecting

29.
Second
combat
at Fère-
Champenoise.

a great convoy of guns and bread, which had been driven into this apparently unaccountable cross march, to avoid Blücher's advanced guard, with which, to their infinite astonishment, they had fallen in near Bierges, on the road to Vitry. Immediately forming his troops in square, with the convoy in the centre, Paethod had long and bravely resisted the impetuous charges of Generals Korff and Wassilchikoff, at the head of the best Russian horse of the army of Silesia. At length, perceiving the enemy's squadrons and artillery every moment thickening around him, he abandoned the convoy, harnessing its horses to the guns so as to double their complement, and was making his way by a flank movement across the fields to Fère-Champenoise, when he fell into the middle of the cavalry of the Russian and Prussian Guards.¹

As soon as Alexander was aware that this corps consisted of enemies, he took the most prompt measures to encompass them and accomplish their destruction. The Russian and Prussian cuirassiers of the Guard were formed on the right; Korff's hussars, who had moved parallel to them in their cross march, in front; and Wassilchikoff's dragoons on their left and rear. Thus nine thousand chosen horse, supported by seventy guns, were ready to assail six thousand infantry, without cavalry, and with only sixteen pieces of cannon. Having in this manner environed the enemy, Alexander, to prevent a useless effusion of blood, summoned the French general to surrender. Paethod, albeit sensible that escape was hopeless, nobly refused, and, briefly haranguing his soldiers, exhorted them to die like brave men in defence of their country. Loud cheers followed the generous appeal, and immediately the firing began. Formed into squares, with the ammunition and carriages in the centre, they bravely began a rolling fire,² still continuing to retreat towards Fère-Champe-

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

¹ Vaud, ii.
262, 284.
Vid. et
Comp. xxiii.
273, 274.
Lond. 2-7,
288. Dan.
313. Koch,
iii. 388.
392. Plötho,
iii. 378, 389.
Thiers, xvii.
566.

30.
Heroic res-
istance of
the French.

² Dan. 314,
315. Lond.
287, 290.
Vaud, ii.
283, 285.
Plötho, iii.
375, 377.
Burgh, 230.
231. Die
Grosse
Chron. iv.
144, 145.
Thiers, xvii.
565.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

noise, and for some time repelled all the charges of the Russian horse. At length, however, the guns, one battery of which was under the immediate command of Lord Cathcart, to whom the Emperor, who was on the spot, had given its direction, were brought to bear upon them. Such was the deadly precision of their fire, that lanes were soon made in one of the squares, and, the cavalry breaking in at the apertures, the whole were cut down or made prisoners.

31.
Their final
destruction.

Meanwhile the intelligence spread like wildfire through the Russian columns coming up, that the Emperor was in danger. With inconceivable ardour the troops rushed forward : hussars, light dragoons, hulans, and cuirassiers, came up at speed or full trot, thick clouds of dust darkening the air, and at last thirteen thousand were on the field. Still the other squares of the French refused to surrender ; they even fired on the Emperor's aide-de-camp, Rapatel, whom he had adopted as a legacy from Moreau, who fell dead on the spot ; and Alexander, seeing there was nothing else to be done, gave the signal for a general charge. At the head of his Chevalier Guards, that brave prince threw himself upon the square, and dashed in at one of the openings made by the cannon ; the soldiers, roused to the highest pitch by the presence and danger of their beloved Czar, followed with irresistible fury, and the mass was penetrated on all sides. Still the French, with heroic resolution, refused to submit. Some in tears, others almost frantic with indignation, kept firing till their last cartridge was exhausted ; and Pauthod, in the centre of the square, only surrendered his sword to the Emperor in person. Three thousand of these brave men, many of them national guards, fell nobly resisting on this fatal occasion : their historians justly lament that no monument is erected to their memory by their ungrateful country. Let the first stone in the mausoleum of Fame be laid by their enemies.¹

The trophies of the battle of Fère-Champenoise were

¹ Dan, 314.
316. Vaud.
ii. 283, 285.
287. Lond.
287, 292.
Burgh, 230.
231. Vict.
et Conq.
xxiii. 273,
275. Platho,
iii. 375.
379. Koch,
iii. 369,
392. Die
Grosse
Chron. iv.
143, 147.
Thiers, xvii.
567.

immense; seven thousand prisoners, two generals of division, four of brigade, eighty guns, two hundred ammunition waggons, with the whole of the convoy and baggage, fell into the hands of the Allies, whose loss did not exceed two thousand five hundred men. Mortier and Marmont were weakened in all by nearly eleven thousand men, and half their artillery—a dreadful loss to two weak corps, upon which, in the absence of the Emperor Napoleon, the defence of Paris had devolved.* The captured generals were received with the most marked distinction and courtesy by the Emperor of Russia, who invited them immediately to his own table, and paid them the most deserved compliments on their valour. The action itself was remarkable for one circumstance, that it took place on a line of march, and that cavalry alone, with artillery, utterly broke and inflicted fearful loss on two corps, consisting of as great numerical force as their assailants, and four-fifths of whom were infantry, with an adequate proportion of guns. The number of troops successively engaged on each side was about twenty-two thousand; and not a musket was fired on the part of the Allies, who, by the force of their cavalry and horse-artillery alone, broke all the squares to which they were opposed, though formed in great part of veteran troops, and took or destroyed half their number.¹

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

32.
Results of
these combats.

¹ Die Grosse
Chron. iv.
149, 152.
Plocho. iii.
373. Lond.
292. Viet.
et Comp.
xxiii. 275.
Dan. 316,
317. Koch,
iii. 30,
302.

* A romantic but melancholy incident occurred on this occasion, which deserves to be recorded. When Lord Londonderry, who was among the foremost in the charge, was in the midst of the *mêlée*, he perceived a young and beautiful French lady, the wife of a colonel, in a *calèche*, seized by three Bashkirs, who were proceeding to carry her off. The gallant Englishman immediately rushed forward and rescued her from her lawless oppressors, and, delivering her in charge to his own orderly, directed her to be taken to his own quarters till a place of safety could be procured for her. The orderly accordingly put her *en croupe*, and rode off towards Fère-Champenoise, which was in sight; but on the road he was attacked by a ferocious band of Cossacks, pierced through, and left for dead on the field; while the ruffians seized their victim, who was never more heard of, though the Emperor of Russia, who was greatly moved by the incident, made the utmost efforts to discover what had become of her. — MARQUESS LONDONDERRY'S *War in Germany and France*, 288, 289.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

33.

Reflections
on the im-
portance of
cavalry in
war.

This remarkable fact is calculated to shake the confidence which military men, by general consent since the invention of firearms, have placed in the ability of infantry to resist the utmost efforts of cavalry in at all equal numbers; and may lead to a doubt whether the opinion of Napoleon is not the better founded—that cavalry still retains the superiority which it enjoyed, in the days when horse first gave Hannibal victory over the Romans at the Ticino and Cannæ, and afterwards, at Zama, rendered Scipio victorious over Hannibal. Certain it is, that it was the decided opinion of Napoleon, that in equal numbers, and equally bravely led, it is still the most important force in war; and that the spread of the opposite opinion, since the decline of chivalry, has arisen from the circumstance of modern generals having never, from the cost with which it is attended, had the means of employing this formidable arm in adequate strength, or to an extent commensurate to the revolutions which in all other ages it has produced in the world.*

34.

Retreat of
Marmont
and Mortier
towards
Paris.

Atlas,
Plate 93.

These brilliant successes laid open to the allied armies the road to Paris, now not more than sixty-five miles distant; and they lost no time in pressing forward to the goal. The reduced strength of Marmont and Mortier left these marshals no means of arresting the enemy; all that they could hope for was to retard his advance, to give the Emperor time to come up to their succour. Such, however, was the rapidity with which the allied advanced guard followed upon their traces, that they had no time to take up a position, or to stop their march. The Grand Army marched, at four in the morning on the 26th, from Fère-Champenoise, on the direct road through Sézanne, to Paris; while Blücher advanced on two roads, his main body from Vertus on Montmirail; Kleist and York from Chateau-Thierry on La Ferté-

* "My decided opinion," said Napoleon, "is, that cavalry, supposing the men on both sides to be equal in number, equally brave, and equally well led, must always break infantry."—LAS CASES, vii. 184.

Gaucher.* An attempt was made to reach the latter town before the French, so as to cut off their retreat, and the latter aim was very nearly effected. The Prussians, under Kleist, had received orders to anticipate them at this important point, and their advanced guard had accomplished the task, and established themselves in so solid a manner, that all Mortier's efforts to force a passage proved ineffectual. Meanwhile the indefatigable Pahlen, who with the advanced posts of the Grand Army never lost sight of the enemy, was closely pursuing their rear-guard; and no sooner did he hear the firing at La Ferté-Gaucher, than, foreseeing that they would endeavour to save themselves by a detour to the left, he quitted the high-road, and, crossing the fields rapidly, reached Masioncelles, where the head of Mortier's columns had already begun to appear, who had sought this very outlet from otherwise inevitable destruction.¹

Like Napoleon on the Beresina, the French marshals were on the eve of total destruction: and, if Pahlen had been left to himself, they would have met it. For their troops, worn out and dejected, were in no condition to withstand the charge of the victorious Russian squadrons; and such had been their losses in artillery the day before, that they had only seven pieces with them. From this hopeless state they were relieved by the ill-timed prudence of the hereditary Prince of Würtemberg, Pahlen's commander, who was seized with such apprehensions about his artillery being lost in the fields or cross-roads, that he ordered that general to return to the highway, which the latter officer, burning with indignation at seeing the enemy thus permitted to escape, reluctantly obeyed. Overjoyed to see him retire, the French immediately drew off their troops from the attack on La Ferté-Gaucher;² and defiling rapidly across the fields to the left, reached Provins through Cour-

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

March 27,
1 Dan, 320,
322, Barch.
234, 235,
Pothoec. iii.
361, 362,
Vict. et
Camp. xxvii.
277, 279,
Vand. 3,
289, 297,
Die Grosse
Chron. iv.
155, 156,
Marm. vi.
230, Thiers,
xvii. 568,
579.

35.
Their ear-
row escape.

² Barch.
234, 1 Dan,
321, 322,
Vand. 3,
293, 297,
Pothoec. iii.
364, Die
Grosse
Chron. iv.
158, 171,
Marm. vi.
240.

* The two last had followed Marmont and Mortier to Chateau-Thierry, and were thus on their flank and rear.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

tacon. They were followed, however, by the advanced guard of Pahlen's Cossacks ; and no sooner were the first spears discerned than, rushing tumultuously out of Provins, they retired in haste to Nangis, from whence, without further loss, they reached the capital ; Mortier through Guignes, and Marmont through Melun.

36.
Splendid
appearance
of the allied
army on the
march to
Paris.

Meanwhile the Grand Army, and that of Blucher, continued their march, without interruption, towards Paris. The Russians of Raeffskoi's corps and the Würtembergers led the van : then came the Austrians and Bavarians : behind them the Guards and grenadiers—all marching along, or on either side of the high-road to Meaux. The columns of the army of Silesia were seen like a waving dark line to the right. Indescribable was the enthusiasm of the troops ; magnificent the spectacle which the military pageant exhibited. The weather, which for some months before had been so severe and dreary, had now become beautiful, and the rays of the ascending sun were reflected from the glittering arms of the host. Every step was lightsome, joy beamed in every countenance, ardour glanced from every eye, and rendered this triumphant march truly magnificent. A flourish of martial music, the loud roll of the drums, and the louder cheers of the soldiers, announced the presence of the Emperor as he rode successively up to every regiment. Several times he passed through the Guards, and conversed with the generals and officers of corps, many of whom had been trained under his own eye ; often he ascended an eminence on the roadside, to gaze on the vast columns, which were all pressing forward to the completion of their mighty enterprise. " My children," said the Czar, " it is now but a step to Paris." " We will take it, father," they answered with loud cheers ; " we remember Moscow." ¹ *

1 Dan. 322,
323.

* " An incident occurred on this day, strikingly characteristic of the true magnanimity which warmed the bosom of this great man. On occasion of a deliberation the day before, he had said to Prince Volkonsky, in allusion to some apprehensions he had expressed of the amount of Napoleon's force,

Foreseeing that Napoleon would, in all probability, as soon as he received intelligence of the advance on Paris, endeavour to regain the capital by the circuitous route of Troyes, Sens, and Fontainebleau, the greater part of the next night was employed by the Emperor in despatching orders in all directions, as well to Winzingerode as to Chernicheff and the other partisans. They were enjoined to preserve the communications to the southward, to keep a vigilant look-out, and forward the earliest intelligence to headquarters of any movement on Napoleon's part of which they could receive advices. Meanwhile, however, Winzingerode himself, having borne the shock of the French Emperor's greatly superior forces, had suffered a severe defeat. Napoleon, as already mentioned, had rested on the 25th at Doulevant, extending his wings in all directions in order to spread alarm in the enemy's rear; and although Winzingerode was in sight of the rearguard, under Macdonald, yet with such diligence had the directions of Alexander been obeyed, that the reports constantly were, that they were followed by the whole allied army, under the Emperor and Schwartzemberg in person. Meanwhile, the march of a body of French troops towards Chaumont spread such terror in the rear that the Emperor of Austria, Lord Aberdeen, Counts Razumoffsky and Stadion, and the whole *corps diplomatique* who lay there, were obliged to mount on horseback, and ride thirteen leagues, without drawing bridle, by cross-roads to Dijon. The alarm, swelling as it receded from the real point of danger, spread to the Rhine, where it was universally believed that the whole victorious French army was immediately to be upon them. But

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

27.

Attack on
Winzingerode by Na-
poleon.

March 25.

March 26.

'You always see the enemy double.' Musing on the displeasure of his sovereign, the prince was riding on, pensive and alone. No sooner did the Emperor see him approach, than he called him to come near, and said publicly, in presence of the King of Prussia and a numerous suite, 'I wronged you yesterday, and I publicly ask your pardon.' Napoleon, though greatly Alexander's superior in genius, could not have done this: he could conquer the world, but not subdue himself. DANILEFSKY, 323.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

¹ Fain, 137.
133. Vaud.
ii. 314, 316.
Dau. 326,
327. Bergh.
262, 263.
Koch, iii.
543, 550.
Die Grosse
Chron. iv.
282, 286.
Varnhagen
von Ense,
231.

38.

Defeat of
Winzingerode.

on the day following, Napoleon, uneasy at the account transmitted by Macdonald, that he saw only horse in the enemy's outposts, began to suspect that he was not in reality followed by the Grand Army, and gave orders for the troops to retrace their steps towards St Dizier. The reflux tide soon brought an overwhelming force on Winzingerode, who had meanwhile occupied St Dizier with five thousand horse, the remaining three thousand being detached to the front under Tettenborn to gain information. The better to deceive the enemy, Winzingerode ordered rooms at St Dizier for the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, who, he said, might be expected on the following day—a fact which was immediately communicated to Napoleon by his devoted adherents in that town.¹

Tettenborn, seeing that he was about to have the whole of Napoleon's army upon his hands, sent word to Winzingerode to send him no reinforcements, as none he could send could enable him to keep his ground, and the troops coming up would only obstruct his retreat. Winzingerode, accordingly, drew up his troops in two lines, extending from St Dizier towards Perthes, on the right bank of the Marne, hoping by this imposing array to gain time for Tettenborn's advanced guard to retire. The attack of the French, however, was so rapid, and with such overwhelming force, that there were no means whatever of either stopping or retarding it. Their troops deployed with incredible rapidity: column after column descended from the neighbouring plateau into the valley of the Marne: powerful batteries were erected on all the eminences, which sent a storm of round-shot and bombs through the allied ranks; and under cover of this fire, the French infantry, cavalry, and artillery crossed the Marne at the ford of Hallignicourt, and came close to Tettenborn, who was now cut off from St Dizier. With his little band of heroes, however, he plunged into the midst of the French horse, who were ten thousand strong, and broke the first and second lines; but, being speedily

enveloped by greatly superior forces, he was routed, and driven with great loss towards Vitry. Winzingerode's main body was next assailed by ten thousand French cavalry, supported by a large body of infantry; while the succeeding columns of the army, stretching as far as the eye could reach, presented the appearance of an interminable host. The Russian horse were unable to resist the shock; their artillery had time only to fire a few rounds: in a few minutes they were fairly routed. In utter confusion they now made for the road to Bar-le-Duc, where Benkendorff, with a regiment of dragoons and three of Cossacks, with some guns, had taken up a good position, flanked by an impassable morass. By the firm countenance of his brave rearguard, the pursuit was checked; and Winzingerode gained time to re-form his men, and continued his retreat to Bar-le-Duc without further molestation, from whence next day he retired to Chalons. The French loss in this brilliant affair did not exceed seven hundred men, while the Allies were weakened by two thousand, of whom five hundred were made prisoners, and nine pieces of cannon.¹

This was the last gleam of sunshine which fortune bestowed upon the conqueror who had so long basked in her smiles; henceforth he was involved in one disaster after another, till he was precipitated from the throne. Such as it was, it had a most disastrous effect on the fortunes of Napoleon, for it inspired him with renewed confidence in his fortunes, and confirmed him in the opinion that he was on the traces of the whole allied army, and that he had only to follow up his advantages to insure their entire destruction. Accordingly, in the first moment of triumph, after his success at St Dizier, he ordered a strong body of troops to approach Vitry; and as the commandant refused to surrender, he marched thither next day himself, ordered a hundred and twenty guns to be planted against it, and threatened in a few hours to reduce the town to ashes. He soon, however, received

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1811.

¹ Dan, 228.
229, Bagn.
263, 264.
Vaud, ii.
316, 318.
Koch, iii.
553, Varn.
von Ense,
232, 234.
Plotho, iii.
189, Die
Grosse
Chron, iv.
233, Thiers,
xvii, 617,
618.

29.
Napoleon
learns of
the advance
of the Allies
toward
Paris, and
sets out after
them.

March 27.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

intelligence which gave him more serious subject of meditation. From the prisoners taken on the field, he learned that Winzingerode's corps consisted only of cavalry and horse-artillery, with a few battalions of light infantry, drawn from the garrison of Vitry; and immediately after some peasants came up from Fère-Champenoise with full details of the march of the allied armies towards Paris, and the disastrous combat which had taken place there two days before, between the retreating marshals and their cavalry. The veil now dropped from before his eyes; all doubt was at an end. It was all but certain that the Allies, fully three days' march ahead, would be in Paris before him. "Nothing but a thunderbolt," said he, "can save us:" and immediately drawing off his whole troops and guns from before Vitry, he retired with his staff to St Dizier, where he shut himself up in his cabinet, and spent the whole night in intently studying the maps. He resolved, after much consideration, instead of pursuing his movement on the Rhenish and frontier fortresses, to return forthwith to Paris; and to avoid the allied army, which lay between, he chose the road by Doulevant, Vassy, Troyes, Sens, and Fontainebleau. Orders to that effect were immediately given, and by daybreak on the morning of the 28th, all the army was in motion by Doulevant for Troyes.¹

Meanwhile the Allies were not idle. No force capable of even retarding their advance to the capital existed in the field; and they met with little interruption except at the passage of the Marne. The army of Silesia approached this river, which lay directly across their advance to Paris. Count Compans and General Vincent, with five thousand men, were retiring before them, and, like good soldiers, they broke down the bridges over the river, and took post on the opposite bank, at Trilport and Meaux, to dispute the passage. General Emmanuel, with the advanced guard of the army of Silesia, soon came up, and established a bridge of pontoons under the fire of

¹ Die Grosse Chron. iv. 295, 297. Plotho, iii. 399, 400. Fain, 193, 196. Dan. 330, 332. Burgh, 265, 266. Vaud. i. 319, 320. Varnhagen von Ense, 284. Thiers, xvii. 619, 621.

40.
Passage of
the Marne
by the
Allies.

March 27.

artillery; the Cossacks crossed over, for the most part, by swimming their horses; and soon the bridge groaned under the weight of five Prussian regiments, which, with the Russian horse, instantly attacked the enemy, drove them back into Meaux, and following close on their heels, expelled them from that town. Two bridges were immediately established at Trilport, and one at Meaux; and the whole of the 28th was employed in transporting the immense masses and convoys of both armies, which, according to the plan concerted, here united, to the right bank of the river. The Emperor then reviewed Sacken's corps, and publicly thanked them for the extraordinary energy and valour they had displayed since the commencement of the campaign. Their diminished numbers, for they were now only six thousand out of twenty thousand who had crossed the Rhine, as well as the bronzed countenances and tattered garments of the men, told the desperate nature of the service which they had gone through. But though their clothes and equipments were worn out, their arms were clean and in good condition, and the artillery train in perfect working order, though the loss by the fracture by an enemy's ball was often supplied by the wheel of a farmer's cart.¹

The Allies had now entered a rich champaign country, adorned with woods, villas, orchards, smiling fields, and all the charming indications of long-established prosperity. It therefore not only abounded with resources of all kinds for the use of the troops, but offered almost irresistible temptations to the violence and marauding of conquest. This was more especially to be dreaded in a host such as that which now approached Paris, consisting of the soldiers of six different nations, extending from the Rhine to the wall of China, many of them of lawless and half savage habits, all smarting under the recollection of recent wrongs and unbearable oppression. True to the noble principles on which he had throughout maintained the contest, Alexander immediately issued a proclamation to his

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

March 28.

¹ Dan. 335,
336. Burgh.
334, 336.
Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
280, 281.
Vaud. ii.
296, 299.
Die Grosse
Chron. iv.
297, 300.
Tolers, xvii.
570.

41.

Alexander's
efforts to
preserve
discipline in
the army.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

¹ Dan. 334.
Lab. ii. 349.

42.
Their im-
portant
effect.

soldiers, enjoining the strictest discipline, and forbidding any supplies to be obtained for the troops, except through the intervention of the mayors and local authorities.* Not satisfied with this, he addressed with his own hand a circular to the commanders of corps belonging to the other nations, earnestly entreating them to take every possible means to preserve the strictest discipline among their troops.¹ †

The effect of these measures, not less politic than humane, was immense. A vast crowd of peasantry, indeed, inspired with terror, with their horses and cattle, at first fled into Paris, before the columns of the allied army; but it was soon discovered that order was preserved by the invaders; and, ere long, the inhabitants remained at home, gazing with amazement at the endless columns of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, which, for days together, defiled past them towards the capital. After the repeated accounts which had been published of the defeat and ruin of the allied armies, it was with unbounded astonishment that they beheld the extent of their hosts. They admired the superb array of the Guards, the dazzling cuirasses of the horsemen, the formidable trains of artillery; and shud-

* "It is the immutable will of his majesty the Emperor, that the troops under your command should observe the strictest discipline, and on no account whatever leave their bivouacs to go into the villages; and that their wants, such as fire, wood, straw, should not be supplied otherwise than through the intervention of the mayor. You cannot but be aware how much the good conduct of our troops in the present circumstances may influence the common success; and therefore his majesty will hold you personally responsible for the execution of this order."—ALEXANDER'S *Circular Order*. 26th March 1814; DANILEFSKY, 334.

† "At the moment we are approaching Paris, it is only by the strictest subordination among the troops that we can hope to obtain the important results we have in view. You were one of the first to be convinced of the necessity of gaining over the affections of the inhabitants of Paris to the cause we are maintaining; but shall we be acting on this conviction, if the villages round Paris be left a prey to plunderers, instead of finding protection from our armies? I earnestly entreat of you to use every possible means to prevent acts of violence. Every commander of a corps, or detachment, should be made personally responsible for whatever disorder may be committed. Your active exertions on this occasion will secure you the general gratitude, and double the high respect I entertain for you."—ALEXANDER to MARSHAL COUNT WREDE, March 26, 1814; DANILEFSKY, 334, 335.

dered when they gazed on the long and desultory array of Cossacks and Bashkirs sweeping by, speaking uncouth tongues, singing Oriental songs, giving fearful token of that vast moral revolution which had thus brought the children of the desert into the heart of European civilisation.¹

As the allied troops approached Paris, the resistance of Marmont and Mortier's retiring corps, which had now completed their roundabout march by Nangis and Melun, crossed the Marne at Charenton, and interposed between the invaders and the capital, was again felt. Compans' division did not evacuate the forest of Bondy till it had been turned on all sides, and after some sharp firing. Thence the sovereigns inclined to the left, and ascended an eminence on the roadside by a path through brushwood. The sun had just set; a cool breeze refreshed the air; there was not a cloud in the sky. All at once, on the right, the buildings of Montmartre appeared, and the stately edifices of PARIS burst upon the view. Indescribable was the sensation which this sight produced. From rank to rank, from mouth to mouth, the thrilling words passed; in a few seconds the electric shock was felt as far as the eye could reach in the columns; and all, breaking their order, hurried forward to the front, and crowded up the ascent.* The last rays of the sun were still illuminating the dome of the Invalides, the summit of the Pantheon yet reflected his beams; while they gazed the light ceased, and darkness began to overspread

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.
¹ Dan. 334,
335. Lib.
ii. 349, Cap.
x. 440.

43.
First sight
of Paris by
the allied
army.

* "Ecco apparir Gerasalem si vede,
Ecco additar Gerasalem si scorge,
Ecco da mille voci unitamente
Geraslemme salutar si sente.

Così di naviganti audace stuolo
Che mova a ricercar estranio lido,
E in mar dubbioso e sotto ignoto polo
Provi l'onde fallaci e 'l vento infido,
S' alfin discopre il desiato suolo,
Il saluta da lunge in lieto grido;
E l' uno all' altro il mostra, e in tanto oblia
La noja e 'l mal della passata via."

Tasso,--*Ger. Lib.* iii. 3, 4.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

¹ Dan. 338,
339.

44.
Extreme
agitation in
Paris during
this period.

² Lab. ii.
349. Beau-
champ, ii.
194. Cap.
x. 449.
Thiers, xvii.
572.

the massy structures of the capital. Forgotten in an instant were the fatigues of the campaign. Wounds, fallen brothers, lost friends, were as nothing. One only feeling, that of exultation, filled every bosom; one only emotion, that of gratitude, swelled every heart. After inhaling, during several minutes, the entrancing spectacle, the allied sovereigns, slow and pensive at the very magnitude of their triumph, descended from the height, and proceeded to Bondy, the last post station before Paris, where they passed the night.¹

And what was the state of Paris—of the great Revolutionary capital—when the danger could no longer be concealed; when crowds of peasants, flying before the foe, beset the barriers with trembling agitation; when the rattle of musketry was at last heard in the plain of St Denis, and the illumination of the eastern sky told the affrighted inhabitants that the forces of banded Europe slept round watch-fires at their gates? Fearful indeed, for eight-and-forty hours, had been the note of preparation within its walls. In vain the agents of the police everywhere placarded proclamations, assuring the people that the Allies would never venture to attack the immortal city; that its means of defence were invincible; that five hundred guns were ready to spread death among the foe; and that it would be sufficient simply to close the barriers to exterminate them to the last man.^{2*} These high-sounding expressions could not conceal the real facts

* "The Allies regard the pillage and destruction of the capital as the recompense and end of their invasion: they already make a boast of having entered it without resistance—of having sacked it; and they propose to send off the *Elite* of its workmen, of its artisans, of its artists, to the depths of Russia, to people their deserts, and then they will set fire to all the quarters of the town. But with what hope of success can they enter Paris? What would become of them in the midst of an immense population, armed, inflamed, and resolute to defend itself? Paris contains twenty thousand horses, which might convey to the heights five hundred pieces of cannon. It would be easy to barricade the streets, and to offer at every point an invincible resistance. It would be enough even to close the barriers to exterminate them to the last man! No! The Allies will never approach Paris!" *Agénor Paris*, 29th March 1814; BLAUCHAMPE, ii. 191, 192.

which were before their eyes. They could not make the citizens blind to the endless crowds of peasants in consternation, who defiled in confusion along the Boulevards, conveying with them their wives, their children, their horses and cattle, into the last asylum of the capital.

The extreme proposals which the more violent of the Jacobin emissaries promulgated in the name of the Emperor, that they should arm the populace, burn the suburbs, destroy the bridges, barricade the streets, and, if necessary, retire to the south of the Seine, there to defend themselves to the last extremity, till the arrival of the heads of his columns, augmented the general consternation. Universal spoliation, conflagration, and massacre, were anticipated, from such letting loose of the long pent-up passions of the Revolution. The banks were closed; the shops shut up; every one hid his most valuable movables; vast quantities of plate and treasure were buried; the gaming-houses were stopped; and, what had been unknown in the bloodiest days of the Revolution, *the theatres were empty*. Preparations were at length making by the government, but they were of a kind to increase rather than diminish the terrors of the people. Six thousand troops of the line, and twenty thousand national guards, were reviewed in the Place Carrousel, and marched along the quays; but the gloomy aspect of the soldiers, the long trains of artillery which traversed the streets, the distant thunder of the enemy's cannon, the ceaseless torrent of disorderly peasants flying before the invaders, which streamed over the Boulevards, and the wounded and dying who were brought in from the advanced posts, told but too plainly that war in all its horrors was fast approaching the mighty capital.¹

In the midst of the general consternation, the council of state was summoned to deliberate on the grave question, whether or not the Empress and the King of Rome should remain in Paris to await the fate of arms, or be withdrawn to a place of safety beyond the Loire. The

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1-14.

15.

1-30 had
all rights to
organise a
balance.

¹ Beauch. ii.
191, 194.
Lab. ii. 349,
350. Cap.
x. 449.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

46.

Deliberation in the Council of State as to whether the Empress and King of Rome should remain in Paris.

minister of war, Clarke, briefly unfolded the military situation of the capital, the troops of the line, artillery, and national guards, who could be assembled for its defence. The forces of the Allies were estimated at a hundred and fifty thousand men; and in these circumstances the minister declared he could not answer for the safety of the Empress and her son. Various opinions as to what should be done followed this exposition. Boulay de la Meurthe, an old republican, proposed that they should convey the Empress to the Hôtel de Ville, and show her to the people in the faubourgs, holding her infant in her arms; that now was the time to display the heroism of Maria Theresa. Savary expounded the means which he could put in motion for rousing the masses. Molé combated the removing the Empress, by observing, "that the greatest of all errors, if resistance was determined on, would be to leave Paris without a government—that left to themselves they would speedily abandon the Emperor." To this opinion Talleyrand assented. Clarke insisted "that it was a mistake to consider Paris as the centre of the imperial power: that the power of the sovereign would follow him everywhere: and as long as a village remained in France unoccupied by the enemy, that was his capital."¹

On the vote being taken, nineteen out of twenty-three voted for making the contest a popular one, and transporting the Empress and the seat of the government, as in the days of the League, to the Hôtel de Ville. When this division was made known, Joseph produced an express order from the Emperor, dated from Rheims not a fortnight before, to the effect that in no event should they permit the Empress and the King of Rome to fall into the hands of the enemy; that if the Allies approached Paris with forces plainly irresistible, the Empress, with the King of Rome, and the great dignitaries of the empire, should be removed to the other side of the Loire;² in fine, that he would rather see his son in the Seine than in the hands of

¹ Thib. ix. 617, 618. Sav. vi. 344. Cap. x. 442, 443. Thiers, xvii. 575, 579.

47. Joseph produces an order by Napoleon for their removal.

² Thib. ix. 617, 618. Cap. x. 442, 444. Savary, vi. 344, 345. Thiers, xvii. 579, 583.

the enemy.* This precise and definitive order, which provided for the very case that had occurred, put an end to all deliberation ; and it was arranged that Joseph should remain to direct the defence of the capital, but that the principal officers of state should accompany the Empress and the King of Rome beyond the Loire.

The departure of the Empress took place next day, and completed the discouragement of the inhabitants of Paris. A great crowd assembled at the Place Carrousel, when the carriages came to the door at daybreak ; and though none ventured openly to arraign the orders of government, yet many were the condemnations uttered in private at the timid policy which virtually abandoned the capital to the enemy, by withdrawing those whose presence was most calculated to have preserved authority, and stimulated resistance, among its inhabitants. The King of Rome, though only three years of age, cried violently when they came to take him away ; he exclaimed that they were betraying his papa, and clung to the curtains of his apartment with such tenacity, that it required all the influence of his governess, Madame de Montesquieu, to induce him to quit his hold. He was still in tears when he was carried down to the carriage of the Empress. Marie Louise was calm and resigned, but deadly pale. At eleven o'clock in the morning the mournful procession

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

48.
Mournful
scene at the
departure of
the Em-
press.
March 29.

1 Sav. vii. 1,
3. Thib. ix.
618, 619.
Cap. x. 442,
443. Die
Grosse
Chron. iv.
321, 324.
Thiers, xvii.
584.

* "You are in no event to permit the Empress and the King of Rome to fall into the hands of the enemy. I am about to manœuvre in such a manner, that you may possibly be several days without hearing from me. Should the enemy advance upon Paris with such forces as to render all resistance impossible, send off in the direction of the Loire the Empress, the King of Rome, the great dignitaries, the ministers, the officers of the senate, the president of the council of state, the great officers of the crown, and the treasure. Never quit my son ; and keep in mind that I would rather see him in the Seine than in the hands of the enemies of France. The fate of Astyanax, a prisoner in the hands of the Greeks, has always appeared to me the most deplorable in history."—*NAPOLÉON to JOSEPH, Rheims, 16th March 1814* ; CAPEFIGUE, x. 443, 444. On these instructions being read, Talleyrand remarked to the Duke of Rovigo, "Eh bien, voilà donc comment devait finir ce règne glorieux ! . . . Terminer sa carrière comme un aventurier, au lieu de la terminer paisiblement sur le plus grandes des trônes, et après avoir donné son nom à son siècle—quelle fin !" —See THIERS, xvii. 582.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
—
1814.

set out, and, defiling by the quay of the river, took the road for Rambouillet. The long train of carriages passed slowly along, amidst the tears of a large body of people, while the thunder of the cannon was already heard from the direction of St Denis. Terror now froze every heart; all felt that resistance was hopeless, and that nothing remained but to make the best terms that could be obtained from the victors.

49.
Description
of Paris as
a military
station.
—

Atlas,
Plate 102.

Paris, now almost as well known as London to every person in England, whether male or female, who has received a liberal education, may not be equally familiar in future times, or in other countries; and even to those who know it best, it is never irksome to read a description of a city in which some of the happiest days of their life may have been spent. Situated on both banks of the Seine, the French metropolis is as favourably adapted for external defence as for internal ornament and salubrity. From Mount Valerien on the west, to the fortress of Vincennes on the east, it is protected by a line of hills running on the northern bank of the Seine, and presenting a natural fortification against an enemy approaching from the north or east, the quarter from which danger is principally to be apprehended. Rosny, Romainville, Belleville, the plateau of Chaumont, Montmartre, are the names which have been affixed to this ridge; and although not strengthened by field-works, yet their natural advantages constituted a very formidable position. The ridge is about three miles and a-half in length, and the woods, orchards, gardens, villas, and enclosures with which it is covered, rendered it in a peculiar manner susceptible of defence by a body of militia or national guards, who might be unequal to a combat with regular forces in the open field. The plain of St Denis, between Montmartre and Romainville, extends up to the gates of the capital; but it is enfiladed on either side by the guns from those elevated heights, the fire of batteries on which, intersecting each other, rendered all access by the great road from St Denis

impossible, till the summits were carried. Montmartre, a conical hill which rises to a considerable height, and is nearly covered with buildings, presented, if adequately furnished with cannon, a most formidable point for defence; but the positions of Chaumont, Belleville, and Menilmontant were less compact and more open to a flank attack. The whole defence of the capital, however, depended on the possession of these heights: if they were taken, Paris was at the mercy of the conqueror. Bombs from Montmartre and Chaumont would carry as far as the Rue Montblanc, and into the very heart of the city; the old ramparts had long since been converted into shady walks, well known as the principal scene of enjoyment in the capital; and the barriers on the principal roads, connected together by a brick wall, presented the means only of preventing smuggling, or aiding the efforts of the police, but could oppose no resistance whatever to the attack of regular soldiers.¹

What chiefly strikes a stranger on his first arrival in Paris, is the extraordinary variety and beauty of the public edifices. The long-established greatness of the French sovereigns, the taste for architecture which several of them possessed, and the durable materials of which the capital is built, have conspired, in a succession of ages, to store it with a series of public and private edifices, which are not only for the most part exceedingly imposing in themselves, but in the highest degree interesting, from the picture they present of the successive changes of manners, habits, and taste, during the prolonged lifetime of the monarchy. From the stately remains of the baths of Julian, now devoted to the humble purpose of a cooper's warehouse in the faubourg St Germain, to the recent magnificent structures begun by Napoleon, and completed by the Bourbons, it exhibits an unbroken series of buildings, still entire, erected during fifteen centuries, connecting together the ancient and modern world, and forming, like Gibbon's History of Rome, a bridge which spans over

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

¹ Personal observation.
Koch, iii.
415, 429.
Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
232, 284.
Thiers, xvii.
538.

50.
Description
of the build-
ings of
Paris.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

the dark gulf of the middle ages. The towers of Notre-Dame, which rose amidst the austerity of Gothic taste, and were loaded with the riches of Catholic superstition ; the Hôtel de Ville, the florid architecture of which recalls the civil wars of the Fronde and the League ; the Marais, with its stately edifices, carrying us back to the rising splendour of the Bourbon princes ; the Louvre, which witnessed the frightful massacre of Charles IX. ; the Pont Neuf, which bears the image of Henry IV. ; the Tuileries, recalling at once the splendour of Louis XIV., and the sufferings of his martyred descendant ; the Place Louis XV., which beheld in succession the orgies of royalty and the horrors of the Revolution ; the column of the Place Vendôme, which perpetuates the glories of Napoleon—present a series of monuments unequalled in interest by any other city of modern Europe, and which may possibly, to future ages, exceed even the attractions of the Eternal City itself. Every step in Paris is historical ; the shadows of the dead arise on every side ; the very stones breathe.

31.
Its architectural splendour.

The streets in the old part of the town are narrow, and consequently, perhaps, unhealthy ; but their straitness only renders them the more imposing, their buildings being always seen in rapid perspective. The old stone piles, often five stories in height, some of them contemporary with the Crusades, seem to frown with contempt on the modern passenger. It was in these narrow streets, the focus of the Revolution, that the great bulk of the inhabitants, estimated in all at that period at six hundred thousand souls, dwelt. On the banks of the river a wider space is seen. Light arches span the stream, and long lines of pillared scenery attest the riches and taste of a more refined age. Nor is the beauty of architectural monuments inferior to the interest of ancient associations. The colossal proportions, and yet delicate finishing, of the arch of Neuilly ; the exquisite peristyle of the church of the Madeleine ; the matchless façade of the Louvre ; the

noble portico of the Pantheon : the lofty column of Austerlitz, will ever attract the cultivated in taste from every quarter of Europe, even after the political greatness of France has declined, and its glories exist only in the records of historic fame.^{1*}

The troops which remained at the disposal of Joseph, for the defence of the heights of Paris, were very inconsiderable, and altogether inadequate to the defence of so extensive a position. The national guard, indeed, was twenty thousand strong, but not more than half of this number were armed ; and they were, for the most part, absorbed in the guarding of the twelve barriers of the city, or the service of the interior : so that not more than six thousand were available for service on the external defences. Marmont commanded the right, which rested on Belleville and Chaumont, with detachments on all the points susceptible of defence, as far as Vincennes ; and Mortier the left, which extended between the canal of Oureq and Montmartre, across the great road from St Denis, with posts as far as Neuilly. It was easy to foresee that the weight of the contest would be around the hill of Montmartre and the *buttes* of Chaumont ; and it was there, accordingly, that the main strength of the French was placed. The wreck of fifteen divisions stood on the line of defence, which, in former days, would have contained at least ninety thousand combatants : but so wasted had they been under the dreadful campaigns of the last two years, that they could not now muster more than twenty thousand infantry and six thousand horse. In Marmont's wing, the skeletons of seventy battalions were required to make up eight thousand men. Their air was firm, but sad :² they were resolved to lay down

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

Personal
observation.

52.

Forces of
the French
on the line
of defence.

² Koch, iii.

449, 450.

Vand. ii.

310, 312.

Berth. 236.

Dan. 147.

Florio, iii.

403, 196.

Grosse

Clém. iv.

307, 309.

314, Marm.

v. 241.

Tellers, xvii.

593.

* They may well put the architects of England to the blush, for the painful inferiority which the modern structures of London exhibit. The *modern* structures, observe. Nothing worthy of the nation has been built in public edifices in London in our time. Compare St Paul's or Westminster Abbey with the National Gallery, and say whether we have not fallen from a race of giants to a brood of pigmies.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

53.
And of the
Allies.

their lives for their country ; but they knew the enemy they had to combat, and were aware it would be in vain.

Including the national guards, who were without the barriers, and all the depots which had been brought forward, not more than thirty-three thousand men took part in the defence ; but they were supported by a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, fifty-three of which were of position, some on the extreme right being manned by the young men of the Polytechnic school.* Of the Allies, a hundred thousand combatants were in line, and ready to take part in the attack ; the remainder of the force being left behind on the Marne, at Trilport and Meaux, to guard the communications and keep an eye on the movements of Napoleon. That great commander, as already mentioned, had projected the erection of powerful fortifications on the heights now threatened by the Allies, after his return from Austerlitz in 1806,¹ and had been only prevented by the dread of awakening the Parisians from their slumber of security under the shadow of the glory of the great nation. Memorable warning! How often is national security endangered, or national existence shortened, by heedless pride or shortsighted economy obstructing the sagacious foresight of prophetic wisdom, requiring present sacrifice in money, or threatening a passing mortification to vanity!²

Joseph, on the 29th, published a spirited proclamation to his troops and the inhabitants of Paris, in which he exhorted them to combat bravely to maintain their ground until the arrival of the Emperor, who might be hourly expected.† Schwartzberg, on his part, with the appro-

¹ Ante, ch. Ivii. § 73.
² Vaud, ii. 310, 313, 326. Koch, iii. Burgh. 238. Dan. 347, 348. Plotho, iii. 403, 404. Die Grosse Chron. iv. 340. Marm. vi. 336. Thiers, xvii. 591, 610.

54.
Schwartz-
zenberg's
proclama-
tion to the
inhabitants
of Paris.

* See the official return given by Marmont (vi. 336). This includes 2000 men who garrisoned Vincennes, Charenton, &c. About 24,000 regular troops and some 5000 national guards were engaged.

† "Citizens of Paris! A column of the enemy has advanced to Meaux. It approaches by the road of Germany ; but the Emperor follows it closely, at the head of a victorious army. The Council of the Regency has provided for the safety of the Empress and the King of Rome. I remain with you. Let us arm to defend our capital—its monuments, its riches, our wives, our children, all that is dear to us. Let this great city become a camp for a few moments ; and

bation of the allied sovereigns, issued a remarkable address to the inhabitants of Paris, in which the precise language was used which Louis XVI., two-and-twenty years before, had recommended to the allied sovereigns as the only tone which was likely to vanquish the Revolution, by declaring war on it, but not on France; but which had been then and since unaccountably forgotten amidst the ambition and separate interests of the potentates who composed the alliance.* The allusions in this proclamation to the insatiable spirit of conquest with which all the governments of France for twenty years had been animated, and to the facility with which peace might be obtained, on honourable terms, by France, and to the example of Bordeaux, where Louis XVIII. had already been proclaimed, pointed, not obscurely, to a restoration of the exiled princes as the sole condition on which, since the rupture of the negotiations at Châtillon, the Allies considered it possible that a pacification could

let the enemy find his shame under those walls which he hopes to pass in triumph. The Emperor marches to our succour: second him by a brief and vigorous resistance, and we shall preserve the honour of France."—THIBAUDEAU, ix. 619, 620.

* "Inhabitants of Paris! The allied armies are under your walls. The object of their march to the capital of France is founded on the hope of a sincere and durable pacification with her. For twenty years Europe has been deluged with blood and tears. Every attempt to put an end to these calamities has proved vain; for this reason, that in the very government which oppresses you, there has been found an insurmountable obstacle to peace. Who among you is not convinced of this truth? The allied sovereigns desire to find in France a beneficent government, which shall strengthen her alliance with all nations; and therefore, in the present circumstances, it is the duty of Paris to hasten the general pacification. We await the expression of your opinion, with a degree of impatience proportioned to the mighty consequences which must result from your determination. Declare it: and you shall at once find defenders in the armies standing before your walls. Parisians! the state of France, the proceedings of the inhabitants of Bordeaux, the peaceable occupation of Lyons, and the real sentiments of your countrymen, are known to you. In these examples you will find the end of war and domestic discord: it is to be found nowhere else. The preservation of your city and of your tranquillity shall be the object of the prudent measures which the Allies will not fail to take, in concert with such of your authorities as enjoy the general confidence. Troops shall not be quartered upon you. Such are the sentiments with which Europe, arrayed before your walls, now addresses you. Hasten to justify her confidence in your patriotism and prudence."—See DANILEVSKY, 345, 346; and CAPEFIGUE, x. 458; and *Die Grosse Chronik*, iii. 232.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

¹ Dan. 345,
346. Cap.
x. 438, 439.
Burgh. 234.

be effected. They had already erected the conquered districts into a sort of province, with the direction of which the Comte d'Artois, who was at Vesoul, was intrusted. The proclamation, with a proposal for the capitulation of Paris, was sent to the French advanced posts; but the French marshals, like brave and faithful men, rejected it, and resolved to maintain their posts to the last extremity.¹

55.
Commence-
ment of the
action, and
allied dis-
position of
attack.
March 30.

At two in the morning of the 30th March the *générale* beat in all the quarters of Paris, to summon the national guard to assemble at their different points of rendezvous. One-and-twenty years had elapsed since, at the same hour, it had called them, amidst the clang of the tocsin, to muster for the defence of the throne on the 10th August 1793. They had then failed at the decisive moment—they had basely surrendered their sovereignty to an infuriated rabble, and abandoned the nation to the government of the multitude.¹ They now had their reward. They were to witness the degradation and punishment of their country, the defeat of its armies, the overthrow of its independence; the iron was to enter into the soul of the nation. Bravely, however, they repaired to their posts, amidst the tears of their wives and children, who never expected to see them more. Hardly had the clock in the church of St Denis struck five in the morning, when the anxious eyes from the summit of the heights of Romainville discovered several dark masses appearing beyond Pantin, on the road to Meaux. Still not a gun was fired on either side; the level glance of the sun illuminated the peaceful slopes of Romainville, and the gilded dome of the Invalides was only beginning to lighten before his rays. Suddenly the discharge of artillery was heard on the right; the dark mass quickly became edged with fire; and soon the roar of above a hundred pieces of cannon announced to the trembling inhabitants of the capital that the last day of the Revolution had arrived. Rœffskoi, supported by the reserves

¹ Ante, ch.
vii. § 93.

of Barclay, was charged with the attack on the French centre, between Pantin and Vincennes, and especially of the heights of Belleville; the hereditary prince of Würtemberg, supported by Giulay's Austrians on the left, was to assail the bridges of the Marne at St Maur and Charenton, to clear the wood of Vincennes, blockade its castle, and threaten the Barrière du Trône. On the right the army of Silesia was to advance on Montmartre on two sides; Count Langeron from Clichy and St Denis; Kleist, York, and Woronzoff to his left, by the villages of la Vilette and la Chapelle. Above a hundred thousand men were destined to co-operate in the attack; but they did not all arrive in action at the same time; the weight of the contest long fell on Raefskoi and Barclay alone in the centre, and thence the unlooked-for continuance and bloody nature of the strife.¹

At six in the morning the firing of musketry began in the centre, by Prince Eugene of Würtemberg, with his division, issuing from the village of Pantin; while Raefskoi himself, with Gortschakoff's infantry and Pahlen's cavalry, moved on Romainville. Marmont, however, convinced of the error which had been committed in not holding these villages the evening before, was advancing over the plateau of Romainville to occupy them with Lagrange's division, when he met Prince Eugene's Russians on an eminence a little beyond Pantin. A furious conflict immediately commenced, which soon extended to Romainville: the numbers were equal, the resolution and skill on the opposite sides well matched; and so bloody was the combat, that in a short time fifteen hundred of the Russians had fallen. Mortier, finding he was not attacked, sent two divisions to aid Marmont, who had also brought up his own reserves, and with their aid the Russians were routed, and Prince Eugene driven back, still bravely fighting, into the villages. Marmont then took post on the plateau, and established Compans' division on its northern slopes at Pantin and Pré St Gervais.²

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

¹ Dan, 343, 344, Vaud, ii. 339, 334, Buzh, 237, 238, Koch, ii. 451, 452, Viet, or Comq. xxiii. 293, 294. Die Grosse Chron. iv. 344, 347. Thiers, xvi. 592.

² 56.
Repulse of the Russians in the centre.

² Vaud, ii. 332, 333, Dan, 353, 354, Buzh, 249, Koch, iii. 453, 450, Plöth, iii. 495, 497. Die Grosse Chron. iv. 345, 347. Marm. vi. 242. Thiers, xvi. 594.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

57.

Heroic resistance of the Russians there.

Feeling himself unequal to such a conflict for any considerable time, he wrote to Barclay, representing his situation, but declaring his resolution to die at his post; * and shortly afterwards, Raefskoi, having completed his circular march, commenced operations on the left. His infantry carried Montreuil, and his cavalry pushed on to Charonne, nearly in the rear of Lagrange at Romainville, which checked the advance of Marmont's victorious division; but still decided nothing. It was now eight o'clock, and the Emperor of Russia had just arrived on the field of battle, uncertain of the force of the enemy, or of the probable time of Napoleon's approach; he learned with dismay that Blucher's forces had not yet reached the neighbourhood of Montmartre—that the hereditary Prince of Würtemberg and Giulay were still far behind, on the left—and that Raefskoi was overmatched and his men fast falling, in the centre. Instantly perceiving the danger, the Emperor immediately ordered Barclay to bring up the grenadiers, and Russian and Prussian Guards, to the support of Raefskoi and Eugene; and soon these noble troops were seen marching in double-quick time, on the road to Pantin.¹

53.
The Emperor brings up the Guards, which restores the battle there.

Their arrival at the scene of danger speedily changed the face of affairs. Prince Eugene, long oppressed by superior numbers, now in his turn had the advantage. General Mesenzoff advanced at the head of three Russian divisions of the Guards to the support of Raefskoi; and their united force, finding that it was impossible to advance in the plain till the heights were carried, from the summit of which the French guns vomited forth death on all sides, made a general attack on the wooded hills of Romainville, which were carried after a most desperate conflict. The French who occupied them were driven back to the heights of Ménilmontant and Belleville. At

* His words were—"The second corps is ready and willing to be sacrificed; think of us and help us." Barclay answered—"Many thanks for your resolution: the grenadiers are prepared to reinforce you."—DANILESKY, 352.

the same time, as the Prince-Royal of Würtemberg had not yet come up, Count Pahlen pushed forward a body of his dragoons towards Vincennes, who, meeting with no opposition, approached the Barrière du Trône, where twenty guns, manned by the scholars of the Polytechnic School, received them with a point-blank discharge. Hardly, however, was the first round fired, when the Russian hulans made a dash in flank at the guns, which were taken, with the gallant youths who served them; and the seizure of the gate itself was only prevented by the national guard, who checked the pursuit.* Meanwhile Barclay, having, by the aid of the Guards and grenadiers, at length dislodged the enemy from the heights of Pantin and Romainville, gave orders to suspend the attack in the centre, until the arrival of the army of Silesia on the right, and the corps of Giulay and the hereditary Prince of Würtemberg on the left, enabled the whole army to take the parts assigned them in the battle.¹

At eleven o'clock, standards and armed bodies of men were seen by the anxious crowds who thronged the heights of Montmartre around St Denis, which soon, widening and extending, moved steadily forward, till, like a huge black wave, they overspread the whole plain which stretches from thence to the capital. It was the vast host of the army of Silesia, which, dividing into two columns as it approached Montmartre, streamed in endless files, the one half towards la Villette, on the great road to the barrier of St Denis, the other in the direction of Neuilly, as if to turn that important post by the extreme French left. York and Kleist were on the great road, moving direct on Paris, Langeron on the allied right, moving to turn the enemy's flank. The defence of la Villette and la Chapelle was most obstinate. For four long hours Mortier's troops, with heroic resolution, made

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

1. Dan, 327,
356. Burgh,
241. Koch,
iii. 461, 464.
Vaub. 3.
3. 4. 339.
Pictet, iii.
101, 102.
Duc Guesse
Chron. iv.
349, 351.
Valentin,
ii. 205.
Marm. vi.
243. Thiers,
xvii. 595,
602.

59.
Appearance
of the army
of Silesia on
the right.

* One of these boys was overthrown into a ditch, where a Cossack had his spear uplifted to pierce him, when a Russian lancer, touched with his youth and valour, stayed his arm, saying, "Pas tuez le jeune Français."—Koch, iii. 472.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

¹ Dan. 357.
358, Burgh.
241, 242.
Ploto, iii.
406, 407.
Vaud. ii.
336, 338.
Koch, iii.
465, 476.
Die Gross-
Chron. iv.
354, 357.
Thiers, xvii.
599.

60.
And of the
Prince of
Württem-
berg on the
left.

good their post against the constantly increasing masses and reiterated attacks of the Prussians; and it was not till Woronzoff brought up his iron bands of Russian veterans, with the 13th and 14th light infantry at their head, that the batteries which commanded the village were carried, and the French driven out. Meanwhile Marmont, being reinforced, again made dispositions for an attack on Pantin. Barclay upon that ordered the Prussian and Baden Guards to march out and attack the enemy; and these splendid troops, led by their gallant colonel Alvensleben, rushed on the enemy with such impetuosity, that they were speedily broken and driven back almost to the barrier of Pré St Gervais. Such was the admiration which this charge excited in the breast of Alexander, who witnessed it, that with his own hands he took the cross of St George off the neck of the Archduke Constantine, who stood near him, and sent it to the Prussian commander while he and his troops were in the thick of a running fire. The flattering badge being put on his breast on the spot, the men set up a shout which was heard above all the roar of the battle.¹

At length, about one o'clock in the afternoon, the heads of the columns of the hereditary prince of Würtemberg arrived at the extreme allied left; and although Giulay's Austrians had not yet made their appearance, he immediately commenced operations. The wood of Vincennes was occupied almost without opposition; the castle blockaded; the bridge of St Maur, with eight guns, carried by storm, and the French driven back with severe loss to Charenton. Both wings having thus come up at last, the Emperor ordered a general attack along the whole line. The Allies formed, as at Leipsic and Arcis-sur-Aube, a vast concave, stretching from Charenton on the extreme left, to the neighbourhood of Neuilly on the right; the French a convex, and which was gradually falling back to the barriers. Langeron was ordered to carry Montmartre, cost what it might; while Raefskoi and Prince

Eugene, supported by Barclay's reserves and the grenadiers, again renewed the attack on the centre, and converged in three columns on Belleville; one assailing it in front, another turning it on the north by Pré St Gervais, and a third on the south by Menilmontant. This grand assault, now made with greatly superior forces, and at all points at the same time, proved entirely successful. The conquerors rushed forward in the order followed in the desperate assault of Ismael, and with as rapid success. In vain the French generals and officers did all in their power, by standing in front of their columns, and exposing themselves to the uttermost, to animate their men and lead them back into action. Heroism and patriotism did their best to resist, but they did it in vain. An invincible spirit was roused among mankind; the Almighty fiat had gone forth, its instrument was the indignation of oppressed humanity, and France was to undergo the punishment of the Revolution.¹

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

¹ Dan, 350.
Barth, 242,
243. Vaud,
ii. 342, 352.
Koch, i. i.
639, 646.
Vict. et
Conq. xviii.
342, 343.
Ploto, iii.
413, 414.
Die Grosse
Chron. iv.
363, 369.
Thiers, xvii.
593, 605.

Flashing in the rays of a brilliant sun, the Russian and Prussian colours were carried forward from one summit to another, till every obstacle was surmounted, and Paris lay at their feet. The Prussians, under the gallant Prince William, after a desperate struggle, carried the bridge over the canal of Oureq, and expelled Mortier's men, at the point of the bayonet, out of la Villette. Charpentier's veterans of the Guard retired, furious with indignation, and still even in retreat keeping up a deadly and unquenchable fire on their pursuers. Pitchnitsky's division of the Russians carried the barrier of Pré St Gervais, and made themselves masters of seventeen guns which had been planted there; ten more yielded to the impetuous assault of the Prussian and Baden Guards; Prince Gortschakoff forced Charonne; the burying-ground at Mont Louis with eight, the battery of Ménilmontant with seven guns were successively stormed; the inmost recesses of the wood of Romainville were the theatre of mortal conflict; the village of Bagnolet was forced at the same

61.
Storming of
the heights
which com-
mand Paris.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

¹ Dan. 360,
361. Burgh.
342, 343.
Koeh. iii.
474, 477.
Vaud. ii.
362, 365.
Viet. et
Conq. xxiii.
303, 307.
Plotio. iii.
407, 411,
414. Dic
Grosse
Chron. iv.
368, 371.
Thiers. xvii.
605, 606.
Marm. vi.
245, 247.

time by Mesenzoff. The external defences of the French centre being thus all carried about the same time, the whole allied centre, amidst deafening shouts, converging together, rushed simultaneously into Belleville. Following up their successes, the advanced guards, with breathless haste, toiled to the summit of the Butte de Chaumont; the level plateau was speedily covered with troops; the splendid capital of France burst on their view; the cry, "Fire on Paris! fire on Paris!" arose on all sides, and, amidst cheers which were heard over the whole battlefield, twenty howitzers were brought forward, which speedily sent their bombs as far as the Chaussée d'Antin. The first shot was fired from a Russian battery of light artillery, which was the last that evacuated Moscow; and on both occasions was under the direction of General Milaradowitch.¹

62.

A suspension of arms is agreed to on both sides.

All of a sudden the troops received orders to halt at all points, and it was soon known that a capitulation had been concluded. Joseph no sooner perceived that the allied armies were about to throw the French troops back upon Paris, than he authorised the marshals to enter into a capitulation. This injunction was given by Joseph at a quarter past twelve; but it was not till the plateau of Chaumont was stormed, and the Russian bombs began to fall in the city, that the French marshals rightly judged that the defence could no longer be prolonged. In fact, in half an hour more the French troops, driven headlong down the steep descent which leads from the plateau to the town, would have been irrecoverably routed, and the conquerors would have entered the gates with them. They, in concert, accordingly despatched an officer to the Emperor Alexander, who was on the summit of the hill of Romainville, to request an armistice. The Emperor answered, with dignity, that he acceded to the proposition, but on condition only that Paris was immediately surrendered. As the officer had no power to accede to such a condition, Colonel Orloff returned with him to Marshal

Marmont, whom he found in the first line, with his sword drawn, encouraging his worn-out battalions. The terms were at once agreed to, and the French were immediately to evacuate all the positions without the gates, including Montmartre. Orders were soon after despatched in all directions to stop the firing. So warm, however, was the conflict, so exasperated were the soldiers on the opposite sides, that it was with great difficulty that they could be separated; the enthusiastic cheers of the Allies made the air resound over the adjacent parts of Paris; and when the firing ceased, the last sounds that were heard were from Curial's veterans of the Old Guard, who still shouted "Vive l'Empereur!"¹

To the loud roar of the artillery, the incessant clang of the musketry, the cries and cheers of the combatants, now succeeded a silence yet more awful, during which the terms of the capitulation were under discussion, and the fate of six hundred thousand human beings depended on a few words from the Emperor of Russia. Meanwhile the French troops, in the deepest dejection, many of them with tears mingling with the blood on their cheeks, withdrew within the barriers. The allied columns, who had now all come up in great strength, and exulting in their triumphs, were immediately everywhere brought forward to the front, and formed a sublime spectacle. From the banks of the Marne to those of the Seine, on a vast semicircle of six miles, the troops rested on their arms. The different lines were placed near each other, so as to form a continued close array. Artillery bristled on all the heights, cavalry filled all the plains; a hundred thousand men, leaning on their arms, and three hundred pieces of cannon, with the matches burning, were ready to pour the vials of wrath on the devoted city. Alexander, with all his suite, rode on to the plateau of Chaumont; Paris lay spread like a map at his feet. The descending sun, which cast its rays over its vast assemblage of domes and palaces,² seemed to supplicate him to imitate its

CHAP.
LXXXVII.

144.

2 Dan. 263,
265. Koch,
i. 464, 465.
Sav. viii. 1;
13. B. 36.
247. Koch,
269, 270.
Ph. 9, 14.
114. Vaud.
Ch. 1. 297.
209. M. 36.
vi. 244, 247.

63.
General
occupation
of the
heights.

2 Dan. 266,
267. Koch,
iii. 467.
Vaud. ii.
369, 370.
Die Grosse
Chron. iv.
357, 359.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

64.
Storming of
Montmar-
tre, which
closes the
battle.

beneficence, and shine alike upon the just and the unjust. He was not wanting to his glorious destiny.

But ere the terms could be agreed to, loud cheers, followed by a tremendous fire, were heard on the allied right. Montmartre was speedily enveloped in smoke ; and for some time all were in suspense, watching the dreadful struggle, the last of the northern campaign, which was there going forward. In a quarter of an hour, however, the thunders ceased ; the well-known Russian hurrah resounded through the air ; Russian standards were descried on the summit of the hill : and soon the arrival of messengers announced, that before intelligence of the suspension had reached them, Count Langeron, ascending from the extreme right of the allied line on the side of Clichy, had carried this stronghold by assault. Such was the vigour of the storm, that of thirty guns planted on the hill, twenty-nine were taken ; and in ten minutes from the time when the attack commenced, the Russian colours waved on its summit, although the preparations for defence appeared so formidable that the brave Radzewitz, who led the assault, took leave of his brother officers, as advancing to certain death, before he entered the fire. No sooner was the hill carried, than Langeron chased the French back into Paris, and immediately brought up eighty-four guns, which were planted on its summit, pointed towards the capital. "So, Father Paris! you must now pay for Mother Moscow," exclaimed a Russian artilleryman, with the medal of 1812 on his breast, as he approached his match to the touch-hole of his cannon. As soon as the suspension of arms, however, was agreed to, a white flag was displayed from the telegraph on the top of Montmartre, the soldiers piled their arms, and the bands of all the regiments, advancing to the most elevated points around, made the air resound with martial and triumphant strains. By a singular coincidence, the last action in the war took place on an eminence which still bears its Roman name of the Hill of Mars,¹ and

¹ Dan, 396,
358, Ploche,
55, 414.
Koeh, iii.
647, 659.
Vand. ii.
369, 371.
De Grosse
Chron. iv.
3, 9, 5-2.
Varnhagen
von Ense,
439, 440.
xviii, 597.

where, fifteen hundred years before, St Denis suffered martyrdom, who first introduced Christianity into Northern Gaul.¹ *

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

The battle of Paris, the last scene in this mighty drama, was also on the side of the Allies, and, considering the number opposed to them, one of the most bloody. They lost not less than 9093 men, of whom 153 were Würtembergers, 1840 Prussians, and 7100 Russians—a clear proof upon whom the weight of the contest had fallen, and with whom its principal glory should rest. They took eighty-six pieces of cannon on the field, two standards, and a thousand prisoners; and the guns of the National Guard, seventy-two in number, were given up by capitulation. The French loss was much less severe, and did not exceed 4500 men. The reason of this great disproportion between the loss of the victorious and vanquished army, was not so much the strength of the French position, or the effect of their formidable heavy batteries on the allied columns, as the circumstance that Blucher did not receive his orders in time to make his attack on the right simultaneous with Raefski's in the centre; and that the Prince-Royal of Würtemberg did not come up till the very last attack, at two o'clock in the afternoon, after the battle had lasted eight hours. Thus, during the greater part of the day, the opposite sides were nearly equally matched in respect of number at the points engaged, though, when all their troops came up, the Allies were three to one. Nevertheless, the resistance of the French army, from first to last, was most heroic: they yielded their capital, in the end, only to the forces of banded Europe: and this day may justly be considered as adding another to the immortal wreath of laurels which encircles their brows.¹

65.
Results of
the battle.

¹ Dan. 371.
Plotho, iii.
416, 417.
Vaud, ii.
372, 373.
Koch, iii.
488, 506.
De Grosse
Chron. iv.
335.

* Montmartre—Mons Martis. St Denis, the patron saint of France, suffered martyrdom there in the year 241. His remains, cast into the Seine, were raised by a pious widow near Chaillot, and interred in a wheat field, where the church of St Denis now stands, and the mausoleum of the kings of France has been constructed.—See THIERRY, *Œuvres sous la Domination Romaine*, ii. 324, 325.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

66.

Napoleon
receives in-
telligence of
the allied
advance.

"If the Allies were encamped," said Napoleon in the senate, on the 30th March 1813, "on the heights of Montmartre, I would not surrender one village in the thirty-second military division," (the Hanse Towns). On that day year—on the 30th March 1814—the Allies *were encamped* on the heights of Montmartre; but he was obliged to surrender, not a village in the north of Germany, but his crown and his empire. No sooner was the Emperor made aware, while on his return to Paris, that the Allies were approaching its walls, than he despatched on the 29th his aide-de-camp, General Dejean, from Dolancourt, to announce his immediate return to the capital; and to intimate that negotiations were renewed, through the medium of Austria and Prince Metternich, with the allied powers. Dejean had reached Mortier, after incredible exertions, about three o'clock, as he was bravely combating the Prussians in front of la Villette. The marshal immediately despatched a flag of truce to Schwartzberg, with a letter written on a drum-head, intimating the resumption of the negotiations, and proposing an armistice. The allied generals, however, were too well informed to fall into the snare; and a polite answer was returned by the generalissimo, stating "that the intimate and indissoluble union which subsists between the sovereign powers, affords a sure guarantee that the negotiations which you suppose are on foot separately between Austria and France, have no foundation; and that the reports which you have received on that head are entirely groundless." The attempt to avert the evil hour thus completely failed, and it was shortly after that Marmont and Mortier jointly concluded the armistice for the evacuation of Paris.¹

¹ Mortier to Schwartzberg, March 30, 1814; and Reply, Sav. vii. 10, 11. Fain, 198, 199. Thiers, xvii. 608, 609.

67.

His rapid
return to the
neighbour-
hood of
Paris.

Meanwhile Napoleon, every hour more alarmed, was straining every nerve to reach the capital. On the 29th the Imperial Guard and equipages arrived at Troyes late at night, having marched above forty miles in that single day. After a few hours' rest he threw himself into his

travelling carriage, and, as the wearied cuirassiers could no longer keep pace with him, set out alone for Paris. Courier after courier was despatched before him, to announce his immediate return to the authorities of the capital; but as he approached it, the most disastrous intelligence reached him every time he changed horses. He learned successively that the Empress and his son had quitted Paris; that the enemy were at its gates; that they were fighting on the heights. His impatience was now redoubled: he got into a little post *calèche* to accelerate his speed; and although the horses were going at the gallop, he incessantly urged the postilions to press on faster. The steeds flew like the winds; the wheels took fire in rolling over the pavement; yet nothing could satisfy the Emperor. At length by great exertions he reached Fromenteau, near the fountains of Juvisy, only five leagues from Paris, at ten at night. As his horses were there changing at the post-house called Cour de France, some straggling soldiers who were passing announced, without knowing the Emperor, that Paris had capitulated. "These men are mad!" cried Napoleon, "the thing is impossible: bring me an officer!" At the very moment General Belliard came up, and gave the whole details of the catastrophe. Large drops of sweat stood on the Emperor's forehead: he turned to Caulaincourt and said, "Do you hear that?" with a fixed gaze that made him shudder. At this moment the Seine only separated the Emperor from the enemy's advanced posts on the extreme allied left, in the plain of Villeneuve St George; their innumerable watch-fires illuminated the whole north and east of the heavens; while the mighty conqueror, in the darkness, followed only by two post carriages and a few attendants, received the stroke of fate.¹

Berthier now came up, and Napoleon immediately said he must set out to Paris. "Caulaincourt, order the carriage!" Unable to restrain his anxiety to get forward,

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

144.

¹ Fain, 198,
199, 203.
Caul. ii.
356, 358.
Koch, iii.
561, 562.
Die Grosse
Chron. iv.
393, 394.
Tellers, xvii.
621, 622.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

68.

His conver-
sation on
hearing of
the fall of
Paris.

he set out on foot, accompanied by Berthier and Caulaincourt, speaking incessantly as he hurried on, without waiting for an answer, or seeming to be conscious of their presence. "I burned the pavement," said he; "my horses were as swift as the wind; but still I felt oppressed with an intolerable weight: something extraordinary was passing within me. I asked them only to hold out four-and-twenty hours. Miserable wretches that they are! Marmont, too, who had sworn that he would be hewn in pieces rather than surrender! And Joseph ran off too—my very brother! To surrender the capital to the enemy—what poltroons! They had my orders; they knew that on the 2d April I would be here at the head of seventy thousand men. My brave scholars, my national guard, who had promised to defend my son—all men with a heart in their bosoms—would have joined to combat at my side. And so they have capitulated!—betrayed their brother, their country, their sovereign, degraded France in the eyes of Europe! Entered into a capital of eight hundred thousand souls without firing a shot. It is too dreadful! That comes of trusting cowards and fools! When I am not there, they do nothing but heap blunder on blunder. What has been done with the artillery? They should have had two hundred pieces, and ammunition for a month. Every one has lost his head; and yet Joseph imagines he can lead an army, and Clarke is vain enough to think himself a minister; but I begin to think Savary is right, and that he is a traitor. Set off, Caulaincourt; fly to the allied lines; penetrate to headquarters, you have full powers; fly, fly!" He still insisted upon following with Belliard and the cavalry, who had already evacuated Paris; but upon the repeated assurances of that officer that the capitulation was concluded, and the capital in the hands of an army of a hundred and twenty thousand men, he at length agreed to return, rejoined his carriages, which he had preceded by above a mile, and,¹ after ordering the retiring corps to take a position at

¹ Gaul, ii.
353, 361.
Koeh, iii.
562-564.
Die Grosse
Chron, iv.
294, 395.
Thiers, xvii.
623, 265.

Essonne, set out for Fontainebleau, which he reached at six in the morning. CHAP. LXXXVIII.

While these mournful scenes were passing at the solitary headquarters of the French Emperor, very different was the spectacle which the victorious camp of the Allies exhibited. It was there universally known that the troops were to enter Paris on the following morning; and orders had been issued that all those who were to accompany the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia should appear in their gala dresses, and with their arms and accoutrements in the best possible order. In great part of the troops, especially the corps of Blücher's army, the clothing was almost worn out; hardly an entire uniform was to be seen; many of the men were arrayed in a motley garb, stripped from the dead bodies of their enemies or their allies. But the case was otherwise with the household troops of Alexander, the Guards, grenadiers, and reserve cavalry. These superb corps had been kept by the Emperor throughout the whole three preceding campaigns in the highest state of discipline and equipment, and for this glorious *entrée* they decked themselves out with the utmost possible care. Incredible efforts were made by the men through the night, even after the fatigues of the preceding day, to gratify alike their sovereigns' and their own wishes on this memorable occasion. From having almost invariably, during the preceding campaign, marched and fought in their great-coats, their uniforms were in their knapsacks, clean and dry, and their arms were burnished up with a vigour which soon rendered them as bright as when they left the esplanades of St Petersburg or Berlin.¹

Meanwhile the terms of the capitulation were the subject of anxious discussion in the Emperor's cabinet. It was conducted on the part of the French by Colonels Fabvier and Denis, on that of the Allies by Nesselrode and Orloff. To all the demands of the French marshals that Paris should be protected, its monuments intrusted

1814.
69.
Preparations of the Allies for entering Paris.

¹ Dan, 331.
Lond, 254,
300.

70.
Final conclusion of the capitulation.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

to the care of the national guard, and private property preserved sacred, the Allies gave a ready consent ; but a very serious difficulty arose, when it was proposed that the marshals with their followers should capitulate. To this they positively refused to accede, declaring that they would sooner perish in the streets ; and as the Russian officers had no power to dispense with this material article, they were obliged to refer the matter to the Emperor, who agreed to abandon it. A discussion next arose as to the route by which the marshals should retire ; the Allies insisting for that of Brittany, the French for any they might choose. This too was referred to the Emperor, who agreed to forego this condition also. The terms of the capitulation were at length finally adjusted at three in the morning ; it being stipulated that the marshals should evacuate Paris at seven on the same day ; that the whole public arsenals and magazines should be surrendered in the state in which they were when the capitulation was concluded ; that the national guard, according to the pleasure of the Allies, should be either disbanded or employed under their direction in the service of the city ; that the wounded and stragglers found after ten in the morning should be considered prisoners of war ; and that Paris should be recommended to the generosity of the allied sovereigns.¹

¹ Dan. 375, 377. Vict. et Conq. xviii. 317, 318. Plötho. iii. 418, 419. Marm. vi. 248. Thiers, xvii. 609.

71.
Interview
of Alex-
ander with
the magis-
trates of
Paris.

The municipal authorities of Paris, consisting of the two prefects of the department of the Seine, the mayor of the city, the chiefs of the national guard, and a few of its superior officers, thus abandoned to themselves without any superior government to direct their movements, now deemed it high time to take steps for the preservation of the city. Accordingly a deputation, consisting of those elevated functionaries, set off at two in the morning for the headquarters of the allied sovereigns. They had no need of lamps to their carriages ; the immense semi-circle of watchfires through which they passed on the road to Bondy threw a steady light on the road, and

first revealed to them the vast force by which the capital had been assailed. Proceeding rapidly on, they soon reached the headquarters, and at four they were introduced to the Emperor Alexander. They were received by him in the most gracious manner—"Gentlemen!" said the Czar, "I am not the enemy of the French nation; I am so only of a single man, whom I once admired and *long loved*; but who, devoured by ambition and filled with bad faith, came into the heart of my dominions, and left me no alternative but to seek security for my future safety in the liberation of Europe. The allied sovereigns have come here, neither to conquer nor to rule France, but to learn and support what France itself deems most suitable for its own welfare; and they only await, before undertaking the task, to ascertain, in the declared wish of Paris, the probable wish of France." He then promised to take under his especial protection the museums, monuments, public institutions, and establishments of all sorts in the capital. Upon the request of the magistrates that the national guard should be kept up, Alexander, turning to the chief of the staff, asked if he could rely upon that civic force. The reply was, that he might entirely rely upon their discharging every duty like men of honour. The Emperor immediately replied that he could expect nothing more, and desired no other guarantee: and that he referred the details to General Sacken, whom he had appointed governor of Paris, and whom they would find in every respect a man of delicacy and honour.¹

Paris, meanwhile, was in that state of combined excitement and stupor which prepares the way for great political revolutions. The terrors of the people had been extreme during the battle: they trembled for the pillage, massacre, and conflagration, which they were told, by the placards posted by the police, awaited them if the Allies were successful; and they dreaded at least as much the unchaining the cupidity of the faubourgs and passions of the Revolution, by the proposal to arm the working classes, and

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1814.

¹ Viet, et
Conq. xxiii.
319, 320.
Burgh. 249,
250. Koch,
iii, 517, 521.
Die Grosse
Chron. iv,
300, 304.
Thiers, xvii,
630.

72.
State of
public feel-
ing at Paris
during this
period.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

prepare a national defence. While the struggle lasted, an immense crowd filled the Boulevards, and all the streets leading in to them on the north and east, composed of at least as many women as men, who manifested the utmost anxiety for the event, and evinced the warmest sympathy with the long files of wounded who were brought in from the heights. On the approach of evening, when the passage of artillery and ammunition waggons through the streets to the southward told but too plainly that the defence could no longer be maintained, the sentiment that Napoleon was overthrown, and that a change of government would take place, became universal. The partisans of a regency, under the direction of Marie Louise, who otherwise might have been numerous, were paralysed by her departure from the capital; and the Jacobins and republicans, long restrained under the empire, did not venture to declare themselves, from terror of the allied arms. Thus the Royalists, who had received some slight countenance at least from the allied headquarters, were the only party that ventured to act openly; and already some symptoms of their taking a decided part had appeared.¹

¹ Beanch. ii.
225, 259.
Vict. et
Conq. xxiii.
320, 321.
Lab. ii. 369.
Koch, iii.
521, 523.
Marm. vi.
249.

73.

First move-
ments of the
Royalists.

At the barrier of Monceaux, where a battalion of the national guards was ordered by the general to issue forth and combat with the troops of the line, the Duke of Fitzjames, a known Royalist leader, had stepped forward from the ranks, harangued the regiment, and persuaded them to disobey the order, upon the ground that it was contrary to the fundamental conditions of their institution to be sent beyond the barriers. After it was known that a capitulation had been agreed to, the activity of the Royalist committee was redoubled. All night they were in deliberation: in vain several of their members were arrested by the police: the general conviction that the authority of that hated body, and their host of ten thousand spies, by whom Paris and France had so long been governed, would soon be at an end, counterbalanced all

their efforts ; and it was determined to raise the Royalist standard openly in the capital on the following morning at nine o'clock. Accordingly, M. Charles de Vauvineux, on the Place Louis XV., read aloud to a small assembly of Royalists Schwartzberg's proclamation, issued the day before, and at its close, mounting the white cockade, exclaimed "VIVE LE ROI!" The number of his followers was only four, but they immediately rode through the neighbouring streets and Boulevards, repeating the ancient rallying cry of France, and distributing white cockades to the people. A few gentlemen of the old families and the better classes joined them, but their numbers were still very inconsiderable ; and towards the Porte St Martin and Rue St Antoine the Royalist emissaries were insulted by the people and seized by the police. The great body of the inhabitants were congregated in the streets, and highly excited, but dubious and uncertain ; anxious, but yet apprehensive : ready to receive an impulse, but incapable of originating it. Such is the end of revolutions.¹

In this state of agitation and uncertainty, morning arrived, and the *cortege* of the allied sovereigns began to make its appearance in the Faubourg St Martin, on their way to the capital. The Prussian cavalry of the Guard, preceded by some squadrons of Cossacks, came first ; then the Prussian light horse of the Guard ; next the Austrian grenadiers ; then the Russian and Prussian foot-guards : the Russian cuirassiers and artillery closed the procession. Indescribable was the enthusiasm which the matchless spectacle excited in the minds of the soldiers and officers who witnessed the march. Precisely at eight o'clock the Emperor mounted his horse, and, traversing the vast array of soldiers who were drawn up to salute him in passing, arrived at nine at the commencement of the Faubourg St Martin. Already various pickets of Cossacks had traversed the Boulevards ; the principal military points in the capital had been occupied by the Russians ; the red

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.
1811.

¹ Lab. ii.
379, 381.
Beauch. ii.
257, 283.
Montz. vii.
400. Viet.
et Conq.
xviii. 321.
Koch, iii.
525, 527.
Thiers, xvii.
635, 636.

74.
Entrance of
the allied
sovereigns
into Paris.
March 31.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

¹ Dan. 304,
235. Burgh.
251.
Beauch. ii.
281, 283.
Lond. 301.
Cap. x. 467,
468. Die
Gresse
Claron. iv.
396, 397.

Cossacks of the Guard were to be seen at the corners of the principal streets; their bizarre costume and Asiatic physiognomy had excited general alarm. But when the superb array of the household troops appeared, when the infantry thirty, and the cavalry fifteen abreast, began to defile through the faubourg, and the forces whom they had so often been told were cut to pieces or destroyed, were beheld in endless succession, in the finest order and the most brilliant array, one universal feeling of enthusiasm seized upon the multitude.¹

75.

Universal
transports
of the
people.

Every window was crowded; the roofs were covered with anxious spectators; the throng in the streets was so excessive that it was with difficulty the troops could make their way through them. Passing from the extreme of terror to that of gratitude, the Parisians gave vent in the loudest applause to their astonishment and admiration. The proclamation of the allied sovereigns to the inhabitants of Paris, already given,² had been placarded in every part of the capital that morning; its conciliatory expressions were universally known, and had diffused a unanimous entrancement. The grand object of anxiety with all, was to get a glimpse of the Emperor Alexander, to whom, it was generally felt, their deliverance had been owing. When that noble prince, with the King of Prussia on his right, and Prince Schwartzemberg and Lord Cathcart on his left, made his appearance, amidst a brilliant suite of varied uniforms, at the Porte St Martin, the enthusiasm of the multitude knew no bounds. Cries of "Vive l'Empereur Alexandre!" "Vive le Roi de Prusse!" "Vivent les Alliés!" "Vivent nos libérateurs!" burst from all sides; and the universal transports resembled rather the incense of a grateful people to a beneficent and victorious sovereign, than the reception by the vanquished of their conqueror, after a bloody and desperate war.³

² Cap. x.
467, 468.
Dan. 384.
386. Lond.
301, 302.
Burgh. 251,
252. Thib.
ix. 640.
Beauch. ii.
231, 284.
Thiers. xvii.
637. Marm.
vi. 253, 254.

Turning to the right at the Porte St Martin, the allied sovereigns passed along the Boulevard of the same name,

and admired at the gate of St Denis the noble triumphal arch, inscribed "Ludovico Magno."* As they approached the Boulevard Italien, the aspect of the multitude, if possible still greater, was of a more elevated description: the magnificent hotels of that opulent quarter were crowded with elegantly dressed females, waving white handkerchiefs, and cries of "Vivent les Bourbons!" were heard in every direction. Such was the enthusiasm with which the sovereigns were received as they defiled through the Boulevard de la Madeleine, that the people kissed their boots, their sabres, and the trappings of their horses; and many young women of graceful exterior and polished manners, entreated the gentlemen in attendance to take them up before them on their horses, that they might obtain a nearer sight of their deliverers.† Alexander's manner was so gracious, his figure so noble, his answers so felicitous, his pronounciation of the French so pure, as to excite universal admiration. "We have been long expecting you," said one. "We should have been here sooner but for the bravery of your troops," was the happy answer of the Czar. "I come not," he repeatedly said, "as your enemy; regard me as your friend."¹

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

76.

Extraordi-
nary scene
in the Place
Louis XV.

¹ Deauch, ii.
233. — Dan.
334, 385.
Burgh, 252.
Cap. x. 4, 7,
463. — Die
Grosse
Chron. iv.
397.

The sovereigns defiled past the then unfinished pillars of the Temple of Glory, now converted into the graceful peristyle of the church of the Madeleine; their triumphant

* "To Louis the Great."

† I have been assured of this fact by both Lord Cathcart and Lord Burghersh, now the Earl of Westmoreland, who took a part in the procession, and themselves had a fair Parisienne, sometimes *en croupe*, at others on the pommel of their saddles, at the Place Louis XV. The English who entered Paris with the Allies were the Earl of Cathcart, Sir Charles Stewart, Lord Burghersh, Sir Hudson Lowe, Colonel H. Cooke, the Hon. Major Frederick Cathcart, Captain Wood, Lieutenant Aubin, Lieutenant the Hon. George Cathcart, Lieutenant Harris, who brought the despatches to England, Thomas Sydenham, Esq., John Bidwell, Esq., and Dr Frank. — BURGHESH, 254, *note*. Savary gives the same account of the Parisian ladies on this occasion. "There were to be seen ladies, and even ladies of rank, who so far forgot the respect due to themselves, as to give themselves up to the most shameful delirium. They threw themselves over the circle of horses which surrounded the Emperor of Russia, and testified an *empressement* more fitted to excite contempt than conciliate kindly feeling." — SAVARY, vii. 52.

CHAP.
LXXXVIII.

1814.

77.
Striking
moral re-
tribution
which now
fell on
Paris.

¹ Ante, ch.
xiv. § 43.

² Montg. vii.
400. Beau-
champ, ii.
283, 285.
Cap. x. 467,
468. Lond.
302. Dan.
384, 386.
Burgh. 252.
Duval, iv.
150.

hoofs rang in the Place Louis XV., on the spot where Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and the Princess Elizabeth had been executed ; and, halting in the entrance of the Champs-Élysées, they beheld fifty thousand of their chosen troops defile before them, amidst the applause of the multitude, and through the space formed by the bayonets of the national guard of Paris, which kept the ground for the procession. “God !” said Monvel, in the church of St Roch, during the fervour of the Revolution, “if you exist, avenge your injured name : I bid you defiance : you dare not launch your thunders ; who will after this believe in your existence ?”¹ “Lento gradu, ad vindictam, Divina procedit ira ; tarditatem supplicii gravitate compensat.”* The thunders of Heaven had now been launched ; the Revolution had been destroyed by the effect of its own principles, and the answer of God delivered on the spot where its greatest crimes had been committed, by the mouths of the Revolutionists themselves.²

“Par ce terrible exemple, apprenez tous du moins
Que les crimes publics ont les dieux pour témoins ;
Plus le coupable est grand, plus grand est le supplice.
Tremblez, peuples et rois, et craignez leur justice !”

VOLTAIRE, *Sémiramis*, Act v. scene 8.

* “The Divine wrath proceeds by a slow step to retribution : it compensates the delay of punishment by its weight.”—ST AUGUSTINE.

CHAPTER LXXXIX.

RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS, AND CONCLUSION OF THE
WAR. APRIL 1—JULY 30, 1814.

NAPOLÉON was now overthrown : but a duty of no small difficulty awaited the allied sovereigns in deliberating upon who was to be acknowledged as his successor. In truth, it was a question of the most delicate kind ; and there was not a little danger that the alliance, which had been held together with such difficulty during the vicissitudes of war, would be broken up in determining what use was to be made of its victory. Not only political principles and passions of the most profound, but family interests of the strongest kind, were at issue in the determination that was about to be taken. It was of the last importance to avoid rendering the war a national one in France, and to continue to hold it out as directed, as in reality it was, solely against the violence and injustice of the Revolution. But how was this to be done if a dynasty which they had proscribed, and which was possibly still unpopular, was forced upon an unwilling people ? The allied sovereigns had uniformly declared, that they would wait for some manifestation of public opinion in France, but none such had hitherto been generally evinced ; and it would soon be necessary to take some decided measure while yet in uncertainty as to the race of sovereigns, or the species of government, which would be acceptable to its inhabitants. Nor were

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

1.
Great difficulty in the
choice of
Napoleon's
successor.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

the inclinations of the allied sovereigns less at variance on the subject. Alexander had more than once repudiated the idea of a crusade for the restoration of the Bourbon line, and seemed rather to favour the pretensions of Bernadotte; Austria naturally and openly inclined to a regency, of which Marie Louise might be the head; while, although the English ministers in private inclined to the ancient race, yet no official act implicating the nation had hitherto taken place; and, following the principles of their constitution, and the uniform principles of their government during the war, they too deprecated the idea of any forcible interference in the internal affairs of France.

2.
Important
meeting of
the sove-
reigns at
Talleyrand's
hotel.

When the review was concluded, and the troops were dividing into small parties to reach the quarters assigned them, in the barracks and suburbs of the city, Alexander alighted at the hotel of M. Talleyrand, where the leading members of the senate, and the most distinguished characters of the capital, were assembled. The fact of his taking up his residence there sufficiently evinced the part which the arch-diplomatist had taken in the measures which had preceded, and was to take in the negotiations which followed. The meeting was of a very various character, and exhibited a strange example of the manner in which the most opposite parties are thrown together in the later stages of a revolution. On the side of the Royalists there were the Baron Louis and M. de Pradt, the well-known and acute archbishop of Malines, General Dessoles, the Duc de Dalberg, Bourrienne, formerly Napoleon's private secretary, and the senator Bournonville; and these, with the Emperor of Russia, King of Prussia, Prince Schwartzberg, Prince Lichtenstein, Count Nesselrode, and Count Pozzo di Borgo, constituted this memorable assemblage. Their proceedings are well worth recounting; the fate of the world depended upon their deliberations.¹

¹ Thib. ix.
610, 611.
Cap. x. 469,
476. De
Pradt, Hist.
de la Rest.
13, 14.

Alexander opened the discussion by stating that there

were four courses to adopt : either to make peace with Napoleon, taking the necessary securities against him ; to establish a regency ; to favour the election of Bernadotte ; or to recall the house of Bourbon. Upon these momentous questions he requested the opinion of the meeting, protesting that the only wish of the allied sovereigns was to consult the wishes of France, and secure the peace of the world. Talleyrand immediately rose, and strongly urged that the two former projects were altogether inadmissible : and that there could be no peace in Europe while Napoleon, or any of his dynasty, were on the throne : that the third was hopeless, as France would never accept an indifferent soldier stained with her own blood. He concluded that the only course was to adopt the fourth, which would be generally acceptable, and which offered the only way of escaping from the evils by which they were surrounded. He added, under the mild rule of a race of princes who had learned wisdom in misfortune, all the guarantees which could be desired would be obtained for durable freedom. To this proposition it was replied by Schwartzemberg, that no indications of indifference to the Emperor had been witnessed by the army in its passage through France ; that the declarations in favour of the Bourbons had been few and far between : and that the heroic resistance of the national guards at Fère-Champenoise, many of whom had been only a few days before at the plough, gave no indications of such a disposition. Alexander then turned to Talleyrand, and asked him how he proposed to arrive at his object. Talleyrand replied, by means of the constituted authorities : that he would answer for the senate, and that their example would be speedily followed by all France.¹

Alexander then asked the Abbé de Pradt and Baron Louis their opinion ; and prefaced it by declaring, in the most energetic terms, “that the Russian Emperor was not the author of the war ; that Napoleon had, without

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

B.

Alexander
Talleyrand

1 D. Pradt,
Hist. de la
Russie, t. 1.
Chap. 18, 19.
Chap. 20, 21.
Chap. 22, 23.
Chap. 24, 25.
Chap. 26, 27.
Chap. 28, 29.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

4.

Which terminates in the determination to restore the Bourbons.

a cause, invaded his dominions ; that it was neither a thirst for conquest nor the lust of dominion which had brought him to Paris, but the necessity of self-preservation ; that he had done all in his power to spare that capital, and would have been inconsolable if he had failed in that object ; finally, that he was not the enemy of France, but of Napoleon, and all who were hostile to its liberties." In these sentiments the King of Prussia and Prince Schwartzemberg expressed their entire concurrence ; and then the Abbé de Pradt, Baron Louis, and General Dessoles, declared that they were Royalists ; "that the great majority of the French nation were of the same opinion ; that it was the knowledge of negotiations going on at Châtillon with Napoleon, that alone had hitherto prevented this opinion from manifesting itself ; but that, now they were concluded, Paris would readily declare itself, and the whole of France would immediately follow its example." "Sire," resumed Talleyrand, "there are but two courses open to us: Buonaparte or Louis XVIII. Buonaparte, if you can—but you cannot ; for you are not alone. What would they give you in his place ? A soldier ? We want no more of them. If we wanted one, we would keep the one we already have : he is the first in the world. After him, any one that could be offered us would not have ten votes in his favour. I repeat it, Sire ! any attempt except for Buonaparte or Louis XVIII. is but an intrigue." "Well, then," said Alexander, "I declare that I will no longer treat with the Emperor Napoleon ;" and added, on the suggestion of the Abbé de Pradt, "nor with any member of his family."¹

¹ De Pradt, *Hist. de la Rest.* 18, 24. Sav. vii. 53. 55. Thib. ix. 640, 641. Cap. x. 476, 477. Thiers, xvii. 645, 647.

The die being thus cast, the next step to be taken was to announce the resolution of the allied sovereigns to the inhabitants of Paris. An address to the French nation was immediately drawn up and published, in which they declared that they would grant more favourable terms to a wise government, than when it was necessary to provide

against the devouring ambition of Napoleon; that they would not treat with Napoleon, nor any member of his family; that they would respect the integrity of France, as it had been under its legitimate monarchs; that they wished that France should be great and powerful, and would respect and guarantee any constitution which it might adopt; and concluded by inviting the senate to appoint a provisional government, and prepare a suitable constitution for the French people.* Orders were, at the same time, sent to the police to liberate all persons detained in prison for state offences, or “for having prevented the inhabitants in their communes from firing on the allied troops, and so saved their persons and effects, or who were in detention on account of their attachment to their ancient and legitimate sovereign.” Some difficulty was anticipated in getting a printer who would have courage enough to throw off such a proclamation: but Talleyrand had early in the morning provided against this difficulty, and was ready with an artisan, who did the work with such expedition that before nine at night five hundred copies were placarded over every part of Paris. At the same time Bourrienne, by means of the post-office, of which he got command by authority of Alexander, circulated it next morning over the whole of France.¹

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

5.

Declaration
of the Allies
that they
would no
longer treat
with Napo-
leon nor his
family.
March 30.

¹ Hard, xii.
394, 395.

Cap. x. 476,
477. Thib.

ix. 642.

643. Bour.

x. 43, 45.

Thiers, xvii.

643.

This declaration produced a prodigious impression.

* “The allied powers having occupied Paris, they are ready to receive the declaration of the French nation. They declare, that if it was indispensable that the conditions of peace should contain stronger guarantees when it was necessary to enchain the ambition of Napoleon, they would become more favourable when, by a return to a wiser government, France itself offers the assurance of repose. The allied sovereigns declare, in consequence, that they will no longer treat with Napoleon nor with any of his family; that they respect the integrity of old France, as it existed under its legitimate kings—they may even go further, for they always profess the principle, that for the happiness of Europe it is necessary that France should be great and powerful; that they recognise and will guarantee such a constitution as the French nation may give itself. They invite, consequently, the senate to appoint a provisional government, which may provide for the necessities of administration, and establish such a constitution as may be fitting for the French people. The intentions which I have just expressed are common to me with all the allied powers. ALEXANDER, *Paris*, 31st March 1814: Three P.M.”—See CAPEFIGUT, x. 477; and THIBAUDEAU, ix. 642.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

6.

Immense
effect of this
declaration.

It cut short at once all intrigues for a regency, and, in fact, left the nation no alternative but to revert to the Bourbons. The senate, thus specially called upon by the allied sovereigns to act, was not long in being put in motion : it had been secretly prepared in part for such a step by Talleyrand, and the declaration of the Allies at once brought matters to a crisis. Already the municipal council of Paris had, from the Hôtel de Ville, issued a vehement invective against Napoleon, and in favour of Louis XVIII. ; but the senators were in great part uninitiated in the secret of the approaching change, and it was with pale visages and trembling steps that they obeyed the summons which, early on the morning of the 1st April, Talleyrand, in his capacity of arch-chancellor of the empire, sent them, to assemble to deliberate in their usual hall of assembly. Only sixty-four out of one hundred and forty attended ; but that number comprised several men of distinction, whose names had been known on almost every side through all the phases of the Revolution : many who had voted for the death of the king, and others who, by a kind of miracle, had kept their heads on their shoulders during the Reign of Terror. To the proceedings of that day are affixed the signatures of Destutt de Tracy, Fontanes, the eloquent orator of the empire, Garat, the Abbé Grégoire, Lambrecht, Lanjuinais, the Abbé de Montesquiou, Roger Ducos, Serrurier, Bourdesoules, and the Marshal Duc de Valmy ! Strange assemblage of men of the most opposite political sentiments, now met together to pull down the last government of the Revolution !¹

¹ *Moniteur*,
April 1, 2,
and 3, 1814.
Thiers, xvii.
650, 663.

7.

Establish-
ment of a
provisional
government
by the
Senate,
April 1.

Talleyrand opened the proceedings ; and after a short discussion, a provisional government was unanimously established, consisting of Talleyrand, who was president, the Comte de Beurnonville, the Comte de Jaucourt, the Duc de Dalberg, and M. de Montesquiou. The latter had been a distinguished member of the Constituent Assembly in 1789. Nothing was said of Napoleon,

though the very establishment of a provisional government was the most decided act of high treason to his authority ; nor of the Bourbons, though every step taken was a nearer approach to their recognition. The principal care of the senate appeared to be the formation of a constitution ; and in that view it was provided that the senate and legislative body should be a constituent part of the new government ; their ranks and pensions should be preserved to the army, the public debts maintained, the sale of the national domains ratified, an amnesty declared for the past, liberty of worship and of the press established, and a constitution on these bases formed. The last act in the popular drama in France was worthy of all which had preceded it. No provision was made, excepting a word for the press, for public freedom or individual liberty : all that was thought of was the preservation of the *interests* created by the Revolution, and the first stipulation was in favour of these. Doubtless their preservation was an essential element in any restoration which was likely to be durable ; but what a picture does the *absence* of any other stipulations give of the principles on which the struggle had been maintained, and the motives by which its promoters had been actuated ! ¹

The meeting of the senate broke up at half-past nine ; and they proceeded to wait upon the Emperor Alexander. He received them in the most gracious manner. “ Gentlemen,” said he, “ I am charmed to find myself in the midst of you. It is neither ambition nor the love of conquest which has led me hither ; my armies have only entered France to repel unjust aggression. Your Emperor carried war into the heart of my dominions when I wished only for peace. I am the friend of the French people ; I impute their faults to their chief alone ; I am here with the most friendly intentions ; I wish only to protect your deliberations. You are charged with one of the most honourable missions which generous

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
—
1814.

¹ Séances, April 1, 1814, *Moniteur*, April 2, 1814; art. 1 Cap. x. 171; ix. 647. Thiers, xvii. 650, 651.

8.
Generals
confer with
the Emperor
Alexander,
who has
ratified all the
French pro-
posals.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

men can discharge,—that of securing the happiness of a great people, in giving France institutions at once strong and liberal, with which she cannot dispense in the state of civilisation which she has attained. I set out to-morrow to resume the command of the armies, and sustain the cause which you have embraced: it is time that blood should cease to flow; too much has been shed already: my heart grieves for it. I will not lay down my arms till I have secured the peace which has been the object of all my efforts; and I shall be content if, in quitting your country, I bear with me the satisfaction of having had it in my power to be useful to you, and to contribute to the peace of the world. The provisional government has asked me this morning for the liberation of the French prisoners of war confined in Russia: I give it to the senate. Since they fell into my hands, I have done all in my power to soften their lot. I will immediately give orders for their return: may they rejoin their families in peace, and enjoy the tranquillity which the new order of things is fitted to induce!" A hundred and fifty thousand men by these words recovered their liberty, and were to be restored to their families and their country. Such was the vengeance which Alexander took for the desolation of his dominions and the flames of Moscow! When Napoleon left Vienna in 1809, he blew up the time-honoured bastions of the capital;¹ when he became master of Berlin in 1806, he said, "I will make the Prussian nobility so poor, that they shall beg their bread;"² when he evacuated Moscow, he gave orders for destroying the Kremlin, the last relic of that capital which had escaped the flames.³ If ever the spirit of the Gospel actuated the human breast, it was Alexander's on this occasion.⁴

On the day following, being 2d April, the senate by a solemn decree dethroned the Emperor, and absolved the army* and people from their oaths of alle-

¹ Ante, ch. lx. § 44.

² Ante, ch. xlv. § 88.

³ Ante, ch. lxxiii. § 28.

⁴ *Moniteur*, April 3, 1814. Cap. x. 478.

Beauch. ii. 326, 327.

Thiers, xvii. 671, 673.

* "Soldiers! France has broken the yoke beneath which she has groaned

giance.* This decisive step was moved in an impassioned speech by Lambrecht ; the act of accusation having been prepared by Barbé-Marbois, Lanjuinais, and Fontanes. It abounded in the most severe and cutting invectives against the imperial government ; in the justice of which posterity, from the evidence of facts, must almost entirely participate, and which involve the most valuable commentary that history has preserved on the inevitable tendency and final issue of revolutions. Nor is the lesson the less important, if we recollect that the body which now burst forth into this vehement strain of indignation against the Emperor, was the very senate which had so long been the passive instrument of his will ; that the orators, whose eloquence was now so powerfully exerted to demonstrate the ruinous tendency of his administration, were the very men who had hitherto exalted it to the skies as the height of wisdom and magnanimity ; and that the empire, whose exhaustion and miseries they now so graphically portrayed, was the powerful monarchy which they had formerly represented as regenerated by revolution, and conducted by

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.
9.
The Senate
dethrone
Napoleon.
April 2.

for so many years ! You have never fought save for your country : you can now no longer combat but against her, under the standards of the man who has hitherto conducted you. See what you have suffered from his tyranny : you were once a million of soldiers ; almost all have perished under the sword of the enemy ; or, without subsistence, without hospitals, they have been doomed to die of misery and famine. You are no longer the soldiers of Napoleon : the senate and people of entire France absolve you from your oaths."—*Moniteur*, 5th April 1814.

* "Frenchmen ! on emerging from civil dissension, you chose for chief a man who appeared on the theatre of the world with an air of grandeur. You reposed in him all your hopes ; these hopes have been deceived : on the ruins of anarchy he has founded only despotism. He was bound at least in gratitude to have become a Frenchman with you : he has not done so. He has never ceased to undertake, without end or motive, unjust wars, like an adventurer who is impelled by the thirst for glory. In a few years he has devoured at once your riches and your population. Every family is in mourning ; all France groans : he is deaf to our calamities. Possibly he still dreams of his gigantic designs, even after unheard-of reverses have punished in so signal a manner the pride and the abuse of victory. He has shown himself not even capable of reigning for the interests of his despotism. He has destroyed all that he wished to create. He believed in no other power but that of force ; force now overwhelms him—just retribution of insensate ambition !"—*CARLEIGUE*, x. 483 ; and *Moniteur*, April 5, 1814.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

¹ *Moniteur*,
April 4,
1814; and
Cap. x. 481.
Thib. ix.
650, 651.
Thiers, xvii.
673, 674.

the most splendid abilities to the summit of social happiness and military glory. Either the statement they now made, and the picture they now drew, was true or false. If it was true, what a lesson does it read on the effect of that unrestrained indulgence of the social passions which constitutes a revolution; if it was false, what a mirror does it present of the baseness of character which such a convulsion produces, and the destiny of a state which it throws into the guidance of such hands! ¹* But, in truth, such was the baseness of those days, that a

* "The conservative senate, considering that, in a constitutional monarchy, the monarch exists only in virtue of a social compact: that Napoleon Buonaparte's administration for some time was firm and prudent, but that latterly he has violated his fundamental compact with the French people, especially by raising and levying taxes without the sanction of the law, in direct opposition to the oath which he took on ascending the throne: that he committed that infraction of the liberties of the people, when he had, without cause, prorogued the legislative, and suppressed as criminal a report of that body, thereby contesting its title and share in the national representation: that he has undertaken a series of wars of his own authority, in violation of the law, which declared that they should be proposed, discussed, and promulgated as laws: that he has illegally issued several decrees declaring the penalty of death, especially those of 3d March last, tending to establish as national a war which sprang only from his immediate ambition: that he has violated the laws of the constitution by his decrees on state prisons: that he has annihilated the responsibility of monarchs, confounded all powers, and destroyed the independence of the judiciary bodies: that he has trampled under foot the liberty of the press by means of a corrupt and enslaved censorship, and made use of that powerful instrument only to deluge France with false maxims, doctrines favourable to despotism, and outrages on foreign governments: that acts and reports of the senate itself have undergone alteration previous to publication: that instead of reigning conformably to the interest, happiness, and glory of the French nation, in terms of his oath, Napoleon has put the finishing stroke to the miseries of the country, by refusing to treat with the Allies on terms which the national interest required him to accept, and which did not compromise the honour of France: that by the abuse which he has made of the resources in men and money intrusted to him, he has effected the ruin of the towns, the depopulation of the country, and everywhere induced famine and contagious pestilence: considering, in fine, that by all these causes the imperial government *has ceased to exist*, and that the wishes of the French call for a state of things of which the first result may be the re-establishment of a general peace, and the reunion of France with all the states of the great European family,—the senate declares and decrees as follows:—1. Napoleon Buonaparte is cast down from the throne, and the right of succession in his family is abolished. 2. The French people and army are absolved from their oath of fidelity to him. 3. The present decree shall be transmitted to the departments and armies, and proclaimed immediately in all the quarters of the capital."—*Moniteur*, 5th April 1814; and *CAMPBELL*, x. 479, 481.

parallel to it is to be found only in the degraded days of Roman slavery. "*Certatim omnis populus, senatus, equites, plebs, in servitutem decurrunt.*"* CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1811.

The legislative body, in a meeting consisting of seventy-seven members, adhered to the act of the senate dethroning Napoleon, and absolving the army and nation from their oaths to his government. Adhesions speedily came in on all sides. A falling cause rarely finds faithful defenders; in a revolutionary state, where success is the god of idolatry—never. All the public bodies of Paris forthwith prepared addresses, vying with one another in invectives against Napoleon, as they had formerly exhausted all the powers of rhetoric in extolling the unparalleled blessings of his government. It was a realisation of the views, and even the language of Malet, who had so nearly proved successful when the Emperor was in Russia; but with the additional invectives drawn from boundless calamities since incurred, and irresistible military support since obtained. As fast as the intelligence reached the provinces and provincial towns, they lost not an instant in proclaiming the downfall of the tyrant, and their cordial adhesion to the new order of things. Still not a word was said, at least by any of the constituted authorities, on the subject of a return to the Bourbon dynasty. On the contrary, the persons appointed by the provisional government to the principal offices of state, were almost all drawn from the republican party. Dessolles, an austere democrat, was nominated to the command of the national guard; M. Angles to the police; Henrion de Pansey became minister of public justice; M. Beugnot, of the interior; Malouet, of the marine; M. Louis, of the finances; M. de Laforest, of foreign affairs; Dupont de Nemours was made secretary to the Government; and General Dupont minister of war. This last appointment, though made because they thought they were sure

* "The whole people, senators, knights, plebeians, vie with each other in rushing headlong into servitude."—TACITUS.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

¹ *Moniteur*,
April 4,
1814; and
Cap. x. 482.
Thiers. xvii.
659, 662.

of the man, was unfortunate; it recalled to the army the disaster of Baylen, one of the darkest blots on their historic setutheon. All the persons belonged more or less to the republican or imperial parties; not a Royalist appeared amongst them. Therein Talleyrand showed his knowledge of human nature: the former could be gained only by their interests; of the latter he was sure through their affections.¹

11.
Defection of
Marmont.

Nothing, however, had yet been heard from the army; and although its force, reduced now to fifty thousand men, could not pretend to cope with the colossal mass of a hundred and sixty thousand Allies, who, having been brought up from all the detachments in the rear, were now grouped around Paris, yet it had Napoleon at its head, and it was of the highest importance, both to the domestic settlement of France and the general peace of Europe, that its sentiments should as soon as possible be expressed. The world was not long kept in suspense. In the *Moniteur* of 7th April appeared an official correspondence between Prince Schwartzenberg and Marshal Marmont, commencing on the 3d, and which terminated in the adhesion of the marshal to the provisional government on the 4th. The stipulated conditions were, that the life and personal freedom of Napoleon should be secured, and a fitting asylum provided for him in some situation designated by the allied powers; and that the French troops which, in virtue of the present convention, might pass over to the Allies, should be provided with secure quarters in Normandy, whither they were to retire with their arms, cannon, and baggage. These stipulations had been agreed to by Marmont before he heard of Napoleon's abdication (to be immediately mentioned) in favour of his son. Macdonald and Caulaincourt, on their way from Fontainebleau to Paris with Napoleon's proposal, stopped at Marmont's headquarters at Essonne. As soon as Marmont heard their intelligence, he communicated to them the steps he had already taken, but promised to

break off at once any separate negotiation, and to unite his fate for good with theirs. He in consequence accompanied them to Paris. During his absence, however, his generals of division determined to adhere to the original agreement, and in consequence his whole corps, twelve thousand strong, immediately entered the allied lines, where they were received with respect mingled with acclamations, and, passing through their files, took up their quarters at Versailles on their route for Normandy.*

At the same time Barclay de Tolly issued a proclamation to the Russian troops, in which he declared that, peace being now restored between France and Russia, all enmity between them and the French inhabitants should forthwith cease, and they should reserve their hostility for the small body of unhappy warriors who still adhered to the fortunes of Napoleon.¹ †

That body, however, was daily becoming more considerable: the fidelity of the Revolution could not withstand the storms of adverse fortune. Caulaincourt, despatched by Napoleon from Juvisy to endeavour to reopen a negotiation with the allied powers, had great difficulty

* "Soldiers! for three months the most glorious successes had crowned your efforts: neither perils, nor fatigues, nor privations have been able to diminish your zeal, or cool your ardour for your country. Your country esteems and thanks you by my mouth, and will never forget what you have done. But the moment has now arrived when the war which you waged has become without end or object; it is time you should repose. You are the soldiers of your country: it is public opinion, therefore, which you are bound to follow; and it desires you to tear yourselves from dangers which are now without an object, to preserve the noble blood which you will know how again to shed, should your country again call for your exertions. Good cautionments and my paternal cares will soon, I trust, make you forget the fatigues you have experienced."—MARMONT *to his Corps d'Armée*, 5th April, 1814; *Moniteur*, 7th April 1814; and CAPEFIGUE, x. 500.

† "Soldiers! your perseverance and your valour have delivered the French nation from the yoke of a tyrant, who acted for himself alone, and forgot what he owed to an estimable and generous people. The French nation has declared for us; our cause has become theirs; and our magnanimous monarchs have promised them protection and support. From that moment the French became our friends. Let your arms destroy the inconsiderable band of unfortunate men who still adhere to the ambitious Napoleon; but let the cultivators and the peaceable inhabitants of towns be treated with consideration and friendship, like allies united by the same interests."—*Ordre du Jour*, *par le COMTE BARCLAY DE TOLLY*, Paris, 4th April, 1814; See *Moniteur* of 5th April.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

April 5.

April 4.

¹ *Moniteur*,
April 4 and
7, 1814; and
Cap. x. 467,
501. *Monit.*
vi. 278, 293.
Thiers, xvi.
713, 720,
755, 757.

12.
Caulaincourt's mis-
sion to
Alexander.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

in making his way into Paris, as the barriers were in the hands of the allied soldiers. He was on the point of turning back in despair, when, by accident, the carriage of the Grand-duke Constantine drove up, who, after much entreaty, agreed to put him in the way of seeing the Emperor. On the morning of the 31st March, as the allied sovereigns were preparing to set out from their headquarters at the Chateau of Bondy to enter Paris, Caulaincourt arrived in the courtyard of the castle. He was introduced to the Emperor Alexander, who received him with great kindness, but in a calm and gentle, though resolute voice, informed him of the determination of the Allies no longer to treat with Napoleon. They would, he said, on entering the capital, learn what public opinion in France desired, and affix to it the adhesion of Europe. He had no time longer to confer with him, but would see him again that night. At ten o'clock in the evening, accordingly, Caulaincourt repaired to the Palace of the Elysée Bourbon, but the Emperor could not leave the conference of the allied sovereigns at which he assisted. The brilliant lights with which the palace was resplendent; the rapid entry and departure of carriages; the cheers of the Russian Guards round the hotel; the prancing and neighing of steeds which drove up to the door; the busy concourse to and fro—reminded him of the days when, in that identical palace, Napoleon had with him matured his gigantic plans for the conquest of Russia. What a contrast for the imperial plenipotentiary! Here, worn out with care, devoured with misery, steeped in grief, he awaited with breathless anxiety the approach of the Czar, who was to announce the decision of the allied powers on his master's fate.¹

¹ Caill. i. 363, 374; and ii. 1, 12. Thiers, xvii. 631, 634.

13.
Which terminates in disappointment.

At length, at one in the morning, the Emperor appeared, and received him in the kindest manner; but gave no hopes of any modification of the resolution of the sovereigns. The utmost that he could get him to promise was, that on the day following, at the council, he would

revert to the question of a regency ; intimating, at the same time, that any further hope was inadmissible. At four the Emperor retired to rest ; he reposed in the bed in which Napoleon formerly slept : Caulaincourt threw himself, in the antechamber, on a sofa on which that great man had in old times worked with his secretaries during the day. Unable to sleep, from the recollections with which he was distracted, he arose, and rested for some hours in an arm-chair : when daylight dawned in the morning, he found that it was the very chair on which Napoleon had usually sat, and which bore in all parts the deep indentations of his penknife.¹ The decision of the sovereigns was, at eleven, announced by Alexander in these words—"Return to the Emperor Napoleon ; tell him faithfully all that has passed here, and as soon as possible come back with an abdication in favour of his son. The Emperor Napoleon shall be suitably treated, I give you my word of honour."² *

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1-14.

¹ Antec. ch.
Lxxxviii. §
52.

² Caul. i.
263, 260 ;
and ii. 1.
19. Cap. x.
491, 493.
Eckh. 215,
219.

Caulaincourt arrived with this intelligence at Fontainebleau late on the night of the 2d April. Napoleon at once refused, in the most peremptory terms, to abdicate, and treated as altogether chimerical the idea of restoring the Bourbons in France ; alleging that they were obnoxious to nine-tenths of the nation. "Re-establish the Bourbons in France ! The madmen ! They would not be there a year : they are an object of antipathy to nine-tenths of the nation. And how would the army, whose chiefs have combated the Emigrants—how would they bear the change ? No, no ; my soldiers will never be theirs : it is the height of folly to think of founding an empire of such heterogeneous materials as

14.
Napoleon
at first re-
fuses to
abdicate.
April 4.

* Thiers gives this a little differently : " S'appliquant toujours à ménager M. de Caulaincourt, Alexandre en parlant d'un sort moins rigoureux pour Napoléon, avait laissé entrevoir qu'il s'agissait pour sa personne d'une retraite meilleure, et pour son fils d'un trône sous la régence de Marie-Louise. M. de Caulaincourt, quoique peu enclin aux illusions, avait alors *deux certitudes essentielles, et s'était dit que ce trône serait peut-être celui de France*, accablé au Roi de Rome sous la tutelle de sa mère." — THIERS, xvii. 684.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

theirs of necessity would be composed of. Can it ever be forgotten that they have lived twenty years on the charity of the stranger, at open war with the principles and interests of France? The Bourbons in France! it is absolute madness, and will bring down on the country a host of calamities. I was a new man, free of the blood which had stained the Revolution: I had nothing to avenge, everything to reconstruct; but even I would never have ventured to seat myself on the vacant throne, had not my forehead been crowned with laurels. The French nation have raised me on their bucklers, only because I have executed great and glorious deeds for it. But the Bourbons—what have they done for France? What part can they claim in its conquests, its glory, its prosperity? Re-established by the stranger, they must yield everything to their masters; they must bend the knee to them at every turn. They may take advantage of the stupor occasioned by the occupation of the capital to proscribe me and my family; but to make the Bourbons reign in France!—never!”¹

¹ Caül. ii.
48, 50.

15.
But at
length
agrees to
do so in
favour of
his son.

Full of the project of resuming hostilities, he mounted on horseback early on the morning of the 3d, and traversed the advanced posts along the whole line. The soldiers, despite their disasters, were full of enthusiasm, and demanded, with loud cries, to be led back to Paris; and the *young* generals, who had their fortunes to make, shared the general ardour. But it was not thus with the old generals, or those whose fortunes were made. They surrounded Caulaincourt, eagerly demanding what had been done at Paris; listened with undisguised compla-

* “Soldiers!” said he, “the enemy has gained some marches upon us, and outstripped us at Paris. Some factious men, the emigrants whom I have pardoned, have mounted the white cockade, and surrounded the Emperor Alexander, and they would compel us to wear it. Since the Revolution, France has always been mistress of herself. I offered peace to the Allies, leaving France in its ancient limits, but they would not accept it. In a few days I will attack the enemy; I will force him to quit our capital. I rely on you—am I right? (Yes, yes.) Our cockade is tricolor, before abandoning it we will all perish on the soil of France. (Hurrah! yes, yes!)”—CAPEFIGUE, x. 496.

cency to his account of the first proceedings of the senate; and it was evident, from their doubts and hesitation, either that they regarded the cause of the Revolution as hopeless, or that they had profited so much by its excesses that they were disposed to risk nothing more in its defence. The marshals were nearly unanimous on the subject; Ney in particular was peculiarly vehement upon the impossibility of further maintaining the contest, and the absurdity of their sacrificing everything for one man.* Orders were, nevertheless, given over night for the troops to prepare for a forward movement; and measures were adopted for transferring the headquarters next day to Essone, on the road to Paris. But, during the night, news arrived of the dethronement of the Emperor by the senate. It spread immediately through the army, and produced a great impression, especially on the marshals and older generals. The orders to advance to Paris were not recalled, but it was evident that they were not to be obeyed. At noon a conference of the Emperor with Berthier, Ney, Lefebvre, Oudinot, Macdonald, Maret, Caulaincourt, and Bertrand, took place, at the close of which Napoleon signed his abdication in favour of his son, and of the Empress as regent. Macdonald and Ney were forthwith despatched with Caulaincourt to present this conditional abdication to the allied sovereigns.^{1†}

CHAP.
LXXAIX.
1814.

¹ Fain, 218;
221. Caul.
ii. 26, 37.
Caul. 10,
492, 493.
Thiers, xvii.
709, 713.

While the three plenipotentiaries of Napoleon were on

* "Ney, in an especial manner, made himself remarkable by the vehemence of his expressions, as he had always done since Moscow. 'Are we,' said he, 'to sacrifice everything to one man? Fortune, rank, honours, life itself? It is time to think a little of ourselves, our families, and our interests.' Caulaincourt warmly supported the plan of a regency, thinking that it was all that could be done for Napoleon."—CAPRIGET, x. 492.

† "The allied powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe,—the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he is ready to descend from the throne, to quit France, and even life itself, for the good of the country, which is inseparable from the rights of his son, of the regency of the Empress, and of the maintenance of the laws of the empire."—*Fortuinblean*, April 4, 1814; FAIN, 221.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

16.
Napoleon's
proclama-
tion against
Marmont
and the
Senate.

April 5,
1814.

their way to Paris, the march of events at Fontainebleau was so rapid as almost to outstrip imagination. During the night of the 4th, intelligence arrived of the adhesion of Marmont to the provisional government, and the entrance of his *corps d'armée* within the allied lines. At this news the indignation of the Emperor knew no bounds, and its vehemence found vent in an order of the day next morning. "The Emperor," said he, "thanks the army for the attachment which it has manifested towards him, and chiefly because it has recognised the great principle that France is to be found in him, and not in the people of the capital. The soldier follows the fortune and the misfortune of his general; his honour is his religion. The Duke of Ragusa has not inspired his companions in arms with that sentiment: he has passed over to the Allies. The Emperor cannot approve the condition on which he has taken that step; he cannot accept life and liberty from the mercy of a subject. The senate has allowed itself to dispose of the government of France; it forgets that it owes to the Emperor the power which it has now abused—that it was he who saved a part of its members from the storms of the Revolution, drew it from obscurity, and protected it against the hatred of the nation. The senate founds on the articles of the constitution to overturn it, without adverting to the fact that, as the first branch of the state, it took part in those very acts. A sign from me was an order for the senate, which always did more than was desired of it. The senate does not blush to speak of the libels the Emperor has published against foreign nations; it forgets that they were drawn up by itself. As long as fortune was faithful to their sovereign, these men were faithful, and not a whisper was heard against the abuse of power. If the Emperor despised them, as they now reproach him with having done, the world will see whether or not he had reasons for his opinion. He held his dignity from God and the nation; they alone could deprive him of it.

He always considered it as a burden; and when he accepted it, it was in the conviction that he alone was able to bear its weight. The happiness of France appeared to be indissolubly bound up with the fortunes of the Emperor; now that fortune has decided against him, the will of the nation alone can persuade him to remain on the throne. If he is really the only obstacle to peace, he willingly gives himself up a sacrifice to France."¹

When Caulaincourt and Macdonald arrived at Paris, however, they found that matters had proceeded too far to render the proposition of a regency admissible. In fact, though the Emperor Alexander secretly inclined to that course, and Austria, as might have been expected, was ready to support it, yet the declaration against Napoleon, and the manifestations in favour of the Bourbons had been so vehement and unanimous from all incorporated bodies and all classes of society, that to establish the family of Napoleon now on the throne, would appear to be doing a violence to the national will. Nor did it escape observation, that the recognition of Marie Louise as regent, and the young Napoleon as heir, would in fact be a continuation of the revolutionary regime, attended with its passions, its ambition, and its dangers; and that the exclusion of Napoleon personally would be but nominal, as long as his family sat upon the throne, and the imperial authorities continued the government.* Influenced by these considerations, and, above all, by the news which had just arrived, of the entrance of Marmont's corps into their lines, the allied powers unanimously agreed that the sentence of dethronement pronounced

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
114.

¹ Fain, 225,
227. Cap.
x. 505.

17.
The mission
of Caulain-
court to
establish a
regency
fails.

* "A regency with the Empress and her son," said the Emperor Alexander, "sounds well, I admit; but Napoleon remains—there is the difficulty. In vain will he promise to remain quiet in the retreat which will be assigned to him. You know even better than I his devouring activity, his ambition. Some fine morning he will put himself at the head of the regency, or in its place: then the war will recommence, and all Europe will be on fire. The very dread of such an occurrence will oblige the Allies to keep their armies on foot, and thus frustrate all their intentions in making peace."—THIBAU DEAU, x. 15.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

¹Thib. x.
21. Fain, ii.
228, 230.
Cap. x. 508,
509. Caul.
ii. 51, 57.
Lond. 311.
Thiers, xvii.
725, 741.

by the senate could not be disturbed, and that they must adhere faithfully to their declaration, that they would not negotiate with Napoleon or any of his family. Caulaincourt and Macdonald exerted themselves to the utmost in the Emperor's behalf, but it was in vain; and Alexander announced the final decision in the mournful words—"It is too late." Ney was more flexible: feeble and irresolute in political life, as much as he was bold and undaunted in the field of battle, he was easily gained over to the party of Talleyrand; and next morning his formal adhesion to the provisional government appeared in the columns of the *Moniteur*.^{1*}

18.
The cause
of the Re-
storation
had become
irresistible
at Paris.

In truth, during the four days which had elapsed since the first declaration of the Allies that they would not treat with Napoleon or any of his family, the cause of the Bourbons had been gained. The voice in their favour, which at first had emanated merely from the enthusiastic lips of a few devoted adherents, whose fidelity had survived all the storms of the Revolution, had now swelled into a mighty shout, so as to include not only the whole influential bodies, but nearly all the population of the capital. It was neither any chivalrous feeling of loyalty, nor any abstract repentance for the crimes of the Revolution, which produced this vehement desire. Selfishness was at the bottom of the public sentiment. *Deliverance from evil* was the feeling of the multitude—preservation of their fortunes, the passion with the great.

* "Yesterday I came to Paris with the Duke of Vicenza and the Duke of Tarentum, furnished with full powers from the Emperor Napoleon to defend the interests of his dynasty on the throne. An unforeseen event having broken off the negotiations when they promised the happiest results, I saw that, to avoid a civil war to our beloved country, no course remained but to embrace the cause of our ancient kings; and, penetrated with this sentiment, I repaired that evening to the Emperor Napoleon to declare to him the wish of the French nation. The Emperor aware of the critical situation to which he has reduced France, and of the impossibility of his saving it himself, appeared to resign himself to his fate, and has consented to an absolute resignation, without any restriction. LE MARÉCHAL N.Y." *Fontainebleau, 5th April 1814, half-past eleven at night; Moniteur, April 7.* See also the very full and interesting details of the interviews of Napoleon's plenipotentiaries with Alexander, given in THIERS, xvii. 725, 741.

Even on the first day of the Allies' arrival, a crowd of persons, flying with characteristic vehemence from one extreme to another, had grossly insulted the busts and monuments of the Emperor, and a rope was slung up to his statue on the pillar in the Place Vendôme, with which they strove to pull it down. But the solidity of the fabric resisted all their efforts. When they could not succeed in throwing it down, the mob next covered the statue with a white sheet, so as to withdraw it from the view. "They did well," said Napoleon, "to conceal from me the sight of their baseness." The Royalists were too few to affect anything in the work of demolition; it was the constituted authorities, all the creatures of Napoleon, who succeeded at last by the aid of scaffolding in getting it down. By a decree of the senate on 5th April, all the emblems and initials belonging to the imperial dynasty were ordered to be effaced from the public edifices and monuments in Paris; workmen were immediately engaged to carry this decree into execution, and their ingenuity generally contrived to turn the N into an H, for Henri IV., as quickly as the nation turned from the imperial to the royal dynasty. So great was the violence of public feeling against the monuments of the late Emperor, that Alexander, to prevent their total destruction, was obliged to issue a decree,* taking them, and in an especial manner the pillar in the Place Vendôme, under his peculiar protection.¹

Such was the impulse communicated to the public funds by the prospect of a termination of the war, that the five per cents, which on the 30th March were at forty-five, had risen in the next five days twenty-five per cent, so as to be quoted on the 5th April at seventy. Universal transports, similar to those which prevailed in

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

April 5.

April 7.

¹ *Moniteur*,
April 5, and
7, 1814.
Cape X. 492.
Chateaub.
Mem. vi.
325. Thiers,
xvii. 651,
762.

19.

Intensifying
fervour in
favour of
the Bour-
bons.

* "The monument on the Place Vendôme is under the especial safeguard of the magnanimity of the Emperor Alexander and his allies. The statue on its summit will not remain there; it will immediately be taken down and give place to one of Peace."—*Proclamation, 7th April 1814; Moniteur*.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

England at the Restoration, seized upon the public mind; it was like the joy of a shipwrecked mariner when he first beholds a friendly sail in the desolate main. In the midst of the general rapture, Chateaubriand's celebrated pamphlet, "*De Buonaparte et des Bourbons*," appeared; and contributed, in the most powerful manner, to give a practical direction to general feeling, by pointing out with fervent, though exaggerated eloquence, the origin of the public evils, and the only mode of escape which yet remained open from these.* Whatever might

* François René de Chateaubriand was born on the 4th September 1768, the same year as Napoleon, in an old melancholy chateau on the coast of Brittany, washed by the waves of the Atlantic Ocean. His mother, like that of almost all other remarkable men recorded in history, was a very remarkable woman, gifted with a prodigious memory and an ardent imagination; qualities which she transmitted in a very high degree to her son. His family was very ancient, going back to the year 1000; but, till illustrated by François René, who has rendered it immortal, the Chateaubriands lived in unobtrusive privacy on their paternal acres. After receiving the elements of education at home, he was sent at the age of seventeen into the army; but the Revolution having soon after broken out, and his regiment revolted, he resigned his commission and came to Paris, where he witnessed the storming of the Tuileries on the 10th August 1792, and the massacres in the prisons on the 2d September. Many of his nearest relations, in particular his sister-in-law, Madame de Chateaubriand, and sister, Madame de Rozambeau, were executed, along with Malesherbes, shortly before the fall of Robespierre. Obligated now to fly to England, he lived for some years in London in extreme want, sometimes unable to procure even a single meal a-day. It was there he wrote his first and least creditable work, the *Essai Historique*, which is strongly tinctured with the revolutionary principles in religion and politics, then so prevalent in France. Tired of such an obscure and monotonous life, he set out for America in 1798, with the Quixotic design of discovering by land the north-west passage. He failed in that attempt, for which indeed he had not any adequate means; but he dined with Washington, and in the solitude of the Far West imbibed several of the noblest ideas, and found the subjects of many of the finest descriptions which have since adorned his works. Finding that there was nothing to be done in the way of discovery in America, he returned to England; from whence, on the amnesty proclaimed by Napoleon in 1800, he went over to Paris. He there composed his greatest works, *Atala et René*, and the *Génie du Christianisme*, which soon gained for him a colossal reputation, and attracted the notice of Napoleon, who gave him a diplomatic situation first at Rome, and afterwards in the Republic of the Valais.

The murder of the Duc d'Enghien in 1804, however, so deeply affected Chateaubriand, that he instantly threw up his appointment to the Valais: a courageous and highly honourable step, which for some days exposed his life to the most imminent danger. Having happily escaped without being shot, he travelled to the East, and visited Athens, Constantinople, Jerusalem, and Egypt. These travels furnished subjects for two very charming works, the *Pèlerinage à Jérusalem*, and *Les Martyrs*, the scene of which latter romance is

be said of the violence of this production, of which thirty thousand copies were sold in a few days, no reproach could be cast upon the consistency of the author; for he had refused office under Napoleon on the death of the Duc d'Enghien, and braved his resentment in the plenitude of his power.¹ When Alexander and the King of Prussia appeared at the opera, on the 3d April, thunders of applause shook that splendid edifice. Every allusion to passing events was seized with avidity and encored with rapture. The Buonapartists, from the senate downwards, were foremost in adulation of the foreigners, and flattery of the exiled princes;² they fêted them in their palaces, applauded them at the theatres, and ex-

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1-11.

¹ *Anglo-G.*
XXXIX.
25.

² *Cap.* x.
503, 509.
Personal
observation.
Thib. ix.
653, 655.
Montg. vii.
418, 419.
Chateaub.
vi. 523.
Thiers. xxi.
762, 763.

laid on the banks of the Nile. He afterwards returned to France, but did not reappear in public life till the approach of the Allies to Paris, when he composed in a few days, and published his celebrated pamphlet, *De Buonaparte et des Bourbons*, which had a powerful effect in bringing about the Restoration. That event opened to him the career of political life, and in a great degree closed his literary career.

The usual jealousies of courts, however, at real genius, long prevented him from being placed in the situations for which he was fitted. He was first appointed ambassador at Stockholm, to which, however, he never went, in consequence of the return of Napoleon, and flight of Louis to Ghent, whither he was accompanied by Chateaubriand, who obtained the situation of Minister of the Interior; in which, during the exile of the royal family, he rendered very important services to the royal cause. So great had his ascendancy now become, that it was only from the overpowering influence of Talleyrand and Fouché, and the phalanx of baseness with which the fugitive monarch was surrounded on his second restoration, that he was prevented from making him prime minister. He retired from the ministry on their appointment in July 1815, and was sent as ambassador to Berlin, and afterwards in the same capacity to London in 1822. He afterwards was one of the plenipotentiaries of France at the Congress of Verona, and had the entire merit of the successful expedition of the Duke d'Angoulême into Spain in 1823. Jealousy, however, again led to his overthrow; he was dismissed from the ministry which he had so ably and successfully served, and was not again restored to power. He was too liberal a man to be employed by Charles X.; but he exhibited an honourable constancy to misfortune on the Revolution of the Barricades in June 1830. Pressed by Louis Philippe to accept the portfolio of foreign affairs, he refused the offer, and retired to Rome, from whence he returned and was imprisoned for a short time by the government of Paris on occasion of one of the disturbances in Paris in 1832. The remainder of his life was passed in retirement, engaged in literary pursuits, and in the composition of the interesting memoirs of his eventful life, which have been published since his death in ten volumes. During this period, also, he wrote his *Etudes Historiques* in four volumes. He died in July 1848, in his eightieth year. — See *Memoires d'Outre-Tombe*, par M. DE CHATEAUBRIAND, 10 vols. Paris: 1849-50.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

hausted all the flowers of rhetoric in their praise, in the press. The splendid melodrama, the "Triumph of Trajan," was brought forth with unequalled magnificence, and had a run of unprecedented success; and a couplet, the production of a liberal writer, was sung and rapturously encored, which savoured rather of the servility of Oriental despotism than of a nation which had so strenuously contended for liberty and equality.*

20.
Napoleon's
final and
uncondi-
tional abdi-
cation.

When the plenipotentiaries of Napoleon returned to Fontainebleau with this decided refusal, he burst into an explosion of passion; declared that it was too much; that he would put himself at the head of his armies, and rather run the hazard of any calamities than submit to a humiliation worse than them all: but that he would give them his final answer on the following day. He then called for his generals and maps, talked of retiring to the Loire, and spoke of the resources which still remained to him in the armies of Soult and Suchet. "I have," said he to Caulaincourt, "twenty-five thousand of the Guards and cuirassiers at Fontainebleau—those giants who are the terror of all Europe; on them I will rally thirty thousand men from Lyons, eighteen thousand under Grenier from Italy, fifteen thousand under Suchet, and forty thousand with Soult. They form in all a hundred and thirty thousand men, and with them I am still erect. I will rest on that sword which has visited every capital of Europe: I will inscribe on my eagles, 'Independence and our Country,' and they will again become terrible." But during the night he received the most decisive proof of the universal defection.

* The following couplets were added to the air of Henry IV., and sung at all the theatres amidst unbounded applause:—

"Vive Alexandre,	Vive Guillaume,
Vive le Roi des Rois;	Et ses guerriers vaillants;
Sans nous donner des lois,	De ce royaume
Ce prince auguste,	Il sauve les enfants,
A le triple renom	Par sa victoire,
De héros, de juste;	Et nous donne la paix;
Et nous rend un Bourbon.	Et compte la gloire
	Par ses nombreux bienfaits."

tion of his generals. All, with the exception of a few young, generous, and ardent men, represented the continuance of the war as impossible; and in fact, during the five days which had elapsed since the battle of Paris, the allied forces had so accumulated both on his front and flanks, that retreat even had become out of the question. Still the iron soul of Napoleon could hardly be brought to yield; and it was only after several long conversations with Caulaincourt and his marshals, that with an agitated hand, and in almost illegible characters, he wrote and signed the absolute and unqualified resignation of the throne.* “Observe,” said he, when he affixed his signature, “it is with a conquering enemy that I treat, and not with the provisional government, in whom I see nothing but a set of factious traitors.”¹

And now commenced at Fontainebleau a scene of baseness never exceeded in any age of the world, and which forms an instructive commentary on the principles and practice of the Revolution. Let an eyewitness of these hideous tergiversations, an ardent supporter of the Revolution, record them: they would pass for incredible if narrated from any less exceptionable source. “Every hour after this,” says Caulaincourt, “was marked by fresh voids in the Emperor’s household. The universal object was how to get first to Paris. All the persons in office quitted their post without leave, or asking permission; one after another they all slipped away, totally forgetting him to whom they owed everything, but who had no longer anything to give. The universal complaint was, that his formal abdication was so long of appearing. ‘It is high time,’ it was said by every one, ‘for all this to come to an end; it is absolute childishness to remain any longer

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

¹ *Moniteur*, April 12, 1814. *Cap.* x, 515. *Plan*, 231, 232. *Cacl.* ii, 61, 62, 68, 95. *Thiers*, xvi, 750, 751.

21.
General and
base defec-
tion from
Napoleon.

* “The allied powers having declared that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the re-establishment of a general peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he renounces, for himself and his heirs, the throne of France and Italy; and that there is no personal sacrifice, not even that of life itself, which he is not willing to make for the interests of France.”—*Fontainebleau*, April 6, 1814; *Moniteur*, April 12, 1814; and *CAPEFIGUE*, x, 515.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

in the antechambers of Fontainebleau, when favours are showering down at Paris;’ and with that they all set off for the capital. Such was their anxiety to hear of his abdication, that they pursued misfortune even into its last asylum: and every time the door of the Emperor’s cabinet opened, a crowd of heads were seen peeping in to gain the first hint of the much longed-for news.” No sooner was the abdication and the treaty with the Allies signed than the desertion was universal; every person of note around the Emperor, with the single and honourable exceptions of Maret and Caulaincourt, abandoned him: the antechambers of the palace were literally deserted. Berthier even left his benefactor without bidding him adieu! “He was born a courtier,” said Napoleon, when he learned his departure: “you will see my vice-constable a mendicant for employment from the Bourbons. I feel mortified that men whom I have raised so high in the eyes of Europe should sink so low. What have they made of that halo of glory through which they have hitherto been seen by the stranger? What must the sovereigns think of such a termination to all the glories of my reign!”* Alexander was so impressed with this universal baseness, that he said to Caulaincourt, who recounted it to him, “Add to that, that they owed him everything—rank, celebrity, fortune. I verily believe if Kutusoff had lived, and we had proposed to put him on the throne, they would have exclaimed, ‘Vive Kutusoff!’ What a lesson to us sovereigns! There is no Tartar who would have dishonoured himself by such baseness.¹ Think of the

10. *id.* ii. 49.
68, 69, 69,
111. *Fain*,
233, 235.
Cap. x. 317,
318. *Thiers*,
xvii. 823,
825.

* In the general scramble, Constant, the Emperor’s private valet, who had served him faithfully for fourteen years, took the opportunity to secrete one hundred thousand francs with which he had been intrusted, and which he buried in the forest of Fontainebleau. The fraud was detected the night before the Emperor set out for Elba, and the money given up by Constant, from the place where he had secreted it. He set off immediately for Paris, accompanied by Rustan, the Mameluke, who had been the Emperor’s constant companion ever since he returned from Egypt. What is very remarkable, Constant details all these facts himself, giving them of course the best colouring he could. See *CONSTANT’S Mém. des*, vi. 101, 112; and *FAIN*, ii. 159.

noble blind peasant, Patrowik. Think of Moscow, and its splendid palaces, thrown as a holocaust to our country. What a contrast between these effects of a sublime patriotism and the conduct we see around us !”

Nothing remained now but to conclude the formal treaty between Napoleon and the allied powers; and it was signed on the 11th April. By it Napoleon renounced the empire of France and the kingdom of Italy for himself and his descendants; but he was to retain the title of Emperor, and his mother, brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces, those of princes and princesses of his family. The island of Elba having been selected by him as his place of residence, it was erected into a principality in his favour: the duchy of Parma and Placentia was secured to the Empress Marie Louise and the prince her son, in full sovereignty: two million five hundred thousand francs (£100,000) a-year was provided for the annual income of the Emperor Napoleon, to be reserved from the revenue of the countries he ceded; and two millions more inscribed on the great book of France, to descend after his decease to his heirs—the first being a provision for himself, the second for his family: the ex-Empress Josephine was to receive a million of francs yearly (£40,000) from the great book of France. All the movable estate of the princes and princesses of the Emperor's family was to remain with themselves; but the furniture of the palace and diamonds of the crown were to revert to France. Fifteen hundred of the Old Guard were to escort the Emperor to his place of embarkation; and he was to be at liberty to take with him four hundred soldiers to form his body-guard. Finally, the Poles in the service of France were to be at liberty to return to their own country, with their arms and baggage.¹ The treaty bore the signatures of Caulaincourt, Macdonald, Ney, Metternich, Nesselrode,*

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1-14.

22.
Treaty between
Napoleon and
the allied
powers.

¹ See the
Treaty in
Marten's,
Sup. i. 603,
700; and
Cap. x. 516,
519.

* Charles Aibert, Count of Nesselrode, was born at Lisbon in 1770. His father, who was descended of an ancient and noble family of German extraction, was plenipotentiary in that capital to Catherine II., Empress of Russia. Early destined to the diplomatic line by the choice of his father, and the rapid dis-

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

23.
Abortive
attempt of
Napoleon
to poison
himself.

and Hardenberg. To this treaty Lord Castlereagh, on the part of England, acceded, "but only to be binding upon his Britannic Majesty with respect to his own acts, but not with respect to the acts of third parties." *

A terrible catastrophe had well-nigh terminated at this period the life and the sufferings of Napoleon. His departure for Elba had been fixed for the 20th April; and in the interim, while he was totally deserted by all but a few domestics and his faithful Guards, it became

cernment of rising talent which distinguishes the cabinet of St Petersburg, Nesselrode made his first *entrée* into public life as an *attaché* to the French embassy at Paris in 1801, when Napoleon was First Consul. He little thought, amidst the succession of reviews, fêtes, and pageants, which then surrounded the throne of the victorious general, that he was destined to sign, in the very same capital, the treaty which told of his overthrow! His remarkable abilities and vast erudition, which were marked even at that early age, soon, however, occasioned his transfer to the inner chancery, or private council, of the Russian empire. The Emperor Alexander early appreciated the importance of his services, and accordingly he accompanied that prince on his important interview with Napoleon at Erfurth, in 1808. From this period he became, as it were, the head of a middle body in Russian diplomacy, equally removed from the ardent patriotism of the old national party, which beheld with undisguised pain the subjection of the cabinet of St Petersburg to the dominion of Napoleon, and the ambitious dreams of the Greek enthusiasts, who aimed at planting the cross on the dome of St Sophia. Moderate and rational in his views, with extensive knowledge and great address, he soon became indispensable to Alexander—whose views he divined, whose character he studied, to whose interests he was devoted. In 1812, though not as yet the head of the imperial chancery, he had the chief direction of its foreign diplomacy. He was present at the interview at Abo between Alexander and Bernadotte. In 1813 his influence openly appeared; he accompanied the Emperor to Germany in the memorable campaign of that year, and signed the convention of Reichenbach with England on the 15th June 1813. He had a great share in the delicate negotiation which, in the succeeding months, led to the accession of Austria to the grand alliance, and ultimately occasioned the fall of Napoleon; and bore an active part, when military measures were resumed, in the difficult task of keeping Bernadotte to his diplomatic engagements. He signed, with the other plenipotentiaries of the Allies, the treaty of Chaumont, and subsequently that of Paris in the French capital. Since that time he has been almost the Metternich of Russian foreign affairs, and continued to enjoy the entire confidence of the Emperors.—See CAPEFIGUE, *Diplomates Européens*, ii. 317, 345; *Biog. des Hommes Vivants*, iv. 539, 540.

* Lord Castlereagh's objections to the treaty were two-fold, 1st, That it recognised the title of Napoleon as Emperor of France, which England had never yet done, directly or indirectly. 2d, That it assigned him a residence, in independent sovereignty, close to the Italian coast, and within a few days' sail of France, while the fires of the revolutionary volcano were yet unextinguished in both countries. The result proved that he had judged rightly. See BEAUCHAMP, ii. 324.

evident to those around him that some absorbing idea had taken possession of his mind. He recurred constantly to the last moments of departed greatness; his conversation to his intimate friends was entirely upon the illustrious men of antiquity, who, in circumstances similar to his own, had fallen by their own hands; in the close of his career as in its outset, he dwelt on the heroes of Plutarch, and their resolution not to survive misfortune. The apprehensions of his attendants were increased when they learned that on the 12th, the day after the signature of the treaty, he had directed the Empress Marie Louise, who was on her way from Blois to join him, to delay the execution of her design. On taking leave of Caulaincourt that night, after a mournful reverie he said: "My resolution is taken: we must end: I feel it." Caulaincourt had not been many hours in bed when he was suddenly roused by Constant, the Emperor's valet, who entreated him to come quickly, for Napoleon was in convulsions, and fast dying. He instantly ran in; Bertrand and Maret were already there; but nothing was to be heard but stifled groans from the bed of the Emperor. Soon, however, his domestic surgeon Ivan, who had so long attended him in his campaigns, appeared in the utmost consternation, and stated that he had been seen, shortly after going to bed, to rise quietly, pour a liquid into a glass, and lie down again; and Ivan had recognised in the phial, which was left on the table, a subtle poison, a composition of opium and other deadly substances, prepared by Cabanis, the celebrated physician, which he had given the Emperor during the Moscow retreat, at his own desire, and which, as long as the danger lasted, he had constantly worn round his neck. When Caulaincourt seized his hand it was already cold. "Caulaincourt," said he, opening his eyes, "I am about to die. I recommend to you my wife and my son—defend my memory. I could no longer endure life. The desertion of my old companions in arms had broken my heart." The poison, however, either from having been so long

Month,
Captivité
de St.
Helène, ii.
39, 40, 41.
ii. 85, 89.
Fain, 241.
243. Con-
stant, vi. 65,
90. Thiers,
xvii. 754,
806.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

kept, or some other cause, had lost its original efficacy; violent vomiting gave him relief; he was with great difficulty prevailed on to drink warm water; and after a mortal agony of two hours, the spasms gradually subsided, and he fell asleep. "Ivan," said he, on awaking, "the dose was not strong enough—God did not will it;" and he rose, pale and haggard, but composed, and seemed now to resign himself with equanimity to his future fate.*

24.
Universal
desertion of
the Em-
press, and
dispersion
of Napo-
leon's
family.

Meanwhile the imperial court at Blois, where the Empress Marie Louise and the King of Rome had been since the taking of Paris, was the scene of selfishness more marked, desertions more shameless, than even the saloons of Fontainebleau. Unrestrained by the presence of the Emperor, the egotism and cupidity of the courtiers there appeared in hideous nakedness, and the fumes of the Revolution expired amidst the universal baseness of its followers. No sooner was the abdication of the Emperor known, than all her court abandoned the Empress; it was a general race who should get first to Paris, to share in the favours of the new dynasty. Such was the desertion that, in getting into her carriage on the 9th April, at Blois, to take the road to Orleans, no one remained to hand the Empress in but her chamberlain. The Empress, the King of Rome, were forgotten: the grand object of all was to get away, and to carry with them as much as possible of the public treasure, which had been brought from Paris with the government. In

* There can be no doubt now of the accuracy of the preceding account, for Napoleon himself gave precisely the same account of the matter to Montholon at St Helena:—"Depuis," said he, "la retraite de Moscow, je portais sur moi du poison suspendu au cou dans un cachet de soie: c'est Ivan qui l'avait préparé par mon ordre dans la crainte d'être enlevé par les Cosaques. A présent (à Fontainebleau) ma vie n'appartenait plus à la patrie: les événemens des derniers jours m'en avaient rendu le maître. Pourquoi tant souffrir? Je n'hésitais pas: je sautais à bas de mon lit, et, délayant le poison dans un peu d'eau, je le bus avec une sorte de bonheur. Mais le temps lui avait ôté sa valeur. D'atroces douleurs m'arrachaient quelques gémissemens; ils furent entendus; des secours m'arrivèrent; Dieu ne voulut que je mourusse encore; St Helène était dans ma destinée." MONTHOLON, *Captivité de Napoleon*, ii. 37.

a few days it had all disappeared. At Orleans, the remaining members of the Emperor's family also departed: Madame, Napoleon's mother, and her brother, the Cardinal Fesch, set out for Rome; Prince Louis, the ex-king of Holland, for Switzerland; Joseph and Jerome soon after followed in the same direction. The Empress at first declared her resolution to join Napoleon, maintaining that there was her post, and that she would share his fortunes in adversity as she had done in prosperity. The wretched sycophants, however, who were still about her person, spared no pains to alienate her from the Emperor. They represented that he had espoused her only from policy; that she had never possessed his affections; that during the short period they had been married he had had a dozen mistresses;* and that she could now expect nothing but reproaches and bad usage from him. Overcome partly by these insinuations, and partly by her own facility of character and habits of submission, she, too, followed the general example. Her French guards were dismissed, and replaced by Cossacks; she took the road from Orleans to Rambouillet, where she was visited successively by the Emperor her father, and the Emperor Alexander; and at length she yielded to their united entreaties, and agreed to abandon Napoleon. A few days after, she set out for Vienna, taking the King of Rome with her, and neither ever saw Napoleon more.¹

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

April 18
and 23.
¹ Sav. vii.
115, 119,
156, 157.
Thib. x. 33
34.

Amidst the general and humiliating scene of baseness which disgraced the French functionaries at the fall of Napoleon, it is consolatory, for the honour of human

* There was too much foundation for this scandal. Though women had no lasting power over Napoleon, and never in the slightest degree influenced his conduct, he was extremely amorous in his disposition, so far as the senses were concerned; and his infidelities, though carefully conducted to avoid observation, were very frequent, both before and after his marriage with Marie Louise. Two instances in particular, are mentioned by Constant, which occurred at St Cloud recently before this period; and, what was very remarkable, both the ladies, one of whom was of rank, came to visit him at Fontainebleau during the mournful scenes which passed, though neither saw him on that occasion. Both afterwards visited him at Elba.—CONSTANT'S *Mémoires de Napoléon*, vi. 92-97.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

25.

Honourable
fidelity of a
few at Fon-
tainebleau.
April 15.

nature, to have some instances of a contrary character to recount. Carnot remained faithful at his post at Antwerp till the abdication of Napoleon was officially intimated; and then he announced his adhesion to the new government in an order of the day to the garrison, in which he concluded with the memorable words, which so completely define the soldier's duty—"The armed force is essentially obedient; it acts, but never deliberates." Yet he was not insensible to the evils which had rendered the farther sway of Napoleon insupportable in France, and said—"The return of the Bourbons produced in France a universal enthusiasm; they were received with an effusion of the heart which is inexpressible; the enthusiasm was universal. The ancient republicans did not feel it the least; Napoleon had in a particular manner oppressed them." Soult was one of the last to give in: his adhesion is dated Castelnau-dery, 19th April, nine days after the battle of Toulouse,* and when, in reality, there was no alternative, as the whole nation had unequivocally declared itself. Of the few who remained faithful to the Emperor at Fontainebleau, it is impossible to speak in terms of too high admiration. Caulaincourt, after having nobly discharged to the very last his duties to his old master, at his earnest request returned to Paris, a few days before he departed for Elba, and bore with him an autograph letter from Napoleon to Louis XVIII., strongly recommending him to the service of the restored monarch. The Emperor obviously thought, and justly, that his presence there was indispensable to watch over the performance of the treaty of Fontainebleau. Generals Bertrand, Drouot, and Cambronne, Maret, General Belliard, Baron Fain, General Gourgaud, Colonel Anatole Montesquiou, Baron de la Place, Generals Kosakowski and Vonsowitch remained with him to the last at Fontainebleau; and Bertrand

* "Essentially obedient, the army has nothing now to do but to conform to the will of the nation."—SOUT'S *Proclamation, Castelnau-dery, 19th April 1814; Mémoires*, 24th April; and BLANCHAMP, ii. 501.

shared his exile, as well at Elba as at St Helena. Mac-
donald, though the last of his marshals to be taken into
favour, was faithful to his duty: he did not forget his
word pledged on the field of Wagram.¹ Napoleon was
so sensible of his fidelity, that on the morning when he
brought him the ratification of the treaty of Fontainebleau
to sign, he publicly thanked him for his affectionate zeal,
and lamented the coldness which had at one period
estranged them from each other. He had derived one
benefit from his misfortunes—he had learned who were
his real and who his false friends.* “At least,” said the
Emperor, “you will not refuse one souvenir—it is the
sabre of Mourad-Bey, which I have often worn in battle;
keep it for my sake. Return to Paris, and serve the
Bourbons as faithfully as you have served me.” Amidst
the general and hideous defection of the other marshals,[†]
it is refreshing to find one man who preserved unscathed,
amidst the revolutionary furnace, the honour and fidelity
of his Scottish ancestors, which had so long bound the
Highlanders, more steadily even in adverse than in pros-
perous fortune, to the house of Stuart.²

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.
1 *Angl.* ch.
lx. § 59.

² Chateaub.
Mém. vi.
283. Mém.
sur Carnot,
230. *Thib.*
x. 27, 29.
Moniteur,
April 21.
Cecil. ii.
114, 125.
Tellers, xvii.
828, 829.

The last scene of this mighty drama was not unworthy
of the dignity of those which had preceded it. When
the day for setting out drew nigh, Napoleon in the first
instance refused to move, and even threatened to renew

“L'unico ben, ma grande,
Che riman fra' disastri agl' infelici.
E il distinguer da' finti i veri amici.
Ohi del tuo Re, non della sua fortuna.
Fido seguace! E perchè mai del regno,
Ond'io possa premiarti, il Ciel mi priva?”

MITASTASIO, *Abbasando*, Act ii. scene 1.

* Augereau, at Valence, on the Rhone, thus addressed his soldiers:—
“Soldiers! the Senate, the just interpreter of the national will, worn out with
the despotism of Buonaparte, has pronounced, on the 2d April, the dethrone-
ment of him and his family. A new dynasty, strong and liberal, descended
from our ancient kings, will replace Buonaparte and his despotism. Soldiers!
you are absolved from your oaths; you are so by the nation, in which the
sovereignty resides: you are still more so, were it necessary, by the abdic-
ation of a man who, after having sacrificed millions to his cruel ambition, has
not known how to die as a soldier.” AUGEREAU, 16th April; *Moniteur*, 23rd
April 1814.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

26.

The Empe-
ror's last
speech at
Fontaine-
bleau.
April 24.

the war, alleging that the allied powers had broken the compact with him, by not permitting the Empress Marie Louise and his son to accompany him. Upon the solemn assurance of General Koller, the Austrian commissioner, that the absence of the Empress was of her own free will, he agreed to take his leave. The preparations for his departure were at length completed, and the four commissioners, on the part of the allied sovereigns, who were to accompany him, appointed—viz. General Koller on the part of Austria, General Schouvaloff on that of Russia, Colonel Campbell on that of England, and Count Waldburg-Truchess on behalf of Prussia. The Emperor then at noonday descended the great stair of the palace of Fontainebleau, and, after passing the array of carriages which awaited him at the door, advanced into the middle of the Old Guard, which stood drawn up to receive him. Amidst breathless silence and tearful eyes, he thus addressed them :—"Soldiers of my Old Guard, I bid you adieu ! During twenty years I have ever found you in the path of honour and of glory. In the last days, as in those of our prosperity, you have never ceased to be models of bravery and fidelity. With such men as you, our cause could never have been lost ; but the contest was interminable : it would have become a civil war, and France must daily have become more unhappy. I have therefore sacrificed all our interests to those of our country. I depart ; but you remain to serve France. Its happiness was my only thought ; it will always be the object of my wishes. Lament not my lot ; if I have consented to survive myself, it was that I might contribute to your glory. I am about to write the great deeds we have done together. Adieu, my children ! I would I could press you all to my heart ; but I will at least press your eagle." At these words, General Petit advanced with the eagle ; Napoleon received the general in his arms, and kissed the standard. His emotion now almost overcame him ; but, making a great effort, he regained his firmness, and said,

“Adieu, once again, my old companions! May this last embrace penetrate your hearts!” With these words he tore himself from the arms of those around him, and threw himself into his carriage, which immediately drove off amidst the sobs and tears of his faithful Guard, all of whom had petitioned to be allowed to accompany him. Certainly never was a great career more nobly terminated.^{1*}

Napoleon ere long, however, received convincing evidence that, how ardent soever might be the attachment of his soldiers, the population of all France was far from sharing the same sentiments. On the road to Lyons, indeed, he was received always with respect, generally with acclamations; but after passing that city, which he traversed on the night of the 23d, he began to experience the fickleness of mankind, and received bitter proofs of the baseness of human nature, as well as the general indignation which his oppressive government had produced. At noon on the following day he accidentally met Augereau on the road near Valence; both alighted from their carriages, and, ignorant of the atrocious proclamation in which that marshal had so recently announced his conversion to the cause of the Bourbons,² the Emperor embraced him, and they walked together on the road for a quarter of an hour in the most amicable manner. It was observed, however, that Augereau kept his helmet on his head as he walked along. A few minutes after, the Emperor entered Valence, and beheld the proclamation placarded on the walls:³ he then saw what recollection

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

¹ Fain, 250, 252. Thib. x. 46, 47. Thiers, xvii. 331.

27.
Napoleon's journey to Lyons, and dangers which he ran.

² Ante, ch. lxxxix. § 25, note.

³ Thib. x. 45, 47. Sir Neil Campbell's MS. Cap. i. 31, 32. Bour. x. 227, 230. Thiers, xvii. 332, 333.

* Voltaire would seem to have had a presentiment of this impressive scene in *Oedipe*, in the noble lines:—

“Finissez vos regrets et retenez vos larmes;
Vous plaignez mon exil, il a pour moi des charmes;
Ma fuite à vos malheurs assure un prompt secours;
En perdant votre roi, vous conservez vos jours.
Du sort de tout ce peuple il est temps que j'ordonne,
J'ai sauvé cet empire en arrivant au trône,
J'en descendrai du moins comme je suis monté;
Ma gloire me suivra dans mon adversité;
Mon destin fut toujours de vous rendre la vie.”

Oedipe, Act v. scene 2.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

his lieutenant had retained of the days of Castiglione. The troops were drawn out to receive him, and they saluted the Emperor as he passed ; but they all bore the white cockade. At Orange loud cries of " *Vive le Roi !*" were heard ; and at Avignon he found his statutes overturned, and the public effervescence against his government assuming the most menacing character.

28.
His narrow
escape at
Orgon and
Saint Canat.

As Napoleon continued his journey to the south, the tumult became so excessive, that his life was more than once in imminent danger from the fury of the populace. At Orgon he was with difficulty extricated, chiefly by the firmness and intrepidity of Colonel Campbell and the other allied commissioners, who acted with equal courage and judgment, from a violent death. At the inn of La Calade, near Saint Canat, a furious mob surrounded the house for some hours, demanding his head ; and it was only by getting out by a back window, and riding the next post disguised as a courier, with the white cockade on his breast, that he escaped. Such was the mortification which Napoleon felt at this cruel reception from the people whom he had so long governed, that when the allied commissioners came up to the post-house, they found him in a back room, with his elbows on his knees and his hands on his forehead, in profound affliction. He was persuaded that the government had excited these tumults, in order that he might be murdered in them ; and refused to take any nourishment lest it should be poisoned. He put on the uniform of the Austrian general, Koller ; the helmet of Count Waldburg on his head ; hung the order of Maria Theresa on his breast ; wrapped himself in the cloak of General Schouvaloff, whose aide-de-camp took his place in the one provided for the Emperor. Relays were provided outside the walls at Aix, to avoid the danger of entering the city ; he was clothed in the Austrian uniform, which he wore during the remainder of his journey ; and the under-prefect, Dupeloux, a man of courage and honour, escorted him in person on

horseback as far as the limits of his department. At Luc, Napoleon met and had an affecting interview with Pauline, who, amidst all her vanities, had some elevated points of character, and offered to accompany him in his exile; on the 27th, he reached Frejus; and on the 28th, at eight at night, set sail for Elba, on board the English frigate the *Undaunted*, sent there to receive him. Thus, in its last stage, a British vessel bore Cæsar and his fortunes. He was received by Captain Usher, who commanded that vessel, agreeably to the orders of government, with the honours due to a crowned head: a royal salute was fired as he stepped on board, the yards were manned, and every possible respect was shown to him, from the captain to the humblest cabin-boy. Such was the impression produced by this reception from his enemies, so different from that of his own subjects which he had recently experienced, that he burst into tears. During the voyage he was cheerful and affable; conversed much with Captain Usher and the other officers on board; and was particularly inquisitive concerning the details of the English naval discipline—the object, he said, of his long admiration. A slight shade of melancholy was observed to pass over his countenance while the vessel was in sight of the Maritime Alps, the scene of his early triumphs; but he soon regained his usual serenity, and had, with his wonderful ascendancy over mankind, made great progress in the affections of the crew, when the vessel cast anchor in Porto-Ferrajo, the capital of Elba. Moreau said of Napoleon, on hearing of the subterfuges to which he had recourse during this journey to save his life—"What characterises him is a mixture of falsehood and of the love of life: when he is beaten, you will see him fall at your feet and ask his life." But this was not a just appreciation of his character. With more truth Chateaubriand said:—"He is like the rebel angels: at one time he can contract into a dwarf, at another expand into a giant."¹

Josephine did not long survive the fall of the hero with

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1-14.

¹ THIB. x.
47, 48. Sir
Neil Camp-
bell's MS.
Cap. Cent.
Jours. i. 32,
33. Lab. ii.
452, 453.
Journal du
Comte
Waldbourg,
27. Bour. x.
227, 235.
Chateaub.
vi. 294, 295,
303. Thiers,
xvii. 833,
836.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

29.

Death of
Josephine.
May 28.

whose marvellous fortunes her own seemed in a mysterious manner to be linked. In her retreat at Navarre, she had wept in secret the declining fortune and tarnished glory of the husband who had elevated her to the pinnacle of worldly grandeur, and whose star had visibly become obscured from the moment that he divorced her from his side. He married misfortune, like Louis XVI., when he allied himself with the Austrian line.* Alexander was desirous to see and console her amidst her misfortunes, and promise his powerful protection to her children. At his request she came to Malmaison, the much-loved scene of the early and romantic attachment of Napoleon, and there the Emperor saw her frequently, and gave her those assurances in the most unreserved manner. In the midst of these cares, however, she was suddenly taken ill of a putrid sore throat, which proved fatal at the end of a few days. The Emperor Alexander was with her almost to the last, and soothed her deathbed by reiterated assurances of protection to her children. And well and faithfully did he keep his promise. When some delay took place in making out the letters-patent, erecting the forests around Saint Leu into an appanage in favour of the second son of Queen Hortense, her grandson, as had been stipulated in the Treaty of Paris, he declared that his Guards should not leave Paris till they were signed, which induced its being immediately done. In the following year he took Prince Eugene's interests under his especial protection at the congress at Vienna, and was mainly instrumental in there putting them on a proper footing. The friendship thus contracted between the Viceroy and the Czar led to a prolongation of the intimacy in the

* How applicable to Napoleon's fate were the words which Lucan makes the shade of Junia, Pompey's first wife, address to him in a dream :—

“Conjuge me, letos duxisti, Magne, triumphos.
Fortuna est mutata toris : semperque potentes
 Detrahère in cladem fato damnata maritos,
 Inmisit tepido pellex Cornelia busto.”

LUCAN, *Pharsalia*, iii. 20.

next generation; and by a remarkable revolution in the wheel of fortune, Eugene Beauharnais' son, the Duke of Leuchtenberg, espoused in subsequent times one of the grand-duchesses, a daughter of the Emperor Nicholas: so that it is not altogether beyond the bounds of possibility, that a lineal descendant of Josephine, and a descendant by marriage of Napoleon, may one day mount the throne of Russia.¹

ALEXANDER, Emperor of Russia, who took so prominent a part in these memorable events, is one of the sovereigns of modern times who has left the greatest name in history, and who has made the most indelible marks on the records of European fame. The vast extension which the Russian empire has received under his rule, the burning of Moscow, and dreadful overthrow of the French army in 1812—the deliverance of Germany, and fall of Napoleon, have conspired to give a character of awful and yet entrancing interest to his reign, to which there is perhaps nothing comparable in the whole annals of mankind. He was born in 1777, and ascended the throne on the murder of the Emperor Paul in 1800, so that he was at this period only thirty-seven years of age. His character, naturally amiable and benevolent, had been moulded by the precepts of his enlightened, though speculative and visionary, Swiss preceptor, la Harpe. But the ideas of that distinguished philanthropist were formed upon the dreams of the closet rather than a practical acquaintance with men, and this defect strongly appeared when Alexander was first called to act in the great theatre of public life. His early measures were all beneficent in their tendency, and bespoke a warm and susceptible heart; but he was not at first a match for the talent and the wickedness of the Revolution; and he yielded at Tilsit, less to the force of the French arms, than to the irresistible ascendant and magic sway of the great enchanter who wielded its powers.

But if he was born good, he became great. He learned

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

1 THEB. x.
115, 117.
Boech. ii.
37, 42.
Boer. x.
212, 216.

30.
Character
of the Em-
peror Alex-
ander.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

31.

He became
great in
misfortune.

wisdom and gathered strength in the school of misfortune. If he had yielded at first, perhaps too easily, to the fascination of Napoleon's genius, no one ever surpassed him in the firmness with which, when again driven to arms, he resisted his aggression, or the tenacity with which he followed up the contest, till he had hurled his enemy from the throne. His early friendship for Napoleon was an affair of the heart; and he who has surrendered his heart, and been deceived, will be deceived no more. But for his firmness and resolution, the coalition would repeatedly have fallen to pieces. From the day Napoleon crossed the Niemen, Alexander clearly saw that peace with him was impossible. With Roman magnanimity, he held the same language when his empire was reeking with the slaughter of Borodino, and his star seemed to pale before the conflagration of Moscow, as when, on the heights of Chaumont, he gave law to a conquered world: and if he has been outshone by few conquerors in the lustre of his victories, or the magnitude of his conquests, none have equalled him in the magnanimous use which he made of his power, and the surpassing clemency with which in the moment of triumph he restrained the uplifted arm of vengeance. When it was suggested to him to change the name of the bridge of Austerlitz, after the taking of Paris, he replied—"No; it is enough that I have passed over it with my army."¹

¹ Clarendon.
Mem. vi.
230.

32.

His private
character
and disposition.

In private life his conduct was less irreproachable. Unhappy circumstances, and the usual vices of royal life, had early produced an estrangement between him and the Empress, who nevertheless continued to reside in the imperial palace, where she preserved a spotless reputation. But though external decorum was thus preserved, and they were frequently in company together, they never met in private; and this at once deprived the empire of the hope of a direct succession to the throne, and threw the Emperor into the usual temptations of female fascination. He had frequent *liaisons* accordingly, but they partook of the

benevolent and tender character of his mind, and were unattended by open licentiousness or indecorum. He was fond of praise, and often led into extremes by that weakness; but it was the praise only of generous or noble deeds which he coveted. His figure was tall and majestic, his countenance open, his air mild, but such as at once bespoke the sovereign. He possessed the mingled dignity and serenity of aspect which poetic genius has ascribed to Jupiter Tonans.* No one possessed greater personal courage, or more passionately desired the honours of war; but still a sense of duty to Europe led him to forego the command which he might have obtained, of the allied armies in Germany in 1813. His manners were polished and fascinating in the highest degree, his tastes refined and elegant, and his information surprising, considering the incessant avocations which the management of such weighty concerns required. Though passionately fond of accomplished female society, he was deeply impressed with the responsibility of his situation at the head of such an empire, and was ever ready to forego its charms, and abandon all the luxuries of the court, to execute justice or stimulate improvement in the remotest parts of his dominions. A profound master, like most of his nation, of dissimulation, he was yet jealous of his personal honour: and whatever he promised on his word, might with confidence be relied on, how much soever he thought himself entitled to elude the wiles of inferior diplomatists.

He was ambitious; but his thirst for acquisition of territory was so blended with a desire for, and generally followed by an increase of, the happiness of mankind, that it could hardly be called a fault. Deeply impressed

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

23.
His ambi-
tion, and
character as
a sovereign.

* — Dagli occhi, eh' etade ancor non muta.

Spira l'austire e 'l suo vizor primiero:

E ben da ciascun atto è sostenuta

La maestà degli anni e dell' Impero.

Apelle forse o Fidia in tal sembiante

Giove formò, ma Giove allor tonante."

Giord. Liber. xvii. 11.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

with religious feelings, those noble sentiments breathed forth in all his addresses to his people and army throughout the whole course of the war; and influenced his conduct to the latest hour of his life. He regarded himself as an instrument in the hand of the Almighty for the destruction of the Revolution and the improvement of mankind, and acted through all his career, sometimes with imprudent haste, under that impression. His character cannot be better illustrated in this respect than by the fact that he refused to permit his statue to be placed on the summit of the column which the gratitude of his country decreed to him at St Petersburg, but instead he caused it to be surmounted by one of Religion extending her arms to bless mankind. Serenity and benevolence formed the leading features of his mind: no one more readily overlooked a fault, or forgave an injury; none was so uniformly devoted to the happiness of his people. But his empire was not ripe for the mighty projects of amelioration which he contemplated; mankind were too selfish and corrupt to follow out his wishes. He was perpetually grieved by discovering how all his philanthropic intentions had been marred by the cupidity or neglect of inferior agents, and how uniformly human wickedness had fastened on the best conceived plans of social improvement. His very generosity at Paris, the liberal sentiments he there uttered, which entranced the world, were in advance of the people whom he governed, and brought on a dark conspiracy in his own dominions, which embittered his future days, and in the end shortened his life. He died of the malaria fever, at Taganrog, in the south of Russia, on the 31st November 1825, in the arms of the Empress Elizabeth, to whom he had for some time before his death become reconciled.* He

* The following letter, written by the Empress of Russia to her mother the day after her husband's death, will show how entirely the bonds of conjugal affection had been reunited before the Emperor's death:—"I have lost all: the angel is no more. Dead, he smiles upon me as he was wont to do while living. There now remains no hope to me but in you, my dear mother, with



retained his faculties to the last, had the Scriptures frequently read to him during his previous illness, and left the theatre of his worldly greatness with the serenity which might have been expected from such a character.

Inferior to Napoleon in genius, he was his superior in magnanimity : both conquered the world ; but Alexander only could conquer himself. Posterity will certainly award the first place to the matchless genius of the French Emperor ; but it will confirm the saying of that great man, extorted from him even in the moment of his fall, — “ If I were not Napoleon, I would be Alexander.”¹

Never was character more opposite to the Russian autocrat's than that of his great coadjutor in the pacification and settlement of Europe, PRINCE TALLEYRAND. This most remarkable man was born at Paris in 1754, so that in 1814 he was already sixty years of age. He was descended of an old family, and had for his maternal aunt the celebrated Princess of Ursins, who played so important a part in the War of the Succession at the court of Philip V. Being destined for the church, he early entered the seminary of St Sulpice ; and, even there, was remarkable for the delicate vein of sarcasm, nice discrimination, and keen penetration, for which he afterwards became so distinguished in life. At the age of twenty-six he was appointed agent-general for the clergy, and in that capacity his administrative talents were so conspicuous that they procured for him the situation of Bishop of Autun, which he held in 1789, when the Revolution broke out. So well known had his talents become at this period, that Mirabeau, in his secret correspondence with Berlin, pointed him out as one of the most eminent men of the age. He was elected representative of the clergy of his diocese for the Constituent Assembly, and was one of the first of that rank in the church who voted

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
— 1814.

¹ Caül, ii.
297. — *Sup.*
x. 347.
Allen's *Life*
and *Corresp.*
ii. 499
Eiog. Univ.
Sup. lvi.
190 (Alex-
andre.)

34.
Character
of Talley-
rand. His
early his-
tory.

whom I wish to come and weep, and to be present at the interment. I shall remain near the deceased, and follow him as fast as my strength will permit.”
— *Empress ELIZABETH to her Mother, Dec. 1, 1825; WHILLER'S Memoirs.*

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

on the 29th May for the junction of the ecclesiastical body with the Tiers Etat. He also took the lead in all the measures, then so popular, which had for their object to despoil the church, and apply its possessions to the service of the state. Accordingly, he himself proposed the suppression of tithes, and the application of the property of the church to the public treasury. In all these measures he was deaf to the remonstrances of the clergy whom he represented, and already he had severed all the cords which bound him to the church.

35.
Ruling
principles
in life.

His ruling principle was not any peculiar enmity to religion, but a fixed determination to adhere to the dominant party, whatever it was, whether in church or state ; to watch closely the signs of the times, and throw in his lot with that section of the community which appeared likely to gain the superiority. In February 1790 he was appointed president of the Assembly ; and from that time forward, down to its dissolution, he took a leading part in all its measures. He was not, however, an orator : knowledge of men and prophetic sagacity were his great qualifications. Generally silent in the hall of debate, he soon gained the lead in the council of deliberation or committee of management. He officiated as constitutional bishop, to the great scandal of the more orthodox clergy, in the great fête on the 14th July 1790, in the Camp de Mars, of which an account has already been given ;¹ but he had already become fearful of the excesses of the popular party, and was perhaps the only person to whom Mirabeau, on his deathbed, communicated his secret views and designs for the restoration of the French monarchy. Early in 1792 he set out on a secret mission from the French government to London, where he remained till the breaking out of the war in February 1793, and enjoyed much of the confidence of Mr Pitt. He naturally enough became an object of jealousy to both parties ; being denounced by the Jacobins as an emissary of the court, and by the Royalists as an

¹ Antec. ch.
vi. § 46.

agent of the Jacobins. In consequence he was accused and condemned in his absence, and only escaped death by withdrawing to America, where he remained till 1795, engaged in commercial pursuits. It was not the least proof of his address and sagacity that he thus avoided equally the crimes and the dangers of the Reign of Terror, and returned to Paris at the close of that year with his head on his shoulders, and without deadly hostility to any party in his heart.

His influence and abilities soon caused themselves to be felt. The sentence of death which had been recorded against him in absence was recalled; he became a leading member of the Club of Salm, which, in 1797, was established to counterbalance the efforts of the Royalists in the Club of Clichy; and on the triumph of the Revolutionists by the violence of Augereau in July 1797, he was appointed minister of foreign affairs. Nevertheless, aware of the imbecility of the Directorial government, he entered warmly into the views of Napoleon, upon his return from Egypt, for its overthrow. He was again made minister of foreign affairs by that youthful conqueror, after the 18th Brumaire, and continued, with some few interruptions, to be the soul of all foreign negotiations, and the chief director of foreign policy, down to the measures directed against Spain in 1807. On that occasion, however, his wonted sagacity did not desert him: he openly disapproved of the design to appropriate the whole Peninsula, and counselled the Emperor to confine his spoliations of Spain to the provinces to the north of the Ebro. He was, in consequence, dismissed from office, which he did not again hold till he was appointed chief of the provisional government on 1st April 1814. He had thus the singular address, though a leading character under both *régimes*, to extricate himself both from the crimes of the Revolution and the misfortunes of the Empire.

He was no ordinary man who could accomplish so great a prodigy, and yet retain such influence as to step,

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

36.
His appointment
as minister
of foreign
affairs.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

37.
His great
abilities.

as it were, by common consent, into the principal direction of affairs on the overthrow of Napoleon. His power of doing so depended not merely on his great talents : they alone, if unaccompanied by other qualifications, would inevitably have brought him to the guillotine under the first government, or the prisons of state under the last. It was his extraordinary power of divining the future course of events, the versatility and flexibility of his disposition, and the readiness with which he accommodated himself to every change of government and dynasty which he thought likely to be permanent, that mainly contributed to this extraordinary result. Such was his address, that though the most changeable character in the whole Revolution, he contrived never to lose either influence or reputation by all his tergiversations, but, on the contrary, went on constantly rising, to the close of his career, when above eighty years of age, in weight, fortune, and consideration. The very fact of his having survived, both in person and influence, so many changes of government, which had proved fatal to almost all his contemporaries, of itself constituted a colossal reputation. Men never ceased admiring an address which could have so long obtained the mastery of the mutations of fortune ; and when he said, with a sarcastic smile, on taking the oath of fidelity to Louis Philippe in 1830, “ C’est le treizième,” the expression, repeated from one end of Europe to the other, produced a greater admiration for his address than indignation at his perfidy.

38.
And profound
simulation.

He has been well described as the person in existence who had the least hand in producing, and the greatest power of profiting by, revolutions. He was not destitute of original thought, but wholly without the generous feeling, the self-forgetfulness, which prompt the great in character, as well as talent, to bring forth their conceptions in word or action, at whatever hazard to themselves or their fortunes. His object always was not to direct but to observe and guide the current ; he never opposed

it when he saw it was irresistible, nor braved its dangers where it threatened to be perilous ; but quietly withdrew till an opportunity occurred, by the destruction alike of its supporters and its opponents, to obtain its direction. In this respect his talents very closely resembled those of Metternich, of whom a character has already been drawn ;¹ but he was less consistent than the wary Austrian diplomatist ; and, though equalled by him in dissimulation, he was far his superior in perfidy. It cost him nothing to contradict his words and violate his oaths, whenever it suited his interest to do so ; and the extraordinary and almost unbroken success of his career affords, as well as that of Napoleon, the most striking confirmation of the profound saying of Johnson—that no man ever raised himself from a private station to the supreme direction of affairs in whom great abilities were not combined with certain meannesses, which would have proved altogether fatal to him in ordinary life. Yet was he without any of the great vices of the Revolution. His selfishness was constant, his cupidity unbounded, his hands often sullied by gold : but he was not cruel or unforgiving in his disposition, and few, if any, deeds of blood stain his memory. His witticisms and bon-mots were admirable, and repeated from one end of Europe to the other. Yet was his reputation in this respect perhaps greater than the reality ; for, by common consent, every good saying at Paris, during his lifetime, was ascribed to the ex-bishop of Autun. But none perhaps more clearly reveals his character, and explains his success in life, than the celebrated one, of which he at least obtained the credit, “That the principal object of language was to conceal thought.”*

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

¹ *Ante, ch.*
lxxxix. § 70.

* There can be little doubt that this celebrated expression was original in the person of Talleyrand or Fouché, or both ; but it had long before been used by an author very different from either, though not less deeply versed in the secrets of the human heart—Oliver Goldsmith. “It is usually said by grammarians,” says he, “that the use of language is to express our wants and desires ; but men who know the world hold, and I think with some show of reason, that he who best knows how to keep his necessities private, is the most likely

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

— 1814.
39.
Solemn
thanks-
giving in
the Place
Louis XV.
April 10.

On Easter day, being 10th April, a grand and imposing ceremony was performed in the Place Louis XV. On the spot where Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, the Princess Elizabeth, and so many of the noble victims of the Revolution had perished, a great altar was erected, by command of the Emperor Alexander, in order to a general thanksgiving, by the sovereigns and armies, for the signal and complete success with which it had pleased the Almighty to bless the allied arms. There was something to the thoughtful mind inexpressibly impressive in this ceremony. Bareheaded, around the altar, the sovereigns, with their princes, marshals, and generals, partook in the service, which was celebrated with extraordinary pomp, according to the forms of the Greek church, by the bishops and priests of that establishment who had accompanied the Russian army. But it was, in the most emphatic sense, a *catholic* service. All Christendom was there represented; the uniforms of twenty victorious nations were to be seen round the altar; it was a thanksgiving for the triumph of Christianity over the most inveterate, the most depraved, and the most powerful of its enemies. It bore none of the marks of worldly exultation; the deliverance of mankind was ascribed with reverent humility to the arm of Omnipotence. On their knees, around the altar, the monarchs kissed the sacred emblem of the cross; when it was elevated, all assembled bowed their heads with reverent devotion; and a hundred guns, from the two banks of the Seine, announced the triumph of the Gospel by the devotion which it had inspired into the breasts of its supporters. Such was the impression produced by the august scene, that not an arm was moved, nor a sound to be heard, in the vast concourse of thirty thousand soldiers, who stood in close column in the square. The whole marshals of France, in full

person to have them redressed, and that *the true use of speech is not so much to express our wants as to conceal them.*" — "On the Use of Language" *The Bee*, No. 8, Oct. 20, 1759.

uniform, attended the ceremony. The world never beheld such an example of moral retribution, such a convincing proof of the reality of the Divine administration. The rudest Cossack present felt the sacred influence. But no feelings of that sort were experienced, save in a few breasts, by the immense numbers of French who witnessed the ceremony. They were dead to its moral import; they felt not its awful warning; and consoled themselves for the presence of so many foreign uniforms in the heart of their capital by the observation that the "dresses were not so well made as those of their own army."¹

Nothing remained but to give effect to the declared will, alike of the sovereigns and the French people, by recalling the Bourbons. Hitherto, although all believed that the old family would be restored, yet no act clearly expressive of that intention had emanated from the provisional government; and they had, on the contrary, carefully disclaimed several acts of individuals, tending to the restoration of the royal authority. Doubts, in consequence, began to be entertained as to what was to be done, and the Royalists were in general and undisguised uneasiness. But the resolution of the Allies was finally taken in the sitting, which continued till seven in the morning, of the night between the 5th and 6th, not to treat with a regency. Talleyrand then threw off the mask, and the conservative senate, by a solemn decree, April 7. called Louis XVIII. to the throne, and his heirs, according to the established order of succession previous to the Revolution. Various provisions were at the same time made for the establishment of the senate and legislative body, and the due limitations of the royal authority, which were afterwards engrossed in the charter, and formed the basis of the government of the Restoration. The chief articles of that celebrated instrument will be considered in a subsequent chapter, when the internal state of France after the accession of Louis XVIII. is

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1-14.

¹ Dan. 403,
404. Bour.
x. 180, 181.
Lab. ii. 435,
436. Monar-
chie, April
12, 1814.
TLib. x. 24
25.

40.
Louis
XVIII. is
called to the
throne.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

considered.* Suffice it to say at present, that the French received a constitution which gave them a hundred times more real freedom than they had ever enjoyed since the revolt of the 10th August had overturned the throne, and incomparably more than, as the event proved, they were capable of bearing. And so completely had the people repented of their dreams of self-government, and so woefully had they suffered from its effects, that this important decree, which thus re-established, after a lapse of twenty-one years, the royal family upon the throne, attracted very little attention, and was received by the whole multitude as a matter of course. Even the Abbé Sièyes voted for the King's return: he had now felt what the government of the masses was, and got an answer to his celebrated question, which twenty-five years before had convulsed France, "What is the Tiers Etat?"¹

¹ *Moniteur*,
April 7,
1814.
Beauch. ii.
390, 394.
Thib. x. 19,
21. *Lond.*
309. *Burgh.*
306. *Thiers*,
xvii. 779,
789.

41.
Entry of
the Comte
d'Artois
into Paris.

The royal authority being thus re-established, the different branches of government rapidly fell into the new system. On the 9th the national guard assumed the white cockade; and on the 12th the Comte d'Artois, who during these great events had been drawing near to the capital, made his public entry into Paris. He was on horseback, surrounded by a brilliant *cortège* of gentlemen who had gone out to meet him; and near the barrier of Pantin he was met by the marshals of France, in full costume, with Ney at their head. "Mon Seigneur," said Marshal Ney, speaking for himself and his brethren in arms, "we have served with zeal a government which commanded us in the name of France: your Highness and his Majesty will see with what fidelity we shall serve our legitimate king." "Messieurs," replied the Comte d'Artois, "you have made the French arms illustrious; you have carried, even into countries the most remote, the glory of the French name; the King claims your exploits:² what has ennobled France can never be foreign

² *Beauch.* ii.
407, 415.
Burgh. 397.
Lath. ii. 147.
Thiers,
xvii. 365,
369.

* See Chap. xcii. §§ 37, 38.

to him." The procession, which swelled immensely as it advanced, proceeded to Notre Dame, where the prince returned thanks for his restoration to his country. "There is nothing changed," said he, "only a Frenchman the more in Paris. This is the first day of happiness I have experienced for twenty-five years."

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

Louis XVIII. was not long of responding to the call made upon him by the Senate. On the 20th April, the fugitive monarch left his peaceable retreat of Hartwell to be again tossed on the stormy sea of public affairs, and made his entry amidst an extraordinary concourse of spectators into London, where he was received in state by the Prince-Regent. No words can convey an adequate idea of the enthusiasm which prevailed on this occasion. It was a great national triumph, unmingled by one circumstance of alloy; it gave demonstration strong of the total overthrow of the revolutionary system. Sympathy with an illustrious race, long weighed down by misfortune, was mingled with exultation at the glorious reward now obtained for a quarter of a century of toils and dangers. White cockades were universal; the general rapture was shared alike by the rich and the poor; the fierce divisions, the rancorous faction, with which the war commenced, had disappeared in one tumultuous swell of universal exultation. "Sire," said the monarch with emotion to the Prince-Regent, when he first addressed him, "I shall always consider that, under God, owe I my restoration to your Royal Highness." The Prince-Regent received his illustrious guest with that dignified courtesy for which he was so celebrated, accompanied the royal family to Dover, and bade them farewell at the extremity of the pier of that place. In a beautiful day, and with the utmost splendour, the royal squadron, under the command of the Duke of Clarence, accompanied the illustrious exiles to their own country. Hardly had the thunder of artillery from the castle of Dover ceased to ring in their ears, when the cliffs of

42.
Entry
of Louis
XVIII. into
London.
April 20.

April 27.
i Cap. Cent.
Jours, i. 7,
10. Ann.
Reg. 1814.
Chronicle,
34, 36.
Beauch. ii.
509, 515.
Lab. ii. 473,
474.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

43.
And into
Paris.
May 3.

France exhibited a continued blaze ; and the roar of cannon on every projecting point, from Calais to Boulogne, announced the arrival of the monarch in the kingdom of his forefathers.

Hitherto the progress of the sovereign had been a continued triumph ; but as he advanced through France, although the crowds which were everywhere assembled on the wayside to see him pass received him always with respect, sometimes with enthusiasm, yet it was apparent that there was a mixed feeling on the part of the people. The unanimous transports which had greeted his entry into London, and passage through England, were no longer to be discerned. The feeling of loyalty, one of the noblest passions which can fill the breast, because one of the least selfish, was nearly extinct in the great mass of the people ; the return of the royal family was associated with circumstances of deep national humiliation : the principal feeling in the multitude was curiosity to see the strangers. The King arrived at Compiègne on the 29th, and the preparations for his reception at Paris having been completed, he made his public entry by the gate of St Denis on the 3d May, in the midst of a prodigious concourse of spectators. The Duchesse d'Angoulême was seated by his side ; the Old Guard of Napoleon formed his escort ; the national guard of Paris kept the streets for the procession ; and innumerable officers and privates of the allied armies added, by their gay and varied uniforms, to the splendour of the scene. The procession proceeded first to Notre Dame, where the King and the royal family returned thanks for their restoration, and then advanced by the quays and the Pont Neuf to the Tuileries. From a delicate desire to save Louis the pain of seeing the foreign uniforms, it was arranged that the streets should be lined by French soldiers, and the Old Guard were stationed between Notre Dame and the Tuileries. Never was indignation more strongly marked than in their visages. Some under pre-

tence of saluting the cortège, bent their heads down and drew their bearskins over their eyes so as to see nothing ; others ground their teeth in the vehemence of their rage, or showed them like tigers ; several shed tears of rage. When commanded to present arms, they did it with a vehemence which made the spectators start ; it was like bringing down their bayonets to the charge. When the Duchesse d'Angoulême reached the foot of the principal stair, of that palace, which she had not seen since the 10th August 1792, when, in company with Louis XVI. and Marie Antoinette, she left it to take refuge from the insurgents in the National Assembly,¹ her emotions were so overpowering that she fell down insensible at the King's feet. But these awful recollections produced little or no effect on the Parisians : and the principal observation made was, that the King's and Princess's dresses were cut in the London fashion, and that the Duchesse d'Angoulême was a perfect fright with her low English bonnet.² *

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

¹ Anté, ch. vi. § 48.
² Cap. Hist. de la Restauration, l. Beauh. ii. 517, 533. Bour. x. 239, 242. Lab. ii. 479, 490. Montour, May 1, 1814. Thib. x. 492. Chateaub. Mon. vi. 311.

But a more serious duty awaited the restored monarch : and having now resumed the reins of government, the first care which awaited him was the difficult task of concluding a treaty of peace with the allied powers, which should at once satisfy their just and inevitable demands, and not prove an insuperable stumblingblock in the first days of his restoration to the French people. The generous, perhaps in some degree imprudent, expressions of the Emperor Alexander, at the first taking of Paris, had produced a prodigious impression ; his popularity was at the highest point, and his influence in the capital altogether irresistible. It was the idea that they

41.
Convention of April 23, for the abandonment by France of all her conquests.

* At this period the English fashion for bonnets was exceedingly low, and the French proportionally high : so that the contrast between the Duchesse d'Angoulême's haymaker's bonnet and the splendid *coiffures* and feathers with which the ladies were adorned at Paris, was sufficiently striking. When Louis crossed the Pont Neuf the veil was taken off the statue of Henry IV., which had been placed there a week before, and which bore the inscription—" *Eudovico rediit, Henricus rediit*," which was the felicitous thought of M. Lally Tollendal. — *Personal observation.*

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

would escape by his magnanimity from the consequences of defeat, and retain, even after the occupation of the capital, no inconsiderable portion of their conquests, which had reconciled its inhabitants to the Restoration, and produced the general burst in favour of the Bourbon dynasty. But when the diplomatists began coolly to sit down to reduce the conditions of the treaty to writing, it was no easy matter to reconcile these expectations with the obvious necessity of curtailing France so much, that it should not again prove dangerous to the liberties of Europe; and it required all the address of Talleyrand, and the other ministers who had been appointed by the King, to overcome the difficulty.¹

¹ Hard. xii.
422, 423.
Lab. ii. 483,
484. Sav. vi.
174, 175.

45.
Prodigious
extent of
the posses-
sions thus
ceded by
France.

By a convention concluded on 23d April, it was provided that the French troops in Germany, Italy, and the Low Countries, should cede all the fortresses and countries beyond the frontiers of old France, as they stood on the 1st January 1792, which was at one blow to sweep away the whole conquests of the Revolution. The allied troops were, with as little delay as possible, to evacuate the whole of the territory so defined; and all military exactions on both sides were, by a secret article, to cease forthwith. The principal object of this clause was to put a stop to the unbounded and scourging requisitions of Marshal Davoust, who still retained possession of Hamburg. The number of strong places, and the quantity of artillery, warlike stores, and muniments of war, which by this convention fell into the hands of the Allies, was prodigious, and altogether unexampled in the annals of military trophies. They of themselves convey a stupendous idea of the vast extent of the military resources which, at one period, were at the disposal of the French Emperor; and of the strange and ruinous policy which prompted him to disperse his troops over so many distant strongholds, when he was contending against greatly superior forces of the enemy, for life or death, on the plains of Champagne.²

² Schoell, v.
442. Mar-
tens, N.
Bibliol. i.
706.

Hamburg, Magdeburg, and Wesel, in Germany; Maestricht, Mayence, Luxembourg, and Kehl, on the Rhine and the Meuse; Flushing, Bergen-op-Zoom, Antwerp, Ostend, Nieuport, and many others in the Low Countries; Mantua, Alessandria, Peschiera, Gavi, and Turin, in Italy; Barcelona, Figueras, Rosas, and Tortosa, in Spain, besides a vast number of others of lesser note, were abandoned.* Fifty-three fortresses of note, twelve thousand pieces of cannon, ammunition and military stores in immense quantities, and garrisons to the amount of nearly a hundred thousand men, all beyond the frontiers of old France, were thus at one blow surrendered! What a picture does this present of the astonishing strength and tenacity of the grasp which Napoleon had laid on Europe; of the greatness of the military giant whose weight had so long oppressed the world, when even in his last extremity, and after such unheard-of reverses, he yet had such magnificent spoils to yield up to the victor! But what is physical strength where moral virtue is wanting; and what the external resources of an empire, when its heart is paralysed by the selfishness of a revolution?¹

The treaty of the 30th May was signed at Paris by the plenipotentiaries of France on the one side, and Great Britain, Russia, and Prussia, on the other; but

CHAP.
LXXIX.

1814.

46.

Fortresses
which were
abandoned,
and vast
amount of
cannon, ammu-
nition, &c.¹ Koell. iii.
667, 670.
Schoell, x.
142, 145.
Marten, N.
Reinhold, i.
706.

47.

Treaty of
May 30,
at Paris.

The magnitude of these garrisons, even in the last moments of the empire, and when Napoleon was literally crushed in France for want of men, was such as almost to exceed belief. The following was the amount of a few of the principal, as they finally evacuated the fortresses they held on the conclusion of hostilities:

	Garrisons.	Surrendered.
Hamburg,	12,200	25th May.
Magdeburg,	16,000	25th May.
Wesel,	10,000	10th May.
Mayence,	15,000	4th May.
Barcelona,	6,000	12th May.
Antwerp,	17,500	6th May.
Mantua,	6,000	28th April.
Alessandria,	5,500	29th April.
Bergen-op Zoom,	4,000	24th April.

92,200

—See SCHÖELL, *Historische Politik*, x. 432, 433.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

after the convention of 23d April, it contained little which was not foreseen by the French. It provided that France should be reduced to its original limits, as they stood on 1st January 1792, with the exception of various cessions of small territories, some to France by the neighbouring powers, others by France to them, for the sake of defining more clearly, and for mutual advantage, its frontiers, but which, upon a balance of gains and losses, gave it an increase of four hundred and fifty thousand souls. Avignon, however, and the country of Venaisin, the first conquests of the Revolution, were secured to it. France, on the other hand, consented to abandon all pretensions to any territories beyond these limits, and to throw no obstacle in the way of fortifications being erected on any points which the new governments of those countries might deem expedient. Holland was to be an independent state, under the sovereignty of the house of Orange, with an accession of territory drawn from union with Flanders; Germany was to be independent, but under the guarantee of a federal union; Switzerland independent, governed by itself; Italy divided into sovereign states. The free navigation of the Rhine was expressly stipulated. Malta, the ostensible cause of the renewal of the war after the Treaty of Amiens, was ceded in perpetuity, with its dependencies, to Great Britain; and she, on her part, agreed to restore all the colonies taken from France or her allies during the war, with the exception of the islands of Tobago, St Lucie, and the portion of St Domingo formerly belonging to Spain, which was to be restored to that power, in the West, and the Isle of France in the East Indies. Guadaloupe, Martinique, and Guiana were restored to France. France was to be permitted to form commercial establishments in the East Indies, but under the condition that no more troops were to be sent there than were necessary for the purpose of police; and she regained the right of fishing on the coast of Newfoundland and in

the gulf of St Lawrence. The fleet at Antwerp, which consisted of thirty-eight ships of the line and fifteen frigates, was to be divided into three parts, of which two were to be restored to France, and one to the King of Holland. The ships, however, of France which had fallen into the hands of the Allies before the armistice of 23d April, and especially the fleet at the Texel, were to remain with the Allies; and they were immediately made over to the King of Holland. All subordinate points and matters of detail were, by common consent, referred to a congress of all the great powers, which it was agreed should assemble at Vienna in the succeeding autumn.¹

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1:14.

¹ Martens, *Suppl. N.R.*, ii. 1; and *Schoell, N.*, 496, 497.

Such were the public articles of the treaty; but, in addition to these, there was a secret treaty also signed, which contained articles of considerable importance, and which pointed in no obscure manner to the policy to be pursued for the reconstruction of the balance of power in Europe. They related chiefly to the disposal of the immense territories, containing no less than 15,360,000 souls, which had been severed from Napoleon's empire, besides 16,000,000 more from its external dependencies, which were now in great part at the disposal of the allied powers. The leading principle which regulated these distributions was, to strengthen the second-rate states bordering upon France, from the weakness of which she had hitherto always been able to make successful irruptions from her own territories, before the more distant sovereigns could come to their support. To guard against this danger, it was provided, that Piedmont should receive an accession of territory by the incorporation of Genoa with her dominions, the latter town being declared a free port; that the reconstruction of Switzerland, as agreed on by the allied powers, should be ratified by France; that Flanders, between the Scheldt and the Meuse, should be annexed to Holland; and the German states on the left bank of the Rhine, which had been conquered from France, divided between Holland and Prussia.²

48.
Secret articles of the treaty.

² Cap. Cent Jours, i. 18, 19.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

49.

Reflections
on the treaty
of Paris.

Such was the treaty of Paris, the most glorious that England had ever concluded—glorious, even more from what she abandoned than what she retained of her conquests. With her enemy absolutely at her feet—with half of France overrun by four hundred thousand victorious troops, her capital taken, and her Emperor virtually a prisoner in exile—she gave to this prostrate foe no inconsiderable *accession* of territory in Europe, and restored four-fifths of her colonial possessions. Not a village was reft from old France; not a military contribution was levied; not a palace or museum was rifled; not an indignity to the national honour was offered. All that was done was to restore the provinces which, since her career of conquest began in 1794, she had wrested from the adjoining powers. The French museums, loaded with the spoils of Italy, Germany, Spain, Flanders, and Holland, were left untouched: even the sacred relics of Sans-Souci, and of the great king of Prussia, were unreclaimed.* So far were the Allies from following Napoleon's bad example, in seizing every article of value wherever he went, that when they had them in their power they did not even reclaim their own.

50.

And on the
generosity
of the allied
sovereigns.

¹ Ante, ch.
li. § 7.

² Ante, ch.
lix. § 71.

What did Napoleon do to Prussia in similar circumstances, in 1807? Why, he imposed on that small state, with only seven millions of inhabitants, a war contribution of £26,000,000, and severed from it the half of its dominions!¹ What did he do to Austria by the treaty of Vienna, in 1809? Why, he imposed on it a contribution of £9,500,000, and wrested from it a fourth of the monarchy!² If the Allies had acted in a similar spirit in 1814, how much of the territories of old France would they have left to its inhabitants? What crushing contributions would they have levied, for many a long and weary year, on the vanquished! what havoc would

* Napoleon had some of these with him, in the room in which he died at St Helena. "Vous examinez," said he, "cette grande horloge; elle servait de reveille-matin au Grand Frédéric. Je l'ai prise à Potsdam: c'était tout ce que valait la Prusse." ANTOINARD, *Derniers Jours de Napoléon*, i. 97.

they have made in all the museums and royal palaces of France! Doubtless, their forbearance was not entirely owing to disinterestedness; doubtless they had jealousies of their own to consider, political objects of their own to gain, in reconciling France to the new dynasty. But their policy was founded on a noble spirit—it rested on the principle of eradicating hostility by generosity, and avenging injury by forgiveness. The result proved that, in doing so, they proceeded on too exalted an estimate of human nature.

In the general settlement of Europe, after the revolutionary deluge had subsided, the fate of one of the most persevering, and not the least illustrious, of Napoleon's opponents must not be overlooked. Pius VII., after having been taken away, by orders of Napoleon, from Fontainebleau on the 23d January, in virtue of the convention already mentioned,¹ had been still, under one pretext or another, detained in the French territory, and was still in Provence when Paris was taken. One of the first cares of the provisional government was, by a decree, to direct him to be instantly set at liberty, and conducted to the Italian frontiers with all the honours due to his rank. He entered Italy accordingly, and at Cesina, near Parma, had an interview with Murat, who exhibited to him the original of a memorial, which a number of the nobles and chief inhabitants of Rome had, at his instigation, presented to the allied powers, praying to have the Roman states incorporated with one of the secular powers of Italy. Without looking at the memoir so as to know what signatures were attached to it, the generous pontiff at once threw the document into the fire. Continuing his route by slow journeys, which the feeble state of his health rendered necessary, he reached the neighbourhood of Rome on the 23d, and entered that city on the 24th May—nearly five years after he had been violently carried off, at dead of night, by the troops of Napoleon. Opinions had been divided previously as to the expedience of his

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

51.
Return of
the Pope to
Rome.
April 2.

¹ Ante, ch.
lxxxiv. §
43.

April 2.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

¹ Artaud, ii.
367, 361.
Pacca, ii.
257, 261.

52.
Extraordi-
nary spec-
tacle which
Paris exhi-
bited at this
period.

return; and those who had signed the memorial to the Allies justly dreaded the effects of his resentment. But the generous proceeding at Cesina overcame all hearts, and he was received with unanimous and heartfelt expressions of satisfaction. Stricken by conscience, some of the nobles who had signed the memorial came next day to request forgiveness. "Have we not some faults, too, to reproach ourselves with?" replied the generous pontiff; "let us bury our injuries in oblivion."¹

The world had never seen—probably the world will never again see—so marvellous a spectacle as the streets of Paris exhibited from the 31st March, when the entry of the Allies took place, till the 16th June, when, upon their finally retiring, the service of the posts was restored to the national guard of the capital. The dream of Ariosto was realised under circumstances yet more striking—round a greater than Charlemagne all the princes and ambassadors of the world were assembled.* In a state of the most profound tranquillity, with the most absolute protection of life and property, even of the most obnoxious of their former enemies, the capital of Napoleon was occupied by the troops of twenty different nations, whom the oppression of his government had roused to arms from the Wall of China to the Pillars of Hercules. As if by the wand of a mighty enchanter, all the angry passions, the fierce contentions, which had so long deluged the world with blood, seemed to be stilled; victors and vanquished sank down side by side into the enjoyment of repose. Beside the veterans of Napoleon's Old Guard, who still retained, even in the moment of defeat, and when surrounded by the might of foreign powers, their

* "Dentro a Parigi non suriano state
L' immumerabil genti peregrine,
Povere e ricche, e d'ogni qualitate,
Che v'eran, greeche, barbare e latine,
Tanti signori, e imbascerie mandate
Di tutto 'l mondo, non aveano fine."

Orlando Furioso, xlvi. 75.

martial and undaunted aspect, were to be seen the superb household troops of Russia and Prussia; the splendid cuirassiers of Austria shone in glittering steel; the iron veterans of Blücher still eyed the troops of France with jealousy, as if their enmity was unappeased even by the conquest of their enemies. The nomad tribes of Asia and the Ukraine strolled in wonder along every street; groups of Cossack bivouacs lay in the Champs-Élysées; the Bashkirs and Tartars gazed with undisguised avidity, but restrained hands, on the gorgeous display of jewellery and dresses which were arrayed in the shop-windows, to attract the notice of the numerous princes and potentates who thronged the metropolis. Every morning the noble columns of the Preobazinsky and Simonsky Guards marched out of the barracks of the École Militaire, to exercise on the Champ de Mars; at noon, reviews of cavalry succeeded, and the earth shook under the thundering charge of the Russian cuirassiers. Often in the evening the allied monarchs visited the opera, or some of the theatres; and the applause with which they were received resembled what might have been expected if Napoleon had returned in triumph from the capture of their capitals. Early in June, Wellington, who had been appointed ambassador of England at the court of the Tuileries, arrived among them: he was received with enthusiasm; and the opera-house never shook with louder applause than when he first made his appearance there, after the battle of Toulouse.¹

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1811.

¹ Personal
observation.
Dun. 406,
409.

One peculiarity in the Russian and Prussian armies, which most excited the attention of the Parisians, was the universal and simple feeling of piety with which they were animated. To an infidel generation, who had never known Christianity but in its corruption, and judged of its spirit only from the misrepresentations of its enemies, this circumstance was the subject of general astonishment and partial admiration. "We listened," says a contemporary French journalist, "to young Russian officers, on

53.
Universal
religious
feelings of
the allied
troops.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

the very day of their triumphant entrance into Paris, who spoke of their exploits from Moscow to the Seine as of deeds which had been accomplished under the immediate guidance of divine Providence, and ascribed to themselves only the glory of having been chosen as the instruments for the fulfilment of the divine decree. They spoke of their victories without exultation, and in language so simple, that it seemed to us as if they did so by common consent out of politeness. They showed us a silver medal, worn equally by their generals and private soldiers as a badge of distinction.* On the one side is represented the eye of Providence, and on the other these words from Scripture, 'Not unto us, not unto us, but to Thy name.' We must allow it is religion which has formed the sacred bond of their union for the benefit of mankind, the emblems of which their troops wear on their garments. No human motive could have induced them to make sacrifices unparalleled in history."¹ The Emperor Alexander uniformly expressed the same sentiments. "This arm," said that noble prince, "did no more than other men's—each did his duty. Could I do less? Not I, more than they, achieved the victory. 'Twas Providence." Such was the spirit which conquered the French Revolution; such, on the testimony of the vanquished, the principles which gave final victory to the arms of the desert in the centre of civilised infidelity. The opposite characters of the two contending powers were perfectly represented by one circumstance: Napoleon placed on his triumphal column, in the Place Vendôme, a statue of *himself*; Alexander, as has been already mentioned, caused the column which the gratitude of the senate decreed to him at St Petersburg to be surmounted by a statue of *Religion* extending her arms to bless mankind.²

¹ Journal des Debats, April 3, 1814. Coxe's Memoirs of Russia, v. 173.

² Dan. 497, 498.

* The medal of 1812.

Before the allied armies broke up from Paris, a grand review took place of the whole troops in and around that

city, comprising the *élite* of the allied forces then in France. Seventy thousand men, with eighty-two guns, were drawn up three deep on the road, from the barrier of Neuilly to the bridge of St Cloud: they occupied the whole space, and certainly a more magnificent military spectacle never was witnessed. When the Emperor Alexander, with the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, and all the marshals and generals of their respective armies, rode along the line, the acclamations of the troops, at first loud and overpowering, then getting fainter and fainter as they died away in the distance, were inexpressibly sublime. Breaking then into open column, the whole defiled past the sovereigns; and such was the splendour of their array, that it seemed scarcely conceivable that they had so recently been engaged in a campaign of unexampled duration and hardship. The Russian Guard in particular, twenty, and the Prussian, eight thousand strong, with hardly a man in their ranks under six feet high, attracted, by the brilliancy of their equipments and the precision of their movements, universal admiration. The eye could scarcely bear the dazzling lines of light which, under a bright sun and a cloudless sky, were reflected from the cuirasses and sabres of the cavalry. Proudly the celebrated regiments of the Russian Guards, Preobazinsky, Simonefsky, and Bonnet d'Or, marched past. In noble array, and with an erect air, the vast host pressed on: they passed round the massy pillars of the arch of Neuilly, begun by Napoleon to the honour of the Grand Army, defiled in silence over the Place of the Revolution, treading on the spot where Louis XVI. had fallen, and scarce cast an eye on the unfinished columns of the Temple of Glory, commenced after the triumph of Jena. Among the countless multitude whom the extraordinary events of the period had drawn together from every part of Europe to the French capital, and the brilliancy of this spectacle had concentrated in one spot, was one young man who had watched

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

54.

Grand review of the allied troops at Paris, May 20.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

with intense interest the progress of the war from his earliest years, and who, having hurried from his paternal roof in Edinburgh on the first cessation of hostilities, then conceived the first idea of narrating its events; and amidst its wonders inhaled that ardent spirit, that deep enthusiasm, which, sustaining him through fifteen subsequent years of travelling and study, and twenty more of composition, has at length realised itself in the present history.

55.
Visit of the
allied sove-
reigns to
England.

Having finally arranged matters at Paris, the allied sovereigns, before retiring to their own dominions, paid a visit to London. It belongs to the historians of England to recount the festivities of that joyous period—that Cloth of Gold of modern times; when the greatest, and wisest, and bravest in Europe came to do voluntary homage to the free people whose energy and perseverance had saved themselves by their firmness, and the world by their example. Suffice it to say, as a topic interesting to general history, that the allied monarchs left Paris on the 5th July, and reached Dover on the 8th: that they were received with extraordinary enthusiasm by all classes in England, from the peasant to the prince: that they were feasted with more than the usual magnificence at Guildhall, and received with more than wonted splendour at the palace: that the Emperor of Russia was invested with the Order of the Garter at Carlton House; and that at Oxford both he and the King of Prussia as well as Marshal Blücher, were arrayed with all the academic honours which a grateful nation could bestow: that a splendid naval review at Portsmouth, where thirty ships of the line and frigates manœuvred together, conveyed an adequate idea of the naval power of England: and that, satiated with pomp and the cheers of admiration, they embarked for the Continent on their return to their own dominions. But two circumstances connected with this visit, at the close of the longest, most costly, and bloodiest war mentioned in history, deserve to be recorded, as characteristic of the British empire at this period.

When Alexander visited the arsenal at Woolwich, and saw the acres covered with cannon and shot in that stupendous emporium of military strength, he said, "Why, this resembles rather the preparation of a great nation for the commencement of a war, than the stores still remaining to it at its termination." And as the same monarch surveyed the hundreds of thousands who assembled to see him in Hyde Park, he was so impressed with the universal wellbeing of the spectators, that he exclaimed, "This is indeed imposing ; but where are the people?"¹

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
—
1814.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1814, 43,
55. Chron-
icle, Croly,
Life of Geor.
IV. ii. 67,
71.

One other circumstance, of domestic interest in its origin, but of vast importance in its ultimate results, deserves to be recorded of this eventful period. At Paris, during the stay of the allied monarchs, resided Lord Burghersh, who had filled with acknowledged ability a high diplomatic situation at their headquarters during the later period of the war. His lady, of high rank, had joined him to partake in the festivities of that brilliant period, and with her a young relative, equally distinguished by her beauty and talents, then appearing in all the freshness of opening youth. A frequent visitor at this period in Lord Burghersh's family was a young officer, then an aide-de-camp to the Grand-Duke Constantine, a younger brother of an ancient and illustrious family in Germany, but who, like many other scions of nobility, had more blood in his veins than money in his pocket. The young aide-de-camp was speedily captivated by the graces of the English lady ; and when the sovereigns were about to set out for England, whither Lord Burghersh was to accompany them, he bitterly lamented the scantiness of his finances, which prevented him from following in the train of such attraction. Lord Burghersh good-humouredly told him he should always find a place at his table when he was not otherwise engaged, and that he would put him in the way of seeing all the world in the British metropolis, which he would probably never see to

52.
Remarkable
circum-
stance
which led
to Prince
Leopold of
Saxe Co-
burg com-
ing to Eng-
land.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

57.
Which led
to the Saxe-
Coburg
dynasty
ascending
the throne
of England.

such advantage again. Such an offer, especially when seconded by such influences, proved irresistible, and the young German gladly followed them to London.

He was there speedily introduced to, and ere long distinguished by, the Princess Charlotte, whose projected alliance with the Prince of Orange had recently before been broken off. Though the princess remarked him, however, it was nothing more at that time than a passing regard; for her thoughts were then more seriously occupied by another. Having received, at the same time, what he deemed some encouragement, the young soldier proposed to the princess, and was refused, and subsequently went to Vienna during the sitting of the congress at that place, where his susceptible heart was speedily engrossed in another tender affair. Invincible obstacles, however, presented themselves to the realisation of the Princess Charlotte's views, which had led to her first rejection of the gallant German: he received a friendly hint from London to make his attentions to the fair Austrian less remarkable: he returned to the English capital, again proposed to the English princess, and was accepted. It was PRINCE LEOPOLD OF SAXE-COBURG: and his subsequent destiny and that of his family exceeds all that romance has figured of the marvellous. He married the heiress of England; after her lamented death, he espoused a daughter of France: he was offered the throne of Greece; he accepted the crown of Belgium. In consequence of his elevation, one of his nephews has married the heiress of Portugal, another the Queen of England; and the accidental fancy of a young German officer for a beautiful English lady has, in its ultimate results, given three kingdoms to his family, placed on one of his relatives the crown of the greatest empire that has existed in the world since the fall of Rome, and restored to England, in hazardous times, the inestimable blessing of a direct line of succession to the throne.*

It would be indelicate, during the life of some of the persons mentioned

The march upon St Dizier was unquestionably expedient as a measure of military policy; and as such it may be regarded as the last of those brilliant movements in that astonishing campaign, which alone would be sufficient to give immortality to the name of Napoleon. When his whole remaining resources had been fairly worn out in that marvellous struggle, he had a fair prospect by this felicitous conception of renewing the contest on fresh ground, hitherto comparatively unexhausted, and of tripling his force in the field by the addition of the garrisons drawn from the frontier fortresses. Yet this movement, beyond all question, proved Napoleon's ruin; for, by giving room for the manly councils of Blücher and the Russian Emperor, it exposed the capital to the assault of irresistible forces, and led to the overthrow of the French Emperor's power in the very quarter where he had deemed it most securely founded. And that he fully appreciated the danger of an attack there, is decisively proved by the haste with which he at once abandoned all the military advantages of the march on St Dizier to avert it, and the decisive results which followed the start which the Allies had got of him at the capital by only eight-and-forty hours.

It was not thus with the other European monarchies, when they were involved in disaster. Vienna was taken by Napoleon in 1805; but the Austrians fought the battle of Austerlitz, and had well-nigh restored affairs after that event: it was again taken in 1809, but the monarchy stood firm, and reduced the invader to the

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.
58.
Reflections
on the de-
cisive move-
ment on
St Dizier.

in the preceding curious narration, to give their names to the public. Those acquainted with the elevated circles of English society at that period, will have no difficulty in filling them up; and the statement may be relied on, as the author had it from some of the parties immediately concerned. The reader of Italian history will recollect the corresponding anecdote of the peasant Sforza, when invited to enter the army by a recruiting party which was passing the field where he was pruning vines. He hesitated whether to accept or decline the offer; and at length put his shears on a branch, saying, if they fell he would go, if they were supported by the branch he would remain. They fell: he joined the party, became Duke of Milan, and founded the house of that name.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

59.

Difference
between
France and
the other
European
monarchies,
as regards
the effect
of the occu-
pation of
their capi-
tals.

verge of ruin at Aspern. Berlin was captured by the Russians in 1769, and by Napoleon in 1806: but that did not prevent the Great Frederick, in the first instance, from bringing to a glorious close the Seven Years' War, nor Frederick-William, in the second, from gallantly struggling with his Russian allies for existence in the furthest corner of his dominions, amidst the snows of Eylau. Madrid fell an easy prey, in 1808, to the mingled fraud and violence of the French Emperor; but Spain, notwithstanding, continued to maintain a mortal struggle for six long years with the forces of Napoleon. Russia was pierced to the heart in 1812, and her ancient capital became the spoil of the invader; but Alexander persevered in the contest with unabated vigour, and from the flames of Moscow arose the fire which delivered the world. How, then, did it happen that the fall of the capital—which in all these other cases, so far from being the termination, was rather the commencement of the most desperate and protracted period of the war—should in France alone have had a totally opposite effect; and that the capture of Paris should not merely have been the conquest of a kingdom, but the overthrow of a system, and the change of a dynasty, which still spread its ramifications over the half of Europe?

60.

Causes of
this differ-
ence.

The cause of this remarkable difference is to be found in the decisive distinction, in the last crisis, between a revolutionary and an established government, and the different motives to human action which the two bring to bear upon mankind. A revolution being founded in general on the triumph of violence, robbery, and treason, over fidelity, order, and loyalty—and almost always accompanied in its progress by a hideous effusion of blood and spoliation of property—its leaders, if successful, have no means of rousing or retaining the attachment of their followers, but by constantly appealing to the passions of the world. Equality, patriotism, liberty, glory, constitute the successive and brilliant meteors which they launch

forth to dazzle and inspire mankind. They have an instinctive dread of the influences of Heaven ; all allusion to a Supreme Being appears to them fanaticism ; they would willingly bury all thoughts of another world in oblivion. So long as success attends their efforts, the powerful tie of worldly interest, or temporary passion, binds together the unholy alliance, and its force proves for a considerable period irresistible. But the very principle which constitutes its strength in prosperity affords the measure of its weakness in adversity : its idol being worldly success, when that idol is pierced to the heart by the destroyer, “ the ocean-vault falls in, and all are crushed.” The same motives of action, the same principles of conduct, which make them unanimously rally round the eagles of the conqueror, necessarily lead them as generally to abandon the standards of the unfortunate. The enthusiasm of Austerlitz, however different in its aspect, sprang from the same source as the defections of Fontainebleau. In both cases they were true to one and the same principle—self-interest.

The existence of this motive, as the general moving principle, is quite consistent with the utmost generosity and heroism in *individual* cases, though these unhappily daily become less frequent in the late stages of the national malady. Nay, the absorbing passion for individual advancement, which in the more advanced stages of revolution comes to obliterate every other feeling, springs from the ill-regulated impulse given in the outset to the generous affections. For such is the deceitfulness of sin, and the proneness to self-aggrandisement in human nature, that the passions cannot be set violently in motion, even by the disinterested feelings, without the selfish ere long obtaining the mastery of the current ; as in a town carried by a storm, how sublime soever may be the heroism, how glorious the self-sacrifice, with which the troops mount the breach, the strife, if successful, is sure to terminate in the worst atrocities of pillage, rape, and conflagration.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

61.
It is that individual advancement was the main-spring of the Revolution.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

It is religion alone which, by opening a scene of aspiration beyond the grave, can provide a counterpoise to the overwhelming torrent of worldly ambition, which can render men nobly superior to all the storms of time, and give the same fidelity to a falling, which revolution secures to a rising cause.

62.

Wide difference from the fidelity of the monarchy.

That this, and not any peculiar fickleness or proneness to change, was the real cause of the universal and disgraceful desertion by France of its revolutionary chief, when he became unfortunate, is decisively proved by the consideration that, in other times, even in France itself, in those parts of the country, or among those classes where the old influences still survived, the most glorious examples of constancy and fidelity had been found. In the course of the wars with England, Paris was not only taken, but occupied eighteen years by the English armies; an English king was crowned King of France at Rheims; and so complete was the prostration of the country, that an English corps, not ten thousand strong, marched right through the heart of France, from Calais to Bayonne, without encountering any opposition. But that did not subjugate the French people, or hinder them from gloriously rallying behind the Loire, and twice expelling the English from their territory. The League long held Paris; but that did not prevent Henry IV., at the head of the forces of the provinces, from laying siege to it, and placing himself, a Protestant chief, on the throne of France. Where in the annals of the world, shall we find more touching examples of heroism in misfortune, and constancy in adversity, than in La Vendée, amid the republican massacres, or in Lyons under the *mitrailleurs* of Fouché and Collot d'Herbois? Even in Paris, stripped as it had been of almost the whole of the nobility by the previous emigration, five hundred devoted gentlemen hastened to the Tuileries, on the 10th August 1792, to meet death with the royal family. But not one of the new noblesse

went from thence to Fontainebleau to share exile with Napoleon on the eve of his overthrow.

It is in vain, therefore, to attempt to shelter the tergiversation of Fontainebleau under any peculiarity of national character ; or to ascribe to human nature what is evidently owing, in this instance at least, to its baseness under the vices of a revolution. It is equally vain to allege that necessity drove the French leaders to this measure : that they had no alternative : and that desertion of Napoleon, or national ruin, stared them in the face. If that were the case, what condemnation so severe could be passed on the Revolutionary system, as the admission that it had brought matters, under chiefs and leaders of the nation's own appointment, to such a pass that nothing remained but to ruin their country, or betray the hero whom they had placed upon the throne ? But, in truth, it was misfortune, and the stoppage of the robbery of Europe, which alone rendered Napoleon unpopular, and undermined the colossal power which the Revolution had reared up. Not a whisper was heard against his system of government so long as it was victorious ; it was at the zenith of its popularity when, after twelve years' continuance, he crossed the Niemen. It was when he became unfortunate that it was felt to be insupportable. If the French eagles had gone on from conquest to conquest, France would have yielded up the last drop of its blood to his ambition ; and he would have lived and died surrounded by the adulation of its whole inhabitants, though he had deprived all its mothers of their sons, and all the civilised world of its possessions.

No position is more frequently maintained by the French writers of the liberal school, than that Napoleon perished because he departed from the principles of the Revolution : that the monarch forgot the maxims of the citizen, the emperor the simplicity of the general ; that he stifled the national voice till it had become extinct,

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

63.

It was misfortune which alone rendered Napoleon unpopular.

64.

Any restoration of the revolutionary system was impossible at this period.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

and curbed the popular energies till they had been forgotten ; that he fell at last, less under the bayonets of banded Europe, than in consequence of his despotic terror at putting arms into the hands of his own people ; and that, if he had revived in 1814 the revolutionary energy of 1793, he would have proved equally victorious. They might as well say, that if the old worn-out debauchee of sixty would only resume the vigour and the passions of twenty-five, he would extricate himself from all his ailments. Doubtless he would succeed in so doing, by such a miracle, for a time ; and he might, if so renovated, run again for twenty years the career of pleasure, licentiousness, suffering, and decay. But is such a restoration in the last stages of excitement, whether individual or national, possible ? Is it desirable ? Was there ever such a thing heard of as a people, after twenty-five years' suffering and exhaustion from the indulgence of their social passions, again commencing the career of delusion and ruin ? Never. Men are hardly ever warned by the sufferings of preceding generations, but they are never insensible to the agonies of their own.

65.
A pacific
career was
impracticable to Napoleon.

Equally extravagant is the idea frequently started by a more amiable and philanthropic class of writers, that it was Napoleon's ambition which ruined the cause of the Revolution ; and that if he had only turned his sword into a ploughshare, and cultivated the arts of peace, after he had gained possession of supreme power, as he had done those of war to attain it, he might have successfully established in France the glorious fabric of constitutional freedom. They know little of human nature - of the deceitfulness of sin, and downward progress of the career of passion—who think such a transformation practicable. They know still less of the laws of the moral world, who deem such a result consistent with the administration of a just and beneficent Providence. Are the habits necessary for the building up of constitutional freedom ; the industry, self-denial, and frugality, which must constitute

its bases in the great body of the people : the moderation, disinterestedness, and general sway of virtue, which must characterise the leaders of the state, to be acquired amidst the total breaking up of society, the closing of all the channels of pacific industry, the excitement and animation of war ? Is the general abandonment of religion, the universal worship of the idol of worldly success, the sacrifice of every principle at the shrine of self-interest, the school in which the domestic and social virtues are to be learned ? Are robbery, devastation, and murder, the sweeping away of the property of ages, the pouring out like water the blood of the innocent, the steps by which, under a just Providence, the glorious fabric of durable freedom is to be erected ? We might well despair of the fortunes of the human race, if the French Revolution could have given the people engaged in it such a blessing.

Napoleon knew well the fallacy of this idea. He constantly affirmed that he was not to be accused for the wars which he undertook : that they were imposed upon him by an invincible necessity : that glory and success—in other words, perpetual contest—were the conditions of his tenure of power : that he was but the head of a military republic, which would admit of no pause in its career : that conquest was with him essential to existence, and that the first pause in the march of victory would prove the commencement of ruin. This history has indeed been written to little purpose if it is not manifest, even to the most inconsiderate, that he was right in these ideas, and that it was not himself, but the spirit of his age, which is chargeable with his fall.* The ardent and yet

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

66.
Napoleon's
views of the
compulsion
under which
he acted.

* Charlemagne felt the force of a similar necessity: it is common to all men of capacity who find themselves at the head of affairs in a powerful state, long torn by internal dissensions. "Charlemagne, devenu seul Roi des Français, a la conviction profonde qu'il faut occuper incessamment la nation belliqueuse qu'il gouverne ; s'il ne la mène à la conquête, sa force se tournera en guerre civile, comme sous les Mérovingiens ; il a des hommes vaillans et impétueux, il faut qu'il les conduise à travers les fleuves et les montagnes, dans de nouvelles terres ; son habilité consiste à jeter ses compagnons d'armes sur les peuples et les territoires qui l'environnent : car il leur doit du latin, des terres, et des

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

disappointed passions of the Revolution, the millions thrown out of pacific employment, the insatiable desires awakened, the boundless anticipations formed during the progress of that great convulsion, could by possibility find vent only in external conquest. The simple pursuits of industry, the unobtrusive path of duty, the heroic self-denial of virtue, the only sure bases of general freedom, were insupportable to men thus violently excited. If we would know where the career of conquest, once successfully commenced by a democratic state, must of necessity lead, we have only to look to the empire of Rome in ancient, or of British India in modern times. Even now the fever still burns in the veins of France : her maniac punishment is not yet terminated. Not all the blood shed by Napoleon, not her millions of citizens slaughtered have been able to subdue the fierce ebullition ;* the senate and legislative body obsequiously voted, the people slavishly acquiesced in, his ceaseless demands for the blood of their children, happy that he asked less than

dominations, s'il veut éviter qu'ils se dévorent entre eux."—CAPEFIGUE, *Hist. de Charlemagne*, i. 156. This might pass without changing a word, but " Mérovingiens " into " Capétiens," for a true and graphic description of Napoleon's situation, as often drawn by himself, after the strife of the Revolution. The position of Louis XIV., after the wars of the Fronde, was precisely similar, and forced him into a similar career of foreign aggression and conquest.

* Levies of men in France since the Revolution :—

1793,	300,000
1793,	1,200,000
1798,	200,000
1799,	200,000
1801,	30,000
17th Jan. 1805,	60,000
24th Sept. 1805,	80,000
4th Dec. 1806,	80,000
7th April 1807,	80,000
21st Jan. 1808,	80,000
10th Sept. 1808,	160,000
18th April 1809,	30,000
18th April 1809,	10,000
5th Oct. 1809,	36,000
13th Dec. 1810,	120,000
13th Dec. 1810,	40,000
Carry forward,	2,706,000

they would have given.* The double conquest of her capital has been unable to tame her pride ; and nothing but the consummate talents and courage of Louis Philippe, joined to the philosophic wisdom of M. Guizot, have been able to prevent her from rushing again under his reign into the career of glory, of suffering, and of punishment.

The French Revolution, therefore, is to be regarded as a great whole, of which the enthusiasm and fervour of 1789 were the commencement ; the rebellion against government and massacre of the King, the second stage ; the Reign of Terror and charnel-house of La Vendée, the third ; the conquests and glory of Napoleon, the fourth ; the subjugation of France and treachery of Fontainebleau, the consummation. Its external degradation and internal infamy at the latter period, were as necessary a part of its progress, as inevitable a result of its principles, as the harvest reaped in autumn is of the seed sown in spring. The connection—the necessary connection between the two now stands revealed in colours of imperishable light ; they are stamped in characters of fire on the adamantine tablets of history. Therefore it is that any narrative of the Revolution which does not follow it out to its fall, must necessarily be imperfect, both in the fidelity of its picture and the truth of its moral. To stop at the accession of the Directory, or the seizure of supreme power by

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1811.

67.
View of the
progressive
phases of the
Revolution.

	Brought forward, .	2,706,000
20th Dec. 1811,	120,000	
13th March 1812,	100,000	
1st Sept. 1812,	137,000	
11th Jan. 1813,	250,000	
3d April 1813,	180,000	
24th Aug. 1813,	30,000	
9th Oct. 1813,	280,000	
15th Nov. 1813,	300,000	
Total,	4,103,000	

—CAPITUL, v. 510 ; and *Monitors* of the above dates.

“ Sedere Patres, censere parati,
Si re mun, si temple sibi, jura, iunqne Senatūs,
Auxiliumqne petat : melius, quod plura julare
Erubuit, quam Roma pati.” LUCAN, *Pharsalia*, iii. 110.

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

Napoleon, as many have done, is to halt in our account of a fever at the ninth or thirteenth day, when the crisis did not come on till the twenty-first. And he who, after reflecting on the events of this marvellous progress, in which the efforts of ages and the punishment of generations were all concentrated into one quarter of a century, does not believe in the Divine superintendence of human affairs, and the reward of virtuous and punishment of guilty nations in this world, would not be converted though one rose from the dead.

68.
Agency by
which the
Divine gov-
ernment of
nations is
carried on.

An author in whom simplicity or beauty of expression often conceals depth and justice of thought, has thus explained the mode of the Divine administration, and the manner in which it works out its decrees by the instrumentality of free agents:—"The beauty and magnificence," says Blair, "of the universe are much heightened by its being an extensive and complicated system, in which a variety of springs are made to play, and a multitude of different movements are with admirable art regulated and kept in order. Interfering interests and jarring passions are in such manner balanced against one another, such proper checks are placed on the violence of human pursuits, and the wrath of man is made so to hold its course, that how opposite soever the several motions at first appear to be, yet they all concur at last in one result. While among the multitudes that dwell on the face of the earth, some are submissive to the Divine authority, some rise up in rebellion against it; others, absorbed in their pleasures and pursuits, are totally inattentive to it; they are all so moved by an imperceptible influence from above, that the zeal of the dutiful, the wrath of the rebellious, and the indifference of the careless, contribute finally to the glory of God. All are governed in such a manner as suits their powers, and is consistent with their moral freedom; yet the various acts of these free agents all conspire to work out the eternal purposes of heaven. The system upon which the Divine government plainly

proceeds, is, that men's own wickedness should be appointed to correct them, that they should be snared in the work of their own hands. When the vices of men require punishment to be inflicted, the Almighty is at no loss for the ministers of justice. No special interpositions of power are requisite. He has no occasion to step from His throne and interrupt the majestic order of nature. With the solemnity which befits Omnipotence, He pronounces, 'Ephraim is joined to his idols; let him alone.' He leaves transgressors to their own guilt, and punishment follows of course. *Their own sins do the work of justice.* They lift the scourge: and with every stroke they inflict on the criminal, they mix the severe admonition that he is reaping only the fruit of his own deeds, and deserves all that he suffers."¹

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1844.

1 Blair, l.
Serm. 14;
and ii.
Serm. 14.

Without pretending to explain the various modes by which this awful and mysterious system of Divine administration, in which ourselves are at once the free agents, and the objects of reward and punishment, is carried on, it is impossible not to be struck with the powerful operation of two moral laws of our being, with the reality of which every one, from the experience of his own breast, as well as the observation of those around him, must be familiar. The first is, that every irregular passion or illicit desire acquires strength from the gratification which it receives, and becomes the more uncontrollable the more it is indulged. The second, that the power of self-denial, the energy of virtue, the generosity of disposition, increase with every occasion on which they are called forth, until at length they become a formed habit, and require hardly any effort for their exercise. On the counteracting force of these two laws, the whole moral administration of the universe hinges; as its physical equilibrium is dependent on the opposite influences of the centripetal and centrifugal forces.

eg.
Universal
downward
progress of
sin.

It is by gradual and latent steps that the destruction of virtue, whether in the individual or in the community,

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1814.

70.
Gradual
and deceit-
ful progress
of vice.

begins. The first advances of sin are clothed in the garb of liberality and philanthropy: the colours it then assumes are the homage which vice pays to virtue. If the evil unveiled itself at the beginning—if the storm which is to uproot society discovered as it rose all its horrors, there are few who would not shrink from its contact. But its first appearance is so attractive that few are sensible of its real nature: and, strange to say, the most hardened egotism in the end derives its chief strength in the outset from the generous affections. By degrees “habit gives the passion strength, while the absence of glaring guilt seemingly justifies them; and, unawakened by remorse, the sinner proceeds in his course till he waxes bold in guilt and becomes ripe for ruin. We are imperceptibly betrayed; from one licentious attachment, one criminal passion, led on to another, till all self-government is lost, and we are hurried to destruction. In this manner, every criminal passion in its progress swells and blackens, till what was at first a small cloud, no bigger than a man’s hand, rising from the sea, is found to carry the tempest in its womb.”¹ What is the career of the drunkard, the gamester, or the sensualist, but an exemplification of the truth of this picture? Reader, if you have any doubt of the reality of this moral law, search your own heart, call to mind your own ways. Exactly the same principle applies to nations. What is the history of the French Revolution, in all its stages, but an exemplification of this truth when applied to social passions? And how did the vast colossus of earthly passion, which had so long bestrode the world, ultimately break up? Despite the bright and glowing colours with which its youth arose, despite the great and glorious deeds by which its manhood was emblazoned, it sank in the end amidst the basest and most degrading selfishness. It perished precisely as a gang of robbers does, in which, when the stroke of adversity is at last felt, each, true to the god of his idolatry, strives to save himself by betray-

¹ Blair, i.
177.

ing his leader. The same law which makes an apple fall to the ground regulates the planets in their course.

The second moral principle, not less universal, alike in individuals and nations, than the first, is open to the daily observation of every one, equally in his own breast and the conduct of others. Every one has felt in his own experience, however little he may have practised it—every teacher of youth has ascertained by observation—every moralist from the beginning of time has enforced the remark as the last conclusion of wisdom—that the path of virtue is rough and thorny at the outset; that habits of industry and self-denial are to be gained only by exertion; that the ascent is rugged, the path steep, but that the difficulty diminishes as the effort is continued; and that, when the “summit is reached, the heaven is above your head, and at your feet the kingdom of Cashmere.” And such is the effect of effort strenuously made in the cause of virtue, that it purifies itself as it advances, and progressively casts off the intermixture of worldly passion, which often sullied the purity of its motives in the outset. Hence the constant elevation often observed in the character of good men as they advance in life, till at its close they almost seem to have lost every stain of human corruption, and to be translated, rather than raised, by death to immortality. It is in this moral law that the antagonist principle of social as well as individual evil is to be found, and it was by its operation upon successive nations that the dreadful nightmare of the French Revolution was thrown off the world. Many selfish desires, much corrupt ambition, great moral weakness, numerous political sins, stained the first efforts of the coalition, and in them at that period England had her full share. For these sins they suffered and are suffering; and the punishment of Great Britain will continue as long as the national debt endures*—of Russia and Prussia as long as Poland festers, a thorn of weak-

CHAP.
LXXXIX.

1-14.

71.

And as it is
the source of
virtue.

* If England had acted in the outset of the war as she did at the close,

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

ness, in their sides. But how unworthy soever its champions at first may have been, the cause for which they contended was a noble one. It was that of religion, fidelity, and freedom: and, as the contest rolled on, they were purified in the only school of real amelioration—the school of suffering. Gradually the baser elements were washed out of the confederacy; the nations, after long agony, came comparatively pure out of the furnace. At last, instead of the selfishness and rapacity of 1794, were exhibited the constancy of Saragossa, the devotion of Aspern, the heroism of the Tyrol, the resurrection of Prussia; and the war, which had commenced with the partition of Poland and the attempted partition of France, terminated with the flames of Moscow and the pardon of Paris.

72.
How alone
can this
downward
progress be
averted?

Is, then, the cause of freedom utterly hopeless? does agitation necessarily lead to rebellion, rebellion to revolution? and must the prophetic eye of wisdom ever anticipate in the infant struggles of liberty the bloodshed of Robespierre, the carnage of Napoleon, the treachery of Fontainebleau? No. It is not the career of freedom, it is the career of sin which leads, and ever will lead, to such results. It is in the disregard of moral obligation when done with beneficent intentions; in the fatal maxim, that the end will justify the means; in the oblivion of the divine precept, that “evil is *not to be done* that good may come of it;” and not in any fatality connected with revolutions, that the real cause of this deplorable downward progress is to be found. And if the supporters of freedom would avoid this otherwise inevitable retribution; if they would escape being led on from desire to desire, from acquisition to acquisition, from passion to passion, from crime to crime, till a Moscow retreat drowns their hopes in blood, or a treachery of Fontainebleau for ever disgraces them in the eyes of man-

the contest would have been terminated in 1793, and £600,000,000 saved from the national debt.

kind—they must resolutely in the outset withstand the tempter, and avoid all measures, whatever their apparent expedience may be, which are not evidently based on immutable justice. If this, the only compass in the dark night of revolution, is not steadily observed ; if property is ever taken without compensation being given ; or blood shed without the commission of crimes to which that penalty is by law attached ; or institutions uprooted, sanctioned by the experience of ages, when their modification was practicable ; if, in short, the principle is acted on, that the end will justify the means, unbounded national calamities are at hand, and the very objects for which these sins are committed will be for ever lost.

What are the difficulties which now beset the philosophic statesman in the attempt to construct the fabric of constitutional freedom in France ? They are, that the national morality has been destroyed in the citizens of towns, in whose hands alone political power is vested : that there is no moral strength or political energy in the country : that no great proprietors exist to steady or direct general opinion, or counterbalance either the encroachments of the executive or the madness of the people : that France has fallen under a subjection to Paris, to which there is nothing comparable in European history : that the Prætorian guards of the capital rule the state : that nearly six millions of separate proprietors, the great majority at the plough, can achieve no more in the cause of freedom than an army of privates without officers : that commercial opulence and habits of sober judgment have been destroyed, never to revive : that a thirst for excitement everywhere prevails, and general selfishness disgraces the nation : that religion has never resumed its sway over the influential classes : that rank has ceased to be hereditary, and, having become the appanage of office only, is a virtual addition to the power of the sovereign ; and that the general depravity renders indispensable a powerful centralised and military government. In what respect

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

73.
Is a free
government
possible in
France ?

CHAP.
LXXXIX.
1814.

does this state of things differ from the institutions of China or the Byzantine empire? "The Romans," says Gibbon, "aspired to be equal: they were levelled by the equality of Asiatic servitude."

74.
Reasons
which must
prevent it.

And yet, what are all these fatal peculiarities in the present political and social condition of France, but the effects of the very revolutionary measures which were the object of such unanimous support and enthusiasm at its commencement? This was the expedience for which the crimes of the Revolution were committed! For this it was that they massacred the king, guillotined the nobles, annihilated the church, confiscated the estates, rendered bankrupt the nation, denied the Almighty!—to exchange European for Asiatic civilisation; to destroy the foundations of freedom by crushing its strongest supports; and, by weakening the restraints of virtue, render unavoidable the fetters of force! Truly their sin has recoiled upon them; they have indeed received the work of their own hands. Mr Burke long ago said, "that without a complete and entire restitution of the confiscated property, liberty could never be re-established in France." And the justice of the observation is now apparent, for by it alone could the elements and bulwarks of freedom be restored. But restitution, it will be said, is now impossible; the interests of the new proprietors are too immense, their political power too great; the Restoration was based on their protection, and they cannot be interfered with. Very possibly it is so, but that will not alter the laws of nature. If reparation has become impossible, RETRIBUTION must be endured; and that retribution, as the necessary result of the crimes of which it is the punishment, is the doom of Oriental slavery.

CHAPTER XC.

AMERICA—ITS PHYSICAL, MORAL, AND POLITICAL
CIRCUMSTANCES.

IF the friends of freedom are often led to despair of its fortunes amidst the dense population, aged monarchies, and corrupted passions of the Old World, the aurora appears to rise in a purer sky and with brighter colours in the other hemisphere. In those immense regions which the genius of Columbus first laid open to European enterprise, where vice had not yet spread its snares nor wealth its seductions, the free spirit and persevering industry of England have penetrated a yet untrodden continent, and laid in the wilderness the foundations of a vaster monument of civilisation than has ever yet been raised by the efforts of man. Nor has the hand of nature been wanting to prepare a fitting receptacle for the august structure. Far beyond the Atlantic wave, amidst forests trodden only by the foot of the savage, her creative powers have been, unknown to us, in ceaseless activity: in the solitudes of the Far West, the garden of the human race has been for ages in preparation; and amidst the onward and expanding energies of the Old World, her prophetic hand had silently prepared, in the solitude of the New, unbounded resources for the future increase of man.

There is a part of the New World where nature appears clothed with the brilliant colours, and decked

CHAP.
XC.

— 1812.

1.

Vast number
formed in the Amer-
ican conti-
nent.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

2.

Enchanting
aspect of the
West Indian
islands.

out in the gorgeous array of the tropics. In the Gulf of Mexico, the extraordinary clearness of the water reveals to the astonished mariner the magnitude of its abysses, and discloses, even at the depth of thirty fathoms, the gigantic vegetation which, so far beneath the surface, is drawn forth by the attraction of a vertical sun. In the midst of these glassy waves, rarely disturbed by a ruder breath than the zephyrs of spring, an archipelago of perfumed islands is placed, which repose like baskets of flowers on the tranquil surface of the ocean. Everything in those enchanted abodes appears to have been prepared for the wants and enjoyments of man. Nature has superseded the ordinary necessity for labour. The verdure of the groves, and the colours of the flowers and blossoms, derive additional vividness from the transparent purity of the air and the deep serenity of the heavens. Many of the trees are laden with fruits, which descend by their own weight to invite the indolent hand of the gatherer, and are perpetually renewed under the influence of an ever-balmy air. Others, which yield no nourishment, fascinate the eye by the luxuriant variety of their form or the gorgeous brilliancy of their colours. Amidst a forest of perfumed citron-trees, spreading bananas, graceful palms, wild figs, round-leaved myrtles, fragrant acacias, and gigantic arbutuses, are to be seen every variety of creepers, with scarlet or purple blossoms, which entwine themselves round the stems, and hang in festoons from tree to tree.¹

1 *Tour*, i.
33. *Malte*
Bran, vi.
727, 731.
Irving's *Col.*
i. 209.

3.

The noble
forest and
natural
beauty.

The trees are of a magnitude unknown in northern climes. The luxuriant vines, as they clamber up the loftiest cedars, form graceful inverted arches of vegetation; grapes are so plenty upon every shrub, that the surge of the ocean, as it lazily rolls in upon the shore with the quiet winds of summer, dashes its spray upon the clusters; and natural arbours form an impervious shade, which not a ray of the sun of July can penetrate. Cotton, planted by the hand of nature, grows in wild

luxuriance ; the potato and banana yield an overflowing supply of food ; fruits of too tempting sweetness present themselves to the hand. Innumerable birds, with varied and splendid plumage, nestle in shady retreats, where they are sheltered from the scorching heats of summer. Painted varieties of parrots and woodpeckers glitter amidst the verdure of the groves, and humming-birds rove from flower to flower, resembling “ the animated particles of a rainbow.” The scarlet flamingoes, seen through an opening of the forest in a distant savannah, appear the mimic array of fairy armies : the fragrance of the woods, the odour of the flowers, load every breeze. These charms broke on Columbus and his followers like Elysium : “ One could live here,” said he, “ for ever.” Is this the terrestrial paradise which nature seems at first sight to have designed — which it appeared to its heroic discoverer ? It is the land of slavery and of pestilence ; where indolence dissolves the manly character, and stripes can alone rouse the languid arm ; where “ death bestrides the evening gale,” and the yielding breath inhales poison with its delight : where the iron race of Japhet itself seems melting away under the prodigality of the gifts of nature.¹

There is a land, in the same hemisphere, of another character. Washed by the waves of a dark and stormy ocean, granite rocks and sandy promontories constitute its sea-front, and a sterile inhospitable tract, from a hundred to a hundred and fifty miles broad, and eleven hundred long, presents itself to the labours of the colonist. It was there that the British exiles first set their feet, and sought amidst hardship and suffering that freedom of which England had become unworthy. Dark and melancholy woods cover the greater part of this expanse : the fir, the beech, the laurel, and the wild olive, are chiefly to be found on the sea-coast ; but in such profusion do they grow, and so strongly do they characterise the country, that even now, after two hundred years of laborious industry have been employed in felling them,

CHAP.
XC.
1842.

¹ *Madro*
Berni, xi.
727, 731.
Topq. i. 223.
Descomitaz,
Descript.
des Antil-
les, i. 265.
Irving's Co-
lumbus, i.
260, 271.
Barroft, i.
122.

^{4.}
Character of
North Amer-
ican.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

the spaces cleared by man appear but as spots amidst the gloomy immensity of the primitive forest. Farther inland, the shapeless swell of the Alleghany mountains rises to separate the sea-coast from the vast plains in the interior; the forests become loftier, and are composed of noble trees, sown by the hand of nature in every variety, from the stunted pine which strikes its roots into the ices of the arctic circle, to the majestic palm, the spreading plane-tree, the graceful poplar, and verdant evergreen oak, which overshadow the marshes of the Floridas and Carolinas. Inexpressible is the beauty of the scenes which nature exhibits in the highlands which lie around the upper valley of the Tennessee river. The vales are there encircled by blue hills rising above hills, of which the lofty peaks kindle with the first rays of the sun, while their overshadowing mass intercepts his noontide beams. Lower down, the slopes are covered with magnolias; flowering forest-trees, decorated with roving climbers in snow-white cascades, glitter on the hill-sides; the rivers, clear and shallow, rush through the narrow vales amidst thickets of rhododendron and blooming azalia. The fertile soil teems with luxuriant herbage, on which vast herds of deer browse; the vivifying breeze is laden with fragrance; daybreak is ever welcomed by the carol of birds. Such are the enchanting features which nature presents in the highlands of Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama; the most picturesque and salubrious region to the east of the Mississippi.¹

¹ Malte Brun, xi. 184, 195. Balbi, 879. 885. Tocq. i. 34. Bancroft, iii. 246.

^{5.} Prodigious activity of nature in its forests.

The ceaseless activity of nature is seen, without intermission, throughout these pathless solitudes: the great work of creation is everywhere followed by destruction, that of destruction by creation. Generations of trees are perpetually decaying, but fresh generations ever force their way up among the fallen stems; luxuriant creepers cover with their leaves alike the expiring and the reviving race; the frequent rains which almost everywhere stagnate amidst the thickets, attracted by this prodigious expanse

of shaded and humid surface, at once hasten decay and vivify vegetation; prolific animal life teems in the leafy coverts which are found amidst these fallen patriarchs; and the incessant war of the stronger with the weaker, strews the earth alike with animal and vegetable remains. The profound silence of these forests is occasionally interrupted alone by the fall of a tree, the breaking of a branch, the bellowing of the buffalo, the roar of a cataract, or the whistling of the winds. It is the land of health, of industry, and of freedom; of ardent zeal, and dauntless energy, and great aspiration. In those forests a virgin mould is formed; in those wilds the foundations of human increase are laid: no gardener could mingle the elements of rural wealth like the contending life and death of the forest; and out of the decayed remnants of thousands of years are extracted the sustenance, the life, the power of civilised man.¹

CHAP.
XV.
1812.

1 Trav. i.
34, 55.
Mém. Brém.,
xi, 184.
211. Babb.,
57, 920.

The vast forests of this primeval continent have been thus described by the hand of a master, whose pictorial eye and graphic powers almost bring the realities he has witnessed before our eyes:—"The American forest exhibits in the highest degree the grandeur of repose. As nature never does violence to her own laws, the soil throws out the plant it is best qualified to support, and the eye is not often disappointed by a sickly vegetation. There is a generous emulation in the trees, which is not to be found among others of different families, when left to pursue their quiet existence in the solitude of the fields. Each struggles towards the light; and an equality in bulk and similarity in form are thus produced, which scarce belong to their distinctive characters. The effect may easily be imagined. The vaulted arches beneath are filled with thousands of high unbroken columns, which sustain one vast and trembling canopy of leaves. A pleasing gloom and an imposing silence have their interminable reign below, an outer and a different atmosphere seeming to rest on the cloud of foliage. While

6.
Cooper's
Description
of the Amer-
ican forests.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

the light plays on the varying surface of the tree-tops, a sombre hue colours the earth. Dead and moss-grown logs, mounds covered with decomposed vegetable surfaces, the graves of long-past generations of trees, cavities left by the fall of a long uprooted trunk, dark fungi that flourish about the decayed roots of those about to loose their hold, with a few slender and delicate plants of minor growth, and which flourish in the shade, form the principal features of the scene beneath. In the midst of this gloomy solitude, the foot of man is rarely heard. An occasional glimpse of the bounding deer or trotting moose, is almost the only interruption on the earth itself; while the heavy bear or the leaping panther is occasionally met, seated on the branches of some venerable tree. There are moments, too, when troops of hungry wolves are encountered on the trail of the deer; but these are rather an exception to the stillness of the place, than accessories that should properly be introduced into the picture. Even the birds are in general mute; or, when they do break the silence, it is in discordant notes that suit their wild abode. The wilderness in the midst of many successive changes is always sustained at the point nearest to perfection: since the alterations are so few and gradual as never to innovate on its general character.”¹

¹ Cooper, in
Borderers,
chap. 8.

7.
Geographical divisions
of the United States.

The United States of North America extend from 70° to 127° west longitude, and from 25° to 52° north latitude. They embrace in the territories of the separate States 1,535,000 square geographical miles, or about ten times the area of France, which contains 156,000; and seventeen times that of the British islands, which amount to 91,000; besides about 500,000 more in the unappropriated western wilds not yet allotted to any separate State—in all, 2,076,400 square miles, or 1,328,896,000 acres, upwards of twenty times the area of the British islands.* This immense territory is portioned out by

* The total territory of the United States, including the Floridas, is, accord-

nature into three great divisions, of which not a third has yet heard the hatchet of civilised man, by the two great chains of mountains which, running from north to south, nearly parallel to the adjacent oceans, separate the continent of North America, as it were, into a centre and two wings. These chains are the Alleghany and the Rocky Mountains. The former, gradually rising from the shores of the St Lawrence and the frontiers of Canada, and stretching southward to the gulf of Florida, a distance of above fourteen hundred miles, divides the sea-coast, which first began to be cultivated by the European settlers, from the vast alluvial plains of Central America. The space between it and the sea is comparatively sterile, and does not embrace above 200,000 square miles. It is beyond the Alleghanies, a comparatively low and shapeless range, seldom rising to five thousand feet in height, that the garden of the world is to be found. In the immense basins of the Missouri, the Ohio, and the Mississippi, to which the waters descend from the whole length of the Alleghanies on the east, and the vast piles of the Rocky Mountains on the west, are contained above 1,000,000 square miles, with hardly a hill or a rock to interrupt the expanse. Of this prodigious space, above six times the whole area of France, and fully eleven times that of Great Britain, two-thirds, being that which lies nearest to the Alleghany range, is composed of the richest soil, in great part alluvial, in others covered with the virgin spoils of decayed forest vegetation during several thousand years. The remaining third stretches, by a gentle and almost imperceptible slope, to the foot of the Rocky Mountains.¹

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

¹ Hallé, 925,
937. Malte
Brun, xi.
185, 200.

Nature exhibits a character so different on the opposite banks of the Mississippi, that it is scarcely possible

ing to Malte Brun, about 3,000,000 square geographical miles; but that includes the portion covered by water, which is a fifteenth of the whole, and the desert tracts of the Rocky Mountains. MALTE BRUN, xi. 185. The British islands, including Ireland, contain 91,000 square geographical miles, or nearly 122,000 English square miles.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

The Prairies
and Rocky
Mountains.

to believe they belong to the same part of the world. On the western bank vast savannahs stretch as far as the eye can reach; their undulations of verdure, like the waves of the ocean, blend in the distance with the blue of heaven. Gradually as it approaches the stupendous barrier of the Rocky Mountains, the character of nature changes. Charming savannahs, over which innumerable herds of buffaloes range at pleasure, first break the dark uniformity of the forest; wider and more open prairies next succeed over which the trees are loosely sprinkled, and sometimes attain a prodigious size: naked and dreary plains are then to be traversed, in which a thousand rills meander, with imperceptible flow, towards the great river in the east, almost concealed amidst gigantic reeds and lofty grass which fringe their banks; until at length the vast and snowy ridge of the Rocky Mountains, rising in unapproachable grandeur to the height of fourteen and fifteen thousand, sometimes twenty thousand feet, presents apparently an impassable barrier to the adventurous steps of man. Yet even these, the Andes of Northern America, which traverse its whole extent from Icy Cape to the Isthmus of Darien, do not bound the natural capabilities of its territory. On their western slopes another more broken plain, furrowed by innumerable ravines, is to be seen, descending rapidly towards the Pacific, which embraces three hundred thousand square miles. Its numerous and rapid streams give it an inexhaustible command of water-power; its rivers, stored with fish and in great part navigable, present vast resources for the use of man: its boundless forests and rich veins of mineral wealth point it out as the future abode of manufacturing greatness.¹

9.
Character of scene in general presents itself. Every object in nature the eastern bank of the Mississippi.

On the opposite, or eastern bank, a very different scene in general presents itself. Every object in nature is there new and wonderful. Loud and frequent thunderstorms attest the electricity with which the atmosphere is charged, and refresh the earth when parched by

¹ Balbi, 935, 939, 1012.
Torq. ii.
387. Malte
Brun, xi.
185, 215.
American
Atlas, No.
6. Chateaub.
Atala et
Régis, 4, 5.

the droughts of summer. Life everywhere abounds; the woods, the savannahs, the morasses teem with existence. Hanging over the watery current, grouped on the rocks and eminences on its banks, clustering in every valley, trees of all sorts, colours, and perfumes, grow up together in wild profusion, and reach a height which the aching eye can hardly measure. Wild vines, bignonias, and other creepers, generally adorned by the most splendid blossoms, creep up to their very summits; and, stretching from one to another, form, as in the Campagna of Naples, arches of vegetation at the height of a hundred and fifty feet from the ground. Sometimes spreading their tendrils out from the trees, these adventurous creepers stretch across rivers, over which they throw aerial bridges of flowers. From the midst of this verdant wilderness, the magnolia rears his motionless cone, surmounted by large white roses. He has no rival but the palm-tree, which, at his side, waves to every breeze his graceful fan of verdure.¹

CHAP.
XC.

1:42.

¹ Planchon,
i. 233. Cha-
teaub. Atala, 4.

If silence, interrupted only by casual sounds, reigns in the vast savannahs on the western, a very chorus arises from the woods on the eastern bank. A multitude of living animals, of all sorts, there attest the prodigality with which life has been spread in the wilderness by the hand of the Creator. Everything has been prepared for their reception. Forests majestic in their growth, and free from underwood, spread over the plains in boundless magnificence; the purling streams and frequent rivers flowing between alluvial banks, quicken the ever-pregnant soil into unwearied fertility; the strangest and most beautiful flowers grow familiarly in the fields; the woods are replenished with fragrance; the birds, with their gay plumage and varied melodies, inspire delight. The humming-bird, so brilliant in its plumage, so quick in its motions, so unfearful of man, rebounds from the blossoms like a bee gathering honey. Myriads of pigeons often darken the air with their flocks. Bears of huge size,

10.
Prodigious
number of
animals
which are
there assem-
bled.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

often reeling from the intoxication of the wild grapes, of which they are passionately fond, cling to the branches; black squirrels sport in the recesses of the foliage; mocking-birds and Virginian pigeons alight on turf made red by strawberries; parrots, resplendent with green and red, creep around the tops of the cypresses; and in the midst of the jessamine of the Floridas, the deadly sound of the rattlesnake is heard. The noise which these innumerable tribes of animals make, is so prodigious as to exceed anything ever heard in the abodes of civilised man. The roaring of beasts of prey, the bellowing of buffaloes, the cooing of birds, the hissing of serpents, the din of parrots, is all heard at once, without any one apparently being disquieted by the others. And, when wafted by the breeze from a little distance, it produces a dull incessant roar, like the sound of a distant cataract, which harmonises singularly with the deep solitude of these untrodden forests.¹

¹ Chateaub.
Atala, 5, 6.
Œuv. x. 5.
Bancroft, i.
233.

11.
Description
of Canada.

These are the great geographical divisions of the territory of the United States; but they do not comprehend the whole of the immense continent of North America. MEXICO on the south, and the British provinces on the north, contain within themselves the elements of mighty empires, and are destined to open their capacious arms for ages to come, to receive the overflowing population of the Old World. The former of these has been already described in treating of Spanish America, to which division of the New World it properly belongs.² CANADA, and the other British possessions in North America, though apparently blessed with fewer physical advantages, contain a noble race, and are evidently reserved for a lofty destination. Everything there is in proper keeping for the development of the combined physical and mental energies of man. There are to be found, at once, the hardihood of character which conquers difficulty, the severity of climate which stimulates exertion, the natural advantages which reward enterprise. Nature has

² Ante, ch.
Lxxvii. § 26.

marked out this country for exalted destinies ; for if she has not given it the virgin mould of the basin of the Missouri, or the giant vegetation and prolific sun of the tropics, she has bestowed upon it a vast chain of inland lakes, which fit it one day to become the great channel of commerce between Europe and the interior of America and eastern parts of Asia.¹

CHAP.
XC.
1-12.

¹ Malte
Brun, xi.
129, 141.

The river St Lawrence, fed by the immense inland seas which separate Canada from the United States, is the great commercial artery of North America. Descending from the distant sources of the Kaministiquia and St Louis, it traverses the solitary Lake Winnipeg and Lake of the Woods, opens into the boundless expanse of Lake Superior, and, after being swelled by the tributary volumes of the Michigan and Huron waves, again contracts into the river and lake of St Clair ; a second time expands into the broad surface of Lake Erie, from whence it is precipitated by the sublime cataract of Niagara into "wild Ontario's boundless lake," and, again contracting, finds its way to the sea by the magnificent estuary of the St Lawrence, through the wooded intricacies of the Thousand Islands. Nor are the means of water navigation wanting on the other side of this marvellous series of inland seas. The Rocky Mountains, sunk there to five or six thousand feet in height, contain valleys capable of being opened to artificial navigation by human enterprise ; no considerable elevation requires to be surmounted in making the passage from the distant sources of the St Lawrence to the mountain feeders of the Columbia ; the rapid declivity of the range on the western side soon renders the latter river navigable, and a deep channel and swelling stream soon conduct the navigator to the shores of the Pacific. As clearly as the Mediterranean Sea was let in by the Straits of Gibraltar to form the main channel of communication and the great artery of life to the Old World, so surely were the vast lakes of Canada spread in the wilderness of the New,²

^{12.}
Vast inland
navigation
which its
lakes afford.

² Malte
Brun, xi.
129, 143.
Balbi, 926.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

to penetrate the mighty continent, and carry into its remotest recesses the light of European knowledge and the blessings of Christian civilisation.

13.
Superficial
extent, and
probable
capabilities
of Canada.

The superficial extent of the British possessions in North America is prodigious, and greatly exceeds that which is subject to the sway of the United States; it amounts to above four millions of square geographical miles, or nearly a ninth part of the whole terrestrial surface of the globe.* Probably seven-eighths of this immense surface are doomed to eternal sterility from the excessive severity of the climate, which yields only a scanty herbage to the reindeer, the elk, and the musk ox; but the two Canadas alone contain three hundred thousand square miles, of which ninety-five thousand are in the upper and richer province; and, altogether, there are probably not less than six hundred thousand square miles in the British dominions in that part of the world, capable of profitable cultivation, being nearly seven times the superficies of the whole British islands, if the wastes of Scotland, hardly less sterile than the Polar snows, are deducted. Of this arable surface, about one hundred and thirty thousand square miles, or somewhat more than a fourth, has been surveyed, or is under cultivation. The climate is various, being much milder in the upper or more southerly province of Canada, than in the lower; but in both it is extremely cold in winter, and surprisingly warm in summer. In the lower province, the thermometer has been known to stand, in July and August, at 93° of Fahrenheit in the shade, and it is frequently from 80° to 90°; while in winter it is sometimes as low as 40° below zero, so as to freeze mercury.¹ But, notwithstanding this extraordinary range of temperature, the climate is not only eminently favourable to the health

¹ Maltre
Brun, xi.
143, 145.
179. Balbi,
1096, 1107.
Bucking-
ham's Cana-
da, App.
517.

* The exact amount is 4,109,630 square geographical miles. The terrestrial globe embraces about 37,000,000.—MALTRE BRUN, xi. 179. Besides this land surface, British North America contains 1,340,000 square miles of water.—*Ibid.*

of the European race, but brings to maturity, in many places, the choicest gifts of nature.

Vast pine forests, scantily intersected, in the vicinity only of the great rivers, by execrable roads, cover indeed nine tenths of the northern provinces, as of the corresponding districts of Russia and Sweden in the Old World. But they constitute no inconsiderable portion of the national wealth, for in them is found an inexhaustible store of timber, the exportation of which constitutes the great staple of the country, and employs four-fifths of the twelve hundred thousand tons of shipping which now (1849) carry on the trade between Great Britain and her magnificent Transatlantic possessions. Even in Lower Canada, however, when you approach the basin of the St Lawrence, the earth becomes fruitful, and yields ample supplies for the use of man. Grain, herbage, potatoes, and vegetables grow in abundance : the almost miraculous rapidity of spring compensates the long and dreary cold of winter ; and the fervent heat of summer brings all the fruits of northern Europe to maturity. In the upper province, the winter is shorter and milder, and the ardent rays of the summer sun so temper the northern blasts, that the vine, the peach, the nectarine, and the apricot, as well as cherries and melons, ripen in the open air. In both, the same change is now taking place which has been observed in Europe since the dark masses of the Hercynian Forest were felled, and its morasses drained by the laborious arms of the Germans. The climate, every season becoming more mild, has undergone a change of 8° or 10° on the average of the year since the efforts of European industry were first applied to the cultivation of the territory.¹

Although the rivers in the United States of America do not offer the same marvellous advantages for foreign commerce which the St Lawrence and its chain of inland seas afford to the activity of British enterprise, they are inferior to none in the world in the immensity of their

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

11.

Vegetable
products
of the
Canadas.

¹ Malte
Brun, xi.
143, 145.
Annales des
Voyages,
xviii. 114,
126.

15.
Immense
rivers of
the United
States.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

course and the volume of their waters, and present unbounded facilities both for the export of the produce of the soil, and the marvellous powers of steam navigation. The greatest of these is the Missouri—the main branch of the vast system of rivers which drain the rich alluvial plain between the Alleghany and Rocky Mountains, and which, after a course of two thousand five hundred miles in length, empties itself into the gulf of Mexico, below New Orleans. Already a noble river when it issues in the solitude of the Far West from the Rocky Mountains, its passage into the plain is worthy of the majestic character of the Father of waters. Between stupendous walls of rock, twelve hundred feet high, and three leagues in length, whose overhanging cliffs darken the awful passage, it issues forth in a deep and foaming current three hundred yards broad, and, soon swelled by other tributary streams, winds its long and solitary way through the prairies to the falls, sixty miles distant, which rival Niagara itself in sublimity and grandeur.* The Mississippi, the Ohio, the Tennessee, the Illinois, the Arkansas, the Kansas, the White River, the Red River, the St Peter, the Wisconsin, the least of them rivalling the Rhine in magnitude, and some of which have given their names to the mighty states which already are settled on their shores, are but the tributaries of this prodigious artery. But they are tributaries on a gigantic scale. Ere the limpid waters of the Ohio join the turbid waves of the Mississippi, it has already been swollen by sixty tributary streams, any one of which would pass for a great river in Europe. When these two vast arteries join, they are each two miles broad, and they flow for some miles in placid majesty, side by side, without intermingling their waters.¹ These various rivers, all of which are navigable, each with its own affiliated set of tributary

¹ Malte Brun, xi. 192, 194, 296, 297. Lewis and Clarke, ii. and in. Ch. cxxvii. Voyage, 27.

They are, in all, 354 feet in height; the principal fall alone is 229 feet high, and about 800 broad. They are surmounted by lofty cliffs, and their roar is heard thirteen miles off. In a solitary tree on an island, in the middle of one of the falls, an eagle has built its nest. LEWIS and CLARKE, ii. 347, 351.

streams, several thousand in number, form a vast chain of inland navigation, all connected together, and issuing into the sea by one channel, which, like the arteries and veins of the human body, is destined to maintain an immense interior circulation, and convey life and health to the furthest extremities of the million of square miles which constitute the magnificent garden of North America.

If the majestic portals by which the Missouri issues from its icy cradle in the Rocky Mountains are one of the sublimest, the alluvial swamps through which it finds its way to the ocean in the gulf of Mexico present one of the most interesting objects in nature. There, one of the great formations of the earth is actually going forward: we are carried back to what occurred in our own continent before the creation of man. Like all other great rivers, the Missouri, or the Mississippi as it is there called, does not empty itself into the sea in one continuous channel, but by a great variety of arms or mouths, which intersect in sluggish streams the vast alluvial delta, formed by the perpetual deposit from the immense volume of waters which it rolls into the ocean. Between these mouths of the river an immense surface, half land half water, from fifty to a hundred miles in width, and three hundred in length, fringes the whole coast: and there the enormous mass of vegetable matter constantly brought down by the Mississippi is periodically deposited. A few feet are sufficient to bring it above the level of the water except in great floods; and as soon as that is done vegetation springs up with the utmost rapidity in that prolific slime.¹

No spectacle can be conceived so dreary, and yet so interesting, as the prospect of these boundless alluvial swamps in the course of formation. As far as the eye can reach, over hundreds of square leagues, nothing is to be seen but marshes bristling with roots, trunks, and branches of trees. In winter and spring, when the floods come down, they bring with them an incalculable quantity

CHAP.
XC.

1-12.

16.
The Delta
of the Mis-
sissippi.

† Hall's
America,
iii. 336.
Malte
Brun, xi.
272, 274.

17.
Extraordi-
nary spec-
tacle which
it exhibits.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

of these broken fragments, technically called logs, which not only cover the whole of this immense semi-marine territory, but, floating over it, strew the sea for several miles off to such an extent, that ships have often no small difficulty in making their way through them. Thus the whole ground is formed of a vast net-work of masses of wood, closely packed and rammed together to the depth of several fathoms, which are gradually cemented by fresh deposits, till the whole acquires by degrees a firm consistency. Aquatic birds, innumerable cranes and storks, water-serpents and huge alligators, people this dreary solitude. In a short time a sort of rank cane or reed springs up, which, by retarding the flow of the river, collects the mud of the next season, and so lends its share in the formation of the delta. Fresh logs, fresh mud, and new crops of cane, go on for a series of years; in the course of which, the alligators in enormous multitudes fix in their new domain, and extensive animal remains come to mingle with the vegetable deposits. Even here, in the infancy as it were of a world, the efforts of nature to clothe the earth with a robe of beauty are conspicuous. Plants spring up among the debris; flowers and tendrils are seen amidst the desolation; and often beautiful creepers, floated with the stones to which they are attached down the Mississippi, take root and flourish in the watery waste. Gradually, as the soil accumulates and hardens, a dwarfish shrub begins to appear above the surface; larger and larger trees succeed with the decay of their more stunted predecessors; and at length, on the scene of former desolation, the magnificent riches of the Virginian forest are reared.¹

¹ Duvalon's
Colonie de
Mississippi,
13. Captain
Hall's Ame-
rica, iii.
336, 341.
Malte Brun,
xi. 196, 272,
274. Cha-
teaubriand,
Atala, 3, 4.

18.
Primitive
forest of the
southern
provinces.

Would we behold what this barren marsh, at first the abode only of serpents and alligators, is destined one day to become under the prolific hand of nature? Enter that perfumed and verdant forest, where, on the shores of the rivers of Florida and Virginia, the marvellous riches of nature are poured forth with a prodigality, of which,

in more northern climates, scarcely a conception can be formed. So rapidly does vegetation there grow out of the water, that in navigating the rivers, thickets and woods seem to be floating on its surface. The magnificent scarlet blossoms of the *Lobelia Cardinalis*, and the gigantic perfumed white petals of the *Panacratina* of Carolina, attract the eye, even in the midst of the endless luxuriance of marsh vegetation. High overhead the white cedar towers, and furnishes in its dense foliage a secure asylum for the water-eagle and the stork; while wild vines cluster up every stem, and hang in festoons from tree to tree. Every branch in the lower part of the forest teems with luxuriant creepers, often bearing the most splendid flowers. In the natural labyrinths formed in these watery forests, spots of ravishing beauty are often to be found, which might tempt the pilgrim to fix his abode, did not the pestilential air of autumn forbid for a long period the residence of civilised man. But these dangers diminish as the soil becomes higher and more consistent; human perseverance embanks the rivers and excludes the flood: and in no part of the world, when this is done, does such exuberant fertility reward the labour of the husbandman.¹

CHAP.
XC.
1-12.

¹ Malte
Brun, xi.
200, 203.
Payne's
Geog. iv.
413, 424.
Drayton's
South Caro-
lina, 26, 28.
Baneroff, i.
233.

The immense regions of North America were not wholly uninhabited when Columbus first approached their shores. Sprung originally from the neighbouring tribes of Asiatics who dwelt in the most eastern portion of the Old World, and whom accident or adventure had wafted across Behring's Straits, its inhabitants have gradually spread over the whole extent of the American continent in both hemispheres, from Icy Cape to Cape Horn. Tradition, universal and unvarying, assigns the first origin of the American race to a migration of their fathers from beyond the western ocean: a connected chain of words, which float unchanged through the otherwise forgotten floods of time, may be traced from the Caucasian range to the Cordilleras of Mexico and Peru. But climate and cir-

19.
Character of
the American
Indians.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

cumstances, those great moulders of human character, have exercised their wonted influence upon the descendants of Shem, and presented in the North American savage a different specimen of the race of man from what the world has elsewhere exhibited. He is neither the child of Japhet, daring, industrious, indefatigable, exploring the world by his enterprise, and subduing it by his exertions; nor the offspring of Ishmael, sober, ardent, enduring, traversing the desert on his steed, and issuing forth at appointed intervals from his solitudes, to punish and regenerate mankind. He is the hunter of the forest; skilled to perfection in the craft necessary for that primitive occupation, but incapable of advancing beyond it. Civilisation in vain endeavours to throw its silken fetters over his limbs; he avoids the smiling plantation, and flees in horror before the advancing hatchet of the woodman. He does well to shun the approach of the European race; he can neither endure its fatigues, nor withstand its temptations; and, faster than before the sword and the bayonet, his race is melting away under the fire-water, the first gift and last curse of civilisation.

26.
Their striking peculiarities of disposition.

Like the Germans in the days of Tacitus, the life of the North American is divided between total inactivity and strenuous exertion. After sleeping away months in his wigwam, he will plunge into the forest, and walk from eighty to ninety miles a-day, on a stretch, for weeks. He will lie for days together in ambush waiting for an opportunity to spring upon his foe; and in following, sometimes for hundreds of miles, the trail of his enemies through the forest, he exhibits a degree of sagacity which appears almost miraculous. Enduring of privation, patient in suffering, heroic in death, he is wavering in temptation, and without honour in the field. His principle is ever to shun danger if possible, and never attack except at an advantage; and the man who can bear, without flinching, the most exquisite tortures, will often perish beside a barrel of spirits, which he wants the resolution to resist.

The language of these tribes is poetry; their ideas are elevated; the imagery of nature, amidst which they live, has imprinted a majestic character on their thoughts. But they cannot be converted to the habits of laborious life; they adopt of civilisation only its vices; their remains are fast disappearing under the combined influence of European encroachment and savage indulgence. Already they are as rarely to be seen in New York as in London; and before many ages have elapsed, their race, like that of the mammoth, will be extinct; and their memory, enshrined by the genius of Cooper, will live only in the enduring pages of American romance.¹

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

¹ Charlevoix and, Voyages en Amérique, ii. 221, 230.

Two hundred years have elapsed since the British exiles, flying from the persecutions of Charles I., first approached the American shores; and their increase since that time has been unparalleled, for so considerable a period, in any other age or part of the world. Carrying with them into the wilderness the powers of art and the industry of civilisation, with English perseverance in their character, English order in their habits, and English fearlessness in their hearts; with the axe in their hand, the Bible in their pocket, and the rifle by their side; they have multiplied during the long period in exactly the same ratio, and the different states of the Union now (1860) contain above twenty-five millions of souls, of whom twenty-one millions are of the Anglo-Saxon race.* The duplication of the inhabitants during this whole time has regularly occurred every twenty-three years and a half. It was the same under the British colonial as under the Republican independent government; evidently demonstrating that it has been owing to general and permanent causes altogether independent of the forms

21.
Extraordinary growth of the Anglo-Saxon race in America.

* The following is the increase of the American population since the first regular census was taken in 1790 :

1790	1800	1810	1820	1830	1840	1850
3,929,326	5,306,035	7,239,903	9,638,226	12,853,838	17,068,666	21,000,000

—MALTE BRUN, xi. 346; *American Atlas*, No. 6; *Census for 1840*; and *Stat. Abstract*, 265.

The increase in America in the last ten years has been 4,202,646 inhabitants—being a growth of 34½ per cent for the last ten years—less than the increase

CHAP. of constitution. The Negro inhabitants, in 1840, were
XC. 2,874,378, of whom 2,487,113 are in a state of slavery ;
1812. but though the black inhabitants increased from 1790 to
1830, faster than the white, yet the balance since that
1 Census of time has been rather turned the other way, and, except
1841 ; and
Tocq. ii. in the most southern states, the European race is now in-
329, 370. creasing faster than the African.^{1*}

22. If this rate of increase should continue for the next
Prospects of hundred, as it has done without the slightest variation for
the growth the last two hundred years, America will, by the year
of the Ame- 1940, contain two hundred and seventy millions of inha-
rican popu- bitants, or thirty more than all Europe west of the Ural
lation.

during the same period in some parts of Great Britain. In the following counties, from 1831 to 1841, the augmentation was—

Monmouth,	.	.	.	36.9	per cent.
Lanark,	.	.	.	34.8	...
Dumbarton,	.	.	.	33.3	...
Durham,	.	.	.	27.7	...
Stafford,	.	.	.	24.2	...
Lancashire,	.	.	.	24.7	...
Forfar,	.	.	.	22.0	...
Surrey,	.	.	.	19.0	...
York (West Riding),	.	.	.	18.2	...
Chester,	.	.	.	18.5	...

Population Returns, 1841. Great Britain, p. 2, 3.

But the increase over the whole empire, during this period, has been only 14 per cent, not half of what has occurred in America during the same time. Yet when it is recollected that at least from 50,000 to 60,000 persons annually, on an average, during the same time have emigrated from the British islands and settled in the United States, it is probable that the increase in *births* in the two countries was not materially different ; an extraordinary and portentous circumstance, when it is recollected that in the British islands population is about three hundred to the square mile, whereas in America it is only eleven : the area of the States being about 1,500,000 square miles.

* The following is the relative growth of population, in the Blacks and Whites, from 1780 to 1840, in the Slave States :—

From 1790 to 1830, the Whites increased 80 per cent.
— — — Blacks — 112 —

But since 1830 the proportion stands thus :—

From 1830 to 1840, the Whites increased 30 per cent.
— — — Blacks — 25 —

What is very remarkable, it appears from all the returns that the White race is now gaining rapidly on the Black in all the Northern states, where slavery is abolished, and the Black race is increasing most rapidly in the Southern states ; a state of things which leads to the hope that, in process of time, the Black slave population will be entirely confined to the States bordering on the Gulf of Mexico. See CAREY'S *Lectures on Colonisation*, 1833 ; TOCQUEVILLE, *l.* 239 ; and *Population Returns*, 1849.

mountains at this time, which is now peopled by two hundred and forty millions. Prodigious as this increase of human beings is, it is by no means beyond the bounds of probability that it will be realised; for if the usual causes which retard the advance of mankind, shall, long ere that time arrives, have come into powerful operation over a great part of the Union, as they already have done in the states on the sea-coast which were first colonised, yet the immense tracts of unappropriated rich land in the basin of the Mississippi will still communicate an unwonted impulse to the principle of population, and perpetuate, on the frontier of the desert, the prolific augmentation of the human race. Gradually, however, as the sea-coast becomes an old-established and densely peopled country, the temptation to European emigration will diminish, while its difficulties must increase: the expense of transporting a family from the shores of the ocean to the Far West, will exceed that of conveying it across the Atlantic; the stream of European settlement will take some other direction, and the two hundred thousand emigrants who now (1860) annually land on the American shores, from the states of the Old World, will disappear. But whatever may be the rapidity of their increase, nothing is more certain than that the prolific powers of nature will keep far ahead of them; and that, great as is the surplus produce of the American agriculturist at this time, it will, if their society is undecayed, be far greater in proportion to their population a thousand years hence.¹

CHAP.
XV.
1812.

¹ Alison's
Population,
i. 60, 62.

Prodigious as has been this increase of population during so long a period, in the whole American states, it is incomparably less than the growth of mankind in particular parts of this favoured quarter of the globe. In the basin of the Mississippi—by far the richest part, as already mentioned, of the states of the Union—the population has multiplied in the last fifty years no less than fifty-fold, having increased in that time from one hundred

23.
Prodigious
increase in
the valley of
the Missis-
sippi.

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

and twelve thousand to five million three hundred and eighty-five thousand, the numbers ascertained by the last census. It has now reached the enormous amount of *eight millions!* This is probably the most extraordinary instance of well-authenticated human increase on record in the world. It is far beyond the powers of multiplication which mankind possess from their own unaided resources; and is mainly to be ascribed to the vast influx of emigrants into those fertile regions, both from the states of the Union on the shores of the Atlantic, and the more distant British islands.* The number of persons who annually settle in the United States of America from Great Britain and Ireland, has been, on an average of the last twenty years, above an hundred thousand.† During the disastrous years, from 1846 to

* The following table exhibits the growth of population in the provinces in the basin of the Mississippi since 1790. It almost exceeds belief:

	1790,	1800,	1810,	1820,	1830,	1840
Ohio,	3,000	45,365	230,760	581,434	935,884	1,519,467
Kentucky,	73,677	220,959	406,511	561,317	687,917	779,898
Indiana,	—	4,875	24,520	147,178	343,031	685,866
Arkansas,	—	—	—	14,273	30,388	212,267
Illinois,	—	215	12,282	55,211	157,455	476,183
Tennessee,	35,691	105,602	261,727	422,813	684,904	829,210
Missouri,	—	—	20,845	66,586	140,455	383,702
Mississippi,	—	8,850	31,502	75,448	136,621	97,574
Louisiana,	—	—	76,556	153,407	215,529	352,411
Total,	112,368	385,866	1,064,703	2,080,667	3,372,184	5,335,578

MALTE BRUN, xi. 346; *American Atlas*, No. 6; and *Stat. Almanack*, 1841, 264.

† Table showing the number of emigrants who have landed in the United States, in the years under mentioned, from the United Kingdom.

1830,	.	.	21,867	1841,	.	.	45,917
1831,	.	.	23,489	1842,	.	.	63,852
1832,	.	.	32,872	1843,	.	.	28,335
1833,	.	.	29,109	1844,	.	.	43,660
1834,	.	.	33,074	1845,	.	.	58,538
1835,	.	.	26,720	1846,	.	.	82,239
1836,	.	.	37,774	1847,	.	.	142,154
1837,	.	.	36,770	1848,	.	.	188,233
1838,	.	.	14,332	1849,	.	.	208,067
1839,	.	.	33,536	1851,	.	.	289,611
1840,	.	.	40,642	1852,	.	.	280,008

- PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, xii. 253; and MARTIN'S *British Colonies*, i. 108.

1849, it exceeded on an average one hundred and fifty thousand a-year. At New York, it is no unusual thing to see five thousand immigrants landed in a single week ; and great numbers of those who proceed first to Quebec or Montreal, attracted by the fertility of the backwoods of America, make their way across the border.¹

Almost the whole of this vast multitude no sooner arrive on the shores of America, than they crowd away to the back settlements, and seek the prodigious flood of civilisation which is overspreading the banks of the Ohio. To these are to be added a still greater stream of immigration from America itself ; for, clearly marked as is the tendency of emigration from Europe, and especially from the British islands, to the American shores, it operates not less forcibly in directing mankind from the margin of the Atlantic, across the Alleghany mountains, into the vast and untrodden solitudes of the West. Such has been the growth of the human species in that fertile territory, that the states in its great alluvial surface, though they only began to be seriously cultivated in 1790, contain now (1850) above eight millions of inhabitants ; and, from the vast rapidity of their increase, compared with that of the other states in the Union, it is no longer a matter of doubt that in less than twenty years their representatives will have a preponderating voice in the national legislature.²

There is something solemn and almost awful in the incessant advance of the great stream of civilisation, which in America is continually rolling down from the summits of the Alleghany mountains, and overspreading the boundless forests of the Far West. Vast as were the savage multitudes whom ambition or the lust of plunder attracted to the standards of Timour or Genghis Khan, to oppress and overwhelm the opulent regions of the earth ; immense as were the swarms which, for centuries, issued from the cheerless plains of Scythia to insult or devastate the decaying provinces of the Roman empire ; they were

CHAP.
XC.
1842.

¹ Census of
America,
1840.

² 24.
We are
mainly owing
to immi-
gration from
Europe and
the A. S. C.
1840.

² Tocq. ii.
376, 377.
Census of
America,
1840.

25.
Immense
stream of
immigra-
tion across
the Alle-
ghany
Mountains.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

as nothing compared to the ceaseless flood of human beings which is now in its turn setting forth from the abodes of civilised man, into the desert parts of the world. Nearly two hundred thousand persons, almost all in the prime of life, now yearly cross the Alleghany mountains, and settle on the banks of the Ohio or the Arkansas and their tributary streams. They do not pass through, as the Tartar hordes, like a desolating fire or a raging torrent ; they settle where they take up their abode, never to return. Their war is with the forest and the marsh, not with the corrupted cities of long-established civilisation. Spreading themselves over an extent of nearly twelve hundred miles in length, these advanced posts of civilisation commence the incessant war with the hatchet and the plough : and at the sound of their strokes, resounding through the solitude of the forest, the wild animals and the Indians retire to more undisturbed retreats. Along a frontier tract, above twelve hundred miles in length, the average advance of cultivation is about seventeen miles a-year. The ground is imperfectly cleared, indeed, by these pioneers of humanity ; but still the forest has disappeared under their strokes : the green field, the wooden cottage, the signs of infant improvement, have arisen : and behind them, another wave of more wealthy and skilled settlers succeeds, who complete the work of agricultural improvement. The wild animals of the forest retire before this incessant advance of civilisation ; by a mysterious instinct, or the information of other creatures of their race, they become aware of the approach of the great enemy of their tribe : and so far does the alarm penetrate before the approach of real danger, that they are frequently found to commence their retreat two hundred miles in advance of the actual sound of the European hatchet.¹

¹ Tocq. ii.
274, Report
of Cass and
Clarke to
Congress,
Feb. 4,
1829.

The first settlers, or squatters, who precede the arrival of regular colonists, constitute a most important class, peculiar to America, of whom no type had previously

existed in the world. Consumed by an incessant desire to explore new territories, and skim the surface of the as yet virgin soil, they penetrate with dauntless courage into the wilderness ; and, often several hundred miles in advance of the regular clearers of the forest, first make the woods resound with the crack of the rifle and the strokes of the hatchet. The profound solitude with which they are surrounded, the dangers from wild beasts and savage tribes to which they are exposed, the independent roaming life which they lead, possess charms which more than compensate to them for the loss of all the comforts and intercourse of civilised society. The desert attracts them as powerfully as it does the Red man or the elk. Under pretence of choosing a more healthy abode, richer soil, or more abundant game, they push incessantly forward ; and, advancing into the very depths of the forest or the prairie, gradually drive the native inhabitants of the wilderness before them. Adventurers of this description have often been known to penetrate a thousand miles alone into the woods ; in a small canoe, capable of being borne on the shoulders, they descend immense rivers, with no other equipments but a rifle, a bag of powder and shot, a tomahawk, a couple of beaver-traps, and a large knife. If the first stragglers of the crowd approach in their rear, they move steadily on, ever far in advance of civilised life ; and leave to succeeding and more permanent settlers the labour of felling the trees, of erecting the log-houses, of sowing the maize, and reaping the first-fruits of the virgin riches of nature.¹

CHAP.
AC.

1812.

27.

First settlers, or squatters. Their habits and mode of life.

¹ Michaux, Voyage à l'Ouest des Monts Alleghany, 149. 91. Malte Bran, xi. 253, 254.

Few objects are more striking than the first appearances of regular cultivation in the midst of the aged magnificence of nature. They have been thus described by the master-hand of an eye-witness. "Beside an ancient cypress tree of the desert," says Chateaubriand, "is to be seen the spring of infant cultivation ; the golden ears of the wheat wave over the fallen trunk of an oak,

^{27.} Striking appearances of the progress of cultivation in the forests.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

and the harvest of a season replaces the growth of ten centuries. Everywhere are to be beheld forests delivered over to the flames, sending forth clouds of smoke into the air, and the plough slowly making its way through their roots; land-surveyors with their long chains are measuring the desert, and marking out the first divisions of property on its surface; arbiters settle the disputed limits; the bird abandons its nest; the resting-place of the wild beast is converted into a log-house; and the strokes of the hatchet are the last sounds which are repeated by the echoes, that are themselves perishing with the forests which produced them." Gradually the powers of man assert their destined superiority over those of nature. "He not only replenishes the earth, but subdues it." In a few years the patriarchs of the forest disappear; a few indurated stems, which have withstood alike the fire and the axe of the woodman, alone rise up above the level expanse of cultivation. The city is ere long seen in the wilderness, and the wilderness is often seen near the city, which has sent forth its swarms to more distant scenes of industry. The capital itself, after thirty years of fostering care on the part of government, presents its disjointed and sickly villages in the centre of the deserted old fields of Maryland; while numberless youthful rivals are flourishing on the rivers of the west, in spots where the bear has ranged and the wolf howled, long since the former had been termed a city. The smooth and gravelled road sometimes ends in an impassable swamp; the spires of the town are often hid by the branches of the forest, and the canal leads to a seemingly barren and unprofitable mountain. In the midst of this marvellous progress, the cultivation of the earth goes on with ceaseless activity. The astonishing riches of a virgin soil, impregnated with the ashes of the forest which overshadowed it, reward fifty-fold even the rudest labours of cultivation.¹ The smiling village, the church spire, the infant school, succeed; but with them

¹ Chateaubriand, *Voyages en Amérique*, i. 312. M. Brun, xi. 263. Hall's *America*, i. 281, 283. Cooper, in *Borderers*, chap. 7.

are mingled the spirit-shop, the hotel, the attorney's office; and civilisation spreads its roots, with its blessings, its passions, and its vices.

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

The violence of the mysterious impulse which thus urges the European race into the western solitudes, appears in the strongest manner in all the public means of carriage which transport passengers to these distant regions. Thousands and tens of thousands every week in summer descend from the heights of the Alleghany to the margin of the streams, which promise them the means of passing to the distant regions of the west, all eager for an immediate conveyance to the land of promise. Difficulties cannot retard, dangers cannot deter them. With ceaseless activity and persevering courage, they make their way to the first steam-boats, which carry them down the tributaries of the Ohio to that mighty river; and, without regarding the perils of the passage, or the numerous dangers of steam navigation, demand only to be instantly conveyed to the land of their hopes. Such are the multitudes that flock to these means of transport, and the universal anxiety to get forward, that even the sight of a high-pressure steam-boiler blown up before their eyes, and scattering wounds and death around, has no effect in deterring others from instantly embarking in the perilous navigation. They ask only a cheap passage and quick voyage. For weeks and months together in summer, they stream down every road which descends from the Alleghanies, and crowd to the quays where the steam-boats take their passengers, almost rolling over each other in their anxiety to get forward. No sooner does a boat touch the quay, than it is instantly filled with passengers; and with scarcely any money in their pockets, and but little provender in their srips, the hardy adventurers rush forward into the wilderness before them, and gain from the chase a precarious subsistence, till the first returns of cultivation afford them the means of support.¹

28.
Extraordi-
nary pro-
gress of the
steam na-
vigation.

¹ Temp. iv.
274. Cleve-
land, n. 23.
24. Alison
on Popula-
tion, i. 547.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

29.

Effects of
steam navi-
gation and
paper credit
on the
United
States.

Steam navigation is the vital means of communication by which this extraordinary activity is conveyed into distant regions. The Ohio, the Mississippi, the Arkansas, and all their numerous tributary streams, are constantly navigated by steam-boats. Nearly three hundred ply on the Mississippi alone : upwards of five hundred are employed on the different rivers which convey this prodigious flood of immigration to the western provinces of the Union. Without the assistance of this mighty agent, which alike aids the descending, and conquers the adverse stream, the progress of cultivation, and clearing of the forest, must have been comparatively slow. Propelled by its marvellous powers, the human race has advanced with the steps of a giant through the vast wilderness prepared for their reception. Steam navigation is to the continent of America, what the circulation is to the human frame ; and the commercial wealth and paper currency of the great commercial cities on the shores of the Atlantic, are the moving power in the heart which sets the whole circulation in motion.¹

¹ Chevalier,
ii. 24, 25.

30.

Vast paper
circulation
of the
United
States.

Immense has been the extent to which this powerful, but perilous, engine of advancement—paper currency—has been employed in the American continent. From an inquiry set on foot in 1834, it appears that there were in the United States at that period five hundred and six banking establishments, independent of the National Bank of the United States at Philadelphia, which last issued notes to the amount of £3,300,000. The private banks issued notes to the amount of £16,200,000 more—making in all a paper circulation of £19,500,000 ; besides £10,000,000 in specie. This makes the total circulation at that period nearly £30,000,000, or nearly £2 a-head to the whole free population ; a proportion considerably greater than obtains in the British Islands,* if

* The total paper circulation of the United Kingdom was, prior to the law of 1814, which materially contracted it, £42,000,000, and that in gold and silver £2,750,000 ; in all, about £45,000,000. At present (1839) the paper circula-

the vast extent of the commercial dealings of this empire are taken into consideration. This immense circulation is pushed into the farthest extremities of the states of the Union by means of the branch banks, which, like so many forcing-pumps, disseminate the bank-notes through every village and hamlet it contains. Such is the competition of these branch banks for employment, that they are everywhere established on the frontiers of civilisation, almost before the surrounding trees are felled. The discounting of bills is carried to an unprecedented extent. The law indeed has, in all the states, fixed eight per cent as the maximum rate of interest, and in most cases it is only six; but the cupidity of lenders, combining with the necessities or speculative tendency of borrowers, very frequently breaks through these restraints, and fixes a higher rate, which is often excessive. One per cent a-month is a usual, three per cent a-month no uncommon occurrence; and these immense profits at once tempt bankers to advance money to needy adventurers, and indemnify them for the numerous losses to which such perilous issues are liable. So powerful an agent is this system of paper credit in forcing and maintaining the industry of the United States, that its influence may be seen in the farthest parts of their possessions; and it is to the greater advantages they enjoy in this respect, more than to any other cause, that the superior population, wealth,¹

CHAP.
AC.
1812.

¹ Chevalier,
i. 392, 394.

tion of Great Britain and Ireland is under £31,000,000. The gold and silver is said to be of equal or larger amount; but no reliance can be placed on that supply, as it is liable at any time to be contracted at least a half by the exportation of the precious metals, to meet the imports of grain, which now exceed 12,000,000 quarters a-year.—M'CLEOD'S *Commercial Dictionary*.

	Oct. 6, 1839.
Bank of England,	£17,814,691
Private banks,	3,462,296
Joint-stock banks,	2,577,234
<hr/>	
Total in England,	£23,854,141
Scotland,	3,139,414
Ireland,	4,133,928
<hr/>	
United Kingdom,	£31,127,483

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

and cultivation of the southern side of the St Lawrence and lakes, to that which appears on the British side of those noble estuaries is to be attributed.

31.
Dreadful
disasters
with which
it has been
attended.

He was a wise man who said that paper currency is too often strength in the outset, but weakness in the end; and unless it is wisely regulated, this is undoubtedly the case: the excess of paper, like that of food, may prove as fatal as its want. America has more than once bitterly felt the truth of this aphorism. The commercial and monetary crisis to which she has long been subject have been such that they would have crushed, perhaps for ever, the industry of any other nation. During the war with great Britain in 1814, the commercial distress was such, that the northern states, including New York, the commercial capital of America, were on the very point of breaking off from the Union; and it was computed that at least two-thirds of the whole traders in the states became insolvent. In the course of the great crisis of 1837, nearly all the cotton growers in the southern states became bankrupt together; in the still more disastrous convulsion of 1839, brought on by the sudden and ill-judged measures of government to return to a gold circulation, and discredit the paper one, the whole banks of Philadelphia and the southern states, including the National Bank of the United States, at once stopped payment; those of New York only avoided a similar catastrophe by a contraction of credit, not less disastrous; and such was the effect of these repeated shocks upon the national fortunes, that the exports of Great Britain to the United States, which in 1836 had reached £12,425,604, in 1837 were only £4,695,225, in 1838 £7,585,760, and in 1842 had sunk to £3,562,000.¹

¹ *Tory*, iv.
556, 557.
Chevalier, i.
117, 120.

32.
Means by
which this
ruin is re-
paired.

But these dreadful catastrophes, which would overwhelm any state in the Old World with a mass of pauperism from which it could scarcely recover, cast but a passing cloud over the fortunes of the New. The vast flood of British emigration; the constant increase of population,

and consequent rise in the value of every species of property, even without any exertion on the part of its owners; the continual forward expansion of cultivation, in a very short time obliterate the effects of all these disasters. So boundless are the resources of the country, that no human catastrophes seem capable of arresting them. In a few months, a new race of traders succeed those in New York or Philadelphia who have been swept away by the tempest: their bills, discounted often at 12 per cent, soon put them on the perilous road to affluence or ruin: their predecessors, who had sunk before the storm, are transported by the steam-boats to the back settlements, where they speedily enter, with exemplary vigour, upon the labours of cultivation. The ladies of New York and Pennsylvania, once delicate and languishing amidst the frivolities of affluence, are seen active and happy when engaged in the variety of rural or household employment. They exhibit under these stunning reverses of fortune a courage and energy, the sure parent of contentment and success, which is worthy of the very highest admiration. Aided by such helpmates, the labours of the men in the Far West are rapidly rewarded with plenty; and the deserts of the Ohio are vivified by a fresh stream of intelligent emigrants, from the effect of those very commercial catastrophes which, to distant spectators, appear to shake to its centre the whole fabric of industry in the New World.¹

The marvellous rapidity of increase in the population has hitherto not only been unattended with any addition to human suffering, but it has taken its rise rather from the prodigious extent to which, owing to the combined bounty of nature and efforts of man, general prosperity has been diffused through all classes of the community. Among the many marvels which strike a European traveller on his first approach to the United States, one of the most extraordinary is the general wellbeing which pervades all classes of the community. Pauperism, indeed, exists to a most

CHAP.
XC.
—
1812.

¹ *Touq.* iv.
81, 357.
Chevalier, i.
117, 124.

33.
General
wellbeing
of the peo-
ple.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

distressing extent in many of the first-peopled states along the sea-coast, and nearly all the great commercial towns of the Union: poor's rates are in consequence generally established, and benevolence is taxed nearly as severely as in the old monarchies and dense population of the European nations. But these are the exceptions, not the rule. They arise in a great degree from the immense multitudes of emigrants who, during the summer months, flood the sea-coast of America, and are destitute alike of the means of maintaining themselves, and of funds to convey them to the interior, where their labour is required. In the rural districts, and especially in the states which lie in the basin of the Mississippi, there is scarcely a working man who does not eat butcher-meat twice a-day. So great is the demand for all kinds of labour, that common workmen everywhere receive from sixteen to twenty shillings a-week: skilled labourers, such as masons and carpenters, from thirty to forty shillings for their ordinary wages. Such is the magnitude of these gains as compared with the cost of food, clothing, and other necessities, that a common workman, with ordinary prudence, is able in two years to lay by enough to purchase and stock a little freehold of twenty or thirty acres. At the end of two years more, the return of the few acres which he has cleared and sown is so considerable as to place him and his family, not only beyond the reach of want, but on the fair road to rustic opulence. The old observation of Adam Smith still holds good, that in America a widow with eight children is sought after and married, as an heiress; and, as in the days of the patriarchs, the greater the number of arrows in the quiver of the American cultivator, the greater is his strength in the gate.¹

¹ Hall's Mar-
tinian's,
Bucking-
ham's, Ame-
rican, &c.
Chesler's,
i. 15.

It is the universal diffusion and extraordinary facility of acquiring property over all the states of the Union, which is the great cause of the coincidence of this astonishing increase, with the continued wellbeing of all the

individuals, at least in the rural districts, of whom the population consists. Over the whole of America there is not to be found a single *farmer*, in the European sense of the word—that is, a cultivator who pays rent to a landlord for the ground which he occupies.¹ Every man is the proprietor of the land which he cultivates. Eight-ninths of the population in the rural districts are engaged in the cultivation of the soil; and even taking into view the whole inhabitants of the Union, the cultivators are to all the other classes of society put together, in the proportion of nearly *four to one*.^{*} This fact is very remarkable, and affords the most decisive refutation of Mr Malthus's celebrated principle of the increasing pressure of population on subsistence in the later stages of society. For in Great Britain, which at that period was about self-supporting, by the late census, the proportion lies just the other way; *one-fourth* of the whole population engaged in agriculture, having been found to raise subsistence for the remaining three-fourths engaged in commerce and manufactures by the census of 1831, while by that of 1841 the supply was raised by *one-seventh* only.²⁺

Nay, in America itself, the same law of nature is dis-

The following is the proportion of the agricultural to the other classes of society in the United States in 1840:—

Agricultural,	3,717,776
Other classes, viz. Mining,	15,203
Commerce,	117,575
Manufactures,	791,554
Sailors,	56,025
On Lakes,	33,007
Learned Professions,	65,236
All other classes,	1,078,650

+ By the census of 1831, out of 3,414,175 families in Great Britain, 991,134, or nearly a fourth only (282 in 1000), are employed in the production of food. By the census of 1841, the agricultural population has in many places declined, and the manufacturing everywhere immensely increased, and hardly a seventh are employed in raising food for the remaining six-sevenths. The total persons employed in raising food in 1841, in Great Britain and Ireland, were 3,343,974, while the consumers were 23,482,115, or above seven times greater. See *Ann.* Chap. ix. § 21, *note*; *PORTER* i. 50; and *Census* 1841.

CHAP.
XV.

1842.

34

Proportion
of agricultural
to other classes
in Great
Britain, 1841.

¹ To be precise,
17.

² Census of
America, 1840.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

35.

Which demonstrates the increasing power of man over subsistence as society advances.

tinently demonstrated;* for while over the whole Union the cultivators are to the other classes as four to one, in the agricultural states beyond the Alleghany they are as *eight* to one. And yet, in Great Britain, anterior to the five extraordinarily bad seasons, which lasted without intermission from 1838 to 1842, subsistence, derived almost entirely from domestic cultivation, was not only abundant, but overflowing; and wheat, for the first time for a hundred years, was, in 1835, under thirty-six shillings a quarter; while the average amount of foreign grain imported had been steadily diminishing ever since the commencement of the present century, until at length it had come to be, on an average of five years, under 400,000 quarters annually.† Thus, while on the virgin

* The following table shows the proportion of the agriculturists to the other classes in the states beyond the Alleghany Mountains:—

States and Territories,	Agriculture.	Mining.	Commerce.	Manufactures and Trades.	Sailors on the Rivers.	Sailors on the Lakes.	Learned Professors.	Total not Agricultural.
N. Carolina.	217,695	589	1734	14,322	327	379	1086	
S. Carolina,	198,363	51	1958	10,325	331	348	1481	
Georgia,	209,383	574	2428	7,984	262	352	1250	
Alabama,	177,439	96	2212	7,195	256	758	1514	
Mississippi,	139,724	14	1303	4,151	33	160	1506	
Louisiana,	79,289	...	8549	7,565	1322	662	1618	
Tennessee,	227,739	103	2217	17,815	55	302	2042	
Kentucky,	197,738	331	3418	23,217	44	968	2487	
Ohio,	272,579	704	9201	66,265	212	3323	5663	
Indiana,	148,806	233	3076	20,590	89	627	2257	
Illinois,	105,337	782	2506	13,185	63	310	2021	
Missouri,	92,408	742	2522	11,100	39	1885	1469	
Arkansas,	26,355	41	215	1,173	3	39	301	
	2,092,255	4260	41,369	204,887	3086	10,053	24,095	287,751

—*American Census*, 1841.

† Average of corn imported into Great Britain

	Quarters.
From 1800 to 1810 . . .	600,468
1810 to 1820 . . .	458,578
1820 to 1830 . . .	534,992
1830 to 1835 . . .	398,509
1835 to 1840 † . . .	1,992,548

—*Porter's Progress of Nation*, ii. 145; and *Parl. Tables*, ix. 164.

; Five bad seasons in succession.

soil, and amidst the boundless profusion of America, four cultivators only maintain one person engaged in pursuits unconnected with agriculture ; amidst the dense and long-established population of Great Britain, one cultivator maintains *seven* manufacturers and artisans : a fact which demonstrates, that so far from population, in the later stages of society, pressing on subsistence, the powers of agriculture daily, in such circumstances, acquire a more decisive superiority over those of population.¹

CHAP.
XC.
1-12.

¹ Allson on Population, chap. iii. vol. i. 40, 52.

“ Accuse not nature ; she hath done her part,
Do thou but thine ; and be not diffident
Of wisdom : she deserts thee not, if thou
Dismiss not her.” *

But in America there is one circumstance connected with the race of cultivators which is very remarkable, and altogether unparalleled in any other age or country of the world. In every nation that has hitherto appeared, the enjoyment of property, and engrossing of mankind in the cares of agriculture, have been found to be attended with the strongest possible attachment by the owners of the soil to the little freeholds which they cultivate ; and nothing short of the greatest disasters in life has been able to tear them away from the seats of their childhood, and the spots on which their own industry and that of their fathers has been exerted. Mungo Park has told us how strong this feeling is in the heart of Africa among the poor Negroes : “ To him no water is sweet but that which is drawn from his own well, and no shade refreshing but the tabba-tree of his native dwelling. When carried into captivity by a neighbouring tribe, he never ceases to languish during his exile, seizes the first moment to escape, rebuilds with haste his fallen walls, and exults to see the smoke ascend from his native village.”² In Ceylon, Bishop Heber informs us, the attachment of the cultivators to their little properties is such, that it is not unusual to see a man the proprietor of the hundred and

26.
General attachment of men to their landed possessions.

² Park's Travels, i. 247.

* *Paradise Lost*, viii. 560.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

¹ Heber's
Travels, ii.
247.² Young's
Travels in
France, i.
496. Tocq.
ii. 204.

fiftieth part of a single tree.¹ In France, the same principle has always been strongly felt; and Arthur Young long ago remarked, that it continues with undiminished strength, though the freehold is reduced to the fraction of a tree. In Canada, local attachment operates among the *habitans* of French descent with such force, that in place of extending into the surrounding wilds, the cultivators divide and subdivide among their children the freeholds they have already acquired; population multiplies *inwards* not *outwards*; and instead of spreading over and fertilising the desert, it leads, as in old France, to an infinite subdivision among the inhabitants of the land already cultivated.²

37.
Universal
migratory
turn of the
Americans.

In America, on the other hand, for the first time in the history of mankind, this strong and general feeling seems to be entirely obliterated. Though the labourers of that country have probably derived greater advantages from the cultivation of the soil than any other people that ever existed, yet they have no sort of attachment either to the land which they have acquired, or to that which they have inherited from their fathers. Not only is real property almost always sold and divided at the death of the head of a family, but, even during his lifetime, emigration from one spot to another is so frequent that it may be considered as the grand social characteristic of the American people. However long and happily a proprietor may have lived upon his little domain; though it may have been the sepulchre of his fathers, the playground of his infancy, the harbour of his wedded love, the nursery of his children; though it may be endeared to him by all the ties which can bind man to material nature, and the severance of which, in other countries, constitutes the last drop in the cup of the vanquished—an American is always ready to sell it, if he can do so for a profit; and putting himself and his family, with all his effects, on board the first steam-boat, make his way to a distant part of the country, and

commence again, perhaps at a distance of some hundred miles, the great and engrossing work of accumulating wealth. To turn money into land, and take root in the soil, and leave his descendants there, is the great object of ambition in the Old World. To turn land into money, and leave his children afloat, but affluent in society, is the universal desire in the New. This peculiarity is so remarkable, and so totally at variance with what had previously been ever observed in nations engaged in the cultivation of the soil, that it may be considered in a social point of view as the grand characteristic of society in the United States of America; and its present condition, at least beyond the Alleghany Mountains, cannot be so well characterised, in comparison with that of other countries, as by styling it the **NOMAD AGRICULTURAL STATE**.¹

This extraordinary peculiarity appears to be mainly owing to three causes:—1. The universal passion for democratic equality has led in practice to a general division of landed estates among all the children equally, or with sometimes merely a double portion to the eldest. The law allows a certain portion of the land to be otherwise disposed of by will; but primogeniture is so repugnant to general opinion, that this power is hardly ever acted upon, and equal division is all but universal. Hence a landed property is never looked to as a permanent family resting-place. It is merely a temporary lodging, to be used till the owner's death breaks it up into lots, or till he can get an opportunity of disposing of it to advantage. Hereditary feeling is unknown in America; even family portraits, pictures of beloved parents, are often not framed, as it is well understood that, at the death of the head of the family, they will all be sold and turned into dollars, to be divided among the children.²

2. Agriculture being the general, and in many places almost the only profession, it is regarded as a *culjar*

CHAP.
XC.

1-12.

¹ Torr. ii.
121, 122.
² Torr. ii.
121, 122.18.
Causes of
this pecu-
liarity.
The general
custom of
dividing
land among
children.² Ch. ii.
Merr. ii.
331.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

39.

The regard-
ing of agri-
culture as a
vulgar pro-
fession.

occupation. The aristocracy—except in Virginia and the Carolinas, where primogeniture has more strongly taken root—is never to be found among the landowners any more than among the merchants. The little freeholders on the Ohio and the Mississippi are the grand support of the extreme democratic party : and the conservative cause is upheld only by the merchants of New York, Philadelphia, and the other commercial towns on the coast. The democratic cry there is not “Down with the landed,” but “Down with the *paper* aristocracy.” The whole clamour against paper currency, which has recently convulsed the Union, and in its effects brought insolvency upon nine-tenths of the whole trading classes throughout the country, was in reality a political movement. They wanted to destroy paper credit, and stop bank issues, because they knew perfectly that was the last citadel in which the influence of property was entrenched, and that when it was ruined the whole power of the state would be centred in numbers. The same instinct which roused such a fever in France against the noblesse, made the American democrats run at the banks.¹ *

¹ Chey. i.
109, 201.

40.

Effect of
the contin-
ual rise in
the value of
land in
the newly
cleared
parts of
America.

3. The prodigious rise in the value of property on the frontiers of civilisation, in consequence of the felling of forests and spread of cultivation around it, offers a prospect of accumulating fortunes and amassing wealth, far beyond what can be obtained from the slow and regular returns of long-established agricultural industry. In the states of the basin of the Mississippi, if a man can only muster up a hundred dollars, and buy as many acres of land, he is certain that in ten years, by the mere lapse of time, and accumulation of population around him, it will be worth, with very little exertion on his part, five

¹ We have felt the same in Great Britain. “To stop the Duke, go for gold.” Mankind are the same at bottom in all countries ; the difference lies in the circumstances, or institution, which do or do not permit the rapacity of a single class to oppress or ruin the others.

hundred or a thousand. Hence the universal fever to get on to the frontier, and, by a cheap purchase of virgin land, at once reap the first fruits from the bounty of nature, and the first profits arising from the rapid multiplication of man. And truly, when we recollect that the population of the states to the westward of the Alleghany has augmented fifty-fold in the last half century, it may be conceived what prodigious profits must have been realised by all those who were fortunate enough first to get possession of the land ; and we shall cease to wonder at the general passion which, obliterating all recollections of home, infancy, and place of nativity, perpetually urges the American race towards the frontiers of civilisation, the real El Dorado of the New World.

Nothing is more remarkable in America than the universal activity and industry which prevail among all classes of society. That the Anglo-Saxon race in Europe is laborious, persevering, and energetic, need not be told to any one who witnesses the colossal fabric of British greatness, or the vast impression which England has made in every quarter of the globe. But, enterprising as it is in Great Britain, it is not influenced by such a restless spirit of activity, such a perpetual fervour of exertion, as appears among its descendants in the New World. The vast facilities for the acquisition of fortune, which the prodigious increase of population, great extent of bank issues, and boundless extent of fertile land afford ; the entire absence of all hereditary rank or property, which opens the career of elevation and distinction alike to every citizen ; the engrossing thirst for gold, which springs from its being the only source of influence, and the only durable basis of power, have combined, with the active and persevering habits which they have inherited from their Anglo-Saxon ancestors, to produce in the Americans a universal spirit of industry and enterprise, to which nothing comparable has ever been witnessed among mankind. It is the fervour of Roman conquest,

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

41.
Extraordi-
nary ac-
tivity of
the Ameri-
cans.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

turned only to war with the desert; the fever of French democracy, yet "guiltless of its country's blood." In the British Islands, if energy and perseverance distinguish the middle classes, labour and industry the lower, the higher ranks are often indolent or luxurious: and, with the graces of patrician manners, they have sometimes imbibed the selfishness and indolence of patrician wealth. But, in America, all are in a state of activity. Every human being, except the pauper and the lunatic, is engaged in some profession. If their efforts are checked in one direction, they are immediately renewed in another. Activity is universal and incessant.¹

¹ Chev. ii.
118, 123;
124. Toeq.
i. 84; iii.
271.

42.

Ardent and
impetuous
character of
the people.

The enterprise of the Americans, however, differs from that which, at least in former times, laid the deep and solid foundation of British greatness. It is far more vehement, ardent, and speculative. If it is true, as the Scripture says, that "he who hasteneth to be rich shall not be innocent," there are few blameless characters in the United States. The few idlers from Europe find themselves so useless and contemptible amidst the general din of activity with which they are surrounded, that they are driven to exertion in their own defence. Wealth being universally felt to be the only passport either to influence, enjoyment, or consideration, it is everywhere sought after with an avidity unknown even in the most commercial states of the Old World. Speculations the most rash, enterprises the most dangerous, undertakings often the most absurd, are gone into with avidity, prosecuted with energy, and never given up in mere fickleness. If it turns out, as is not unfrequently the case, that the affair is of such a kind that it can by no possible effort be brought to a successful issue, it is abandoned in a state of bankruptcy: the speculators get on board steam-boats, hurry away to the frontier, and commence anew with undiminished energy the great and all-important business of amassing wealth. Everything

goes on at the gallop. Neither society nor the individuals who compose it ever pause for an instant: fresh undertakings are incessantly commencing; new paths of life continually attempted by the unfortunate; successful industry ardently prosecuted by the prosperous. Projects of philanthropy, of commerce, of canals, of railways, of banking, of religious and social amelioration, succeed one another with breathless rapidity, and are gone into with ardent zeal by the different classes of society, according to their inclinations and habits. A European, bred up amidst the stillness of social life on the Continent, is almost stunned, when he lands at New York, by the din with which he is surrounded; and even an Englishman, accustomed to the corresponding turmoil in which the commercial cities of his own country are involved, sees enough to convince him that an additional impulse has been communicated to his already active race, by the democratic institutions and vast capabilities of the New World.¹

CHAP.
XC.
1842.

¹ Chev. ii.
122, 124.
T. p. 11.
128, 139.
Mottocut,
Society in
America,
iii. 1, 11.

At first sight it would be supposed that a country such as this, possessing unbounded natural advantages, with unlimited power of elevation and means of advancement open to all, even the humblest of the community, and with no hereditary rank or arbitrary privileges to keep back or prefer any in the common race, must be not only one of the most rising, but one of the happiest in the world. Nevertheless, it is just the reverse; and this is the people of all others where at once general progress is the greatest, and private discontent the most universal. All classes and ranks are dissatisfied with their condition, and plod on in sullen carefulness, which is so strong as to be apparent in their habits, their manners, even the expression of their countenances. The desire to rise and better their condition in the world is so universal, that, as the excessive competition renders it difficult to do so in any great degree, most are disappointed. The scholars are dissatisfied; they complain of the superficial

43.
Universal
discontent
in America.

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

character of literature, and lament that its tone, instead of rising, is progressively sinking, with the extension of the power of reading to the middle and working orders of society, and the growing demand for works adapted to their tastes and suited to their capacity. The professional men are dissatisfied: they allege that their rank is lower than in Europe; that they are overshadowed by commercial wealth, and find no compensation in the esteem or respect in which their avocations are held, or the society, often imperfectly educated and ill-mannered, of which it is composed. The merchants are dissatisfied: they declare that they are worn to death by excessive toil; and are surrounded by such a multitude of competitors and slippery undertakings, that it is seldom they can preserve their fortunes during their lives, and still more rarely that they can bequeath them in safety to their children. Even the mechanics and cultivators are discontented. Outwardly blessed beyond any other class that society has ever contained, they are consumed by the incessant thirst for riches and advancement—a thirst which not even the boundless capabilities of the basin of the Mississippi has been able to slake. They can enjoy nothing, because they desire everything.

“They never are, but always to be blessed.”

It is to this cause that we are to ascribe the melancholy and weariness of life which is so common in America, under circumstances in which a very great degree of comfort appears to have been attained.* They are per-

* Judge Pierpont, a very eminent man, said at a public meeting in New York, on 13th Dec. 1859:—“Twenty-five years ago De Tocqueville passed through this country, and he wrote a book upon democracy. He passed from one end of this land to the other, and he records that he found nowhere, however many faults he saw in this government—he found nobody to complain of them—that no man wished them changed—that all were satisfied with their government, even with its faults. I ask you, Mr Chairman, if he or any other philosopher shall come through this land to day, and pass from Maine to Georgia, will he leave that record? I ask you if you do not find in this

petually straining after a shadow, which as constantly eludes their grasp. In all this there is nothing surprising. Individual dissatisfaction, and the desire to remove it by rising in the world, is at once the mainspring of the general progress, and the certain cause of private discontent, in free communities. In despotic states all are contented, because none can get on; in democratic states none are contented, because all can get on. And thus it is that Nature, in mercy to her offspring, equalises in all respects, save from inequality in virtue, the sum of human happiness.¹

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

¹ Martineau, iii.
40, 49;
Clay, ii.
374. Torq.
ix, 163; iii.
277.

“Our present civilisation,” says Channing, “is characterised and tainted by a devouring greediness for wealth: the passion for gain is everywhere sapping pure and generous feeling, and raising up bitter foes against any reform which may threaten to turn aside the stream of wealth. I sometimes feel as if a great reform were necessary to break up our present mercenary civilisation, in order that Christianity, now repelled by the universal worldliness, may come into near contact with the soul, and reconstruct society after its own pure and disinterested principles.”² This is strictly true, and it is the necessary effect of those democratic institutions, which, by removing all other distinctions, concentrate the whole aspirations of the human mind upon this one object of

14.
General
thirst for
wealth.

² Channing's Letter to Birney, 1837.

land this day the rich dissatisfied that they are governed by the ignorant and poor!—the poor dissatisfied that they are not rich!—those who are labourers dissatisfied that they are not in office, and working and seeking for it!—those who are in office dissatisfied that they cannot plunder more than they do? (Laughter.) I ask if you do not find the North dissatisfied with their federal relations to the South—the South dissatisfied with all her relations to the North?—if you do not find in this land universal general discontent and rising passions, and moving even some States to arms?—that free citizens cannot pass without being arrested, their business inquired into, and their progress stayed? Do you, Mr Chairman, say that this means nothing? I ask those of you whom we have elevated on the plane of intellect and above the common mind, and who are gifted with a keen vision which can look into the future, if in the distant horizon in this land you see dawning a clear day, or do you see it filled with portents of thick clouds and dangers which are to come!

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

ambition. But though beyond all precedent desirous of wealth, the American is far from being avaricious or tenacious in its disposal: like Catiline, he is "*alieni appetens, sui profusus*."* In no country is wealth bestowed with a more lavish hand on all undertakings, public or private, promising a return for money, or gifted in a more generous spirit to every institution of a religious or charitable description. All its great towns can boast of noble establishments for education, public worship, and the relief of suffering, almost entirely supported by private contributions, which can vie with any in the world, both in the magnificence of their undertakings, and the benevolent ardour with which they are superintended and supported. It would seem as if the extraordinary facilities which they enjoy of getting wealth, make them liberal and generous in its disposal. The most common cause of an avaricious disposition is the experience of difficulty in making money; generosity is in general the child of easy circumstances, and of the enjoyment of wealth with little or no exertion.¹

¹ Chey. ii.
159. Buck-
ingham's
America. ii.
237, 343,
and *passim*.

45.
Commer-
cial cities of
America.

Although the mission of America evidently is to the people what has been well termed "the Reserve of Nature;" and her democratic institutions and national character impel her people with such violence towards that noble destiny, yet she is great, also, in her seaport towns and commercial activity. The very transit of such a multitude of emigrants, on their way to the land of promise in the West—the wants of such a vast and rapidly increasing population—necessarily induce a very great foreign trade. New York, the commercial capital of America, already (1849) numbers above four hundred thousand inhabitants, and, at its present rate of increase, will in ten years have six hundred thousand; Philadelphia has two hundred and seventy thousand; Boston, Baltimore, New Orleans, are all rapidly increasing, and will soon rival the greatest commercial cities of the Old

* "Desirous of other's wealth, lavish of his own."

World.* The ardent spirit of enterprise, the insatiable passion for gambling adventures, by which the inhabitants of the United States are so peculiarly distinguished, occasion indeed periodical and rapidly returning crises of commercial or monetary distress, and overwhelm the land with a flood of embarrassment exceeding anything ever experienced from pacific causes in the Old World. But these dreadful catastrophes, though the cause of unbounded private suffering, produce apparently no lasting diminution in the general progress of their commercial activity. A new race of energetic adventurers, equally capable, equally daring, immediately succeeds that which has been swept away. The banks, whom no measure of government are able to restrain, furnish the means of fresh enterprise and adventure. The great work of private effort and public advancement continues with unabated vigour: the flame, apparently extinguished for ever, burns up again with fresh brilliancy; wave after wave is broken on the shore, but the great flood-tide still streams forward, and rises higher and higher upon the beach.

The American seaman possesses all the hardihood and daring which have given to those of Great Britain the empire of the ocean, and is stimulated in addition by a spirit of adventure, a thirst for gain, exceeding that of his hardy progenitors on the wave. The progress of Ameri-

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

43.
Progress of
American
commerce
and ship-
ping.

* The following table exhibits the past progress and present population of the principal cities in America (1840):—

	1790.	1800.	1810.	1820.	1830.	1840.
New York,	33,131	60,489	96,373	123,706	203,007	312,710
Philadelphia,	42,520	70,287	96,661	108,116	167,118	228,691
Baltimore,	13,503	26,614	46,555	62,738	80,625	102,313
New Orleans,	—	—	17,242	27,176	46,310	102,193
Boston,	18,038	24,927	32,250	43,298	61,392	93,383
Cincinnati,	—	750	2,540	9,644	24,831	46,338
Brooklyn,	—	3,293	4,402	7,175	12,042	36,233
Albany,	3,498	5,349	9,356	12,630	24,238	33,721
Charleston,	16,359	18,712	24,711	24,480	30,289	29,261
Washington,	—	3,210	8,203	13,247	18,827	23,364
Providence,	—	7,614	10,071	11,767	16,832	23,171

— *American Statistical Abstract for 1842*, p. 261.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

can foreign commerce has been more rapid, for the last half century, than that of England during the same or any former period. The same indomitable perseverance and inextinguishable passion for advancement, which drive their race with such violence towards the Rocky Mountains, have sent them forth with equal vigour in the opposite direction, and impelled their sails into every creek and bay of the navigable seas. Their pendants are to be seen alongside those of England in every harbour of the world: in London and Liverpool, Petersburg and Constantinople: in the waters of Canton and the Gulf of New Zealand: amidst the ices of the South Pole and on the frozen shores of Greenland. Individual adventure, private enterprise, have in so short a time achieved all these prodigies: the American commercial navy owes nothing to the encouragement or power of its government. The American shipmaster stretches across the Atlantic with a scanty crew and ill-equipped ship: indefatigable exertion, untiring watchfulness, supply the want of numbers; he takes in his cargo of tea at Canton, returns to New York, sells it at a halfpenny a pound cheaper than his British rival, and is content.* It is in this minute attention to details, and indefatigable vigour, that the secret of the rapid progress of the American commercial navy is to be found. Yet is its value so considerable as to have now (1840) reached, in exports, the vast amount of 131,500,000 dollars, or £27,089,000, of which 113,000,000 dollars, or £23,278,000, is for the value of domestic produce.¹ The imports for the same year were

¹ Woodbury's Report to Congress, Dec. 9, 1840.

* Table showing the progress of exports and imports of the United States:—

Years	Value of exports	Value of imports	Years	Value of exports	Value of imports
1821	£13,544,661	£13,638,592	1835	£25,352,822	£31,228,279
1825	20,736,539	20,070,849	1836	26,804,799	30,579,174
1830	15,385,314	14,766,025	1837	24,702,355	20,292,544
1831	16,929,703	21,498,140	1838	22,121,854	22,431,350
1832	18,161,862	21,047,764	1839	25,557,104	32,523,120
1833	18,779,255	22,524,648	1840	27,089,000	21,424,000
1834	21,736,868	26,358,610			

— PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 199; and *American Statistical Almanac for 1842*, p. 120.

104,000,000 dollars, or £21,424,000 sterling. Both exports and imports have more than doubled in the last twenty years; a progress somewhat greater than the British foreign commerce has made during the same period.

The American navy at this time (1841) consists of seven ships of the line, and four on the stocks, seventeen frigates, twenty-one sloops, and twelve schooners and brigs; no very formidable force for a power which boasts its ability to contend with Great Britain for the empire of the waves. The real strength of their marine is to be found in the vast and growing amount of their commercial vessels, and the vigour and courage which long training on the storms of the Atlantic has communicated to the already hardy and intrepid race of their seamen. The marine seamen of their whole states for the year 1840 numbered fifty-six thousand; a considerable commercial navy, from whence powerful supplies of sailors, already trained to the most material parts of their duty, may at all times be obtained. The pay they give to the seamen and inferior officers is very high; to the superior ones proportionally low;—a peculiarity observable universally in the United States, where democratic parsimony can only relax in favour of that class with which itself sympathises, and from the comforts of which itself may derive benefit. Gunners receive £150 a-year, boatswains £180, captains on duty only £625. The wages of common sailors, being four or five pounds a-month, are so considerable as to attract a large portion of British seamen into their service, whom, from the identity of language and habits between the two states, it is impossible to distinguish; while the diminutive number of their ships, compared with those of Great Britain, renders it impossible for the latter power to attempt to vie with the United States in the amount of the remuneration they can hold out to the naval service.¹

CHAP.
AC.
1-12.

17.
The present
naval
establishment.

¹ American Navy List, 1841, in Stat. Abstract, 1842, p. 79, 81.

If the navy of America, even in the present maturity

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

48.

Their mili-
tary force.

of its powers, is small, its military force is still more inconsiderable, and affords a striking proof of the entirely pacific direction which the national strength has hitherto taken. It consists of eight regiments of infantry, three of cavalry, and three of artillery, numbering in all twelve thousand five hundred and thirty-seven combatants! This is just the strength of a Roman legion, or of one of Napoleon's divisions. It is not a fifth part of the military force of Bavaria, nor a half of that maintained by Saxony or Würtemberg. Such as it is, this Lilliputian force is scattered over fifty fortified posts on the frontier, and twelve arsenals in the interior, stretching over an extent two thousand miles in length, being not, on an average, two hundred and fifty men to each post. Of all marvels, this amount of military force is the most marvellous, when the magnitude and resources of the Republic are taken into view, the vast extent of frontier they have to defend, and the arrogant tone which they assume in their diplomatic intercourse with foreign states. It is true they have a militia everywhere established, which in periods of danger may, it is said, enrol fifteen hundred thousand combatants around its banners.* But although such a force, composed of backwoodsmen, combating behind trees in their forests, is doubtless very formidable, and may sometimes make a stout resistance behind intrenchments in the neighbourhood of towns; yet the result of the war of 1812 demonstrated what *à priori* might have been readily imagined, that it is incapable of carrying on war in the field, is wholly unfit for offensive operations, and cannot be relied on for the defence even of the strongest positions, if assailed with skill by much inferior forces. The proof

* The militia of the whole States amounted, according to the Army List of 1841, to 1,503,952 men in arms.

That of New York was,	169,435
Pennsylvania,	257,178
Virginia,	105,122
Ohio,	146,428

— *Militia Abstract*, 1841; *State Almanac* for 1841, p. 85.

of this is decisive: the Americans allowed their capital to be taken and pillaged by a British division, that could not muster three thousand five hundred bayonets. De Tocqueville was never more correct than when he asserted, that if America were placed in the midst of the European powers, it would at the end of a century, if still independent, have made a much more rapid progress than any of them; but that it would run the most imminent hazard of being three or four times conquered, in the interim, by monarchies not possessing a fourth part of its material resources. Her safety hitherto has consisted in her isolation. She is surrounded on all sides, except Canada, by scattered savages or degenerate Europeans; so weak, that she has never known what it was to combat a real enemy.^{1*}

CHAP.
XC.
1-12.

¹ Army
List, 1841.
Stat. Al-
manac, 83.
Tocq. ii.
274. Cha-
teaub. Mem.
ii. 324.

Incredibly small as the naval and military establishments of the United States appear to one accustomed to contemplate the colossal armaments of the European powers, they are fully as large as the scanty revenue at the disposal of the central government can afford to maintain. Such is the impatience of taxation in America, as in all countries where democratic power is really, and not, as in republican France, nominally established, that no consideration will induce them to submit to the general or national burdens necessary to put the independence of the confederacy on a secure foundation. The ordinary national revenue at this time (1840) is only 17,197,000 dollars, or £3,546,000; and including all extraordinary aids, no more than 28,234,000 dollars, or £5,858,000. The expenditure is 26,643,636 dollars, or £5,488,000. There is no national debt properly so called, that is, attaching to the central government, excepting a

49.
Revenue
and expendi-
ture of
the United
States.

* "The isolation of the United States has permitted them to grow and advance: it is doubtful if they would have been able to live and to increase in Europe. Separated from the Old World, the population of the United States still inhabits a solitude. The deserts have proved their safety; but already the conditions of their existence are changing."—CHATEAUBRIAND'S *Mémoires*, ii. 324.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

floating balance of three or four millions of dollars in exchequer bills, issued during the dreadful commercial embarrassments and consequent fall of revenue during the last four years. Even this trifling national debt has since been paid off. Of this revenue, four-fifths, or about 15,000,000 of dollars (£3,090,000), is derived from customs: there is no excise or direct taxes to the general government of any kind; and the remainder is almost entirely drawn from the sale of the lands belonging to the state, which in the year 1840 produced 2,620,000 dollars, or £539,000. Hitherto, indeed, with such scanty public revenues, the Americans have held surprisingly together; but that is because they have not as yet experienced in their full force the causes of separation. The interests, however, of the different parts of their immense territory, exceeding all Europe put together in extent, riches, and variety, are so different, that it is more than doubtful if they will continue united when the separate states become sufficiently strong to be able to stand without support.¹

¹ Finance
Statement,
1841. Stat.
Almanac,
1841, 97.

50.
Revenues
and debt of
the separate
states.

This, however, is but a part of the revenues and debt of the United States. Each of the states in the Union has a separate exchequer, receipts, expenditure, and debt of its own, from which its local expenses, such as judges, courts of justice, militia, &c. are defrayed. The greater part of the debt of each separate state has been contracted by their local legislature for the promotion of great public improvements, such as roads, canals, railways, and bridges, for the benefit of the community; and these debts are very considerable, amounting in all to 248,841,540 dollars, or £51,000,000. This is a fact of no small moment to Great Britain at this time, considering that at least two-thirds of this sum is due to English capitalists, and that the democratic masters of several of these states have already adopted the convenient device of "repudiating" the debt; in other words, refusing to pay either its principal or interest, after it has been expended for their behoof. The

states which have adopted this disgraceful step owe 100,000,000 dollars, or £22,000,000, and include Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and some others beyond the Alleghany mountains. Pennsylvania has failed in the regular payment of the interest of its debt; and even in the great commercial capital of New York, symptoms of no equivocal kind have appeared of a disposition to relieve the people of the disagreeable burden of discharging their obligations. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that there are no direct taxes in America. The direct *local* taxation is often very heavy - higher than in Great Britain. In New York the local rates are thirty per cent on the rental. The reason is obvious. Local taxation is for objects of local interest, by which the majority hope to be individually benefited, and for which they will incur considerable burdens: general taxation is for a remote object, in which they feel but little interest. Add to this that in the large towns it is the majority taxing the minority, the holders of property, which is never objected to. It is for the same reason that nearly all the burghs of Scotland have become bankrupt since the Borough Reform Act admitted the majority, holding no property, to manage the local administration of their affairs, and got Acts of Parliament taxing the minority who have possessions.¹

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

¹ See Finance Statement i.
Stat. Alm.
1841, 37,
98. Characterab. Mem.
ii. 325.

The government of America, as all the world knows, is a pure and unmixed democracy; established on a scale, and over an extent, to which there never has been a parallel in the annals of mankind. The central government—the local government—the officers of state, the president of the republic, the judges and civil officers of every description, in all the states, are elected by the universal suffrage of the people, either through the medium of the elections for their separate legislatures, or the general election for the national office-bearers. So great is the amount of the constituency which may be called on to vote on the election of a president, that it is

51.
Sketch of
the American
constitution.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

not unusual to see nearly two millions and a half of electors record their suffrages on that interesting occasion ; and nearly that number actually voted at the election of General Harrison on 4th of March 1841.* This is somewhat less than the proportion capable of bearing arms, in a population of 14,500,000 free whites in round numbers, being about *one to six* in the whole free inhabitants. In Great Britain and Ireland there are 830,000 electors out of 27,000,000 people, or 1 in 32 only ; in France there were, under Louis Philippe, less than 200,000 among 32,000,000, or 1 in 190 ! So widely different is the extent to which the electoral suffrage has been carried, in the three countries in the world where the greatest efforts in favour of freedom have been made, and popular institutions have been established on the broadest basis. It will not appear surprising, when these figures are considered, that the Americans should be repudiating their debts, while those of England have always been, and of France are now, at least, religiously upheld. The mass of the people are, no doubt, deeply interested in the *final* result of keeping faith with the public creditor ; but the *immediate* effect of its violation promises them a most alluring liberation, in the outset, from disagreeable burdens. The majority of men in all ages are governed by the first effect of measures, and such as strike the senses only. Ultimate consequences, overwhelming in their influence on the thinking few, are wholly overlooked by the unthinking many. The majority of men will never discharge their obligations if they can possibly help it. Public faith is preserved with religious fidelity in England, because it is for the immediate as well as the ultimate interest of the moneyed classes, in whom property is substantially vested,

* On that occasion there voted for

Harrison,	1,274,783
Van Buren,	1,128,702

Total electors,	2,403,485
---------------------------	-----------

- *Stat. Almanac*, 1841, 53.

to uphold it. If Great Britain wants to shake off its national debt, it has only to extend the suffrage in any considerable degree, and the burden will not stand three years, unless the burden of it can be laid in the form of a graduated property tax exclusively on the holders of realised property.

According to the theory of the American constitution, a great variety of checks are established, intended to limit and restrain the inordinate power given to the popular voice in the formation of government. The principle of their union is, that whatever power is not expressly vested in the federal government, belongs of right to the assemblies of the separate states; and the central authority itself is restrained as much as appeared necessary under such a system for its formation. The general government, which meets at Washington in congress, consists of two chambers—the Senate and House of Representatives. Each state sends two members to the Senate, and a certain number in proportion to the population, which is fixed every ten years, to that of the Representatives. This proportion was originally made one to every thirty thousand persons; but in 1792 this was changed to one in thirty-three thousand; and in 1832, to one in forty-eight thousand souls.¹ The House of Representatives is named by the direct and immediate vote of the people; the Senate, by the choice of the state legislature: thus the first is the result of a single, the second of a double election. In the first instance, the seat endures for two—in the second, for six years. The Chamber of Representatives is endowed only with legislative powers; the Senate, in addition to these, with certain judicial and executive duties. No bill can become a law until it passes both houses; but, in addition to this, the Senate judges of impeachments preferred by the lower house for state offences, and its consent is requisite to ratify treaties with foreign powers, and validate certain appointments to offices made by the President.²

CHAP.
XC.

1-12.

12.
The Senate
and House
of Repres-
entatives;
their consti-
tution and
powers.

¹ Story,
Laws of
United
States, i.
235.

² Story, 1, 2,
314. Tocq.
i. 197 and
200.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

53.
Powers of
the Presi-
dent.

The executive power is vested, in a great degree, in the President, whose functions are intended to correspond with those of a sovereign in the European monarchies ; but, both in substantial authority and theoretical right, the two are essentially different. His tenure of office is not for life, but for four years ; and a vice-president is always elected with the President, who, in the event of his death while in office, succeeds without any further election. The President can propose no laws to Congress, and his ministers are excluded in like manner as himself ; so that it is only by indirect means that the views of government can be laid before the legislature. No inviolability is attached to the office of supreme magistrate, as to the constitutional monarchs of France and England. The President carries the laws into execution, but he has no share in their formation ; he can refuse his sanction to them, but, by a singular anomaly, though that prevents their execution, it does not prevent them from being laws, and being enforced when a more pliant chief of the republic is elected. The only real source of influence which the President enjoys, is the nomination to employments under government ; and their number is very considerable, for it already amounted in 1836 to sixty thousand,* the greater part of whom are removed with every change of administration. The number is now (1860) at least twice as great.¹

¹ Tocq. i.
207, 209.
Kent's
Commentaries, i.
239, Chev.
i. 328.

54.
Sovereignty
of the peo-
ple.

It is not, however, either in the President or the Senate, in the ministers of state or the House of Representatives, that the true sovereignty of the United States resides. Government is really vested in THE PEOPLE : and that, too, not in the figurative and hyperbolic sense in which

* Offices in America in the gift of the executive :—

Collection of taxes and general administration,	.	12,144
Military, and service against the Indians,	.	9,643
Navy,	.	6,499
Post Office,	.	21,917

60,203

—CALHOUN'S *Report to the Senate*, 1836 ; given in CULVALIER, ii. 461 ; Note 46.

that expression is used in the declamations of modern Europe, but really, practically, and effectively. Each separate state is a democracy in itself, and in it the power of the people is exerted without any control. Every one has its governor, its senate, and house of representatives; the whole number of which, in both houses, are elected by the universal suffrage of the people. The senators, in these state legislatures, vary from twelve to ninety-three in number: the representatives from twenty-six to three hundred and fifty-two. These legislative bodies are vested with what practically amounts to absolute powers in their separate states; and the governor carries into effect the declared will of the majority of both houses, in like manner as he does the declared will of Congress. They exclusively manage their debts, finances, improvements, judicial establishment, militia, harbours, roads, railways, canals, and whole local concerns. So extensive and undefined are their powers, that it may be doubted whether they do not amount to those of declaring peace and war, and acting in all respects as independent states. Certain it is, that on more than one occasion, particularly the dispute with the southern states in 1834, on the question of nullifying the tariff of duties established by Congress; and the open hostilities which the northern states carried on with the British inhabitants on the Canada frontier in 1837 and 1839; the separate states, the Carolinas in the first instance, and New York and Maine in the second, took upon themselves to set the authority of the central government at defiance; and Congress and the executive were glad to veil their weakness under the guise of moderation, while in reality they succumbed to the whole demands of the insurgent commonwealths. It does not require the gift of prophecy to foretell, that a vast confederacy of separate states, each with its own legislature and armed force, and actuated, from difference of climate and situation, by opposite and conflicting interests, held together by so slender a tie, is

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

not destined to hang long together. The very difference in the national character and descent in different parts of the Union, render it highly improbable that they can remain permanently united. "What similarity," says Chateaubriand, "is there between a Frenchman of Louisiana, a Spaniard of the Floridas, a German of New York, an Englishman of New England, of Virginia, of Carolina, of Georgia? Yet they are all called Americans. The one is volatile, and a duellist; the other a proud and indolent Catholic; this a Lutheran labourer without slaves; that an English Protestant, with slaves; here is a Puritan merchant; there an Episcopalian slave-driver. Can ages ever render such a population homogeneous?"¹

¹ Tocq. i.
99, 130.
Stat. Alm.
1840, 126.
Chateaub.
Mem. ii.
326.

55.
Religion in
the United
States.

In one important respect America differs entirely from any state of Christendom, or indeed any that ever before existed in the world. It acknowledges no state religion; and no public funds whatever are provided for the clergy, or *religious* instructors of any denomination. It is otherwise with *secular* education, which is everywhere supported by direct local taxes, and most anxiously attended to. The cost of this *state education* is very great; it amounts over the whole Union to £1,700,000 a-year. This immense sum, however, is paid without reluctance, so strongly are all classes persuaded of its benefit. But it is otherwise in religion. All the clergy are on the footing of dissenters in England; that is, they are maintained solely by the seat-rents, or the voluntary contributions of their flocks. Churches, especially in the great towns, are numerous, and embrace every possible variety of belief, from the austere Puritan, the genuine descendant of the patriarchs who, two centuries ago, sought a refuge in New England from the persecution of Charles I., to the lax Socinian, whose creed scarcely differs from that of the Deist of former times. Episcopacy is the prevailing religion of the higher classes in the principal cities of the Union, except Baltimore:² but the Baptists and Methodists are by far the most considerable sects.

² Tocq. ii.
224. Mart.
i., 272.
Bacon's
Hist. i., 230,
241.

The Presbyterians are also very numerous; and, in several districts, the Roman Catholics are making great progress; insomuch that they now number above two millions of souls within the pale of their church in the whole states of the Union.

CHAP.

XC.

1812.

Religion in the United States being entirely separated from civil government, its ministers are relieved from that jealousy which in Great Britain is attached by the democratic party to every person in any situation of trust, whether civil or ecclesiastical, whose nomination is not vested in themselves. The clergy of all denominations are elected by their congregations; they are maintained by them during their incumbency; they may, in most cases, like those of the dissenting congregations in the British islands, be dismissed by them at pleasure.* A strong religious feeling pervades the United States, especially New England and Pennsylvania, which has descended to them from their Puritan or Quaker ancestors; and this is much enhanced by the complete divorce from temporal concerns which has taken place in the church. The clergy have no political influence, and never intermeddle with temporal affairs. But in no country in the world have they a stronger sway in society, or are their opinions more attended to, especially by the female portion of their congregations. It is to this general influence of religion, and the unseen chain which it has thrown over the passions and vices of men, more, perhaps, than any other cause, that the existence of society for so considerable a period as sixty years, without any great convulsions, notwithstanding the almost entire absence of external restraint or efficient government, is to be ascribed.¹

56.
Dependence
of the clergy
on their
flocks.

¹ Toop. ii.
224, 228.
Clev. ii.
328. Mart.
iii. 272,
285.

But the difficulties of the American church are yet to come: and with the increase of its destitute population, and of the classes which subsist on wages alone, the impossibility of providing by voluntary contribution for the

57.
Want of a
national
provision
for religion.

¹ The Episcopalian clergy have in some states a life tenure, which the law supports.

CHAP.
XC.
—
1812.

maintenance of religion will become very apparent. No want of religious instruction is felt in the great commercial towns, but in the rural districts the case is often directly the reverse;* and although the proportion of proprietors has hitherto been so great, no less than five millions of persons† already exist in the United States, for whom there is no provision in any place of endowed or existing public worship whatever.‡ If this is the case in their infancy, what will it be in their maturity and old age? And how are funds to be raised to provide for the deficiency in a democratic worldly community which

* “The Baptist sect alone proclaims a want of above three thousand ministers to supply the existing churches. Churches and funds are sufficient, but men are wanting.”—MARTINEAU, iii. 272, 273. This is the precise point where the question hinges, and the difficulty *always* occurs: it is comparatively easy, under the influence of temporary excitement or philanthropic feeling, to *build* churches, at least in great towns; to *maintain* their ministers in decent competence, from voluntary sources, is a very different matter.

† The American Board of Education makes the following statement, March 8, 1844:—“A vast population exists in these United States, for whom no means of grace whatever are provided. The most accurate examination would fix the number at not less than five millions! Among this mass of perishing immortal beings, at our very doors, error in its countless forms,—Popery, infidelity, and delusions wilder than the fanatical dreams of Mohammed—are making fearful havoc of souls. Indeed, the whole number of nominal professors of religion, in all the evangelical denominations in the land, does not much exceed two millions, while our population numbers eighteen millions.”

‡ “According to a general summary of religious denominations, made in 1835, the number of churches was 15,477; but there were only 12,130 ministers.”—MARTINEAU, iii. 272. This is about one church to each thousand inhabitants, and one minister to each thirteen hundred: the population being at that period about 15,000,000. This, on an average, might seem to be a fair proportion; but the evil of the system lies in two points. 1. The churches are unequally distributed; abounding sometimes to profusion in the rich towns, and wholly wanting in the rural districts. 2. No provision exists for the *permanent maintenance* of the clergy, which is the real difficulty; and accordingly, in the Baptist persuasion alone, 3000 churches are already without ministers.—See preceding note, and MARTINEAU, iii. 273.

The following statement of the religious population of the United States is said by the *Rochester Democrat* to be derived from various sources, several of which are authentic:—

Baptists,	4,000,000	Dutch Reformed, . .	450,000
Methodists,	3,000,000	Friends,	220,000
Presbyterians, . . .	2,175,000	Unitarians,	180,000
Congregationalists, .	1,400,000	Dunkers,	30,000
Roman Catholics, . .	1,300,000	Mormonites,	19,000
Episcopalians, . . .	1,000,000	Shakers,	6,000
Universalists,	600,000	Moravians,	5,000
Lutherans,	540,000	Swedenborgians, . .	6,000

starves down all its public establishments to the lowest point, and where no legislator ever yet has ventured to hint, in congress, at a general direct tax !* If nothing else existed to subject America to the common lot of humanity, the seeds of its mortal distemper are to be found in the want of any provision for the *gratuitous* religious instruction of the poor over the whole commonwealth: the very circumstance which, with the admirers of their institutions, is most ceaselessly the subject of eulogy.¹

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

¹ To q. a.
224, 236.
Channing,
284. Buck-
ingham, &c.
231, 234.

If, by being severed from the state, and relieved from the deteriorating effect of political passions or considerations, the American clergy have been relieved from one set of debasing influences, they have, from that very cause, become subjected to another. Already the ruinous effect of the dependence of the ministers of all denominations on the voluntary support of their flocks, has become painfully conspicuous. Religion has descended from its function of correcting the national vices and boldly denouncing the national sins in the ruling power: it has become little more, with a few noble exceptions, of whom Channing was an illustrious example, than the re-echo of public opinion. Listen to the words of an able and candid eyewitness, herself a most strenuous advocate for the voluntary system. "The American clergy," says Miss Martineau, "are the most backward and timid class in the society in which they live; self-exiled from the great moral questions of the time; the least-informed with true knowledge; the least conscious of that Christian and republican freedom which, as the natural atmosphere of piety and holiness, it is their prime duty to cherish and diffuse. The proximate causes of this are obvious: it is not merely that the living of the clergy depends on the opinion of those whom they serve; to all but the far

78.
Ruinous
effects of the
dependence
of the clergy
on the
flocks.

* There are small direct taxes in some of the separate states, and in New York 600,000 dollars, £160,000 is yearly raised in this way. But there is no general direct tax whatever over the whole Union.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

and clear-sighted it appears that the usefulness of their function does so. The most guilty class of the community on the slavery question at present is not the slaveholding, nor even the mercantile, but the clerical. They shrink from the perils of the contest. It will not be for them to march in the noble army of martyrs. Yet if the clergy of America follow in the rear of society, they will be the first to glory in the reformatations which they have done the utmost to retard. The fearful and disgraceful mistake which occasions this, is the supposition that the clerical office consists in adapting the truth to the minds of their hearers; and this is already producing its effect in thinning the churches, and impelling the people to find an administration of religion better suited to their need.

. My final impression is, that religion is best administered in America by the personal character of the most virtuous members of society, out of the theological; and, next, by the acts and preachings of the members of that profession, who are the most secular in their habits of life. The exclusively clerical are the worst enemies of Christianity, except the vicious." Such is the fruit of the voluntary system, according to the testimony of its most ardent supporters. An English historian need not fear to express this opinion, for he sees ample evidence around him of a similar tendency among the dissenting clergy in his own country. They are sufficiently inclined, indeed, to withstand the influence and denounce the vices of the government, of the established church, or of the richer classes who attend the churches of rival persuasions: but are they equally active in denouncing the sins that most easily beset their own popular supporters?¹ *

¹ Martineau's *America*, iii. 27, 263, 293. Buckingham, i. 134, 148.

* At a general conference of the clergy of Georgia, held at Athens on December 30, 1837, it was resolved:—

“I. That it is the sense of the Georgia Annual Conference, that slavery, as it exists in the United States, is *not a moral evil*.

“Resolved, that we view slavery as a civil and domestic institution, and one with which, as ministers of Christ, we have *nothing to do*, further than to

Here, then, is a country in which, if they ever had such on earth, republican principles have enjoyed the fairest ground for trial, and the best opportunity for establishing their benefits. The land was boundless, and, in the interior at least, of unexampled fertility; the nation began its career with all the advantages and powers, and none of the evils, and scarce any of the burdens of civilisation. They had the inheritance of English laws, customs, and descent; of the Christian religion, of European arts, and all the stores of ancient knowledge; they had neither a territorial aristocracy, nor a sovereign on the throne, nor a hereditary nobility, nor a national debt, nor an established church, which are usually held out as the impediments to the advancement of freedom in the Old World. How, then, has the republican system worked in this, the garden of the world, and the land of promise? The answer shall be given on no mean authority—in the words of one, himself an ardent, though candid, supporter of democratic equality, and whose political writings, alone of any in this age, deserve a place beside the works of Bacon and Machiavel.

“The self-government and all-powerful sway of the majority,” says M. de Tocqueville, “is the greatest and most formidable evil in the United States. The reproach to which I conceive a democratic government, such as is there established, is open, is not, as many in Europe pretend, its weakness; it is, on the contrary, its irresistible

CHAP.
XC.
1-12.
59.
How has
this demo-
cracy worked
out?

60.
Irresistible
power of
the major-
ity.

ameliorate the condition of the slave, by endeavouring to impart to him and his master the benign influence of the religion of Christ, and aiding both in their way to heaven.” —*New York Evening Post*, January 5, 1838.

Contrast this with the gradual extinction of slavery in the chief states of Europe by the unceasing efforts and exhortations of the Christian clergy, and say whether religion has not descended from her pedestal when she ceased to rest on independent revenues.

“What is most surprising of all, a large number of the clergy, and especially those of the Episcopal Church, including those who call themselves evangelical, are not merely palliators of this state of slavery, but *advocates for its continuance, and deprecators of all public discussion on the subject*; so that, if the republicans understand civil and political liberty but imperfectly, the Christian professors seem to understand the liberty of religion and justice still less.” —BUCKINGHAM'S *America*, i. 79, 87.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

strength. What I feel repugnance to in America is not the extreme liberty which reigns in it, but the slender guarantee which is to be found against tyranny. When a man, or a party, suffers from injustice springing from the majority in the United States, to whom can he apply for redress? To public opinion? It is formed by the majority. To the legislative body? It represents the majority, and blindly obeys its mandates. To the executive? It is named by the majority, and is the passive instrument in its hands. To the public force? It is nothing but the majority under arms. To a jury? It is the judicial committee of the majority. To the judges? They are in some states elected by the majority, and hold their offices at their pleasure. How unjust and unreasonable soever may be the measure which strikes you, no redress is practicable, and you must submit.”¹—“Liberty of thought and opinion,” says Miss Martineau, “is strenuously maintained in words in America; it has become almost a wearisome declamation; but it is a sad and deplorable fact, that in no country on earth is the mind more fettered than it is here; what is called public opinion has set up a despotism such as exists nowhere else—public opinion, sitting in the dark, wrapt up in mystification and vague terrors of obscurity, deriving power no one knows from whom; like an Asiatic monarch unapproachable, unimpeachable, undethronable, perhaps illegitimate; but irresistible in its power to quell thought, repress action, and silence conviction; bringing the timid perpetually under the unworthy fear of man—fear of some superior opinion which rules the popular breath for a day, and controls, through impudent folly, the speech and actions of the wise.”—“This country,” says Jefferson, “which has given the world the example of physical liberty, owes it that of moral emancipation also; for as yet it is but nominal with us. The inquisition of public opinion overwhelms in practice the freedom asserted by the laws in theory.”²

¹ Tocq. ii.
145, 146.

² Sober
Thoughts on
the Times,
Boston,
1834.
Martineau,
ii. 69, 70.
Jefferson's
Works, ii.
321.

Original thought, independence of character, intrepid assertion of opinion against the prepossessions of the majority, are, generally speaking, unknown in America, at least in all who aspire to a share in the administration of public affairs. Where it exists, it is usually found in persons of respectable birth or ancient descent, who seek, in the privacy of their own homes, that independence which is immediately extinguished in public life. They pass, in consequence, for aristocrats, and are regarded with jealousy as such. This is admitted by their own ablest and best-informed writers.* So completely do the ideas of all who appear in public affairs flow in one channel, that you would say they are all cast in one mould, and stamped with one image and superscription. Party spirit, indeed, runs extremely high; the public press abounds with furious and often coarse invective, and the most vehement division of opinion often agitates the whole Union. But in neither of these vast arrays is there any originality, or stubborn independence of thought in individuals; all follow implicitly, like the well-disciplined forces of a parliamentary leader in England, the opinions of their separate parties. It is a mere struggle of numbers for the superiority, and the moment the contest is decided by a vote, the minority give way, and public opinion ranges itself, to appearance, universally on the side of the greater number. It may well be believed that this unanimity is *seeming* only; and that the beaten party do not really become converted to the opinions of their antagonists. But they are compelled to feign acquiescence; they must crouch to numbers. That noblest of spectacles,

CHAP.
AC.
1812.
61.
Total absence of originality or independence of thought.

* "Manliness of character is more likely to be the concomitant of aristocratic than of democratic birth; for the first feel themselves above public opinion, but the last bow to it as the slave to his master. I have learned in America to feel the truth of a maxim which is becoming familiar amongst us, that it takes an aristocrat to play the true democrat. All the real manly democrats I have ever known in America have been accused of aristocracy, simply because they were disposed to carry out their principles, and not let that imperious sovereign, the neighbourhood, play the tyrant over them."—Coolidge, in *Lacy Harbottle*, ii. 82.

CHAP.
XC.
—
1812.

which is so often exhibited in England, of a resolute minority, strong in the conviction and intrepid in the assertion of truth, firmly maintaining its opinions in the midst of the insurgent waves of an overwhelming majority, is scarcely ever seen on the other side of the Atlantic. They feel sufficiently often the "*civium ardor prava jubentium*;" but the "*justum et tenacem propositi virum*" is unknown.* The reason is obvious: society in America is governed only by one element. Individual resolution is not wanting, but it has no ground to rest on against the ruling and irresistible majority. It is as impossible to escape being carried away by the tide, as for a dismayed ship in a bottomless ocean to avoid being swept on by the waves. Yet there is a remedy for this, as for all the other evils of society. When the event has proved the majority to be in the wrong, which is very often the case, the former general opinion is not openly assailed, but it is secretly abandoned. One by one the majority is lessened, until at length it is turned into a minority, and then, without anything being said about it, the opposite measures are quietly adopted.¹

¹ Tocq. ii. 156, 157, iv. 200. Chev. i. 306, 307. Mart. iii. 8; and ii. 26, 58, and 150.

62.
Test of real
freedom of
thought.

The Americans will exclaim that this statement is overcharged, and that independence of opinion is to be found as much in America as in Great Britain, or any European state. The matter may be brought to a very easy test, which will both illustrate the fact and the causes to which the difference, in this respect, between Great Britain and America, is owing. All the world knows that the greatest diversity of opinion upon different subjects exists in Great Britain, and it is a matter of everyday occurrence to see persons belonging to the aristocratic party, and boldly maintaining Conservative opinions, appear on the hustings and solicit the votes of the most democratic constituencies. It is not less usual for members both of the House of Lords and House of

* "*The ardour of the citizens urging on ruinous measures*;" but "*the just and tenacious of his purpose*," is unknown.

Commons to advocate extreme radical and democratic opinions in presence of a vast majority of persons supporting the aristocratic side. Nay, examples have not been wanting of officers of high rank in the army and navy, who of course are entirely dependent on the crown for their promotion, or even for remaining in the service, giving free vent to the most violent liberal opinions. A part of the public press of Great Britain avowedly supports republican principles; and not a few of its writers, and that, too, of the highest talent, advocate the same doctrines, both at public meetings and in their literary productions. Is a similar state of things ever seen on the other side of the Atlantic? Is it as usual there to see candidates for popular favour at public meetings maintain monarchical and aristocratic opinions, as in Great Britain it is to see them support republican ones? Does the Hall of Congress resound with declamations in favour of a mixed monarchy, in preference to a republic, in like manner as the English House of Commons does with arguments in favour of democratic institutions? Does a large part of the public press and periodical literature of America constantly advocate the substitution of a mixed monarchy for their institutions, in the same manner as it does in England the conversion of the government into a pure democracy? We have never heard that any of these things take place. On the contrary, it is well known that the advocates for monarchical institutions—and they are both numerous and able in America—are as guarded in expressing their opinions in public as are those in Russia who are impressed with republican ideas. The reason is the same in both cases. Power resides in one class only, and therefore the other classes cannot enjoy any practical freedom in discussion, and unfettered opinion cannot exist.¹ Let the Americans, in their public debates, philosophical works, and periodical literature, evince the same variety and independence of opinion on political subjects which are every day put

CHAP.
XV.
1612.

¹ By King-
ham's Amer-
ica, i. 402,
403.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

forth in England, and they will obtain credit in Europe for possessing real freedom in public deliberation and as regards independence of thought, but not till then.

63.
Prodigious
effects of the
revolution-
ary law of
succession.

All the restraints on the excessive power of the majority, devised by the wisdom of Washington and the original framers of the American constitution, have been shattered by two causes; the equal division of landed property by succession, and the growing democratic ambition of the people. Under the law of succession established at the declaration of Independence, the death of every proprietor brings about a splitting of his inheritance into little portions; and when their owners in their turn are carried to the great charnel-house of mortality, a similar division takes place; so that the partition goes on *ad infinitum*. Such has been the effect of this system, that it is extremely rare for any considerable fortune to survive the second generation; and the grandchildren of those who were first in wealth and station in the days of Washington, are now lost in the obscurity of the general crowd, and are even, in many cases, labouring with their own hands. There are thus few rich persons in America, and no hereditary fortunes, but an immense number of little proprietors; and in the states beyond the Alleghanies in particular, their number is prodigious, and hourly increasing. These small landholders, as is invariably the case, are strongly attached to the democratic party. They are the great supporters of the violent outcry which has been raised in every part of the Union, with such fatal effects, against the paper credit and the commercial aristocracy. Such is the ascendant they have now gained, both in the separate states and the general legislature of the Union, from the continual multiplication of these small properties, under the law of equal succession, which is everywhere established, that all bulwarks have been swept away, the march of democracy has become irresistible, and, for good or for evil, the whole confederacy must go through with its consequences.¹ But equality must

¹ Tocq. i. 82,
85, 87.
Chev. ii.
345, 351.
Mart. i. 151,
152.

have one of two results : all must have power, or none. CHAP.
XC.
1812.
Hitherto the first effect has taken place in America : let them beware of the last.

As a natural consequence of this state of things, there is, in opposition to the will or passions of the majority, 61.
speculation
of the com-
mercial
classes ad-
versely af-
ected. no lasting security either for life or property in America, in cases where the public mind is vehemently excited. Hitherto, indeed, no direct attack on property has been made, at least where it is vested in land; for this simple reason, that the majority are themselves landowners, and therefore any such system would be an attack upon their own interests. But the system of spoliating that species of property in which the majority do not participate, and for which they feel no sympathy, has already been carried to a most frightful extent. The run against paper credit, the fury against the commercial aristocracy, the cry "bank or no bank," which has convulsed all the states of the Union for the last ten years, and at last ruined the national bank, rendered bankrupt nine-tenths of the commercial classes, and reduced the national exports and imports to one half,* and in some years to a third of their former amount, are nothing but so many successful attacks of the Revolutionary majority on that species of property which, being vested solely in the wealthy classes of society of whom they were jealous, it had become the object of the democracy to destroy. The determination now openly acted on in many of the states, particularly Arkansas, Illinois, and the democratic communities in the valley of the Mississippi, and even in the great and opulent commercial state of Pennsylvania, to repudiate

* Exports from Great Britain to America in 1835.	£19,598,455
— " — " — 1836.	12,425,604
— " — " — 1837.	4,935,225
— " — " — 1838.	7,585,766
— " — " — 1839.	8,866,264
— " — " — 1840.	5,283,020
— " — " — 1841.	7,498,842
— " — " — 1842.	3,528,897

—*Parl. Papers*, 27th May 1840, and 20th July 1843.

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

their state debt, and shake off the burden of their public creditors, after they have experienced the full benefit of their capital by expending it on railroads, canals, and other public improvements, is another example of the incipient spoliation of the fundholders. Their property of all kinds has undergone the most violent attacks in America, except that in land, which, from its diffusion, was protected by the interests of the majority. But the period of danger to them is postponed only, not averted. The period when the attack on landed property, if the present system of government continues, will commence, may be predicted with certainty. It will be as soon as the majority of electors, in any of the states, have come, from the natural growth of other trades, to be persons without any interest in the soil, and when the back settlements have become so distant by the advance of civilisation, that it is less trouble to take their neighbours' fields than to go to the Far West and seek possessions of their own. This is nothing peculiar to America; in every country in the world the majority, under similar circumstances and political institutions, would do the same.¹*

¹ Chev. i.
153. Tocq.
ii. 284, 287.

* Lord Macaulay strongly expressed the same opinion in a letter to H. S. Randall, Esq., New York, in *Times*, April 7, 1860.—“I am certain that I never wrote a line, and that I never, in Parliament, in conversation, or even on the hustings—a place where it is the fashion to court the populace—uttered a word indicating an opinion that the authority in a State ought to be intrusted to the majority of citizens told by the head; in other words, to the poorest and most ignorant part of society. I have long been convinced that institutions purely democratic must, sooner or later, destroy liberty or civilisation, or both.

“In Europe, where the population is dense, the effect of such institutions would be almost instantaneous. What happened lately in France is an example.

“You may think that your country enjoys an exemption from these evils. I will frankly own to you that I am of a very different opinion. Your fate I believe to be certain, though it is deferred by a physical cause. As long as you have a boundless extent of fertile and unoccupied land your labouring population will be far more at ease than the labouring population of the Old World; and while that is the case, the Jeffersonian policy may continue to exist without any fatal calamity. But the time will come when New England will be as thickly peopled as Old England. Wages will be as low, and will fluctuate as much with you as with us. You will have your Manchesters and your Birminghams; and in those Manchesters and Birminghams hundreds of thousands of artisans will assuredly be sometimes out of work. Then your institutions will be fairly brought to the test.”

Is life secure in the United States, when property is placed in such imminent peril? Experience, terrible experience, proves the reverse; and demonstrates, that not only is existence endangered, but, what is far worse, law is often powerless against the once-excited passions or violence of the people. The atrocities of the French Revolution, cruel and heart-rending as they were, have been exceeded on the other side of the Atlantic; for there the terrible spectacle has been not unfrequently exhibited of late years, of persons obnoxious to the majority being publicly *burned alive* by the people, and, to render the torment more prolonged and excruciating, over a fire purposely kindled of green wood.* Combined and systematic

CHAP.
XV.
1842.
65.
Illustrations
of the
character
of the
American

"Some months before I left the United States a man of colour was *burned alive* without trial, at St. Louis in Missouri; a large assembly of the 'respectable' inhabitants of the city being present. The majority of newspaper editors made themselves parties to the act, by refusing through fear to repudiate it. The gentlemen of the press in that city dare not condemn the deed, for fear of the consequences from the murderers. They merely announced the deed as a thing to be regretted; and recommended that a veil should be drawn over the affair. The newspapers of the Union generally were afraid to comment on it, because they saw the St. Louis editors were afraid."—MISS MARTINEAU, i. 150, 152.

"Just before I reached Mobile, two men were *burned alive* there in a *glorious fire* in the open air, in presence of the gentlemen of the city generally. No word was breathed of the transaction in the newspapers; and this is a special sign of the times. There is far too much subservience to opinion in the northern states; but in the southern it is like the terrors of Tiberius Cæsar."—*Ibid.* ii. 141, 144.

"Upon a mere vague report or bare suspicion, persons travelling in the south have been arrested, imprisoned, and in some cases *plugged up* or *tortured*, in pretence that they came to cause insurrection among the slaves. More than one *innocent person has been hanged*. It was declared by some Eberstadt-minded gentlemen of South Carolina, after the publication of Dr Channing's work on slavery, that if he were to enter that province with a body-guard of twenty thousand men, he would not come out alive. Handbills are issued by the Committees of Vigilance, offering enormous rewards for the heads or ears of prominent abolitionists. The governor of South Carolina last year recommended the summary execution, without benefit of clergy, of all persons caught within the limits of the state holding prominent anti-slavery opinions; and every sentiment of his is indorsed by a select committee of the state legislature."—*Ibid.* ii. 348, 349.

"On the 14th June 1842, a black slave named Joseph was seized, on the suspicion of being concerned in some murders, by a furious mob, without any trial, which bound him to a tree, and kindled a fire of fagots at his feet. He asked for a drink of water, and said, 'Now apply your torches, and let me die in peace.' He beheld with firmness the curling flame approaching his feet; but

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

¹ Chev. ii.
345. Mart.
iii. 162.

66.
Frequent
acts of vio-
lence in the
legislature.

attacks on property, or dreadful acts of terror and revenge, have taken place in several great towns; and such has been the prostration of law and paralysis of authority by the will of the sovereign multitude, that, on many of these occasions, not only the press did not venture to denounce the infamous proceedings, but the law authorities did not make any attempt to apprehend or punish the delinquents.^{1*}

Murders and assassinations in open day have even occurred, among the members of Congress themselves; and the guilty parties, strong in the support of the majority, openly walk about, and set all attempts to prosecute them at defiance. So common have these summary acts of savage violence grown in America, that they have come to be designated by a peculiar and well-known expression; and the phrase "Lynch law" is understood, all over the world, to express the violent assumption by the multitude of the office, on a sudden impulse, at once

when it began to fasten on his legs, and feed on his body, the pain was so excessive, that he screamed aloud, and entreated the bystanders to blow out his brains. Not a hand, however, was raised in mercy to terminate his sufferings; and at length, surging with almost superhuman strength in the excess of his agony, he tore out the staples, and leapt with his half-burnt limbs out of the flames. The crack of rifles was then heard: he fell pierced by several shots, and his body was thrown back into the pile, where it was totally consumed. *No notice whatever was taken of this atrocity; the papers did not venture to condemn it; and no one was punished, nor inquiry ever made.*"—*American Paper, New Orleans, June 15, 1845.*

"A young man at Natchville, in Tennessee, was lately seized by the Committee of Vigilance, and an abolition newspaper found in his bundle, among a number of Bibles. He was immediately seized, publicly flogged, the mayor of the town presiding, and sent out of the town in that dreadful condition; his horse, gig, and Bibles, of which he was disposing, worth three hundred dollars, being no more heard of."—MISS MARTINEAU, ii. 139, 140.

* "Baltimore was lately, during four days, at the mercy of the genius of destruction. The security of the city was vainly banded from the mayor to the sheriff, from the sheriff to the commander of the militia; the prisons were forced, the mayor and militia pillaged; but not a person could be found in that city, with 100,000 inhabitants, who would head any force against the rioters, till an old patriarch of eighty-four, who had signed the declaration of independence, stepped forth, and, requesting to be put at the head of thirty men, stopped the disorder, and put an end to the pillage. Well may the Americans say with Mr Clay, 'We are in the midst of a revolution.'"—CHEVALIER, ii. 347.

of accusers, judges, juries, and executioners. The ablest and best-informed political writers on the popular side in Europe, confess and lament this prostration of law and justice in the United States.* “Is this the freedom we were promised?” said the French Revolutionists; “we can no longer hang whom we please:” but the Americans have improved on this idea,¹ for their prin-

CHAP.

XX.

1-12.

1 *Chen. A.*

345, 347.

Marr. 1-2.

“Depuis que l’Amérique compte de très grandes villes, le peuple des places publiques est seul le peuple souverain. Ses insurrections, ses actes de violence ont été fréquens dans les dernières années, et chacun d’eux a été outrageant pour la vraie liberté! Un jour le peuple se soulève, pour punir ceux qui par humilité ou par religion, veulent voir dans les Nègres de hommes; un autre jour il détruit une maison d’éducation Catholique; un troisième il classe de la chaire et veut mettre en pièces un prédicateur Protestant, parce qu’il parle contre les Catholiques; un quatrième il brise les pièces d’un journaliste qui combat quelque opinion dominante; et toujours et partout il prétend se faire justice à lui-même en soustrayant ceux qu’il croit à la protection, comme à la juridiction, des tribunaux.”—SISMONDI, *Sciences Sociales*, i. 304, 305.

“The longer we remained in Washington, the more we saw and heard of the recklessness and profligacy which characterise the manners both of its resident and fluctuating population. In addition to the fact of all the parties to the late duel going at large, and being unaccountable to any tribunal of law for their conduct in that transaction—of itself a sufficient proof of the laxity of morals, and the weakness of magisterial power—it was matter of notoriety that a resident of the city, who kept a boarding-house, and who entertained a strong feeling of resentment towards Mr Wise, one of the members for Virginia, went constantly armed with loaded pistols and a long bowie knife, watching his opportunity to assassinate him. He had been foiled in the attempt on two or three occasions by finding this gentleman armed also, and generally accompanied by his friends; but though the magistrates of the city were warned of this intended assassination, they were either afraid to apprehend the individual, or, from some other motive, declined or neglected to do so, and he accordingly walked abroad armed as usual.

“Mr Wise himself, as well as many others of the members from the South and West, go habitually armed into the House of Representatives and Senate—concealed pistols and dawks being the usual instruments worn by them beneath their clothes. On his recent examination before a committee of the House, he was asked by the chairman of the committee whether he had arms on his person or not; and answering that he always carried them, he was requested to give them up while the committee were sitting, which he did; but on their rising, he was presented with his arms, and he continued constantly to wear them as before.”—BURNHAM’S (a liberal writer) *Report*, i. 356, 357.

“We published on Monday a short paragraph stating that Mr ANTHONY, a member of the Arkansas Legislature, had been killed in a rencontre with Colonel Wilson, the Speaker of the Lower House. It appears from the particulars since received, that this murderous outrage was actually committed on the floor of the House while in session; the Speaker, in consequence of some offensive remark directed against him by the unfortunate member, having come down from his seat armed with a bowie knife! The member, it is stated, was also

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

ciple, in some instances at least, has been shown to be, that they may either hang *or burn* whom they please.

The American writers plead, in extenuation of these atrocities, that they are only of occasional occurrence ; that the states of the confederacy are in general peaceable and orderly ; that they occur chiefly in rude and

armed with the same weapon, but the rencontre lasted only for a moment—the latter having been left dead on the floor, and the Speaker having had one hand nearly cut off, and the other severely injured. Wilson was forthwith arrested by the civil authorities, and his name struck from the roll of the House by *nearly* a unanimous vote. He was liberated on 2000 dollars' bail, and subsequently *acquitted*.—*New York Sun*, Dec. 29, 1837. BUCKINGHAM, i. 136.

“A tragical occurrence took place during my stay in New York, which brought this question very prominently before the public. It was this: A minister of the gospel, the Rev. Elijah P. Lovejoy, was engaged as the editor of a religious newspaper at the town of St Louis, and in the slave state of Missouri. In this state, the mob had *burned a coloured man alive* for some offence for which he *was never brought to trial*. Mr Lovejoy condemned this act, and reproved the judge, whose name was Lawless, for excusing the mob as he had done for their unjustifiable conduct. In consequence of this, the mob themselves retaliated on Mr Lovejoy, by attacking his house, breaking up his press, and throwing it and the types into the river, for which he could get no redress. He then removed to the town of Alton, on the opposite side of the Mississippi river, and in the free state of Illinois. Even here, however, his advocacy of abolition occasioned the mob to destroy his press a second time ; another was procured to replace that, and they broke it in pieces also. A third press was purchased to replace this ; but when it arrived at Alton, and before ever it was used, the mob attacked the store in which it was, with a view to destroy it, and whatever else the store contained. They were encouraged in this outrage by the more wealthy inhabitants of the place, who fancied they had an interest in slavery being undisturbed ; but on this occasion Mr Lovejoy and his friends determined to defend the store, and went with firearms for this purpose. While the mob were beating in the windows with stones, and firing from the outside into the store, they who were in the inside fired a gun also, by which one of the mob was killed. At this the populace at first dispersed ; but whisky being profusely supplied to them by their abettors, and guns placed in their hands, they returned in large numbers to the store, determined to set it on fire, and burn alive all who were in it. Mr Lovejoy and four of his companions went out to drive away those who were actually setting fire to the roof of the building, and he was then *shot through the body by one of the mob, and died in a few minutes afterwards*. They subsequently wounded several others, took possession of the press, broke it to pieces, and threw its fragments into the river. On such a transaction as this, it might be supposed that there would be scarcely a difference of opinion, or that the whole press of the country, in the free states at least, would have condemned such an outrage, and contended for the right of freedom of discussion. But by far the greater majority of the Whig papers, and some even of the democratic in New York and elsewhere, condemned the pertinacity and obstinacy, as they called it, of Mr Lovejoy, excused the conduct of the mob, and thought that *any man venturing to publish sentiments which he knew to be obnoxious to the majority, deserved to be put down by force*.—BUCKINGHAM, i. 80, 81.

semi-barbarous states, on the frontiers of the Far West, that the annals of every country exhibit too many examples of occasional outbreaks of popular violence: and that it is unjust to hold their institutions responsible for acts common to them with all mankind. There is some justice in these observations, but they are not precisely well founded; for some of the greatest atrocities have been committed in Philadelphia, Baltimore, Boston, and other of the greatest cities of the Union. It affords, too, a melancholy proof of the depravity of human nature, if the spread of knowledge and march of intellect have no tendency to check these savage dispositions, and the citizens of the great and well-educated model republic are obliged to plead, in extenuation of their cruelties, that the same things were done during the crusade against the Albigeois, or by the *autos-da-fé* of Castile. But the peculiar and damning blot on America, in this particular, is this—and it is one to which it is impossible to make any reply. In other countries, the frightful atrocities of the stake and the torture have characterised government during savage and ruthless periods; and it has been the well-founded boast of civilisation, that they have disappeared before the milder spirit which its blessings have introduced. Ebullitions of popular violence have been frequent; horrors unutterable have been committed, and are committed, during their continuance. But these have always been the passing fury of the multitude merely, and the return of order has uniformly been signalised by increased vigour of the executive for the repression of such excesses and increased horror of the public at their continuance. It was thus that the insurrection of the Boors in Germany was in the end repressed by the vigour of the feudal chivalry. The reign of terror in France was succeeded by the iron rule of Napoleon—the violence of the great rebellion in England by the despotism of Cromwell. But in America, not only is there no reaction against such popular

CHAP.
XV.

1812.

b7.

Peculiarity
of the Amer-
ican Repub-
lics in this
respect.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

1 Mart. ii.
177, 178.
Chev. ii.
347, 348.68.
Real re-
proach of
the Ameri-
cans on this
head.

atrocities, or attempt to coerce them, but the human mind is so debased by the tyranny of the majority, that they are not even complained of: they are exhibited, not in an age of universal ignorance and savage barbarity, but in one of general instruction and boasted civilisation: the people are not the victims but the authors of these atrocities; and the reflecting few pass them over in trembling silence, like the stroke of Providence, or the vengeance of an Eastern Sultaun, to which it is the only wisdom to submit without a murmur.^{1*}

It can never be sufficiently enforced that it is not the deeds of violence, cruel and frightful as they have been, of which their country has in recent times been the theatre, which constitute the real and peculiar reproach against the American character and institutions. Deeds of atrocity are common to them with all mankind. It is the irresistible weight of popular opinion which renders *their condemnation rare, their punishment still rarer*, if committed in the interest or in pursuance of the passions of the majority, which is the real disgrace. The American writers ask, What would the English say if their monarchical institutions were assailed because the Porteous mob, a century ago, took summary vengeance on an unpopular functionary on the streets of Edinburgh, or because the Reform transports terminated in the flames of Bristol and Nottingham, in 1831? The answer

* "On occasion of the frightful riot at Faneuil Hall, Boston, in 1835, when the celebrated Mr Garrison narrowly escaped being murdered, *no prosecutions followed*. I asked a lawyer, an abolitionist, why? He said there would be difficulty in getting a verdict; and if it was obtained, the punishment would be merely a fine, which would be paid on the spot, and the triumph would remain with the aggressors. I asked an eminent judge the same question; he said *he had given his advice against a prosecution*. And why? Public feeling was so strong on the subject; the rioters were so respectable in the city: it was better to let the whole affair pass over without further notice." MARTINEAU, i. 175, 176. Many examples of a similar paralysis occurred in Great Britain during the fervour of Reform: and the arm of the law was sometimes, as in the Newport rebellion, paralysed by terror of the people; but generally the majesty of the law was asserted, and severe examples in the case of the greatest outrages were made, especially in the cases of the burning of Bristol and Nottingham in 1831 and 1832.

is obvious. They at once admit that these deeds were a disgrace to the country; they make no attempt to palliate or defend them; and they are the first to confess, that if such acts were to become frequent, and pass unpunished, they would cast an irremovable stain on the British character, and throw a serious doubt on the wisdom of British institutions. But Edinburgh was severely punished for the Porteous mob, though the immediate authors could not be discovered; and four of the principal Bristol delinquents expiated their guilt on the scaffold. A hideous combination murder, interesting ten thousand combined workmen, occurred at Glasgow in 1840; but the murderers were hanged on the spot where the crime had been committed, in presence of a hundred thousand spectators,* one half of whom had come there to effect a rescue. Let the Americans show instances in which the perpetrators of their Lynch murders, or the leaders of the mobs who burned their Negroes, were executed where their flames had been lighted, in presence of a majority sympathising with the criminals, and the British historians will be the first to clear the American institutions from the charge of impotence against popular excesses, under which they at present labour.

The system of government in the United States has been proved to be wholly unequal to the external security of the nation. America, it is true, is still independent, and is rapidly extending in every direction; but that is only because she has no civilised neighbours in contact with her territory, except Great Britain, which has little interest to engage in the fruitless and enormous cost of Transatlantic warfare. But so inefficient is her force both by sea and land, owing to the invin-

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

69.
External
weakness of
the American
cans.

* It was the author's melancholy duty to carry into execution, as Sheriff of Lanarkshire, this just and necessary sentence, which was done with the utmost solemnity, and produced a prodigious and most salutary impression. He never felt so strongly the immense effect of such solemn demonstrations that a government exists in the country.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

cible repugnance to taxation among her people, and the total want of foresight among the ruling multitude, that she rushed headlong into a war with Great Britain in 1812, with an army of six thousand men, and a navy of four frigates and eight sloops; and she could not prevent her capital being taken by an English division not mustering three thousand five hundred bayonets. Baden or Würtemberg would never have incurred a similar disgrace. If America were placed alongside of the European powers, she would be conquered in three months, if she did not alter her system of government. In 1840, she was all but at open war with Great Britain, and yet her army was only twelve thousand men, and her navy seven ships of the line, with a population of seventeen millions; being just the population of the British Isles at the close of the war with Napoleon.

70.
Want of
foresight in
the ruling
majority is
the cause of
this.

True, these four frigates and eight sloops in 1812 did great things, and their crews evinced a valour and skill worthy of combating their ancient parent on the waves. But that only confirms the general argument. In democratic communities, measures of foresight are impossible to government, because the masses of whom it is the organ are incapable of looking before them, and never will submit to present burdens from a regard to future and remote dangers. Hence, while Philip was preparing his armament against Greece, which ultimately proved fatal to its independence, the Athenian democracy diverted the funds set apart for the support of the navy to the maintenance of the theatres; and introduced and carried the punishment of *death* against any one who should propose even their reapplication to their original destination. But energy unbounded is awakened in individuals by such institutions, and hence the great achievements which they often have effected with inconsiderable means. In despotic states, greatness is sometimes forced upon the nation by the vigour and fore-

sight of the government, notwithstanding the general lassitude or supineness of the community. In democratic states, greatness is often forced upon the government, despite its own weakness, by the vigour and spirit of the people.

Ability of the highest kind has been rarely, if ever, called to the direction of affairs in America, since the democratic regime has been fully established by the general triumph of the popular over the Conservative party. Men either of great talents or elevated character are disgusted with the low arts and mob-flattery which are the indispensable passport to popular favour: they retire from all contest for office, as, in Eastern dynasties, similar characters do from the sycophancy of courts and the precincts of palaces. It is extremely rare to see persons of large property who will, for any consideration, engage in public life. They retire into the bosom of their families, and leave open to bustling indigence or pliant ambition the path leading to power, distinction, and political honours. In public, these men profess the most unbounded admiration for popular institutions; they shake hands with every man they meet in the street; they are never to be seen on a platform that they do not utter sonorous periods on the virtue and intelligence of the people, the wisdom which is displayed in all their deliberations, and the incalculable blessings of democratic institutions. In private, they reveal, in confidence to those whom they can trust, and especially to strangers on the eve of departure, their decided conviction that the present system cannot much longer continue, and that a frightful revolution will ere long bury the rising splendour of North, as it has already done that of South America, in its ruins.

The wealthy classes, unable to overcome the jealousy with which they are surrounded, and obnoxious to the people merely because they are independent, and will not in general condescend to court them, have generally

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

71.
But, in fact,
of higher
talent or
station from
the public
service.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

72.
The rich
have taken
refuge in
exclusive
society.

given up public life, and abandoned all contest for political power. They have taken refuge in exclusive society, and guard its avenues with a degree of care unknown even in the aristocratic circles of London or Vienna. Externally they are plain in their dress; few carriages are to be seen in the streets, considering the fortunes enjoyed; and the exterior of their dwellings exhibits nothing to attract notice or awaken jealousy. It is in the interior of their mansions that they give a full rein to the luxury of wealth; all that riches can purchase of the elegant or costly is there displayed in profusion. Like the Jews in the days of Richard Cœur-de-Lion, and from a similar cause, they are homely in external appearance, and gorgeous in interior display. The thirst for material enjoyments is universal, and more ardent than in any other country; in fact it is the grand object of all classes. The reason is, that nearly all have at some period of their lives felt their pleasures, and most have known at other times what it is to want them. The disinterestedness sometimes seen in the highest European society is often founded on ignorance of the real evils of poverty. Great ability is the object of general jealousy to the people, especially if it is independent, when it is stigmatised as aristocratic. Democracy and aristocracy have an equal aversion to the highest class of intellect, and neither will in general call in its assistance except in the last extremity, and when no other means of salvation remain. The first is jealous of the power of mind, which it is unable to combat; the second of independence of character, which it cannot control. Pliant ability is what both desire.¹

¹ Tocq. ii.
12, 13; iii.
274, 275.
Chateaub.
Mém. ii.
330.

73.

State of de-
pendence of
the Bench.

Judicial independence, though in appearance generally established, is in reality almost unknown in America; but integrity of judicial character is, to their honour be it said, universal. All the state judges, from the highest to the lowest, are virtually elected by the people, and are

liable to be displaced by them; for they are appointed by the state legislatures, who are themselves nominated by the universal suffrage of the inhabitants. Their tenure of office is sometimes for four, sometimes for seven years; not generally for life.* In appearance, therefore, the independence of the bench is, in a majority of the states of the Union, established on a tolerably secure basis; but the difference, and it is a vital one, lies here. Power in England resides in three branches of the legislature; in America it is invested solely in one—viz., the people. Judges in Great Britain can be displaced only by the crown, on an address of *both* houses of parliament—a union of the representatives of property and numbers, which can never take place except on a flagrant case of judicial iniquity, or the total prostration of our liberties. In America, they are in all the states liable to be removed by a vote of the two branches of the legislature, both of whom are elected by the people—that is, on the simple declared will of *one interest* in society, namely, the majority in numbers.†

CHAP.
XC.

1 12.

¹ Tocq. ii.
44, 176.
Chev. ii.
151.

* In thirteen states the judges hold office during good behaviour, in eight others during periods of not less than seven years: in some instances these periods are from twelve to fifteen years. In two states they hold office but for one year. In but one instance they are appointed directly by the people, and they can never be removed by the direct action of the people. In thirteen states they are appointed by the legislatures; in twelve by the governors, with the advice of a senate or council. They are removable only by impeachment, or in some instances by an address of both branches of the legislature, for which usually the votes of two-thirds or three-fourths of the house must concur. *North American Review*, No. 119, p. 394. The author is happy, on this high authority, to correct an error into which he had fallen, in regard to the appointment of the judges in America, in his former editions; and at the same time to express his high sense of the liberal and impartial spirit, as well as distinguished ability, with which his work has been reviewed, and its opinions often combated, in that distinguished periodical.

† On October 12, 1839, the Grand Jury of New York said in their official presentment:—"By the present lamentable system of the ballot-box to decide who shall fill office for judiciary purposes, we trace the evil we now complain of, and present as an evil. When the ballot-box is an index of national choice, or the choice of a large portion of our people, the cost or evil of a bad choice is measurably met and felt by a large constituency; but when the same system is applied to small communities, such as wards of a city like ours, it may be

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

74.

Tenure by
which the
judicial of-
fice is held
in the differ-
ent states.

In several states, their tenure of office expires in six or seven years; in two states, in one.* If their decisions are obnoxious to the feelings, however excited, of the multitude, they are sure not to be re-elected. The highest talent at the bar rarely, from this cause, condescends to accept judicial situations; and consequently

in some cases of most serious consequences; for in some cases the evildoers may, by combined efforts, elect their own judiciary, and this judiciary in turn, by extraordinary lenity, reward the electors, and thus in our midst is created and sustained a combination of reciprocal elements of the most dangerous character, and which, if not timely checked, will soon put at naught all power to arrest the progress of crime."

* The following are the provisions on the subject of judicial tenure in the different states of the United States:—

	Tenure of office.	How Removable during tenure.	Authority.
I.—MAINE.			
Supreme Judges,	Seven years.	{ By Governor on address of both Houses of Legislature.	Const. Maine, art. vi. § 4, and ix. 5.
Justices of Peace,	Do.		
II.—MASSACHUSETTS.			
Supreme Judges,	Good behaviour.	{ Governor on address of both Houses.	Massachusetts Const. c. iii. art. 1 and 3.
Justices of Peace,	Seven years.		
III.—NEW HAMPSHIRE.			
Supreme Judges,	Good behaviour.	{ Governor and Council on address of both Houses.	Const. New Hampshire art. 104. Prob. Pow. § 1. 3.
Justices of Peace,	Five years.		
IV.—VERMONT.			
Supreme Judges,	Good behaviour.	{ Governor on address of both Houses.	Const. Vermont, § 24.
Justices of Peace,	Do.		
V.—RHODE ISLAND.			
Supreme Judges,	Good behaviour.	{ Governor on address of Legislature.	Charter of Charles II. and Const.
Justices of Peace,	Do.		
VI.—CONNECTICUT.			
Supreme Judges,	Good behaviour.	{ Do. do.	Const. Connecticut, art. v. § 3.
Justices of Peace,	One year.		
VII.—NEW YORK.			
Supreme Judges,	Good behaviour,	{ Do. Legislative majority.	Const. New York, art. v. § 1. 3, and 6.
Justices of Peace,	till sixty years. Five years.		
VIII.—NEW JERSEY.			
Supreme Judges,	Seven years.	{ Impeachment by Assembly before Council.	Const. New Jersey, § 12.
Justices of Peace,	Five years.		
IX.—PENNSYLVANIA.			
Supreme Court,	Fifteen years.	{ Governor on address of two thirds of both Houses.	Const. Pennsylvania, art. v. § 2.
Justices of Peace,	Terms of Ten and Five years.		
X.—DELAWARE.			
Supreme Judges,	Good behaviour.	{ By Governor on address of two thirds of both Houses.	Const. Delaware, art. vi. §§ 44, 25.
Justices of Peace,	Seven years.		
XI.—MARYLAND.			
Supreme Judges,	Good behaviour.	{ Governor on address of two thirds of both Houses.	Art. ix. amendment of Const.
Justices of Peace,	Do.		
XII.—VIRGINIA.			
Supreme Judges,	Good behaviour.	{ Governor on address of two thirds of both Houses.	Const. Virginia, art. iii. § 12, and v. § 1 and 2.
Justices of Peace,	Do.		

the ability of the bench is generally unequal to that of the counsel, and their station in life inferior. This appears in the clearest manner from the amount of the salaries paid to these functionaries, which, even in the highest stations, never exceeds £1200, and in the local judicatures even of the greatest states, seldom reaches

CHAP.
XV.
1812.

	Term of Office.	How Removed from Office.	Authority.
XIII.—NORTH CAROLINA.			
Supreme Judges, Justices of Peace,	Good behaviour. Do.	{ Governor on address of two-thirds of Senate.	Const. North Carolina, art. v. § 1, 2, and 3; Ord. C. C.
XIV.—SOUTH CAROLINA.			
Supreme Judges, Justices of Peace,	Good behaviour. Do.	{ On impeachment by two-thirds of Senate by address of both Houses.	Const. South Carolina, art. vi. § 1.
XV.—GEORGIA.			
Supreme Judges, Justices of Peace,	Three years. Good behaviour.	{ Governor on address of two-thirds of both Houses.	Const. Georgia, art. iii. § 1, 2, 3, 4.
XVI.—KENTUCKY.			
Supreme Judges, Justices of Peace,	Good behaviour. Do.	{ Governor on address of two-thirds of both Houses.	Const. Kentucky, art. vi. § 3.
XVII.—TENNESSEE.			
Supreme Judges, Inferior Judges,	Twelve years. Eight years.	{ By Senate on address of two-thirds of Re- presentatives.	Const. Tennessee, art. vi. § 2, 3, 4.
XVIII.—OHIO.			
Supreme Judges, Justices of Peace,	Seven years. Three years.	{ By Senate on address of two-thirds of Re- presentatives.	Const. Ohio, art. iii. § 8, 10.
XIX.—INDIANA.			
Supreme Judges, Justices of Peace,	Seven years. Do.	{ By majority of Senate on an impeachment by majority of Re- presentatives.	Const. Indiana, art. iii. § 2, 3, art. v. § 4.
XX.—LOUISIANA.			
Supreme Judges, Justices of Peace,	Good behaviour. Do.	{ Governor on address of three-fourths of both Houses.	Const. Louisiana, art. iv. § 5.
XXI.—MISSISSIPPI.			
Supreme Judges, Justices of Peace,	Two years. Two years.	{ Governor on address of two-thirds of both Houses.	Const. Mississippi, art. vi. § 1, 2, 3, 24, 25.
XXII.—ILLINOIS.			
Supreme Judges, Justices of Peace,	Good behaviour. Do.	{ Governor on address of two-thirds of both Houses.	Const. Illinois, art. vi. § 5.
XXIII.—ALABAMA.			
Supreme Judges, Justices of Peace,	Good behaviour. Do.	{ Governor on address of two-thirds of both Houses.	Const. Alabama, art. v. § 3.
XXIV.—MISSOURI.			
Supreme Judges, Justices of Peace,	Good behaviour. Do.	{ Governor on address of two-thirds of both Houses.	Const. Missouri, art. vi. § 1, 2, 3, 27.
XXV.—MICHIGAN.			
Supreme Judges, Justices of Peace,	Seven years. Do.	{ Two-thirds of Senate on impeachment by majority of Represen- tatives.	Const. Michigan, art. iii. § 3, art. i. art. § 2, 3.
XXVI.—ARKANSAS.			
Supreme Judges, Justices of Peace,	Eight years. Two years.	{ Two-thirds of Senate on address by ma- jority of Represen- tatives.	Const. Arkansas, art. iv. § 26, 27, and art. vi. § 3, 4.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

£500 a-year.* But although these important functionaries hold their offices during the pleasure of a legislature elected by a mere majority of numbers, as was the case in France after the first outbreak of the Revolution, yet no suspicion attaches to their judgments; and justice is impartially administered, in questions at least between man and man, except perhaps in a very few political cases, on the bench. Democratic jealousy, by the dependence which it exacts, and the scanty remuneration which it offers, may effectually exclude elevated character or shining abilities from public situations; but by fixing the attention of all on public functionaries, it provides the only effectual antidote to official corruption.¹

* Salaries paid to judges supreme and inferior in America:—

	Dollars.
Chief Justice of Supreme Court, . . .	5000 or £1050
Ordinary Judges, . . .	4500 — 900
Chief Judge of New York, . . .	3500 — 700
Second Judge of New York, . . .	2000 — 400
Chief Judge of Pennsylvania, . . .	2500 — 500
— — North Carolina, . . .	2000 — 400
— — South Carolina, . . .	2500 — 600
— — Ohio, . . .	1000 — 200
— — Missouri, . . .	2000 — 400

And the others in proportion.—*Stat. Alm.* 1841, p. 64.

Connected with this subject there is a very curious fact, indicative of the opposite effect, yet springing from the same motive at bottom in society, of aristocracy in Europe and democracy in America. It is mentioned by Tocqueville, and the same fact is also attested by Chevalier, that while the greater appointments in America are not paid at so high a rate as a tenth, or sometimes a twentieth part of what the same class of officers in Europe receive, the inferior class of functionaries draw often three, sometimes five times as much as their brethren on this side of the Atlantic. The President of the United States has six thousand a-year, and the highest judge in the republic twelve hundred; but a common sailor has five pounds a-month, and a sheriff-officer or macer from fifty to a hundred pounds a-year. In Great Britain the sovereign has two hundred thousand pounds a-year for the privy purse, exclusive of the civil list, which constitutes no part of the royal expenses; and the highest judges ten or fifteen thousand. But the common sailor has one pound fifteen a-month, besides his allowances and rations, which may amount to as much more, and the doorkeeper or macer would think himself well paid with half of what his brother in America enjoys. Human nature is the same on both sides of the water. Aristocracy in Europe liberally provides for the functionaries who are drawn from its own class, or the splendour with which it sympathises; democracy in America rewards in the most niggardly manner the elevated class of public servants, with which it feels no identity of interest, and reserves all its liberality for the inferior one, from which it itself expects to derive benefit. See TOCQUEVILLE, ii. 73, 75; CHEVALIER, ii. 151.

¹ Tocq. ii.
44, 176,
177. Chev.
ii. 151.
Mart. i. 116.

Literary and intellectual ability of the highest class are comparatively rare in America. The names of Cooper, Channing, and Washington Irving, indeed, amply demonstrate that the American soil is not wanting in genius of the most elevated and fascinating character. Bancroft has given a history of the United States distinguished by profound thought, accurate research, and a manly eloquence; and Prescott, in his fascinating pages, has communicated to the romance of Castilian exploit the riches of classic lore, the colours of painting, and the glow of poetry. Longfellow may be placed beside the great lyric poets of Europe, for profound thought, deep feeling, and touching pathos. But these are the exceptions, not the rule. Such is the concentration of public interest on objects of present and often passing concern, that neither the future nor the past excite general attention. The classics are in little esteem, except with the very highest class of writers; a certain amount of average education in the dead languages is general, considerable knowledge of them uncommon. Works in the abstruse branches of philosophy or speculation are rare. We have the authority of Tocqueville for the assertion, that so generally are they regardless of historical records or monuments, that half a century hence the national annals, even of these times, could only be written from the archives of other states. With a few brilliant exceptions, the Americans have no literature; they have only pamphleteers and journalists.* Literary talent is, in a great degree, directed to the wants or amusements of the day;

CHAP.

XC.

1812.

75.

Literature
and the
press.

* "In the New World there is no literature either classic, romantic, or Indian: — classic, the Americans have no models; romantic, they have no middle ages; Indian, the Americans despise the savages, and regard the woods with horror, as a prison reserved for them. Thus it is not literature by itself, literature properly so called, that exists in America; it is literature made serviceable to the various requirements of society; it is the literature of mechanics, of merchants, of mariners, of labourers." — CHATEAUBRIAND'S *Memoirs*, ii. 315. This description applies to America fifty years ago, since which her great authors have arisen; but that it is generally true at this moment, may be judged of by the fact that it is precisely the condition, so far as regards literature, of the manufacturing districts of Great Britain at this time.

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

it is vehement and impassioned, often in the highest degree able, among them; but in general regardless of other and more durable concerns. The poetry of America is often beautiful: there is nothing more touching in literature than some of the fugitive pieces in their general collections. But, generally speaking, it is descriptive, not reflective: the wide expanse of natural beauty, not the receding recesses of national event, seem to have chiefly struck their imaginations. This peculiarity, however, is not owing to any deficiency in the national taste for the higher branches of literature, but to the fact that England, as the older state, has hitherto in a great degree kept possession of the American market in the productions of thought. So great is still the influence of this start, that the highest class of American authors, such as Cooper, Prescott, and Washington Irving, publish all their works in London first, in preference to their own country. But the taste for English classical writing is not only general, but almost universal. The leading popular authors of Great Britain are all published in America, and read with avidity. So numerous are the editions of the more celebrated writers of this country which appear on the other side of the Atlantic, that they exceed those published in England itself.* This affords decisive evidence, that if their own writers are chiefly occupied with objects of local or party contention, the taste for a higher class of literature is diffused to a sur-

* The author hopes he will not be accused of vanity, if he refers to the success of his own work for a proof of this assertion. "Notwithstanding the repugnance which is felt among us to Mr Alison's misrepresentations of the United States, and the still stronger antipathy to anti-republican heresies, such are the cravings for historical literature, and the avidity with which it is read, that *fifteen thousand* copies of his own work are already disseminated before the printing of the entire work is finished."—*Note to American edition of this History*, vol. iv. 445. New York, 1845: Harper and Brothers. It is a curious proof, however, of the inability of the American majority to bear a free discussion on their customs and institutions, that a popular edition of this *History* has been published in the United States *without the chapter on America*; and this is held forth by the advertiser as a great recommendation. They seem to have embraced the old principle of the English law, "the greater the truth, the greater the libel, because it is the more difficult to bear."

prising degree through the community, greater, indeed, than in any European state. The Americans say this general taste for foreign literature is inconsistent with a deficiency in native literary talent. They might as well say, that because a vast quantity of French wine is drunk in England, therefore Great Britain has vineyards equal to those of Champagne or Burgundy. "America," says De Tocqueville, "is the country in the world where the people are most fond of literature, and where it is least cultivated by themselves."¹

CHAP.
XV.
1812.

¹ Tocq. vi.
108, 109.

Legislation, stamped with the same character, is almost entirely engrossed with objects of material, and often only temporary importance. The struggles of interest between contending provinces or classes in society; the formation of railroads, canals, or harbours, for the advantage of particular districts; the establishment of joint-stock companies as a source of individual profit, engross nine-tenths both of the general and local legislation of the United States. The press, which everywhere abounds, and is diffused to a degree unexampled in any other country, though by no means deficient in ability, is generally distinguished by violence, personalities, and rancour. Its influence is so considerable in guiding the irresistible impulse of public opinion, that it may truly be said to be the ruler of the state, though itself is swayed by the interests and passions of those to whom its productions are addressed. It is well known in the United States, that public services the most important, private character the most immaculate, furnish no protection whatever against its calumnies; and that by a combination among the editors of newspapers, should so unlikely an event occur, the noblest and best citizens of America may at any time be driven into exile.²*

76.
Character of
its legisla-
tion.

² Tocq. ii.
63, 64.

* "It is certain that, for a series of dangerous years, the American press has become the vehicle of the most atrocious personal calumny, and the most flatulent national self-adulation. Bodies of men, however ignorant and small, have come to consider themselves as integral portions of a community which never errs, and consequently entitled to esteem themselves infallible. When

CHAP.
XC.
— 1812.
77.
Great emi-
nence of the
American
legal
writers.

In one most important branch of knowledge, the Americans have already acquired great and deserved distinction. Their legal writers exhibit a degree of learning, judgment, and penetration, which, honourable to any country, is in the highest degree remarkable in one, the career of which has so recently commenced. The works of Storey, Kent, and Greenleaf are distinguished alike by industry, research, and reflection, arranged in systematic order, and guided by the spirit of extensive and enlightened observation. It is not going too far to assert, that they are superior to any systematic writings of a similar description which England has produced. Nor is it difficult to discern the cause of this remarkable excellence. Every great system of law is the result of experience. The most powerful intellect, the most penetrating genius, is unequal to the task, till enlightened by the wisdom learned, the disappointments felt, during many successive ages. The Roman law, one of the most extraordinary monuments of uninspired wisdom which the world has ever seen, slowly grew up from the wisdom of the prætors, largely aided by the experience of other states, during thirty generations. It is the hasty and ill-considered enactments of positive legislation, often dictated by selfishness, directed by impulse, and drawn up in ignorance, which form the greatest, because the most irremediable, obstacles to the formation of a perfect system of jurisprudence.

78.
Cause of
this excel-
lence.

That England has felt, in its utmost extent, the force of this evil, need be told to none who are acquainted with the gigantic intricacies of its statute book, or felt the the blessing which it would be if nineteen-twentieths of it were by one sweeping enactment consigned to oblivion.

in debt, they have fancied it political liberty to pay their debts with the strong hand. This disease has already passed out of New York into Pennsylvania: it will spread, like any other epidemic, over the whole country; and there will soon be a severe struggle amongst us, between the knave and the honest man. Let the class of the latter look to it; it is to be hoped it is still sufficiently powerful to conquer." COOPER, *Preface to Lucy Hastings*, 1844.

The Americans have got quit, by their independence, of the authority of English acts of parliament ; while their want of any adequate store of national decisions has compelled them to have recourse to the great masters of English law, for those equitable precedents which the English judges had mainly adopted from the wisdom and experience of Roman jurisprudence. Thus the American law is based upon the best parts of the laws of Rome and England, and is at the same time in a great degree free of the positive enactments which have constituted the principal difficulty in both. By this means their systematic writers are enabled to follow out principle to its consequences, and exhibit a consistent system of jurisprudence to a degree impossible in an older state, in which the shock of long-contending interests has established numerous points of statute law, irreconcilable either with principle or expedience. The decisions of the American courts are in general unexceptionable in cases between man and man : between man and the prejudices or passions of the despotic majority, the decisions of their courts, constrained by the absolute power of juries deeply impregnated with their feelings, are often of a very different description.

Slavery, as all the world knows, exists to a great extent in a large part of the United States. It is in the southern states that this dreadful evil almost exclusively prevails ; for although the Negro race extends into the northern parts of the Union, yet their number is declining in these districts, while it is rapidly increasing in those to the south ; and the present comparative rate of increase of the two races justifies the hope, that ere long slavery will be entirely confined to those parts of America which border on the tropics. There, however, it prevails to a prodigious extent, and nearly the whole labour, both field and domestic, is performed by the African race. In the six states of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, there were

CHAP.
XC.
1-12.

79.
Great ex-
tent of sla-
very in the
United
States.

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

in 1840 no less than 1,751,529 slaves—a vast number, considering that the total free white population of the same districts is only 2,406,876.* History has not yet solved the questions, either whether the negro race can ever be induced to labour continuously and effectively without the coercion of a master, or whether the whites are capable of bearing the effect of rural work in hot climates. But the experience, alike of Africa in every age, of St Domingo in the last, and of the British West India colonies in the present, seems to lead to the belief that both questions must be resolved in the negative: that the Negro constitution possesses an aptitude for bearing the effect of tropical heat to which the European is a stranger; and that the utmost which philanthropy can do for the descendants of Canaan in the New World—of whom it was prophesied that they should be the servants of those of Japhet†—is to mitigate their sufferings, and restrain the severity of their oppression.

80.
Vehement
resistance
made
against
its aboli-
tion.

The most energetic efforts have been made for a number of years back, by a humane and philanthropic party in the United States, headed by not a few leaders of genius and ability, to produce a general feeling against the farther continuance of slavery in any part of the Union; but although they have succeeded in procuring its abolition in a few states, where the Negroes were inconsiderable in number, they have made no sort of impression in those where they are numerous. All the

*	FREE WHITES.		SLAVES.	
	Males.	Females.	Males.	Females.
Virginia, . . .	371,223	369,745	228,661	220,326
North Carolina, .	240,047	244,823	123,546	122,271
South Carolina, .	130,496	128,588	158,678	168,350
Georgia, . . .	210,534	197,161	139,335	141,609
Alabama, . . .	176,692	158,493	127,360	126,172
Mississippi . . .	97,256	81,818	98,003	97,208
	1,226,248	1,180,620	875,583	875,946

* *Census*, 1841.

† "God shall enlarge Japhet, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem: and Canaan shall be his servant."—*Genesis*, ix. 27.

efforts of philanthropy, all the force of eloquence, have been shattered against the obvious interests of a body of proprietors dependent for their existence on slave labour, and the experienced dangers of precipitate emancipation. It is perfectly understood in every part of the Union, that the first serious attempt to force the freedom of the Negroes upon the country by a general measure, will be the signal for an immediate separation of the southern states from the confederation. Superficial observers are never weary of throwing their tenacious retention of slavery in America in the face of the republicans of that country, and proclaiming it as the greatest of all inconsistencies, for those who are so ambitious of maintaining and extending their own privileges, to deny even common freedom to others who happen to be subject to their power. More profound thinkers have observed, that this democratic principle is itself the main cause of the obstinate retention of the servient race in slavery; that in every country and age of the world, those who are loudest in the assertion of their own privileges, are the least inclined to share them with others; that they are extremely willing to level *down* to a certain point, but extremely unwilling to level *up* from below to the same point; and that that point is always to be found in that stratum of society where the majority of the electors is placed. There cannot be a doubt that the observations of Mr Burke on this subject are well founded. The English Reformed House of Commons would never have emancipated the West India Negroes, if they had been in the employment of even a part of the electors. Witness the obstinate resistance the democratic members of the legislature so long made to any restriction on the practical slavery of the factory children.

Volumes without number have been written on the manners of the Americans: their exclusive system in society; their national vanity and irritability at censure;—and many of these productions, lively and amusing, are

CHAP.
XC.
— 1812.

61.
Morals and
Manners of
America.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

penned in no friendly, and often in no just spirit. The whole subject may be dismissed in a single paragraph. The manners of the Americans are the manners of Great Britain, *minus* the aristocracy, the landowners, the army, and the established church. Their standard of morality is not high, but it is in an eminent degree practical. It is not founded on chivalrous recollections, but on every day's experience. They do not speak of the beauty of virtue; they speak of its utility. The American moralists have abandoned all hope of counteracting the selfish propensities of our nature—they labour only to turn them into the safest channel. In New York and Philadelphia, the society of the great merchants is undistinguishable from that of the same rank in the greatest towns of the British Islands: the habits of the American middle class, if a few revolting customs are excepted, will find a parallel in our steam-boats, railway-trains, and stage-coaches. Exclusive society is practised to an extent, and pervades all ranks to a depth, altogether unknown in most European communities, where the distinctions of rank have been long established, are well understood, and not liable to be infringed upon, except by peculiar merit or good fortune.* But this is the necessary result of the total absence of all hereditary rank, and may be witnessed to nearly the same extent, and from the same causes, in the commercial and manufacturing cities of Great Britain.¹

The admiration for rank which is generally felt in America, especially by the fair sex, is excessive. They

¹ Clateau, *Mem.* ii. 329.

* "‘You can’t imagine,’ said an American girl, the daughter of a milliner, to Miss Martineau, ‘what a nice set we have at school; we never let any of the *haberdashery daughters* associate with us.’ My informant went on to mention how anxious she and her set of about sixty young people were to visit ‘*exclusively*’ among themselves: ‘how delightful it would be to have no *grocers’ daughters* among them?’ but ‘that was found to be impossible.’” MARTINEAU, iii. 33. “*Culam non autumum mutant qui trans mare eunant.*”

“The Americans, who freely mix with one another in political assemblies, carefully separate themselves into small but very distinct associations, in order to taste apart the enjoyments of private life. Each would willingly receive his fellow-citizens as his equals, but it is a very few indeed that he receives among his friends or his guests.” TOCQUEVILLE, iv. 107.

are in an especial manner desirous of the lustre of descent from old families in Great Britain. But that is common to them with republicans all the world over. The abolition of titles of honour in democratic communities is the result, not of a contempt, but of an inordinate desire, for such distinctions; they injure, when enjoyed by a few, the self-love of those who do not possess them; and since the majority cannot enjoy that advantage,—for if they could it would cease to be one,—they are resolved that none shall. Hence it is that, in the first fervour of each of their many revolutions, the French abolished titles of honour: and as uniformly recurred to them when the burst of the moment was over. The Americans are vain on all national subjects, and excessively sensitive to censure, however slight, and most of all to ridicule; but that obtains invariably with those classes or individuals who have not historic descent or great personal achievements or qualities to rest upon, and who, desirous of general applause, have a secret sense that in some particulars they may be undeserving of it. The Americans have already done great things: when they have continued a century longer in the same career, they will, like the English, be a proud, and cease to be a vain people. Vanity, as Bulwer has well remarked, is a passion which feeds on little gratifications, but requires them constantly; pride rests on great things, and is indifferent to momentary applause. The English not only noway resent, but positively enjoy, the ludicrous exhibitions made of their manners on the French stage. Such burlesques would be to the Americans like flaying alive. The English recollect that the French learned these peculiarities when the British troops occupied Paris.¹

How, then, has it happened that a country possessing none of the securities against external danger or internal convulsion, which have been elsewhere found to be indispensable, has still gone on increasing and flourishing: extending alike in internal strength and external con-

CHAP.
XCV.

1-12.

82.
Their admiration for such and titles.¹ Toeq. iv.
23.

83.

How has America escaped its political dangers?

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

sideration; and still exhibiting, though with several ominous heaves, an unruffled surface in general society? The solution of this peculiarity is to be found in the circumstance, that the United States have no neighbouring powers either capable of endangering their security, or likely to gain by provoking their hostility; that the majority of the electors, as yet, are owners of land, and therefore have an interest in resisting or preventing spoliation of real property; and that the back settlements furnish a perpetual and ready issue for all their restless activity and discontented energy, to exhaust and enrich itself in pacific warfare with the forest. When these peculiarities have ceased to distinguish them, as cease they must in the progress of things; when the growth of population, and completed appropriation of land, have rendered the class of workmen who live by wages more numerous than those who have property of their own, and the filling up or distance of the frontier settlements has closed that vast outlet to the selfish desires and ill humours of the state,—the political power, now vested in numbers, will inevitably produce a general disruption and chaos of society, attended with consequences as disastrous as those which in our times have desolated the provinces of South America.* This can only be prevented if, as is

* This period, if we may trust the most popular writer in the United States, is not far distant. "Formerly," says Cooper, "the audacious sophism of calling landed property a monopoly, in a country possessing above a hundred acres to each soul, was not broached. Men did not then set themselves up as representatives of the whole community, and interpret the laws in their own favour, as if they were the first principles of the entire republic. A crisis is at hand; and we are about to see the laws triumphant, or acts of aggression that will far outdo all that has hitherto rested on the American name in regard to pecuniary transactions. The signs of the times are ominous as regards real liberty, by substituting in its stead the most fearful of all tyrannies, the spurious, in its place. God alone knows for what we are reserved; but one thing is certain, there must be a movement *backward*, or the nation is lost."—COOPER, *Lucy Hardinge*, iii. 223. Lord Macaulay has expressed the same sentiments still more strongly in his letter to H. S. Randall, Esq., New York, published in the *Times* of April 7, 1860:—"It is quite plain that your government will never be able to restrain a distressed and discontented majority, for with you the majority is the government, and has the rich, who are always a minority, absolutely at its mercy. The day will come when, in the State of New

not improbable, a sense of the approaching danger, or events that cannot now be foreseen, restore to the United States those safeguards against human wickedness which have in all other ages and countries been found to be essential to the existence of society. "There is no limit," says De Tocqueville, "to general misery, if men remain selfish and grasping after they have become equal."¹

CHAP.
XC.

1-12.

¹ De Tocq.
iii. 249.

In many of the fundamental particulars which distinguish the United States of America from all other countries of the world, the British provinces in CANADA entirely participate. They have the same boundless extent of unappropriated territory, in some places rich and fertile, in others sterile and unproductive; the same active and persevering race to subdue it; the same restless spirit of adventure, perpetually urging men into the recesses of the forest in quest of independence; the same spirit of freedom and enterprise; the same advantages arising from the powers of knowledge, the habits of civilisation, the force of credit, the capacities of industry. Their progress in respect of wealth and population, accordingly, has been nearly at the same rate, at least since, in the middle of the last century, they fell under the British dominion, as that of the neighbouring provinces in the United States. Both have regularly gone

^{84.}
Political
state of Ca-
nada and its
population.

York, a multitude of people, not one of whom has had more than half a breakfast, or expects to have more than half a dinner, will choose a legislature. Is it possible to doubt what sort of legislature will be chosen? On one side is a statesman preaching patience, respect for vested rights, strict observance of public faith. On the other is a demagogue ranting about the tyranny of capitalists and usurers, and asking why anybody should be permitted to drink champagne and to ride in a carriage while thousands of honest folks are in want of necessaries. Which of the two candidates is likely to be preferred by a working man who hears his children crying for more bread? I seriously apprehend that you will, in some such season of adversity as I have described, do things which will prevent prosperity from returning. Either some Caesar or Napoleon will seize the reins of government with a strong hand; or your republic will be as fearfully plundered and laid waste by barbarians in the twentieth century as the Roman empire was in the fifth; with this difference, that the Huns and Vandals who ravaged the Roman empire came from without, and that your Huns and Vandals will have been engendered within your own country by your own institutions."

CHAP.
XC.
1812.

on, doubling in somewhat less than a quarter of a century—a rate of advance which may be considered as the maximum of colonial increase in the most favourable circumstances, and when largely aided by emigration from the parent state. The total inhabitants of the British possessions in America are now (1842) about two millions: but when it is recollected that the natural increase of this number is aided by an annual immigration of from fifty to sixty thousand persons in the prime of life from the British islands, which number is rapidly increasing, it may well be imagined that it is destined to become, ere long, one of the most powerful states of the New World. The proprietors in Lower Canada alone are above sixty thousand, or one in nine of the whole population; while the paupers are only four thousand five hundred and fifty-two, or one in one hundred and fifty-one of the population—numbers the exact converse of what obtains in Great Britain.^{1*}

¹ Malte Brun, xi. 179. Martin's Col. Hist. iii. p. 1. and 89. Martin's Brit. Col. 408.

* The population of the British possessions in North America, according to the last censuses, taken in 1834 and 1842, was as follows:—

	1834.	1842.
Lower Canada,	549,005	640,000
Upper Canada,	336,161	486,055
New Brunswick,	152,156	156,162
Nova Scotia and Cape Breton,	142,548	178,237
Prince Edward's Island,	32,292	41,376
Newfoundland,	75,000	101,241
Total,	1,287,462	1,603,071

Upper Canada, in 1848, contained 723,292 inhabitants. MARTIN'S *British Colonies*, i. 132. In Lower Canada, there were in the same year 768,334 persons.—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, xii. 279. 283.

Increase of Population in Lower Canada.

Years.	Population.
1764,	76,275
1783,	113,012
1825,	425,080
1831,	540,628
1841,	638,000
1848,	768,334

—MALTE BRUN, ix. 179. In the last eighty years the population has multiplied tenfold.

The population of Upper Canada alone is now (1849) above 800,000, and the total inhabitants of the British provinces of North America are scarcely, if at all, under 2,000,000.—See MALTE BRUN, xi. 179; *American Stat. Ann.*, 267; and MARTIN'S *Colonial History*, iii. p. 1. Table. The number of emigrants

It is not the points of resemblance between Canada and the United States of America, it is the points of their difference, which require to be pointed out ; and they are so remarkable, as to indicate, not obscurely, a different ultimate destiny for the two nations.

The character of the Canadians bears the same relation to that of the Americans that the Tyrolese does to that of the Swiss. Both are sprung from the same race, are subjected to the same necessities, are animated by the same ambition, and enjoy, in a great measure at least, the same advantages. But there is this difference between them, and in its ultimate effects it may prove a vital one. The American has no sovereign ; in him the aspirations of loyalty are lost, the glow of patriotic devotion is diffused over so immense a surface as to be well-nigh evaporated ; and, from having no visible or tangible object to rest upon, the generous affections are too often obliterated, and individual ambition, private advancement, the thirst for gold, absorb every faculty of the mind. In the Canadian, on the other hand, patriotic ardour is in general mingled with chivalrous devotion ; the lustre of British descent, the glories of British renown, animate every bosom, at least in the British race ; and with the well-founded pride arising from the contemplation of their own vast natural advantages, and honourable martial exploits, is mingled a strong and personal attachment to the throne.

CHAP.
XV.
1812.

85.
Loyalty of
the Cana-
dians.

who have landed at Quebec and Montreal, in the subjoined years, have been as follows. The marked diminution in the year 1838, being the year of the Canadian Revolt, is a striking commentary upon the tendency of the criminal ambition of its unprincipled leaders :—

1831.	.	49,783	1840.	.	32,293
1832.	.	66,339	1841.	.	38,194
1833.	.	28,898	1842.	.	54,128
1834.	.	40,060	1843.	.	23,518
1835.	.	15,573	1844.	.	22,924
1836.	.	35,226	1845.	.	31,893
1837.	.	29,884	1846.	.	43,439
1838 (Rebellion).	.	4,577	1847.	.	109,600
1839.	.	12,658	1848.	.	31,965

= MARTIN'S *British Colonies*, i. 108 ; and POTTES'S *Prod. Tables*, vi. 196 ; vii. 199 ; viii. 199 ; xii. 253.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

In Upper Canada, in particular, which now (1849) numbers above seven hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants, these sentiments are peculiarly strong. The large bodies of Scottish Highlanders who have settled in its secluded wilds have borne with them from their native mountains the loyal ardour by which their race has been distinguished in every period of English history; on all occasions of hazard they have been foremost at the post of honour; and to the patriotic attachment of the inhabitants of that noble province the preservation of those magnificent possessions to the British crown is mainly to be ascribed. It has radicals in abundance, like every other part of the British dominions; but the majority is firm, like the inhabitants of Great Britain, in their attachment to their sovereign. The effect of this spirit upon national character is incalculable. It produces that first and greatest step in social elevation—a forgetfulness of self, a devotion to others, a surrender of the heart to the generous affections. And from its tendency to concentrate the energies of men upon patriotic objects, it may at some future period, especially if its connection with England is maintained, combined with the incalculable advantages of the water communication by the great chain of lakes, come to counterbalance all the riches of the basin of the Mississippi, and reassert in America the wonted superiority of northern valour over southern opulence.

86.
The habi-
tants of
Lower Ca-
nada.

A peculiar and highly interesting feature of society in Lower Canada is to be found in the *habitants*, or natives of French descent. These simple people, for the most part entirely uneducated, and under the guidance of their Catholic priests, comprise eight-ninths of the whole population of that province, and their number now is not short of five hundred thousand. In every respect they are the antipodes of the Anglo-Saxon race, which elsewhere in the New World has acquired so decided a preponderance. While the colonists of British descent are incessantly penetrating the forests in search of new abodes, and

clearing them by their industry, those of French origin have in no instance migrated beyond the seats of their fathers, and remain immovably rooted in their original settlements. They are more neat and clean in their persons than the British, kind-hearted and simple in their dispositions. Local attachment, unknown in America, is felt in the strongest degree among the *habitans* of Canada; and rather than emigrate from their native habitations, or penetrate the woods in search of more extended or richer settlements, they divide and subdivide those which they already enjoy, till they have in many cases become partitioned into as diminutive portions as in the wine provinces of old France.¹

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

¹ Tocq. ii.
204. Malc
Brun, xi.
155. Buck-
ingham's
Canada,
247.

The effects of this disposition have been in the highest degree important. While the British race has been continually spreading around them, with the same vigour as in the American States, and the forests in every direction have been falling beneath their strokes, the French inhabitants have been fixed immovably in the seats of their fathers, and their descendants, though greatly increased in numbers, are to be found tilling their native fields. Hence, even in the infancy of their nation, they are already a prey to the evils of long-established civilisation. Population has become extremely dense in districts where the European race has been little more than a century established; and in the midst of a country which possesses three hundred thousand square miles of fertile territory, land is often partitioned into heritages of an acre and half an acre each. The ultimate results of this most striking peculiarity may already be distinctly foreseen. The British race, impelled into the wilderness by the wandering spirit which belongs to their blood, and the ardent passions which have been nursed by their institutions, will overspread the land, and, like a surging flood, surround and overwhelm those isolated spots where the French family, adhering to the customs, the attachments, and the simplicity of their fathers, are still marrying and giving in

§7.
Their disin-
clination to
expand in
the woods.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

¹ Malte
Brun, xi.
155, 156.
Tocq. ii.
204.

marriage in their paternal seats. Democracy is the great moving spring in the social world; it is the steam-power of society, the centrifugal force which impels civilisation into the abodes of savage man. It was the habits which the French settlers brought with them from their native monarchy, which has prevented its operation among their descendants.¹

88.
Ruinous ef-
fect of the
constitution
of 1791.

A rebellion, or possibly a separation from the parent state, was inevitably bequeathed to Canada by the constitution of 1791. That constitution, struck out at a heat during the first fervour of the French Revolution, and founded apparently on an equitable basis, the result of inexperience and an over-estimate of human nature, involved two fatal errors. 1st, The country was divided into different provinces, having separate assemblies, over each of which the representatives of the sovereign presided, without any common or paramount legislature in the colonies. Nothing could be more convenient at first sight, or just in theory, than this arrangement, under which the representatives of each province assembled within their own bounds to discuss their matters of local interest. But what was its effect when the representatives of Lower Canada, nine-tenths of the inhabitants of which were of French descent, were in one house, and those of the Upper Province, seventeen-twentieths of whom are of British origin, in another; and the former were animated by the combined passions of roused democracy and national animosity, and the latter for the most part by British spirit and steady loyalty to the throne? 2d, One uniform rate of qualification, viz. the possession of a forty-shilling freehold in the country, or a ten-pound subject held in *tenancy*—as by the British Reform Bill—in towns, was established as the test of the elective franchise in all the British provinces;* a principle in appearance

* By the act of 1791, 31 Geo. III. c. 31, the franchise is vested in forty shilling freeholders in the country; in property to the amount of £5 sterling, or tenancy of a subject paying £10 rent, in towns.

the most equitable, but in practice the most perilous and unequal, where the population is composed of different races of men, in different degrees of civilisation, knowledge, and advancement. It is exactly the same thing as cutting clothes according to one measure for a stripling of fifteen, a man of thirty, and a veteran of sixty, merely because they happen to live under the same roof.

The English have felt the evils of this system, in its application to the British islands, since the Reform Bill established one uniform qualification for the sober English, inured to centuries of freedom : the ambitious Scotch, teeming with visions of democratic equality ; and the fiery Irish, steeped in hatred of the religion and institutions of the Saxons. But these evils have been still more sorely felt in Canada, where that unhappy constitution, in its ultimate effects, gave the same powers to the French *habitans*, not one in fifty of whom could read, and who, speaking their native language, were but ill reconciled to a foreign dominion, as to the hardy English and Scotch emigrants, who had brought with them across the Atlantic the habits and loyalty of their fathers. But the evils consequent on this arrangement as yet lay buried in the womb of time ; they were brought to life only by the passions and the weaknesses of a future age ; and in 1812, when the war began, one only feeling of loyalty animated the whole inhabitants of the British North American possessions. Above forty thousand militia in arms were ready to defend their territory from invasion ; and the King of England had nowhere more loyal subjects than the French inhabitants on the shores of the St Lawrence.¹

Incalculable is the importance of its North American colonies to the British empire. Their population, already two millions, doubling every quarter of a century, promises, in fifty years, to amount to between seven and eight millions of souls ; while the opulence of the inhabitants, and the taste for British comforts which they have brought

CHAP.
XC.
—
1812.

59.
Evils arising from the diversity of race in Canada.

¹ Martin's
Col. Hist.
iii. 127, 128.
31 Geo.
111. c. 31.

90.
Vast importance of the North American colonies to Great Britain.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

with them from their native country, are likely to render them a boundless vent for our manufactures.* The peculiarity of their trade, consisting chiefly of those bulky articles, emigrants taken out, and wood brought home, has already rendered the commerce with them the nursery of the British navy. Already the exports of British produce and manufactures to our North American colonies have reached, on an average of years, above three millions sterling; an amount, great as it is, by no means unprecedented, when it is recollected that in 1812, when the war began, the United States of America, with a population somewhat under eight millions, took off annually thirteen millions' worth of British goods. But the marvels of the shipping employed in the North American trade exceed all other marvels. From the parliamentary returns, it appears that the tonnage, wholly British, employed at this time (1849) in the trade with the North American provinces, has reached

* Table showing the progress of the export and import trade and tonnage with our North American possessions, from 1827 to 1846:—

Years.	Exports. Declared value.	Imports. Declared value.	British tonnage.
1827	£950,490	£468,766	359,793
1828	1,248,288	466,065	400,841
1829	1,117,422	569,452	431,901
1830	1,570,020	682,202	452,397
1831	1,922,689	902,915	489,236
1832	2,078,949	795,652	504,211
1833	2,100,211	756,466	512,820
1834	1,339,629	618,598	524,606
1835	2,127,531	629,051	631,345
1836	2,739,507	633,575	620,722
1837	2,141,035	634,791	631,427
1838†	1,992,459	553,827	665,354
1839	2,467,319	721,679	709,846
1840	2,847,913	834,427	808,232
1841	2,947,061	968,599	841,348
1842	3,528,807	1,124,169	541,451
1843	1,751,211	1,213,462	771,905
1844	3,070,861	1,336,136	789,410
1845	3,515,954	1,479,134	1,090,224
1846	3,308,059	1,312,496	1,076,162

Parl. Return, 27th May 1849; *PORTER'S Parl. Tables*, x 116. and xii., xiii. and xiv., p. 52-54.

† Rebellion.

the enormous amount of eleven hundred thousand tons, being fully a fourth of that required for the intercourse carried on in British bottoms with the whole world put together; and that it has steadily advanced at the rate of doubling every ten years.* At this rate of increase, in ten years more it will give employment to two million tons of shipping, or fully *a half* of the whole British tonnage at this time. And observe, while this is the astonishing value of our colonial trade, both upon our manufactures and shipping, the result as regards our emancipated colonies is widely different. For the parliamentary papers demonstrate that at this moment, while two millions of our fellow-citizens in Canada and its dependencies annually consume above three millions' worth of our manufactures, twenty millions in the United States take off on an average only six or seven millions' worth, or considerably less than what half their number did thirty years ago, before rivalry of British manufactures had commenced. And while the trade with the Canadas gives employment to eleven hundred thousand tons of British shipping, that with the Independent States of America, with just *ten times* their population, only employs

CHAP.
XC.
—
1812.

* Table showing the comparative exports and tonnage to the United States of America and the British possessions therein, from 1836 to 1846:

Years.	Exports to United States, Declared value.	Exports to British American Possessions, Declared value.	Tonnage to United States Inwards		Tonnage to British Possessions.
			American.	British.	
1836	£12,425,605	£2,739,507	226,483	86,383	620,722
1837	4,695,225	2,141,035	275,313	81,023	631,427
1838	7,585,760	1,992,459	357,467	83,203	665,354
1839	8,839,204	2,467,619	282,005	92,482	709,496
1840	5,253,020	2,347,913	426,897	138,201	808,222
1841	7,098,642	2,947,061	294,170	121,777	841,348
1842	3,528,807	2,333,525	319,524	152,333	541,451
1843	5,013,514	1,751,211	396,139	200,781	771,905
1844	7,938,079	3,070,861	338,737	206,133	789,410
1845	7,142,839	3,555,954	444,442	223,676	1,099,224
1846	6,830,460	3,308,059	435,344	205,123	1,076,162

- PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, vi. 43; vii. 43; xvi. 120; and *Ibid.* 1839, 1840, 1841, p. 44, 50, 52, 518.

CHAP.
XC.

1812.

¹ Martin's
Brit. Col.
i. 129.91.
Vital differ-
ence be-
tween fo-
reign and
colonial
trade.

two hundred thousand, or a *fifth part* of the Canadian amount, the remainder having passed into the hands of the Americans themselves. The militia of the Upper and Lower Provinces amount to two hundred and sixty thousand men; a force, with British aid, amply sufficient, if their affections are secured, to bid defiance to all external attempts at subjugation.¹

These facts illustrate the important, and to a commercial state vital, distinction between the foreign and colonial trade, as they affect the market for manufactures and the means of national security. It may safely be affirmed that, on a due and general appreciation of this distinction, the existence of the British empire, in future times, will in all probability come to depend. Experience has now abundantly proved that, even as a trading and manufacturing state, we are dependent on our colonies, if not for the largest, for the most growing part of our exports; and that it is in these that both the most eventually important and enduring market for our domestic industry is to be found.* It is too late to lament the large proportion of our capital and national industry which has been directed to foreign commerce and manufactures, and the huge masses of our population, embracing the most dangerous classes of the com-

* Table showing the population of the under-mentioned countries in 1836, the British exports to them, and the proportion per head they consume of such exports:—

	Population in 1836.	Exports in 1836.	Proportion per head.
Russia,	60,000,000	£1,722,433	£0 0 8½
Sweden,	3,000,000	113,308	0 0 9
Denmark,	2,000,000	91,302	0 0 10
Prussia,	14,000,000	160,472	0 0 3½
France,	32,000,000	1,591,381	0 0 11
Portugal,	3,000,000	1,085,934	0 0 8
Spain,	14,000,000	437,000	0 0 8
United States of America, .	14,000,000	12,425,605	0 17 6
British North American Colonies,	1,500,000	2,739,291	1 16 6
British West India Islands, .	900,000	3,786,453	3 12 0
British Australian Colonies, .	100,000	1,130,000	11 13 0

— PORTER'S *Part. Tables for 1836*, pp. 117, 118.

munity, who have come to depend on these branches of industry for their support. This direction, forced as it may appear, perilous as its consequences have become, has been induced upon the country by causes beyond the reach of human control, and probably forming part of the means employed by Providence for the dispersion of the European race through the world. It is of more consequence to recollect, as these facts demonstrate, the vital difference, in respect to national safety, between the foreign and the colonial trades, and the utter impossibility of any commercial nation long maintaining its independence, if a considerable part of its population depends on the markets they can find in *foreign* states. All such countries, from the very fact of their consuming manufactures, are growing rich, and will ere long become, if they are not already, rivals. The magnitude of a commercial nation's trade with such states is the measure, not of its strength, but of its weakness. It may at any moment be curtailed by foreign tariffs, destroyed by foreign hostility, and a helpless multitude of useless mouths left to encumber and paralyse the blockaded nation. But the case is very different with colonies which, forming integral though distant parts of the parent state, are actuated by no feeling of jealousy towards its mercantile establishments; which find their surest interest in following the agricultural pursuits for which they are all, in the first instance, destined by nature; which constitute at once the best market for its industry, and the widest vent for its population. Such distant dependencies, forming a vast empire, with the ocean for its interior line of communication, and held together by the strong bond of mutual interest, may, if ruled by wisdom and directed by foresight, long bid defiance to the open or covert hostility of foreign powers. Divided by the neglect, or irritated by the selfish legislation, of the parent state; deprived of the

CHAP.

XC.

1812.

CHAP. strong bond of mutual interest arising from protected
XC. industry ; cast adrift upon the world, and exposed to
1812. the competition of foreign countries, the empire of which
they form a part will speedily fall to pieces ; because the
ruling power at home, to gratify separate interests in the
dominant island, has neglected the mission appointed for
it by Providence, and ceased to benefit the human race.

CHAPTER XCI.

AMERICAN WAR.

VARIOUS have been the causes assigned by statesmen and historians for the disastrous issue of the first American war. Two may be specified, of such paramount importance that they eclipse all the others, and are of themselves perfectly adequate to explain the phenomenon, without recurring to any other. Great Britain was at that period in an especial manner, as she is at all times in a certain degree, the victim at once of democratic parsimony and aristocratic corruption. She undertook the conquest of colonies possessing then three millions of inhabitants, situated three thousand miles from the parent state, with an army which could not bring ten thousand combatants into the field ; for the whole military force of the empire, of every description, did not amount to twenty thousand men. The furious patriots and country party were perpetually declaiming against the enormous military and naval forces of an empire which even then embraced both hemispheres, when in fact these were considerably less than what Baden and Würtemberg, or other sixth-rate powers, now maintain, to defend dominions of not a hundredth part of the extent, nor possessing a thousandth part of the resources of the British empire at that period.*

CHAP.
XCI.

1812.

1.

Real causes
of the disastrous
issue
of the first
American
war.

* Supplies for the year 1773 :—

Dec. 3, 1772. That 20,000 men be employed for the sea-service for the year 1773, including 4354 marines.

Dec. 10. That a number of land forces, including 1522 invalids, amounting

CHAP.
XCI.1812.
2.Corruption
and ineffi-
ciency of
the army.

This Lilliputian army, such as it was, was still farther paralysed by the corruption—that inherent vice of aristocratic as well as democratic governments—which pervaded all its branches. Commissions in the army, bestowed almost entirely as a recompense for, or an inducement to secure, parliamentary support, were seldom the reward of the most deserving. Military education was unknown. It was no unusual thing to see boys in the nursery, captains and even majors in the army; and such was the corruption of commissaries and superior officers, sharing in their gains in the field, that the expense of the troops was nearly doubled, while their efficiency was reduced to less than a half. From the combined operation of these causes, the war, which, by a vigorous and efficient army, worthy of the real strength of England, might have been concluded with ease at latest in the second campaign, was protracted till France and Spain, as may always be expected in such a case, joined in the contest; and then England, after a long and costly struggle, was obliged in the end to succumb to a formidable coalition.

3.
Fatal operation of
these causes
on the war.

Even as it was, more than one opportunity of crushing the forces of the insurgents* was lost, by the incapacity on the part of the military commanders, or their selfish desire to protract the war, from the enormous profits with which, to them at least, it was attended. If Great

to 17,070 effective men, commissioned and non-commissioned officers included, be employed for the year 1773.

Feb. 13, 1775. That 2000 men be now added to the navy, in prospect of the war with the Plantations in America.

Feb. 15. That an augmentation of 4383 men be made to the land-forces.—*Ann. Reg.* 1773, 226; *App. to Chron.*; and for 1775, p. 93, 94.

These forces, it is true, were in the course of the war considerably augmented, and in 1776 above 30,000 men were voted by parliament; still this was not a third of what Great Britain might with ease have raised; but that only confirms the argument. It is not in the close, but the commencement of a revolution, that vigorous measures are likely to be successful.

* Particularly when the main American army, under Washington, was driven by Lord Howe into Long Island, and might have been made prisoners by a vigorous advance of the British troops, on 29th August 1776.—See *Ann. Reg.* vol. xix. 173.

Britain had put her naval and military forces on a proper footing *during peace*, and been ready, on the first breaking out of hostilities, to act with an energy worthy of her real strength ; if she had possessed fifty thousand disposable troops in 1775, and a hundred thousand in 1792, the American war might have been brought to a victorious termination in 1776, the French contest in 1793 : six years of subsequent disastrous warfare in the first case, and twenty of glorious but costly hostilities in the second, would have been avoided ; and the national debt, instead of eight hundred, would now have been under two hundred millions sterling. The history of England, for the last hundred and fifty years, has been nothing but a series of disasters in the first years of hostilities, in consequence of the absurd parsimony of the nation having starved down the military and naval establishments to the lowest point during the preceding years of peace—often redeemed, indeed, by glorious successes in the end, when experience had taught the people the necessity of exertion ; but never unaccompanied with lasting and burdensome expenses.

It was not surprising that the American people, after the glorious termination of the war of independence, should have retained a warm feeling of gratitude towards their allies, the French, and a strong degree of animosity towards their enemies, the English. The enlightened and truly patriotic leaders of this revolution, however, had discernment enough to perceive, that though the passions of the people were in favour of France, their interests were indissolubly wound up with those of England ; and they had greatness of mind sufficient to risk their popularity for the good of their country. The whole efforts of Washington and his friends in the government, from the conclusion of the American war in 1783, to the retirement of that great man from public life in 1796, were devoted to tempering the democratic ardour which had broken out with such vehemence in their country

CHAP.
XCI.
1812.

4.
Efforts of
Washington
to maintain
peace with
Great Brit-
tain.

CHAP.
XCI.

1812.

after the declaration of their independence, and laying the foundation of a lasting pacific intercourse with Great Britain. Yet, so strongly were the sympathies of the people enlisted on the side of France and revolution, that it required all his immense popularity to counteract, in 1793, the loudly expressed wish of the decided majority of the American citizens to declare war against Great Britain. So vehement was the clamour that, on more than one occasion at that period, it was apparent that the federalist party, to which he belonged, had lost the majority in the Chamber of Representatives; and such was the fury of the journals out of doors, that he was openly accused of aspiring to the monarchy, and of being, "like the traitor Arnold, a spy sold to the English." But Washington, unmoved, pursued steadily his pacific policy. The horrors of the French Revolution cooled the ardour of many of its ardent supporters on the other side of the Atlantic; and one of the last acts of that great man was to carry, by his influence in Congress, which procured its passing there only by the casting vote of the President, a commercial treaty with Great Britain.^{1*}

¹ Marshall's
Life of
Washington, v. 314,
255, 265.
Toeq. ii.
105. Ante,
ch. xxi. §
83.

5.
Progress of
the mari-
time dispute
with Amer-
ica.

But various causes contributed, in the course of the contest between England and France, at once to increase the partiality of the Americans to the latter country, and to bring such important interests of its citizens into jeopardy, as could hardly fail to involve them in the dispute. Under the influence of the equal law of succession, landed property was undergoing a continual division, while the increasing energy of the democratic multitude was gradually destroying the majority of the conservative party in Congress, and augmenting the violence of the popular press in the country. Already it had become painfully evident,—from the conduct of the American government on various occasions after Washington's retirement from public life, but especially in the dispute

* See the treaty, 19th November 1794, between Great Britain and America in MARTENS, v. 641; and *Ann. Reg.* 1795, *State Papers*, 291.

which occurred with France in 1797,* in consequence of the sanguinary decree of the Directory, and the readiness with which they accommodated all their differences with that power in 1800, and subscribed the treaty of Morfontaine, which recognised Napoleon's new maritime code, and, in particular, stipulated that the flag should cover the merchandise, and that no articles should be deemed contraband of war but arms and warlike stores—that their inclinations now ran violently in favour of the French side of the question, and that, right or wrong, for their interest or against it, they might be expected on the first crisis to take part with that power.¹ And with the usual tendency of mankind to attach themselves to names and not to things, this strong partiality for the French alliance, which originated in the common democratic feelings by which they both were animated, and the republican institutions which they both had established, continued after France had passed over to the other side. The citizens of the United States clamoured as loudly for a junction of their arms with those of the Great Empire under the despotic rule of Napoleon, as they had done for an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the rising Republic.

The Berlin and Milan decrees, and British Orders in Council, however, brought the American commerce immediately into collision with both the belligerent states, and rendered it hardly possible that so considerable a maritime power could avoid taking an active part in the strife. It has been already mentioned how that terrible contest, distinguished by a degree of rancour and violence on both sides unparalleled in modern warfare, commenced with Mr Fox's declaring the coasts of France and Holland, from Brest to the Elbe inclusive, in a state of blockade; which was immediately followed by Napoleon's famous Berlin and Milan decrees, which retaliated upon the English by declaring the British islands in a state of blockade,

CHAP.
XCI.
1807.

¹ *Ante*, ch.
xxxiii. § 14.

6.
The Berlin
and Milan
decrees, and
British
Orders in
Council.

May 16,
1806.

Nov. 27,
1806; and
Nov. 17,
1807.

* *Ante*, Chap. xxv. §§ 130, 131; 18th January and 20th October 1795; 30th September 1800.

CHAP.
XCI.
1807.
Nov. 11.

and authorising the seizure and condemnation of any vessel on the high seas bound from any British harbour, and the confiscation of all British goods wherever they could be found.* To this the English government replied by the not less famous Orders in Council, which, on the preamble of the blockade of the British dominions established by the Berlin decree, declared "all the posts and places of France and her allies, from which, though not at war with his Majesty, the British flag is excluded, shall be subject to the same restrictions, in respect of trade and navigation, as if the same were actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner; and that all trade in articles, the produce or manufacture of the said countries or colonies, shall be deemed unlawful, and all such articles declared good prize."¹

¹ Parl. Deb.
x. 134, 136.

7.
Effect of
these de-
crees upon
the neutral
trade.

It is difficult to say which of these violent decrees bore hardest upon neutral powers, or was most subversive of Napoleon's own favourite position, that the flag should cover the merchandise. For, on the one hand, the French Emperor declared that all vessels coming from England or its colonies, or having English goods on board, should be instantly seized and confiscated; and on the other, the English government at once declared the whole dominions of France and its allies, comprehending, after the treaty of Tilsit, nearly the whole of Europe, in a state of blockade, and all vessels bound for any of their harbours, or having any of their produce on board, good and lawful prize. Between these opposite and conflicting denunciations, it was hardly possible for a neutral vessel, engaged in the carrying trade of any part of Europe, to avoid confiscation from one or other of the belligerent parties. In such circumstances the Americans, whose adventurous spirit had enabled them to engross, during this long war, nearly the whole carrying trade of the globe, had unquestionably the strongest ground of

* *Ante*, Chap. I. § 6 12, where the subject is fully discussed, and the Orders on both sides given.

complaint; but against whom was it properly to be directed?—against the British, who, by Mr Fox's order, declared only the coast from the Elbe to Brest in blockade, and supported that declaration by a fleet of a thousand vessels of war, which had long since swept every hostile flag from the ocean; or the French, who, without a single ship of the line, and only a few frigates at sea, had declared the whole British empire, in every part of the world, in blockade, and all its produce and manufactures, wherever found, lawful prize? If Mr Fox's blockade of the Elbe and the Weser, besides the harbours of the French channel, was an unwarranted stretch, even when supported by the whole navy of England, what was Napoleon's blockade of the whole British empire, enforced only by a few frigates and sloops at sea? If, therefore, the Americans suffered, as suffer they did, in this unparalleled strife, the party which was to blame was that which first commenced this extraordinary system of declaring blockades to extend beyond the places actually invested by sea or land; and of that unheard-of extension Napoleon was unquestionably the author. If the Americans had been really animated by a desire in good faith to vindicate the rights of neutrals, and restrain the oppression of belligerents, what they should have done was to have joined their arms to those of Great Britain, in order to compel the return of the French Emperor to a more civilised method of warfare.

But these were very far from being the views which animated the ruling party now in possession of power in the United States. Mr Jefferson was now president, and he was the organ of the democratic majority, which, forgetting the wise maxims of Washington and the authors of American independence, without being inclined to submit, if it could possibly be avoided, to actual injustice or loss of profit from either of the belligerent powers, desired if possible to accommodate their differences with France, and wreak their spite on aristocracy, by uniting

CHAP.
XCL.
—
1807.

3.
Origin of
the dispute
with Ame-
rica.

CHAP.
XCI.

1807.

with that country against Great Britain. This disposition soon appeared in two decisive proceedings. The British government, in December 1806, had concluded and ratified a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, with the American plenipotentiary in London; but Mr Jefferson refused to ratify it on the part of the States, and it fell to the ground. Not long after, propositions were submitted by the American government to Napoleon on the subject of the Floridas, which they were desirous of acquiring from the Spaniards, and regarding which they wished a guarantee from the Emperor, that, in the event of their being attacked by the English, he would use his influence with the Spaniards to obtain their cession. This Napoleon, in the first instance, positively refused, as he had an eye to those possessions for Joseph as an appanage to the crown of Spain; and afterwards an ambiguous answer was returned: but this repulse had no effect in weakening Mr Jefferson's partiality for a French alliance.¹

Dec. 1807.
July 1808.
1 Bism. viii.
399. Parl.
Deb. xiv.
882, 887.

9.
Hostile
measures
of the
Americans
against the
British.
Oct. 27,
1807.

Meanwhile the American government took the most decisive measures for withdrawing their merchant vessels from aggression on the part of either of the belligerent powers. In the first instance an angry message was communicated to Congress by Mr Jefferson, inveighing bitterly against the British Orders in Council of January 1807, but not breathing the slightest complaint against Napoleon's Berlin decree of November 1806, to which they were merely a reply. On receipt of intelligence of the more extended British Orders of 11th November 1807, he laid a general embargo on all vessels whatever in the American harbours. And this was followed, on 1st March 1808, by the substitution of a Non-intercourse Act for the embargo, whereby all commercial transactions with either of the belligerent powers were absolutely prohibited; but the embargo was taken off as to the rest of the world.² This act, however, contained a clause (§ 11) authorising the President, by proclamation, to renew

March 1.
President's
Message,
Oct. 27,
1807. Ann.
Reg. 1807,
739. State
Papers, &c.
for 1808, p.
223. Bism.
xvii. 399.
Parl. Deb.
xiv. 812,
897.

the intercourse between America and either of the belligerent powers which should first repeal their obnoxious Orders in Council or Decrees. This Non-intercourse Act had the effect of totally suspending the trade between America and Great Britain, and inflicting upon both these countries a loss tenfold greater than that suffered by France, with which the commercial intercourse of the United States was altogether inconsiderable.

In addition to the other causes of difference, unhappily already too numerous, which existed between Great Britain and the United States, an unfortunate collision, attended with fatal consequences, ensued at sea. The Chesapeake, an American frigate, was cruising off Virginia, and was known to have some English deserters on board, when she was hailed by the Leopard, of fifty-two guns, Captain Humphreys, who made a formal requisition for the men. The American Captain denied he had them, and refused to admit the right of search: upon which Captain Humphreys fired a broadside, which killed and wounded several on board the Chesapeake, whereupon she struck, and the deserters were found on board, taken to Halifax, and one executed. The President upon this issued a proclamation, ordering all British ships of war to leave the harbours of the United States: but the English government disavowed the act, recalled Captain Humphreys, and offered to make reparation, as the right of search, when applied to vessels of *war*, extended only to a *requisition*, but could not be carried into effect by actual force.¹

This state of matters promised little hopes of an amicable adjustment; but as Mr Jefferson soon after retired from power, and was succeeded in the office of President by Mr Madison, who professed an anxious desire to adjust the differences which, to the enormous loss of both, had arisen between Great Britain and the United States, Mr Erskine, envoy and minister plenipotentiary at Washington, deemed the opportunity favour-

CHAP.
XCL.
—
1793.

10.
Affair of
the Chesapeake.

June 23,
1797.

July 14.
11. Erskine's
negotiation
with Mr
Madison.

CHAP. able for renewing the negotiations, and, if possible,
 XCI. restoring that amicable intercourse between the two
 — 1809. countries on which their mutual welfare was so materially
 April 17. dependent. A correspondence accordingly ensued between
 Mr Erskine and Mr Smith, the American foreign
 secretary, in which it was expressly stated, that the Non-
 intercourse Act had produced a state of equality between
 the United States and the belligerent powers, and that
 he accordingly offered public reparation for the forcible
 taking of the men out of the American frigate *Chesapeake*,
 which had highly inflamed the national passions on both
 April 18. sides of the water. To this Mr Smith made a reply in a
 similar amicable spirit ; and in consequence, Mr Erskine
 April 19. on the 19th April wrote to Mr Smith, that “his Majesty’s
 Orders in Council, of January and November 1807, will
 have been withdrawn, as respects the United States, on
 the 10th June next.” To which Mr Smith rejoined, that
 the Non-intercourse Act would be withdrawn, in virtue of
 the powers conferred on the President by the act estab-
 lishing it, from and after the 10th June ; and a procla-
 mation to that effect from him appeared the same day.¹

¹ See the
 Correspondence and
 Proclama-
 tion, Ann.
 Reg. 1809,
 694, 697.

12.
 Which the
 British gov-
 ernment
 refuses to
 ratify.

This important change of tone and concession had
 been obtained from the American government by a
 distinct and serious threat, held out by the five northern
 states of the Union, to break off from the confederacy if
 the Non-intercourse Act were any longer continued in
 force. To all appearance, therefore, the disputes with
 America were now brought to a close ; and on the faith
 that they were so, American vessels, in great numbers,
 poured into the British harbours, and the commercial
 intercourse between the two countries became more active
 than ever. This auspicious state of matters, however,
 was not destined to be of long continuance. In con-
 cluding this arrangement with the United States, Mr
 Erskine had not only exceeded, but acted in contradic-
 tion to his instructions ;* and although nothing could be

* This was at first denied, both in the House of Lords and Commons ; but

more advantageous for Great Britain than the renewal of a commercial intercourse with that power, yet it was not by government deemed worth purchasing by an abandonment, so far as the greatest carrying power in existence was concerned, of the whole retaliatory policy of the Orders in Council. The English ministry, accordingly, refused to ratify this arrangement; a resolution which, although fully justified in point of right by Napoleon's violence, and by Mr Erskine's deviation from his instructions, may now well be characterised as one of the most unfortunate, in point of expediency, ever adopted by the British government; for it at once led to the renewal of the Non-intercourse Act of the United States; put an entire stop, for the next two years, to all commerce with that country; reduced the exports of Great Britain fully a third, during the most critical and important years of the war; and, in its ultimate results, contributed to produce that unhappy irritation between the two countries which has never yet, notwithstanding the strong bonds of mutual interest by which they are connected, been allayed.^{1*}

CHAP.
XCI.
1806.

MAY 24.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1809, 255,
256. Parl.
Deb. xv.
314.

It may well be imagined what a storm of indignation arose in the United States when the intelligence of the refusal of the British government to ratify Mr Erskine's convention was received; and how prodigiously it strengthened the hands of the party already in power, and supported by a decided majority in the nation, which was resolved at all hazards, and against their most obvious interests, to involve the country in a war with Great

13.
Storm of
indignation
in the
United
States at
this dis-
avowal.

on February 5, 1810, Mr Canning seconded a motion of Mr Whitbread's for production of the instructions, which were accordingly brought forward and printed, and completely proved Mr Canning's assertion, that they had been violated by Mr Erskine. No farther notice, accordingly, was taken of the subject in parliament. See *Parl. Deb.* xv. 314; and *Ann. Reg.* 1810, 255, 256.

* Exports from Great Britain, declared value:

1806, . . .	£49,874,583	1810, . . .	£43,438,084
1807, . . .	37,245,877	1811, . . .	32,890,712
1808, . . .	37,275,402	1812, . . .	41,710,964
1809, . . .	47,371,363	1813, . . .	Records destroyed by fire.

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 28.

CHAP.
XCI.

1809.

Britain. Mr Erskine, as a matter of course, was recalled, and Mr Jackson succeeded him as British envoy at Washington; but his reception was such, from the very outset, as left little hope of an amicable termination of the differences. From the President's table, where the English minister was treated with marked indifference, if not studied insult, to the lowest alehouse in the United States, there was nothing but one storm of indignation against the monstrous arrogance of the British maritime pretensions, and the duplicity and bad faith of their government. Unhappily the elections for Congress took place during this whirlwind of passion, and such was the ascendancy which the democratic party acquired in the legislature from this circumstance, that it was plain all hopes of an accommodation were at an end. Mr Jackson continued, however, at the American capital, striving to allay the prevailing indignation, and renew the negotiation where Mr Erskine had left it off. But it was all in vain; and after a stormy discussion of twenty-five days in the House of Representatives, it was determined, by a great majority, to break off all communication with the British envoy. In consequence, Mr Pinckney, the American envoy in London, was directed to request the recall of Mr Jackson, whose firmness the American government found themselves unable to overcome; and this was at once acceded to by the British administration. And on the 10th August, Mr Madison formally announced by proclamation, that as "England had disavowed the acts of its minister, the commerce which had been renewed with that country, on the supposition that the Orders in Council were repealed, must be again subjected to the whole operation of the Non-intercourse Act which had been suspended."¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1810, 258,
262. Bign.
viii. 399,
400, 408.

Meanwhile the maritime dispute, so far as the Orders in Council and decrees of Napoleon were concerned, seemed to be reduced, as between America and both these powers, to a mere point of etiquette who should give in first.

England had constantly declared, both in diplomatic notes and speeches by her ministers in parliament, that the Orders in Council were retaliatory measures only ; and that as soon as the French Emperor would recall the Berlin and Milan decrees, they should be repealed. On the other hand, Napoleon formally declared through M. Champagny, that "if England recalls her blockade of France, the Emperor will recall his blockade of England ; if England withdraws her Orders in Council of 11th November 1807, the Milan decree will fall of itself." And to complete the whole, America had already solemnly stated in the Non-intercourse Act, and Mr Madison had acted in terms of it by his declaration of 19th April 1809, that if either France or England would repeal their obnoxious decrees, the non-intercourse would immediately cease with respect to the country making such concession. And this assurance was again renewed by the American legislature, in a bill brought forward in January 1810, which passed by a large majority. It seems difficult to account, therefore, for the continued adherence to the rigorous system of maritime warfare on the part of either of the belligerent powers, and especially of Great Britain, which had such vital commercial interests dependent on adjusting matters with America, and so little to gain either in honour or profit from a contest with that power. But notwithstanding all this, the misunderstanding seemed to increase rather than diminish : and on 1st March, Mr Pinckney, in a formal audience, took leave of the Prince-Regent, not without, on his own admission, the most emphatic expressions on the part of his royal highness, of a wish to restore amicable relations with the United States.¹

After this, it was generally thought a rupture with America was inevitable ; and so entirely were the Americans of this opinion, that the intercourse with France was openly renewed, and the American harbours were filled with French vessels, which were, for the most part, fitted

CHAP.
XVI.

1811.

14.

Neither
France nor
England
will repeal
their ob-
noxious
decrees.
A. C. 22.

Jan. 22,
1810.

March 1,
1811.
1 Champ-
agny to
Mr Arm-
strong, Aug.
22, 1809.
B. m. vi.
414, 416.
Am. Rec.
180.

15.
Affair of
the Little
Bel and
President.

CHAP.
XCI.
—
1811.

out as privateers, and did considerable mischief to British shipping. Matters seemed to be brought to a point, by a collision which soon after took place between a British and American ship of war. On the 16th May, a most gallant officer, Captain Bingham, in the *Little Belt*, of eighteen guns, fell in with the American frigate *President*, of forty-four. The latter gave chase to the former, without either apparently being well aware to what nation the other belonged; and when they were within hail, each party asked the other to what nation they belonged. But before an answer could be received, or at least heard, the American frigate fired a broadside, which was immediately returned. The action now went on with great vigour on both sides, and was maintained with the most heroic valour by the British against such fearful odds for half an hour, when, during a suspension of a few seconds, the hailing was renewed, and as soon as it was understood what they were, both ships drew off, and the action ceased. Captain Rodgers, of the *President*, next morning sent a polite message to Captain Bingham, regretting what had occurred, and offering all assistance in his power, which was declined, and the ships returned to their respective harbours: the *Little Belt* had thirty-two men killed and wounded. The official accounts of the two commanders, as is usual in such cases, differed as to which began the action, each alleging that the other fired the first shot; but in this matter there is an article of real evidence, which seems decisive. It is hardly credible that a sloop with eighteen guns and one hundred and twenty-two men, would provoke a contest with a frigate of forty-four, manned by four hundred.¹

¹ James, vi. 8, 11.
Cooper's Naval Hist. i. 142, 144.
Ann. Reg. 1811, 152, 153.

16.
Threatening aspect of the negotiations.

Notwithstanding this collision, the gallantry displayed in which by Captain Bingham and his crew excited a strong national feeling in Great Britain, and proportionally exasperated the Americans, the English government made one more attempt to adjust the differences between the two countries, by sending out Mr Foster as envoy

plenipotentiary to the United States. The affairs of the Chesapeake and the Little Belt were easily adjusted, and in fact constituted complete sets-off against each other, as both had originated in the larger vessel attacking the smaller to enforce the right of search. Both had been satisfactorily arranged, by each government disclaiming that right when exercised by the armed vessel of one nation against an armed vessel of another. The seizure of Florida by America, which had recently before taken place during the distracted state of Spain, to which it belonged, was justified by the Americans on the ground that it was an appendage of Louisiana, which they had acquired by purchase; and it was proposed to discuss the title with the Spanish government, as soon as that government should be re-established. More serious subjects of difference arose in the right of search, strenuously insisted for by the British government, and as stoutly resisted by the American; and the Orders in Council, which the British government still declined to recall, and the revocation of which the Americans, with reason, maintained was an indispensable preliminary to any accommodation. So little favourable, in the close of the year, was the aspect of the negotiation, that the President's speech in December, to Congress, contained a recommendation to raise ten thousand regular troops and fifty thousand militia: and the vehement temper of the legislature so far outstripped the more measured march of the executive, that the numbers voted were, by a majority of one hundred and nine to twenty-two, increased to twenty-five thousand regular troops, and it was agreed to raise an immediate loan of ten millions of dollars.¹

The object of the Americans in thus precipitating hostilities was to secure the capture of the homeward-bound West India fleet, which was expected to cross the Atlantic in May or June, before the British government was so far aware of their designs as to have prepared a convoy; and they made no doubt, that on the first appearance of an

CHAP.
XCI.

1812.

Jan. 12,
1812.
¹ See the
Correspon-
dence in
Ann. Reg.
1811, 155,
157; and
for 1812,
193.

17.
Violent
measures
of Congress
preparatory
to a war.

CHAP.
XCI.

1811.

April 3.

American force, the whole of Canada would, as a matter of course, fall into their hands. With this view, in the beginning of April, a general embargo was laid by Congress upon all the vessels in the harbours of the United States for ninety days—a measure which they hoped would at once prevent intelligence of their preparations from reaching Great Britain, and furnish themselves with the means, from their extensive commercial navy, of manning their vessels of war. The better to work the representatives up to the desired point of fermentation, the President soon after laid before them copies of certain documents, tending to stir up a separation of the northern provinces from the federal union, found on Captain Henry, who had been despatched by Sir James Craig, governor of Canada, into Massachusetts, without the knowledge of the government at home. To such a pitch were they transported, that a bill was brought into Congress, and seriously entertained, the object of which was to declare every person *a pirate*, and punishable with death, who, under pretence of a commission from any foreign power, should impress upon the high seas any native of the United States; and to give every such impressed seaman a right to attach, in the hands of *any* British subject, or of *any debtor* to *any* British subject, a sum equal to thirty dollars a-month during the whole period of his detention. This violent bill, worthy of the worst days of the French Revolution, actually passed a third reading of the House of Representatives, and was only lost in the Senate.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1812, 1815,
1817.

^{18.}
War declared by
America, though the
Orders in
Council are
repealed.

When such was the temper of the ruling party in the United States, it is unnecessary to follow out ulterior measures, or discuss the objects of complaint ostensibly put forth as the cause of the war. On the 18th of June an act passed both houses, by a majority of seventy-nine to forty-nine, declaring the actual existence of war between Great Britain and America; and hostilities were immediately ordered to be commenced. Nor did the Ameri-

can government make any attempt to recede from these hostile acts, when intelligence arrived a few weeks after this resolution, and before war had commenced, that, by an Order in Council, the British government had actually *repealed the previous orders*, so that the ostensible ground of complaint against this country was removed.¹ Great events were about to take place when the Americans thus thrust themselves into the contest. Three days after, Wellington crossed the Agueda to commence the Salamanca campaign: six days after, Napoleon passed the Niemen on his march to Moscow. No cause of complaint or hostility now remained; for although the right of search exercised by the British in conformity with the common maritime law of nations, may have afforded a fit subject for remonstrance and adjustment, it was no ground for immediate hostilities. But on war they were determined, and to war they went. And thus had America, the greatest republic in existence, and which had ever proclaimed its attachment to the cause of freedom in all nations, the disgrace of going to war with Great Britain, then the last refuge of liberty in the civilised world, when their only ground of complaint against it had been removed: and of allying their arms with those of France, at the very moment of its commencing its unjust crusade against Russia, and straining every nerve to crush in the Old World the last vestige of Continental independence.¹

When the ruling party in America was thus resolved, *per fas aut nefas*, to plunge into a war with England, it may naturally be asked, What preparations had they made for sustaining a contest with that formidable foe? They knew that Great Britain was the greatest maritime power in existence; that she had a hundred ships of the line in commission, and that a thousand ships of war bore the royal flag; they were aware that her armies had vanquished a vast dominion in India, and long measured swords on equal terms in the Peninsula with the

CHAP.
XCI.

1812.

June 23.

¹ Ante, ch.
lxiv, § 121.¹ Ann. Reg.
1812, 196,
197, Cooper,
172.

19.

Diminutive
scale of the
American
prepara-
tions for
war.

CHAP.
XCI.

1812.

conqueror of continental Europe. They had been preparing for the war for four years : since 1807, such had been the difference between them and the English government, that their intercourse with Great Britain had been almost entirely suspended. Almost all their trading vessels, several thousand in number, were at sea, and lay exposed in every quarter of the globe to the innumerable cruisers and privateers of the enemy whom they were thus anxious to provoke. What preparations, then, had a republic, embracing eight millions of souls within its territory, so vehemently bent on war, and having had so many years to muster its forces, actually made for a contest of the most impassioned character with such a naval and military power? Why, they had in 1811 four frigates and eight sloops in commission,* being the very time when the collision of the President and Little Belt took place : and in 1812, when the war broke out, their whole naval force afloat in ordinary, and building for the ocean and the Canadian lakes, was eight frigates and twelve sloops ; while their military force amounted to the stupendous number of twenty-four thousand soldiers, not one half of whom were yet disciplined, or in a condition to take the field.^{1†}

¹ Cooper, Hist. of American Navy, ii. 140, 167.

It is hard to say whether this extraordinary want of foresight, and sway of passion, in the American people

* Viz. in 1811 :—

	Guns.		Guns.
President, .	44	Hornet, .	18
Constitution, .	44	Argus, .	16
United States, .	44	Siren, .	16
Essex, .	32	Nautilus, .	12
John Adams, .	24	Enterprise, .	12
Wasp, .	18	Vixen, .	12

— COOPER'S *Naval History*, ii. 140.

† “ As opposed to this unexampled naval power of Great Britain, America had on her list the following vessels, exclusive of gunboats, in 1812, viz. :

Constitution, .	44	New York, .	36
President, .	44	Essex, .	32
United States, .	44	Adams, .	28
Congress, .	38	Boston, .	28
Constellation, .	38	John Adams, .	28
Chesapeake, .	38	Wasp, .	18

and government, or the great things which, with such inconsiderable means, they actually did during the war, are the most worthy of meditation. It demonstrates, on the one hand, how marvellous is the *insouciance* and want of consideration in democratic communities; how blindly they rush into war, without any preparation either to insure its success or avert its dangers; how obstinately they resist all propositions in time of peace to incur even the most inconsiderable immediate burdens to guard against future calamity; how vehemently, at the same time, they can be actuated by the warlike passions; and with what force, when so excited, they impel their government into the perilous chances of arms without the slightest preparation, and when calamity, wide-spread and unbounded, is certain to follow the adoption of a measure thus wholly unprovided for. On the other hand, the gallant and extraordinary achievements, both of the American navy and army, during the contest which followed, are no less worthy of consideration, as demonstrating how far individual energy and valour can overcome the most serious difficulties, and the tendency of democratic institutions to compensate, by the vigour they com-

CHAP.
XCI.

1812.

20.

Reflections
on this cir-
cumstance.

	Guns.		Guns.
Hornet, . . .	18	Vixen, . . .	14
Argus, . . .	16	Nautilus, . .	14
Siren, . . .	16	Enterprise, .	14
Oneida, . . .	16	Viper, . . .	12

"Of these vessels, the New York 36, and Boston 28, were first aworthy; and the Oneida, 16, was on Lake Ontario. The remainder were sufficient for their rates, though the Adams required extensive repairs before she could be sent to sea. It follows that America was about to engage in a war with by much the greatest maritime power that the world ever saw, possessing herself but *seventeen cruising vessels on the ocean, of which nine were of a class less than frigates*. At this time the merchant vessels of the United States were spread over the whole earth. No other instance can be found of so great a stake in shipping, with a protection so utterly inadequate. In addition to her vast superiority in ships, Great Britain possessed her islands in the West Indies, Bermuda, and Halifax, as ports for refitting, and places of refuge for prizes; while on the part of America, though there were numerous ports, all were liable to be blockaded the moment an enemy might choose to send a force of two line-of-battle ships and one frigate to one point; for it is not to be concealed that three two-decked ships could have driven the whole of the public cruising marine of America before them at the time of which we are writing."

—COOPER'S *History of the American Navy*, ii. 167, 168.

CHAP.
XCI.

1812.

municate to the people, the consequences of the debility and want of foresight which they imprint upon the government.

21.

Invasion of
Canada by
General
Hull, and
his surren-
der.

Atlas,
Plate 103.

The first exploits of the American army, though such as might naturally have been expected from the total want of preparation on the part of their government or people for a war, were, nevertheless, very different from what the noisy democrats who had driven the nation into it had anticipated. Early in July, General Hull invaded Upper Canada with a force of two thousand five hundred men, having crossed at Detroit, and marched to Sandwich in that province. He there issued a proclamation, in which he expressed entire confidence of success, and threatened a war of extermination if the savages were employed in resisting the invasion. His next operations were directed against Fort Amherstburg, but he was repulsed in three different attempts to cross the river Canard, near which it stands; and General Brock, having collected a force of seven hundred British regulars and militia, and six hundred auxiliary Indians, not only relieved that fort, but compelled Hull to retire to Fort Detroit, on the American side of the St Lawrence, where he was soon after invested by General Brock. Batteries having been constructed, and a fire opened, preparations were made for an assault; to prevent which General Hull capitulated, with nearly two thousand five hundred men and thirty pieces of cannon—a proud trophy to have been taken, with the fort of Detroit, by a British force of no more than seven hundred men, including militia, and six hundred auxiliary Indians. At the same time the British captured the distant fort of Michilmackinac, of great consequence as cutting off the communication between the Americans and their Indian allies in the Michigan territory.¹

Aug. 16.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1812, 199.
General
Brock's

Desp. Aug.
16, 1812.
Ibid. App.
to Chron.
243.

This early and glorious success had the most powerful effect in increasing the spirit and energy of the militia of Upper Canada, the inhabitants of which, of British origin,

and strongly animated with patriotic and national feelings, had taken up arms universally to repel the hated invasion of their republican neighbours. An armistice had been shortly before agreed to between Sir George Prevost, the British governor of Canada, and General Dearborn, the American commander-in-chief on the northern frontier, in the hope that the repeal of the Orders in Council, of which intelligence had now been received, would, by removing the only real ground of quarrel between the two countries, have led to a termination of hostilities. But in this hope, how reasonable soever, they were disappointed. The American government, impelled by the democratic constituencies, had not yet abandoned their visions of Canadian conquest, and they not only disavowed the armistice, but determined upon a vigorous prosecution of the contest. As this determination, however, unveiled the real motives which had led to the war, and demonstrated that the Orders in Council had been a mere pretext, it gave rise to the most violent dissatisfaction in the northern provinces of the Union, who were likely, from their dependence upon British commerce, to be the greatest sufferers by the contest. So far did this proceed, that many memorials were addressed to the President from these states, in which they set forth that they contemplated with abhorrence an alliance with the present Emperor of France, every action of whose life had been an attempt to effect the extinction of all vestiges of freedom: that the repeal of the Orders in Council had removed the only legitimate object of complaint against the British government; and that, if any attempts were made to introduce French troops into the United States, they would regard them as enemies.* Nor were these declarations confined to mere

CHAP.
XCL
1812.
22
Vain success
on the fron-
tiers, which
had saved
the
American
govern-
ment, and
dissatisfac-
tion the
disavowal
excites.

* "On the subject of any French coalition we have made no inquiries. We will in no event assist in uniting the Republic of America with the military despotism of France. We will have no commerce with her, nor supply her power. If her armed troops, under whatever name or character, should come here, we will regard them as enemies." *Memorial of Seneca, Cayuga, and Oneida Indians to the President*, 15th September 1812.

"We are constrained to consider the determination to persist in the war,

CHAP.
XCI.

1812.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1812, 200,
201. Tocq.
i. 289.

verbal menaces; for two of the states, Connecticut and Massachusetts, openly refused to send their contingents, or to impose the taxes which had been voted by Congress; and symptoms of a decided intention to break off from the confederacy were already evinced in the four northern states, comprising New York and the most opulent and powerful portions of the Union.¹

23,
Total defeat
of the Ame-
ricans at
Queens-
town.

Oct. 13.

The American government, however, were noways intimidated either by the bad success of their arms in Canada, or by the menaces of the northern provinces of the Union. Later in the season they assembled a considerable force in the neighbourhood of Niagara; and, on the 13th October, General Wadsworth crossed over with thirteen hundred men, and made an attack on the British position of Queenstown. General Brock immediately hastened to the spot; and, while gallantly cheering on the grenadiers of the 49th, he fell mortally wounded, and soon after died. Discouraged by this loss, the British fell back, and the position was lost. But this success of the enemy was of short duration. Reinforcements, consisting partly of regular troops, partly of militia, came up to their aid, of whom General Sheaffe had now assumed the command; and a combined attack was made on the American force by the English troops and artillery in front and on one flank, in all about eight hundred men, while Norton, the Indian chief, with a considerable body of savages, menaced their other extremity. This well-laid attack proved entirely successful. After a short conflict the Americans were totally defeated; their commander, General Wadsworth, with nine hundred men,

after official notice of the revocation of the British Orders in Council had been received, as a proof that it was undertaken on motives entirely distinct from those hitherto avowed; and we contemplate with abhorrence the possibility even of an alliance with the present Emperor of France, every action of whose life has demonstrated that the attainment, by any means, of universal empire, and the consequent extinction of every vestige of freedom, are the sole objects of his incessant, unbounded, and remorseless ambition."—*Resolutions of Thirty-four Cities and Counties of the State of New York, adopted at a meeting held at Albany 17th and 18th September 1812.* *Annual Register*, 1812, p. 291.

being made prisoners, with one gun and two colours taken, and two hundred killed and wounded : while the total loss of the British and their gallant Canadian comrades did not exceed seventy men. At the same time Brigade-major Evans, from Fort George on the Canadian side of the river, opened so heavy a fire on Fort Niagara on the opposite side, that the enemy were compelled to evacuate the fort. This victory, important and decisive as it proved, was dearly purchased by the loss of General Brock — an officer of equal suavity and firmness in civil administration, and energy and valour in war ; and to whose worth, well known on both sides of the frontier, the honourable testimony was borne of minute guns being discharged during his funeral, alike by the American and the British batteries.¹

CHAP.
XCI.
1812.

¹ *Christie's
Memoirs of
the War in
Canada,
67, 68.
Sheaffe's
Desp. Oct.
13, 1812.
Ann. Reg.
1812, p.
253. App.
to Chron.*

Irritated, rather than discouraged, by those repeated and disgraceful failures, the Americans now strained every nerve to augment their naval forces on Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, and reinforced General Dearborn, who commanded their troops on the frontier of Lower Canada, so considerably, that by the middle of November he was at the head of ten thousand men. At the same time General Smyth had five thousand, chiefly militia, on the Niagara frontier ; and they had augmented their fleet on Lake Ontario to such a degree, that the British flotilla was unable to face it, which gave them the entire command of the lake. Encouraged by this favourable state of affairs, which they were aware might be turned the other way before spring, they resolved, notwithstanding the lateness and inclemency of the season, to make a combined attack on the British possessions both in the upper and lower provinces. Early on the morning of the 28th November, accordingly, General Smyth commenced the invasion of Upper Canada, by crossing the St Lawrence, between Chippewa and Fort Erie, with about five hundred men ; but they were received in so vigorous a manner by a small British detachment under Colonel Bishop, that they

24.
A third in-
vasion of
Canada is
repelled.

Nov. 28.

CHAP.
XCI.

1812.
Nov. 22.

were repulsed with severe loss. About the same time, General Dearborn commenced a systematic attack on Lower Canada; but the militia and regular forces of that province, under General Prevost, turned out with such alacrity, and in such formidable numbers, that he withdrew without making any serious progress, and put his army into winter-quarters in the neighbourhood of Plattsburg. Thus the invasion of the Canadas, from which the Americans expected so much, and in the hope of which being successful they had mainly engaged in the war, terminated this year in nothing but discomfiture and disgrace.¹

¹ Christie,
65, 68. Ann.
Reg. 1813,
177, 178.

25.
Success of
the Ameri-
cans at sea.

June 23.

But if the Americans were unsuccessful on one element, they met with extraordinary and unlooked-for triumphs on another; which excited the greater sensation, that they shook the general belief which at that time prevailed of British invincibility at sea, and opened up, to the jealousy of other nations at our commercial greatness, hopes of its overthrow at no distant period. The first action which took place after war was declared, was between the British frigate *Belvidera* and the American frigate *President*. The British vessel, commanded by Captain Byron, was in charge of a large fleet of West India merchantmen on their way home; and Captain Rodgers came up with her on the 23d June, with a squadron of three frigates and two sloops, which immediately gave chase, and a running fight ensued which lasted for a whole day, each party losing two-and-twenty men. But the result was favourable to the British, whose guns were pointed with great skill, and produced a surprising effect, as the American squadron failed in taking the single English frigate, and the whole merchantmen escaped untouched. After a cruise of seventy days, the American squadron returned to port, having only captured seven merchantmen in that time, although they fell upon the British commerce when wholly unaware of hostilities having commenced.²

² James, vi.
105, Cooper,
in. 172, 178.

Shortly after, the *Constitution* was chased by a squadron of British frigates, headed by the *Africa* of sixty-four guns, and escaped after a most interesting chase, in which great skill and ability were displayed on both sides. But in the next action the result was very different. The *Constitution* fell in on the 19th August with the *Guerrière*, Captain Dacres, and a most obstinate action took place. The American frigate was decidedly superior, both in the number and weight of its guns, and the number of its crew;* but notwithstanding that disadvantage, Captain Dacres maintained a close fight, yard-arm to yard-arm, for upwards of an hour, with his formidable antagonist. At the end of that time, however, his vessel was a perfect wreck, wholly dismasted, rolling about in the trough of a tempestuous sea, incapable of making any further resistance, with seventy-nine men killed and wounded, including among the latter Captain Dacres himself, and thirty shots in the hull below water-mark; while the *Constitution* had only seven killed and as many wounded. In these circumstances further resistance was evidently hopeless, and the English colours were mournfully lowered to the broad pendant of their emancipated offspring.¹

Hardly had the English recovered from the shock of this unwonted naval disaster, when other blows of the same description succeeded each other with stunning

CHAP.
XCI.
1812.
27.
Capture of
the *Guerrière*
by the *Constitution*.
Ann. Reg.
1812, 249.

¹ Captain
Dacres'
Account,
Ann. Reg.
1812, 249.
Appendix
Chron.
James, vi.
105, Cooper,
ii. 172, 201.

27.
Frolic and
Wasp.
Oct. 17.

The relative force on the two sides was as follows:—

	<i>Guerrière</i> .	<i>Constitution</i> .
Broad-side guns,	24	28
Weight in lbs.,	517	768
Crew,	244	460
Tons,	1092	1563

—JAMES, vi. 104; and COOPER, ii. 199, 200.

"Captain Dacres," says the American annalist, "lost no professional reputation by his defeat; he had handled his ship in a manner to win the applause of his enemies, fought her gallantly, and only submitted when further resistance would have been as culpable as in fact it was impossible. That the *Constitution* was a larger and heavier ship than the *Guerrière*, will be disputed by no nautical man, though less it is believed than might be inferred from their respective rates; but the great inferiority of the *Guerrière* was in her men."—COOPER, i. 199, 201.

CHAP.
XCI.

1812.

rapidity. On the night of the 16th October, the *Frolic*, British sloop of eighteen guns, fell in with the American brig *Wasp*, of the same number of guns, but considerably superior both in weight of metal, tonnage, and crew.* The crew of the *Frolic* were labouring to repair their rigging, which had been severely damaged the day before in a gale, when the action commenced, and was kept up with equal skill and spirit on both sides. But the rigging of the British vessel was in so shattered a condition, from the effect of the previous storm, that in ten minutes she lay an unmanageable log in the water, which gave her opponent such an advantage, that in twenty minutes more she was compelled to strike. This disaster, however, except in so far as the moral influence of the triumph to the American arms was concerned, was speedily repaired; for a few hours after the action, the *Poictiers* of seventy-four guns hove in sight, and at once captured the *Wasp*, and recaptured the *Frolic*, the captain of which, in just testimony of his valour, was continued in the command.¹

Oct. 16.
¹ James, vi.
109, 112.
Cooper, ii.
203, 211.

28.
Capture of
the *Macedonian* by
the United
States.
Oct. 25.

But a more serious disaster soon occurred. On the 25th October, the American frigate *United States* hove in sight of the British frigate *Macedonian*. As usual on all these occasions, the American vessel was superior by nearly a half, in tonnage, crew, and weight of guns.† From the very commencement of the combat, which for some time was at long-shot only, it was evident that the Americans were cutting the British to pieces with comparatively little loss on their side; and when at length the English commander succeeded in engaging the enemy

	<i>Frolic</i> .	<i>Wasp</i> .
* Guns, broadside,	9	9
Crew,	92	135
Tons,	384	434
- JAMES, vi. 112.		
	<i>Macedonian</i> .	<i>United States</i> .
† Broadside guns,	24	28
Weight of broadside - lbs.	528	864
Crew—men only,	254 (35 boys)	474
Tons,	1081	1533
- JAMES, vi. 119; and COOPER, ii. 206.		

in close fight, which Commodore Decatur of the United States willingly joined in, the superiority of the enemy's fire was such that the Macedonian was soon dismasted she had received nearly a hundred shots in her hull, and her lower tier of guns, owing to the rolling of the vessel in a tempestuous sea, were under water, while a third of her crew were killed or wounded. On the other hand, the American vessel, having no sail which she could not set except her mizen-topsail, remained perfectly steady. Even in these desperate circumstances, however, the native spirit of British seamen did not desert them; as a last resource, an attempt was made to carry the enemy by boarding; and the moment this intention was announced, every man who could move was on deck, several of whom had lost an arm but a few minutes before in the cockpit; and the universal cry was "Let us conquer or die." At this moment, however, the fore-brace was shot away, and the yard, swinging round, threw the vessel upon the wind, so that boarding was impossible. The United States then stood athwart the bows of the Macedonian without firing a gun, and passed on out of shot. It was at first supposed she was making off by the British sailors, who loudly cheered. But this was only to refill her cartridges, which had been expended; and soon tacking, she took up a raking position across the stern of her now defenceless antagonist, and soon compelled her to strike her colours. The superiority of the American force, as well as her weight of metal, was then very apparent; for while the Macedonian had thirty-six killed and sixty-eight wounded, the United States had only five killed and seven badly wounded.¹

Nor was this the last of the discomfitures which at this period befell the British navy. The *Java*, forty-six guns, had sailed from Spithead on the 12th November, with a motley crew of three hundred and ninety-seven persons, nearly one-half of whom were wholly inexperienced; and on the 28th they discharged six broadsides of blank

CHAP.
XCI.
1-12.

¹ Captain
Carr's
Desp. Oct.
23, 1812.
Ann. Reg.
255. App.
to Chron.
James, vi.
113, 117.
Cooper, ii.
205, 207.

29.
Action be-
tween the
Java and
Constitution.

CHAP.
XCI.

1812.

Dec. 29.

cartridges, being the first that the majority of the crew had ever assisted in firing. Captain Lambert, who commanded her, had warmly remonstrated against this insufficient ship-complement, declaring that with such people he was not only no match for an American of superior, but hardly for a Frenchman of equal size. But all the answer he got from the Admiralty was, that "a voyage to the East Indies and back would make a good crew." Obligated to submit, the English captain set sail, and, on the 28th December, fell in with the American frigate *Constitution*: and, notwithstanding the superior bulk and weight of his antagonist,* and the wretched condition of his crew, Captain Lambert immediately made up to the enemy, although nineteen of his men were away with a prize he had shortly before made. The *Constitution* at first stood away under all sail before the wind, to gain the distance at which the American gunnery was so destructive; but finding the British frigate gained upon her, she shortened sail, and, placing herself under the lee-bow of the *Java*, a close action immediately commenced. The first broadside of the English frigate told with such effect on the American hull that the latter wore to get away; but the skilful Englishman wore also, and a running fight ensued for a considerable time, during which Captain Lambert's superiority of seamanship was very apparent.¹

After a desultory engagement of this sort for forty minutes, during which the *Java*, notwithstanding the superior weight of the enemy's metal, had suffered very

* Comparative force of the two vessels:—

	<i>Java</i> .	<i>Constitution</i> .
Broadside guns,	24	28
Weight—lbs.,	517	768
Crew—men only,	344	460
Tons,	1092	1593

— JAMES, vi. 104 and 134; and COOPER, ii. 225.

"The same peculiarity," says Cooper, "attended this combat as had distinguished the two other cases of frigate actions. In all the three, the American vessels were superior to their antagonists; but in all three the difference in execution was greatly disproportioned to the disparity in force."—ii. 225.

¹ Brenton, ii. 461. Ann. Reg. 132, for 1812. James, vi. 128, 129. Cooper, ii. 219, 220.

little, the two vessels came within pistol-shot, and a most determined action ensued. Captain Lambert now resolved on boarding : but just as he was making preparations for doing so, the foremast of the *Java* fell with a tremendous crash, breaking in the forecastle and covering the deck, and soon after the main-topmast came down also ; and, to complete their misfortunes, Captain Lambert fell, mortally wounded. The command now devolved on Lieutenant Chads ; but he found the vessel perfectly unmanœurable, and, the wreck of the masts falling over on one side, almost every discharge set the vessel on fire. Still the action continued with the most determined resolution ; but at length, after it had lasted three hours and a half, the *Java* was found to be rapidly sinking, while the *Constitution* had assumed a raking position, where every shot told, and not a gun could be brought to bear on her. In these desperate circumstances, Lieutenant Chads at length struck ; and the vessel was so disabled that, as soon as the crew were taken out, the American captain blew her up. In this desperate and unequal engagement, the *Java* had twenty-two killed, and one hundred and two wounded ;³ the *Constitution* ten killed, and forty wounded. Captain Bainbridge treated the officers most generously, though his conduct to the crew was unnecessarily severe ; a conduct which contrasted with that of Captain Hull the former captain of the *Constitution*, and Captain Decatur of the *United States*, who had treated their prisoners of all ranks with the courtesy which is ever the accompaniment of heroic minds.¹

CHAP.
XCI.
1812.
39.
Desperate
defence of
the former.

¹ Brinton, ii. 459, 462.
James, vi. 127, 137.
Cooper, ii. 220, 224.
Lieutenant Chads' Account, Dec. 31, 1812.
Ann. Reg. 1813, 132.
App. to Chron.

Another action between smaller vessels, but terminating in the same result, took place on the 14th February

³ The heroism displayed on both sides in this action never was surpassed. A midshipman, Mr Keele, a boy thirteen years of age, had his leg shot away, and suffered amputation. He anxiously inquired, after the action was over, whether the vessel had struck ; and seeing a ship's colour spread over him, the little hero grew uneasy till he saw it was an English flag. He died next day. The boatswain, Mr Humble, had his hand shot away, and he was wounded above the elbow ; but no sooner was the tourniquet put on than he hastened on deck, to cheer his comrades with his pipe in boarding.

CHAP.
XCI.

1813.

31.

The Pea-
cock taken
by the
Hornet.

1813, between the British sloop Peacock, and the American brig Hornet. In this, as in all the previous instances where the Americans had proved successful, the superiority on their side was very decided;* but the action which ensued was, nevertheless, of the most bloody and destructive kind. It lasted an hour and a half; at the end of which time, the effect of the American's fire was such that the Peacock was found to be in a sinking state. A signal of distress was immediately hoisted, which was answered with praiseworthy humanity by the brave Americans, and every effort was made by the crews of both vessels to save the disabled ship. But, notwithstanding all their efforts, she went down in a few minutes, with thirteen of her own crew and three of the Hornet's, who were engaged in the noble act of striving to save their enemies.¹

¹ James, vi.
193. Cooper,
ii. 227, 228.

32.

Prodigious
moral effect
of these
victories.

No words can convey an adequate idea of the impression which the successive capture of these three frigates and two sloops made, not only in Great Britain and America, but over the whole civilised world. The triumphs of the British navy, for above a century, had been so uninterrupted, and the moral influence the nation had in consequence acquired had become so prodigious that it was generally believed, both at home and abroad, that they were invincible, and that no other nation had any chance of success in combating them on the ocean, except with the most decided superiority of force. When, therefore, it was seen that, in repeated instances of combats of single vessels of the same class against each other, the ships of the United States had proved victorious, the English were stunned as by the shock of an earth-

* Comparative force of the combatants :—

	Peacock.	Hornet.
Broadside guns, . . .	9	10
Weight—lb., . . .	192	297
Crew—men only, . . .	110	162
Tons, . . .	336	460

— JAMES, vi. 193.

quake, the Americans were immeasurably, and with good reason, elated, and the other nations in Europe thought they discerned at last the small black cloud arising over the ocean which was to involve the British maritime power in destruction. The majority of men in the Continental states, ever governed by the event, and incapable of just discrimination, took no trouble to inquire whether or not the vessels opposed to each other had been equally matched, but joined in one universal chorus of exultation at the defeat of a nation which had so long been the object of their avowed dread and secret jealousy. And it was generally said, apparently not without reason, that a naval power which, with the command only of four frigates and eight sloops, had in so short a time achieved such successes, might look forward at no distant period, when its navy was enlarged, to wresting from Great Britain the sceptre of the ocean.¹

CHAP.
XCI.
1813.

¹ Cooper, ii.
197. Ann.
Reg. 1812,
108, 109.

In truth, the succession of disasters, like all calamities which occur in such numbers together as to be obviously beyond the effect of chance, gave much subject for serious reflection, not merely to the heedless multitude, but to reflecting statesmen. It was now painfully evident that the English were not invincible on their favourite element; that foresight in preparation, as well as energy in action, were necessary to sustain their fortunes; and that, if these were neglected, they had no exemption from the common lot of humanity. The few who looked beyond the mere surface of things saw, indeed, to what cause the disasters had been owing. The British government, maintaining a hundred ships of the line, and five hundred smaller vessels actually in commission, and carrying on war at once in every quarter of the globe, could not by possibility man their vessels with the same picked and skilled crews as the Americans, who had merely a few frigates and sloops to fit out from the resources of a great commercial navy. The frigates and brigs of the United

33.
Reflections
on the
causes
which gave
rise to
them.

CHAP.
XCI.
1813.

States, built with extraordinary skill and in a peculiar manner, to which there was no parallel in the British navy, were at once too swift sailers to be overtaken by ships of the line, and of too heavy metal to be a fair match for frigates nominally of the same class. This peculiarity in the constitution of their vessels had been wholly overlooked by the Admiralty, who anticipated no danger from so diminutive a marine as that of the United States, though it was well known, and had been the subject of anxious solicitude to better-informed individuals in the community.*

34.
They demonstrated an equality in American and British seamanship.

But, admitting the full weight of these circumstances, it was plain that a new era in naval warfare had arisen, since the English came to contend with their Anglo-Saxon brethren on the other side of the Atlantic. The very fact of the comparison which they so anxiously instituted with their American antagonists, and the superiority on the part of the latter, in weight of metal and strength of crews, in the encounters which had taken place, which they justly pointed out, afforded decisive proof of this. With the French and Spaniards, they had been accustomed to look only to the class of vessels, and never to count guns. In seamanship, the British sailors, inured to the storms of every quarter of the globe, might justly claim an equality with the Americans similarly instructed, and a superiority to the mariners of any other country in the globe. But in the practice of gunnery, especially at a distance, it was very evident that they were, at that moment, their inferiors; experience had now proved, that

* In 1808, four years before the American war broke out, the author well recollects hearing his uncle, the late Dr Gregory of Edinburgh, who paid uncommon attention to naval affairs, say, "The Americans are building long forty-six gun frigates, which really carry fifty-six or sixty guns; when our forty-fours come to meet them, you will hear something new some of these days." In England, as in every other constitutional monarchy, the intelligence and information of enlightened individuals generally precede those of government or public functionaries. If the direction of affairs could be confined to *such* men, or those whom they can influence, no wise man would object to the widest extension of the elective franchise.

long-continued and unexampled success had produced its wonted effect in relaxing the bands of British naval preparation: and that they had much need to recollect, that in the language of the ancient conquerors of the world, the word for an *army* was derived from the verb to *exercise*.*

CHAP.
XCI.
1-13.

In this, as in other cases, however, it soon appeared, that as much as unbroken prosperity is pernicious, so occasional disaster is beneficial to nations, provided only that the patriotic spirit is not extinct in their members, or the generous feelings buried under the weight of selfish indulgence. The surviving officers who had commanded in the vessels which had been taken were all tried by court-martial, honourably acquitted, and immediately after employed anew. This was going to work in the right spirit; there was no attempt to select a second Byng to be the expiatory victim for popular clamour or ministerial neglect. The most vigorous efforts were made by the Admiralty, at once to strengthen the squadrons on the coast of America, and to fit out single ships, which might, from their size, crews, and weight of metal, really be a match for the gigantic frigates which the United States had sent forth to prowl through the deep. Several vessels were commenced on the model of the American frigates and sloops, which had been found by experience so swift in sailing and formidable in action: and secret instructions were given to the commanders of vessels on the North American station, not to hazard an encounter with an opponent nominally of the same class, unless there was something like a *real* as well as an apparent equality between them. Greater care was, at the same time, taken in the selection of crews: a larger proportion of men was given to the cannon on board: and orders were issued for the frequent exercise of the men in ball practice, both with small arms and great guns—a point of vital importance in naval warfare,¹ but one which had

35.
Vigorous
efforts made
in England
to repair the
disasters.

¹ James, vi.
144, 151.
196, "Am.
Rev. 1813,
168, 169."

* *Exercitus*, from *exercere*, "to exercise."

CHAP.
XCI.
1813.

hitherto been in an unaccountable manner neglected, with a very few exceptions, in all the departments in the British navy.

36.
Good effects
of these
efforts, and
supineness
of the Ame-
rican gov-
ernment.

The good effects of these improvements speedily appeared in the next naval actions which ensued. Sir John Borlase Warren, who commanded on the North American station, established a vigilant blockade of the harbours of the United States; their commerce was soon entirely ruined; the immense carrying trade they had so long conducted slipped from their hands;* and such was the consequence of this upon their national finances, which depended almost entirely on custom-house duties, that the public revenue had sunk, since the contest had commenced, from twenty-four millions of dollars annually to eight millions. Paralysed in this manner, in the sinews of war, by the first results of the struggle, the American government were in no condition to augment their expenditure; and notwithstanding the enthusiasm which their glorious successes had excited in the country, no attempt was made by Congress, during the year 1812, to increase their naval force. In the beginning of the next year, however, they passed two acts, the one authorising the building of four seventy-four gun ships, and four of forty-four; and in March, six additional sloops were ordered to be built for the ocean; and for the lakes, as many as the public service might require. But a very considerable period might be expected to elapse before these vessels could be ready for sea, and meantime their trade was destroyed and the danger imminent. A close blockade of all their harbours was maintained by the British:¹ the bays of the Chesapeake and

April 29.
¹ Cooper, ii.
204, 205.
Ann. Reg.
1813, 109.

* Home produce, and of foreign countries, exported from America:—

Years.	Foreign.	Home.	Total.
1805,	£11,078,964	£8,830,625	£19,909,589
1806,	12,559,006	8,594,526	21,153,552
1807,	12,425,741	10,145,747	22,571,488
1812,	1,769,817	6,256,689	8,026,506
1813,	593,301	5,220,031	5,813,322
1814,	30,243	1,412,973	1,443,216

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 191.

the Delaware were scoured by Admiral Cockburn at the head of a light squadron fitted out for that purpose ; and various landings, by bodies of marines, were effected along their shores ; which, besides doing considerable damage to their naval stores and arsenals, kept the towns on the coast in a constant state of alarm.

Among the many officers in the British navy who ardently desired to meet, even on inferior terms, but with an adequate crew, with the American forty-four gun frigates, was CAPTAIN BROKE of the *Shannon*. This able officer commanded a frigate pierced for thirty-eight guns, but really mounting fifty-two ; and, contrary to the general practice in the British navy, he had for many years trained the crew, whom, by admirable management, he had brought to the highest state of discipline and subordination, to the practice of ball-firing with their great guns. Being stationed off Boston, where the *Chesapeake* of forty-nine guns, under Captain Lawrence, had passed the winter, Captain Broke, to render the combat equal, sent away his consort, the *Tenedos*, of equal strength with his own vessel, with instructions not to return for three weeks ; and when she was fairly out of sight, he stood in to the mouth of the harbour, and sent a challenge, couched in the most courteous terms, to the captain of the *Chesapeake*, stating the exact amount of his force, and inviting him to single combat for the honour of their respective flags.* Having despatched this letter, Captain Broke, with colours flying, lay close in to Boston lighthouse ; and soon the *Chesa-*

CHAP.
XCI.
1-13.

37.
The *S. m.*
not and
Crown
power.

* "As the *Chesapeake* appears to be now ready for sea, I request you will do me the favour to meet the *Shannon* with her ship to ship, to try the fortunes of our respective flags. All interruption shall be provided against. I entreat you, sir, not to imagine that I am urged by mere personal vanity to the wish of meeting the *Chesapeake* ; we have both nobler motives. You will feel it as a compliment, if I say, that the result of our meeting may be the most grateful service I can render to my country ; and I doubt not that you, equally confident of success, will feel convinced that it is only by repeated triumphs in *even combat*, that you can console your country for the loss of that trade it can no longer protect. Favour me with a speedy reply ; we are short of provisions and water, and cannot remain long here."—*JAMES*, vi. 139.

CHAP.
XCI.
—
1813.

1 James, vi.
198, 199.
Cooper, ii.
234, 235.

38.
Approach
of the two
vessels.
June 1.

peake was under weigh, surrounded by numerous barges and pleasure boats, which, amidst loud cheers, accompanied her some way out to what they deemed a certain victory. Captain Lawrence of the Chesapeake had not received Captain Broke's challenge when he stood out; but he was too brave a man to shun an offered combat on equal terms; and such was the confidence which the inhabitants of Boston entertained of his success, that they had prepared a public supper to greet the victors on their return, with their prisoners, to the harbour.¹

Meanwhile, Captain Broke at the mast-head was anxiously watching the movements of the American frigate, and beheld with a thrill of delight, such as the brave only can know, first her fore-topsail, then her other topsails loosed and sheeted home, and soon after a signal gun fired, the topgallant sails loosed and set, and at length the vessel under weigh, and standing out with a light air for the bay. The order to clear for action was immediately given on board the Shannon, and as promptly obeyed; and soon the two vessels neared, the Shannon clewing up her foresail, and with her main-topsail braced flat, under a light breeze from the shore, that the Chesapeake might overtake her. The American came gallantly down with three flags flying, on one of which was inscribed, "Sailors' rights and free trade." The Shannon had a union-jack at the fore-mast, and an old rusty blue ensign at the mizzen peak, and two other ensigns rolled up and ready to be hoisted, if either of these should be shot away. Her heavy guns were loaded alternately with two round-shot and a hundred and fifty musket-balls, and with one round and one double-headed shot in each gun. At a quarter to six the enemy hauled up within two hundred yards of the Shannon's weather beam, and her crew gave three cheers. Captain Broke thereupon harangued his men, telling them that that day would decide the superiority of British seamen, when properly trained, over those of all other nations; and that the

Shannon would show how soon the boasting of the Americans would be put an end to when they were opposed to an equal force. Loud cheers followed this gallant appeal; and the two ships being now not more than a stone-throw asunder, the order was given to the crew of the Shannon to commence firing.¹

Slowly, and with deliberate aim, the British guns were pointed and discharged successively at the American frigate as she passed, receiving, at the same time, her broadside, which was delivered at once, and with great effect. But the Shannon's guns, admirably directed, soon injured the Chesapeake's rigging, as well as made dreadful havoc among her men; and after two or three broadsides had in this manner been exchanged, the Chesapeake, attempting to haul her foresail up, fell on board the Shannon, whose starboard bower-anchor locked with her mizzen channels. In this situation the great guns ceased firing, except the Shannon's two aftermost guns, thirty-two pounder carronades, loaded with grape and round-shot, which soon beat in the sternports of the Chesapeake, and, sweeping the deck, drove the men from their quarters. For a few minutes a sharp fire of musketry was kept up by the marines on both sides: but ere long Captain Broke, observing that the Americans were not standing to their guns, ordered the two ships to be lashed together, and the boarders to be called up from below. Mr Stevens, the Shannon's boatswain, a veteran who had fought in Rodney's action, immediately set about making the ships fast, outside the Shannon's bulwark; and while so employed, he had his left arm, which held on to the enemy's rigging, hacked off by repeated sabre-cuts from their marines, and his body mortally wounded with musketry from the tops; but, in spite of all, he had fastened the ships together with the right arm ere his hold relaxed in death!—a deed of heroism worthy of ancient Rome.^{2*}

* A well-known parallel incident occurred in the history of ancient Greece.

CHAP.
XCI.

1813.

40.

Desperate
conflict by
which she
was carried.

Meanwhile, however, the brave Captain Lawrence and several other officers in the Chesapeake were wounded, and Captain Broke, at the head of the boarders, leapt upon the Chesapeake's quarterdeck, on which scarcely an American was to be seen. The men quickly following, the seamen on the gangways, twenty-five in number, were, after a desperate struggle, overpowered or driven below; and the second party of boarders having now come forward amidst loud cheers, the hatchways were closed down, and a sharp fire opened upon the marines in the tops, who kept up a destructive discharge of musketry. The sailors from the Shannon's fore-yard, headed by Mr Smith, at the same time forced their way up to the Chesapeake's main-yard, and thence to her tops, which in a few minutes were cleared. Captain Broke at this moment was furiously assailed by three American sailors who had previously submitted; he succeeded in parrying a thrust at his breast, but was immediately after knocked down by the butt-end of a musket. As he rose, he had the satisfaction of seeing, in his own words, "the American flag hauled down, and the proud old British Union floating triumphantly over it." So rapid was the action, that fifteen minutes only elapsed from the time the first gun was fired, till the Chesapeake was entirely in the hands of the British. Unhappily Lieutenant Watt, who hauled down the enemy's colours, not having immediately succeeded in hoisting the British above it, was killed, with two of his men, by a discharge of musketry from the Shannon's marines, in the belief that the conflict still continued. Yet, in this short period, the Chesapeake had sustained a loss of forty-seven killed and ninety-eight wounded¹— a dreadful proof of the ad-

¹Cooper, ii.
289, 290.
Brenton, ii.
432, 433.
James, vi.
202, 205.
Captain
Broke's
Desp. Ann.
Reg. 1812,
185.

"Cynegiri, militis Atheniensis, gloria magnis scriptorum laudibus celebrata est; qui, post praelii Marathonii innumeras caedes, quum fugientes hostes ad naves egressus, onustam navem dextrâ manu tenuit, nec priùs dimisit quàm manum amitteret: tum quoque amputatâ dextrâ, navem sinistrâ comprehendit: quam et ipsam quum amisisset, ad postremum mersu navem detinuit."— CORNELIUS NEPOS. How identical is the heroic spirit in all ages!

mirable training in the use of their arms, both small and great, which the Shannon's people had received. The loss of the victor had also been severe : it amounted to twenty-four killed and fifty-nine wounded.

Perhaps no single combat between vessels of war ever produced so great a moral impression as this did, both in the United States and the British islands. The Americans had fallen into the fault of the British, and begun to think themselves, from their extraordinary success, invincible in naval warfare ; the English, unaccustomed to disasters at sea, had almost begun to fear that their long career of glory on the ocean was drawing to a close when they sustained such repeated defeats from a maritime force so diminutive as that of the United States. Proportionally great was the despondency on one side and joy on the other, when the result of this action, where an approach to an equality for the first time obtained between the combatants, and due attention had been paid in both cases to their training, explained at once to what causes the former disasters had been owing.* The effect in restoring public confidence in Great Britain in the efficiency of the navy was immense ; and the feelings of every right-thinking man in the country went along with government when they made Captain Broke a baronet. The brave victor brought his prize, amidst the loud cheers of the inhabitants and sailors in the harbour, who manned every spar of their vessels, into Halifax, where Captain Lawrence soon after breathed his last, and was buried with military honours in presence of all the British officers on the station, who uncovered as their noble antagonist was lowered into the grave.¹

CHAP.
XCI.
1796.

11.
Great moral
effect of this
victory.

¹ Cf. *per. al.*
291, 293
James, vi.
299.

No long period elapsed before it appeared from other

* Comparative force of the combatants : -

	Shannon.	Ch. v. l.
Broadside guns,	25	25
Weight—lbs.,	538	590
Crew—men only,	306	376

—JAMES, vi. 299.

CHAP.
XCI.

1-13.

42.

Combats of
lesser ves-
sels. The
Boxer and
Enterprise,
the Pelican
and Argus.
Sept. 5.

Aug. 14.

detached combats, of which alone this naval warfare admitted, that the old superiority of the British navy remained unimpaired. The British brig Boxer, of fourteen guns and sixty-six men, was indeed taken by the American brig Enterprise, of sixteen guns and one hundred and twenty men; the former defect of inadequate manning having paralysed all the efforts of devoted valour, which proved fatal to the commanders of both vessels, who were killed during its continuance. But on the next occasion, when anything like equality of force existed, the result was in favour of the British. On the 14th August, the Pelican, British brig of eighteen guns, met the American brig Argus of twenty; and as the crew of the latter was somewhat superior, and the broadside weight of metal a little in favour of the former, the combatants were very nearly matched.* The action soon became extremely warm; and before it had lasted many minutes, Captain Allen of the Argus was severely wounded, and the rigging of his vessel so much cut up, that the command of it was lost. At length, after a gallant resistance, the Pelican succeeded in raking the Argus, and shortly after carried her by boarding. The Argus had six killed and eighteen wounded: the Pelican two killed and five wounded. This action was the more remarkable that it took place off St David's in the mouth of the Irish Channel.¹

¹James, vi.
221, 223.
Brenton, ii.
495. Cooper,
ii. 308, 309.
Ann. Reg.
1-13, 112.

43.

Naval op-
erations in
Chesa-
peake Bay.

Various operations were undertaken this summer in Chesapeake Bay by the British squadron, under the command of Sir John Borlase Warren, but they were not attended with any remarkable success. An attack on Craney Island, which the Americans had fortified, failed from the water being found too shallow, when the boats

	Pelican.	Argus.
* Broadside guns, . . .	9	10
Weight—lb., . . .	262	228
Crew—men only, . . .	101	122
Tons, . . .	385	316

JAMES, vi. 223; and COOPER, ii. 308.

approached the shore, to admit of the troops being landed ; but some gallant boat enterprises against schooners of the enemy had previously been successful. The British were consoled for this check by the victorious issue of an attack made by Sir Sidney Beckwith, with a strong body of marines, on an American post and battery at Hampton, which was quickly stormed two days after, and all its guns taken. Some acts of violence were committed on the inhabitants during the heat of the assault, which gave rise to much acrimonious feeling in the United States. Shortly after, two fine brigs, the *Anaconda* and *Atlas*, the former of ten, the latter of eighteen guns, were taken in Ocracoke harbour by the boats and marines of the squadron under Lieutenant Westphal. Captain Senhouse in the *Martin*, which had grounded in the Delaware, most gallantly beat off an attack by a cloud of American gunboats ; and at length, when the tide rose, made off with one as his prize, to the great mortification of the crowd on shore, who had hastened to witness what they deemed a certain victory. The American squadron of frigates put to sea from New York, but was speedily pursued by the British fleet, of superior strength, and blockaded in New London. Upon the whole, although the operations in the Chesapeake and Delaware Bays were not attended with any great results, yet they had the effect of completely destroying the trade of the most flourishing harbours in the United States ; and sensibly demonstrated to the people the folly of the war in which they had engaged, in which, without the slightest hope of territorial aggrandisement, they were undergoing the realities of naval blockade, national insult, and commercial ruin.¹

The operations by land during the year 1813 were conducted on a greater scale than in the preceding campaign ; and though they terminated, upon the whole, gloriously for the British arms, yet the contest was more bloody, and success more various. The absorbing interest

CHAP.

1813.

1813.

June 24.

June 24.

July 13.

July 24.

1813.

224, 230.

Ann. R. 2.

1813, 1814.

C. 1813, 1814.

312, 326.

of 1813.

by 1813.

At 1813.

preparation.

tions for the

war.

CHAP.
XCI.
—
1813.

of the contest, yet doubtful and undecided, in the Peninsula, and the urgent necessity of sending off every sabre and bayonet that could be spared to the army of Wellington, rendered it a matter of impossibility to despatch an adequate force to the Canadian frontier, and compelled government, how reluctantly soever, to intrust the defence of those provinces mainly to the bravery and patriotism of their own inhabitants. Nor was the confidence reposed in vain ; although, as the Americans had now accumulated a considerable force on the frontier, the struggle was more violent, and victory alternated with disaster. The government at Washington had rushed into the contest wholly unprepared, alike by land and sea, to maintain it, and they had, in consequence, sustained nothing but disaster on the former element ; and if, on the latter, they met with extraordinary success, it was entirely owing to the hardihood and skill of their seamen, coupled with the dispersion of the British force, and the accidental ignorance of the English government of the structure and size of the American frigates. But the national passions were now roused in the United States, and great efforts were made to prosecute the war with vigour. It has been already noticed, that four additional ships of the line and four sloops were ordered to be built, and a loan of sixteen million dollars was contracted for, at seven and a-half per cent. And in order to excite the ardour of their own, and, if possible, shake the fidelity of British seamen, the war was justified, in an elaborate report presented by the committee of foreign relations to Congress, and approved of by them, entirely on the ground of the right claimed by the English government to search for and reclaim British subjects on board of American vessels. This they declared they were determined at all hazards to resist, should they stand alone in the contest ;¹ “ for to appeal to arms in defence of a right, and to lay them down without securing it, would be

¹ Report to Congress, Jan. 28, 1813. Ann. Reg. 1813, 178, 181. Cooper, ii. 204, 205.

considered in no other light than as a relinquishment of it." CHAP.
XCL.

The first operations of the campaign in Canada proved singularly unfortunate to the Americans. In the end of January, General Winchester, with a thousand men, set out to attack Fort Detroit, on the borders of the upper province, and, before any force could be assembled to resist him, made himself master of Frenchtown, twenty-six miles from that place. General Proctor, however, who commanded the British forces in that quarter, no sooner heard of this irruption, than he hastily assembled a body of five hundred regulars of the 41st regiment and militia, being the Glengarry Fencibles, and six hundred Indians, and commenced an attack upon the invaders two days afterwards with such vigour, that after a sharp action, in which Winchester lost three hundred men, he was obliged to capitulate with thirty-two officers and five hundred men. Shortly after, Colonel McDonnell, with two companies of the Glengarry Fencibles, and two of the 8th, converted a feigned attack, which he was ordered to make on Fort Ogdenburg, into a real one. The assault was made under circumstances of the utmost difficulty: deep snow impeded the assailants at every step, and the American marksmen, from behind their defences, kept up a very heavy fire; but the gallantry of the British overcame every obstacle, and the fort was carried, with eleven guns, all its stores, and two armed schooners in the harbour.¹

But a far more material success soon consoled the Americans for their reverses. By indefatigable exertions during the winter, they had augmented their naval force in Sackett's Harbour so considerably, that the British squadron on Lake Ontario was no longer a match for them. Nor is this surprising; for the Americans built their ships at their own doors, with all their materials at hand; while the British, from the long export of timber

1813.
45.
Invasion
and defeat
of General
Winchester,
and capture
of Ogden-
burg.

Jan. 22.
1 Ann. Reg.
1813, 179.
1807, Arm-
strong's
War of
1812, i. 67.
36, Ch. 7.
tie's War
in Canada,
71, 73.

45.
Capture of
York, the
capital of
Upper
Canada.

CHAP.
XCI.

1813.

April 27.

to England, had not even wood in some places near the shores in abundance, and were obliged to bring all their naval stores from Great Britain. From this cause, it was computed that each gun, before it was launched on the lakes, had cost a thousand pounds. Encouraged by this circumstance, the Americans fitted out an expedition of seventeen hundred men, who sailed from Sackett's Harbour on board fourteen armed vessels, and two days afterwards effected a landing, after a sharp conflict, at the old fort of Toronto, three miles from York, the capital of Upper Canada. General Sheaffe commanded the British forces in that quarter; but he could only collect seven hundred regulars and militia, and a hundred Indians. With these, however, he made a stout resistance in the woods and thickets, in the course of which the grenadiers of the 8th regiment lost more than half their number. He was at last overpowered, and compelled to fall back to the town, which was not fortified; and at a short distance from it was a large magazine of powder, which exploded as the assailants were advancing to the attack. Two hundred of them, with General Pike their commander, were blown into the air by this catastrophe, and a few of the British; but the walls were thrown down by the shock, and the defences were no longer maintainable, while at the same time Chauncey, with his flotilla, had worked his way into the harbour. Sheaffe, therefore, wisely availed himself of the consternation produced among the Americans by the explosion, to effect his retreat in the direction of Kingston, with the whole regulars who remained unhurt, about four hundred in number. And though the enemy seized all the public stores that were left in the place, they re-embarked in such haste that they were all abandoned; and, by their own admission, the only trophies they brought away were "a stand of colours and a human scalp." The Americans, however, made three hundred of the militia prisoners, who were liberated on their parole;¹ an equal

¹ Ann. Reg.
1813, 189.
Chap. 71,
75. Arm-
strong, i.
129, 132.

number were killed and wounded on either side in the action ; and the British sustained a severe loss in a large ship on the stocks, and extensive naval stores, which they were obliged to burn to prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands. CHAP.
XVI.
1756.

The American squadron, after this success, sailed away to Sackett's Harbour for reinforcements, in order to prosecute their ulterior operations ; and meanwhile Colonel Proctor, crossing Lake Erie, made a dash with nine hundred regulars and militia, and twelve hundred Indians, at General Harrison, who lay with his division near the rapids of the Miami, on the American side, in a position strengthened by blockhouses and batteries, which defied every attack made upon them. At this time two American regiments, eight hundred strong, under General Clay, approached to aid Harrison, and at first, by a sudden attack, carried part of the British batteries. Having incautiously followed up their success too far, however, these regiments were surrounded by the British and Indians, and after a desperate struggle totally defeated, with the loss of two hundred killed and wounded, and five hundred prisoners, while the English lost only fifteen killed and forty-five wounded.¹ 17.
See
the
Miami.
May 5.

Meanwhile, a considerable reinforcement of sailors having reached the British side of Lake Ontario, the squadron on that lake, under their able and gallant officer Sir James Yeo, with seven hundred troops on board under Sir George Prevost, was enabled to put to sea from Kingston : and a combined attack by land and water was attempted on Sackett's Harbour, the principal naval establishment of the enemy on that inland sea. The expedition excited great interest on both sides of the water, and the most sanguine hopes were entertained by the British, that it would lead to the destruction of this growing and formidable naval establishment of the enemy. These hopes, however, were disappointed. The troops landed, indeed : and, after some sharp skirmishing, Rep.
See
Har.

CHAP.
XCI.
—
1813.

¹ Christie,
77, 79, Ann.
Reg. 1812,
182, 183,
Armstrong,
i. 123, 147.

advanced over a narrow isthmus, connecting the island on which they had landed with the mainland. Though the British were only seven hundred strong, and the Americans, in the absence of their main force, about twelve hundred; yet the whole American militia took to flight on the first discharge, and sought refuge in the loop-holed blockhouses, leaving the regulars, not more than four hundred strong, to sustain the combat. The militia rallied, however, in the strong blockhouses which commanded, by a cross-fire, the isthmus along which the troops were advancing, and the discharge they kept up was so tremendous, that the bravest of the British recoiled.¹

49.
Gallant but
vain efforts
of Prevost.

Prevost, then, with the utmost gallantry, advanced with his staff to encourage the men;* one of his officers fell dead by his side; but notwithstanding all his efforts, the strait could not be passed. Meanwhile, the utmost terror prevailed among the Americans in the rear: in the first moment of alarm their officers actually set fire to their naval storehouses, arsenal, and barracks, which were speedily consumed. While the flames were yet burning, however, Colonel Toottle, with a reinforcement of six hundred militia, was approaching the American works. The British were reduced to three hundred and fifty men, by the terrible discharges of grape and musketry which issued from them: they had not a single gun to beat down the palisades, or silence the enemies' cannon; and the fleet could not approach the shore to co-operate in the attack, owing to adverse winds. In these circumstances ultimate success was hopeless, and, in fact, the capture of the place must have been im-

* The Author has great pleasure in thus recording this decisive instance of personal gallantry on the part of Sir George Prevost, which he gives on the testimony of his brave and valued friends, Major-General Robert McDowall, celebrated for his gallant defence of Michilmackinac in the same war, who marshalled and led the troops to the last assault, and Sir Allan McNab, so well known for his heroic actions in Upper Canada, who were present on the occasion.

mediately followed by the surrender of the handful of British who remained for the assault. Prevost, therefore, wisely drew off his forces and returned to the British shore, where he was immediately assailed with that vehement acrimony which, in that country, never fails to attend want of success, even when, from deficiency of force, it had been from the first unattainable.¹

The principal American force on Lake Ontario, about six thousand strong, was at this juncture engaged in an attack on Fort George, at the western extremity of the lake. Early in the morning of the 27th May, a combined attack was made, by the naval and military forces, on that stronghold; the former under the command of Commodore Chauncey, the latter led by General Dearborn. General Vincent, who commanded the British in that quarter, could not muster above nine hundred soldiers; but with this handful of men he made a most gallant resistance, until at length the works, especially on the lake front, being torn in pieces by the heavy cannonade, the British commander blew up the fort, and withdrew, with the loss of three hundred and fifty men, to a strong position on Burlington heights, near the head of the lake, where he collected detachments from Chippewa, Fort Erie, and other points, and assembled about sixteen hundred troops, of which one-half were regular soldiers. After this success the Americans advanced to Queens-town, and, being strongly reinforced, established themselves in a solid manner on the Niagara frontier, with nearly six thousand men.²

This was by far the most formidable lodgment which the Americans had effected in the Canadian territory, and it excited, in consequence, equal attention and alarm through the whole British possessions. General Dearborn

* This account of the attack on Sackett's Harbour, which varies considerably from what is contained in the former editions of this work, is much indebted to the valuable information afforded by General McDowall, who was personally engaged with his wonted gallantry in the assault, to whom the author is happy to make this public acknowledgment.

CHAP.
XVI.

1813.

1. Christie,

77, 79, A. 13.

B. 1, 12,

13, 14.

A. 13, 14.

L. 12, 13.

50.

Reduction

11, 12,

13, 14,

15, 16,

17, 18.

May 27.

2 Ann. Reg.

1813, 182.

183, Arm-

strong, 1.

183, 184.

Christie, 75.

76.

CHAP.
XCI.

1813.

51.

The Americans
are defeated
at Stony
Creek.
Beavers'
Dams, and
Black Rock.
June 8.

now confidently anticipated their entire conquest at no distant period; and to dislodge Vincent from his position, which he held with only eleven hundred men, he pushed forward a body of three thousand infantry, two hundred and fifty horse, and nine guns. No sooner was the English general apprised of their approach, than he called a council of war, and, at the suggestion of Captain McDowall of the 8th, Sir George Prevost's aide-de-camp,* despatched seven hundred and fifty men under Colonel Harvey, to retard their advance. This gallant officer finding, when he arrived near the enemy, that they kept a bad look-out, resolved on a nocturnal surprise. It was accordingly executed in the most brilliant style, as soon as it was dark, and with such success, that two generals and a hundred and fifty men were made prisoners, and four guns captured. After this check, the enemy retreated to Fort George in great confusion. Having recovered from this disaster, Dearborn, a fortnight after, sent out an expedition of six hundred men to dislodge a British picket, which was posted at a place called Beavers' Dams, a few miles from Queenstown. They were soon beset on their road through the woods by Captain Kerr, with a small body of Indians, and Lieutenant Fitzgibbons, at the head of forty-six of the 49th regiment, not two hundred in all. But this little force was so skilfully disposed as to make the Americans believe they were the light troops of a very superior army, which in fact was approaching, though it had not come up. They surrendered in consequence, five hundred in number, with two guns and two standards. Shortly after, a successful expedition was undertaken against the American fortified harbour of Black Rock on Lake Ontario, which was burned, with all its naval stores and vessels, by a British detachment under Colonel Bishop, who unfortunately fell in the moment of victory;¹ while the British flotilla on Lake Champlain captured two armed

June 21.

JULY 11.
at Chateaugay,
81, 82, 85.
Armstrong's,
4, 137, 151.
Am. Rev.
1813, 182,
184.

* Now General Robert McDowall.

schooners of eleven guns each—a success of no small importance, in a warfare where so much depended on the command of those inland waters. CHAP. XVI.

1813.

These repeated disasters so disconcerted the Americans, that though their force at Fort George was still more than double that of the British who advanced against it, yet they kept cautiously within their lines, and submitted to be insulted by the English troops, who not only cooped them up within their walls, but actually advanced to within a few hundred yards of their guns. Prevost, however, wisely judged that it would be the height of imprudence to assault the Americans, driven to desperation, with half their number, in works bristling with cannon, and supported by the fire of Fort Niagara, on the other side of the river. As, therefore, no provocation could induce them to quit their lines, he left a force to maintain the blockade, and returned to Kingston. Meanwhile the war was vigorously prosecuted on Lake Erie by General Proctor, who invested the fort of Lower Sandusky on the Sandusky River, with five hundred regulars and militia, and above three thousand Indians. The works having been battered, Proctor led his troops to the assault. They crossed the glacis with great gallantry, though entirely deserted by their Indian allies, whom no consideration could induce to face the great guns, and were actually in the ditch, when the head of the column was smitten by such a fire of grape and musketry, that they were driven back, and obliged to re-embark with the loss of a hundred killed and wounded; and soon after the siege was raised.¹

These mutual injuries, though upon the whole highly favourable to the British arms, yet in truth decided nothing; it was on the lakes that the real blows were to be struck, and a decisive superiority acquired by the one party over the other. Events in the outset of this inland naval warfare were highly favourable to the British arms. Strengthened by the two armed schooners, which had been taken on Lake Champlain, and which had been

59.
Br. 1813.
at Fort
Georg.
and 1813.
of the
disgr.

Aug. 2.

1. Ch. 1813.
83, 84, Ann.
Reg. 1813,
181, 187.
Armstrong,
i. 164, 168.

53.
Success of
the British
on Lake
Champlain,
and 1813.
Plattsburg.

CHAP.
XCI.

1813.

Aug. 10 and
11.

Aug. 28.
Ann. Reg.
1813, 186.
187. Christie,
37, 91.
Armstrong,
i. 165, 166.
James, vi.
246.

named the Broke and the Shannon, the English flotilla, with nine hundred men on board, stretched across the lake, took Plattsburg, which was evacuated by twelve hundred Americans without firing a shot, burned part of the naval stores, brought away the rest, and also destroyed the naval establishments at Burlington and Champlain. By these successes, a decisive superiority was acquired on Lake Champlain for the remainder of the campaign. Sir James Yeo also gained considerable successes on Lake Ontario, particularly on the 10th August, when he captured two schooners, and destroyed two others. But no decided engagement took place on that inland sea, as neither party was sufficiently confident in his strength to risk the fate of the campaign by a general battle on its surface.¹

54.

Defective
state of the
British
flotilla on
Lake Erie.

But while the campaign, both by land and water, was thus prosperous in the upper provinces, a dreadful disaster occurred on Lake Erie, which more than compensated all these advantages, and immediately exposed the British provinces in North America to imminent danger. This was the more alarming, that the force at the command of Sir George Prevost was so small as to be wholly inadequate to the defence of a frontier everywhere vulnerable, and above twelve hundred miles in length. Both parties had made the greatest efforts to augment their naval force on Lake Erie; but, owing to the superior facilities of the Americans for ship-building at their own doors, while the whole British naval stores had to come from England, the weight, as well as the number of their vessels became soon superior to that of the British, while the total stoppage of their commerce gave them ample means for manning them with numerous crews of picked seamen. Captain Barclay, an officer inferior to none in the service of Great Britain for skill and gallantry, was appointed in May to the command of the squadron on the lake, and immediately entered on his unenviable duty, when the whole force was not equal to a British

twenty-gun brig. The Detroit, however, was soon after launched, and fifty English seamen having been received and distributed through his ships, Barclay set out, early in September, with his little fleet, consisting of two ships, two schooners, a brig, and a sloop, carrying in all sixty-three guns. But there was not one British sailor to each gun; the rest of his crews being made up of two hundred and forty soldiers and eighty Canadians. On the other hand, the American squadron, of two more vessels and an equal number of guns, bore nearly double the weight of metal and number of hands; and possessed a still higher superiority in their crews being all experienced seamen, to meet the wretched mixture of five landmen to one sailor, who manned the British fleet.^{1*}

CHAP.
XCI.

1813.

¹ James, vi.
247, 249.
Armstrong;
i. 167, 168.

Barclay, in the first instance, with this feeble force, blockaded the American flotilla in the harbour of Presqu' Isle, now Erie; which he could do with safety, notwithstanding his inferiority, as the Americans could not get their squadron over the bar in its front, except with the guns out, which of course prevented their attempting it in the face of an armed force. At length, however, their commodore, Captain Parry, adroitly seized the moment when Barclay was absent, and got outside the bar. The British commander upon this returned to Amherstburg, where he was soon blockaded by the American squadron; the former being busily engaged, meantime, in exercising the soldiers at the guns, and accustoming the Canadians to handle the ropes. Soon, however, provisions on that desolate shore fell short; and Barclay, deeming his crews a little more efficient, put to sea. An action ensued between the opposite squadrons, which for valour and

55.
Desperate
action on
Lake Erie,
and defeat
of the Bri-
tish.

Sept. 10.

* Force of American and British squadrons.

	British.	American.
Ships, brigs, and schooners, . . .	6	8
Broadside guns, . . .	34	34
Weight of metal—lb., . . .	459	928
Crews, . . .	345	580
Tons, . . .	1250	960

—JAMES, vi. 248, 249.

CHAP.
XCI.

1813.

resolution displayed on both sides never was surpassed. In the first instance, the *Lawrence*, which bore Commodore Parry's flag, was cut to pieces by the British guns : she became unmanageable ; Parry shifted his flag on board the *Niagara*, and soon after the colours of the *Lawrence* were hauled down amidst loud cheers from the British squadron. After this, the firing ceased on both sides for a few minutes, and a breeze at the same time having sprung up behind the Americans, Parry skilfully gained the weathergage, while the British vessels, in endeavouring to wear round to present a fresh broadside to their antagonists, fell, from the inexperience of the crews, into confusion, and for the most part got jammed together, with their bows facing the enemy's broadsides. So defective, too, was Barclay's equipment, that he had only one boat on board of his own vessel, the *Detroit*, and it was pierced with shot ; he could not, in consequence, take possession of his prize ; the *Lawrence* drifted out of fire, and her crew immediately rehoisted their colours. At the same time Parry took advantage of the weathergage which he had gained, to take a position with his remaining vessels which raked the principal British ships ; while they, from the unskilfulness of their men, were unable to handle their ropes so as to extricate themselves from the danger. The result was, that after a furious engagement of three hours, the whole British vessels were taken ; but not until they had become wholly unmanageable, nearly all the superior officers, including Barclay, being killed or desperately wounded, and they had lost forty-one killed, and ninety-four wounded, or above a third of the whole men on board the flotilla.¹

¹ Cooper, ii. 447, 467.
James, vi. 247, 253.
Christie, 93.
94. Ann. Reg. 1813.
187. Capt. Barclay's Account.

56.
Political and
diplomatic
General
Proctor.

The effects of this defeat were soon felt in the military operations. The Americans being now entirely masters of Lake Erie, had it in their power at once to intercept the whole coasting trade, by which Proctor's troops and Indians were supplied with provisions, and to land any

force they chose in his rear, and entirely cut him off from Kingston and York. He was constrained, therefore, immediately to commence a retreat, abandoning and destroying all his fortified posts beyond the Grand River. Amherstburg and Detroit, accordingly, were immediately dismantled; and with the Indians under Tecumseh, who preserved an honourable fidelity in misfortune, the British commenced a retreat towards the river Thames. In this retrograde movement, however, they were immediately followed by Harrison, who was attended by Parry's squadron on the lake, while the British, almost starving, toiled through wretched roads and interminable forests. On the 4th October, Harrison came up with the British rear, and succeeded in capturing nearly all their stores. Unable to retreat further in anything like military array, Proctor had now no alternative but to endeavour to check the enemy by a general battle; and for this purpose he took up a position at the Moravian village on the Thames. Here he was attacked next day by the Americans, with greatly superior forces. The Indians, though little inured to regular warfare, continued the contest with heroic courage, even after it had been given over by the whites; and only abandoned it when the day was irretrievably lost—their gallant chief, Tecumseh, and many of their bravest warriors, having fallen. The first line of the British was overthrown by a sudden charge of the Kentucky horse; and after a short combat they were totally defeated, with the loss of six hundred men—almost all made prisoners. The remainder dispersed in the woods, and after undergoing incredible hardships, reassembled at Ancaster at the head of Lake Ontario, to the number of only two hundred and forty.¹

On the same day on which this defeat was sustained upon the shores of Lake Erie, six schooners, having on board two hundred and fifty soldiers, proceeding from York to Kingston without convoy, were captured on Lake

CHAP.
XCI.
1-13.

Sept. 27.

Oct. 4.

Oct. 5.

¹ Christie, 46, 97; Ann. Reg. 1813, 188; Prevost's Off. and Ac- count, 30, 1813; App. to Chron. 221; Armstrong, 1, 170, 174.

CHAP.
XCI.

1813.

57.

Disaster on
Lake Onta-
rio, and
raising of
the siege of
Fort
George.

Oct. 9.

Ontario. These repeated losses, coupled with the alarming intelligence received at the same time of great preparations for a general invasion of Lower Canada, made Sir George Prevost wisely determine it to be impossible to continue any longer the investment of Fort George; and the siege was accordingly raised a few days after. Though the British force at this point was so much weakened by sickness that not a thousand firelocks, out of three thousand, could be brought into action, yet the retreat was conducted with perfect order; and the troops were concentrated in a strong position on Burlington heights, where they were soon after joined by the fugitives from Proctor's detachment, and succeeded in mustering fifteen hundred bayonets. They showed so strong a front that the Americans did not venture to attack them, and this stemmed the torrent of disaster in that quarter. But by driving the British from the territory to the westward of the river Thames, the Americans had in a great degree cut them off from their Indian allies, with whom they now could maintain no communication but by the distant and now isolated fort of Michilmackinac, on Lake Huron; an advantage of no small moment for the future progress of the war.¹

1 Christie,
97, 98. Arm-
strong, i.
170, 175.
Ann. Reg.
1813, 169.

58.

Prepara-
tions for a
grand inva-
sion of
Canada.

The Americans were so elated with these successes, that they openly announced their intention of forthwith conquering Lower Canada, and taking up their winter-quarters at Montreal. Nor were their preparations and forces, if the numerical amount of their troops is alone considered, at all inadequate to such an undertaking. Their generals, abandoning for the time their operations in Upper Canada, transported all their forces by Lake Erie and Lake Ontario, so as to take part in the grand combined attack on the lower province. With this view they concentrated the great bulk of their army at Sackett's Harbour; and their troops were much more formidable than on any former occasion, for they amounted in all to eighteen thousand regular soldiers and ten thousand

militia, organised into three divisions. That on Lake Erie amounted to eight thousand, under Harrison; Wilkinson had ten thousand at Sackett's Harbour, and Hampton four thousand, and two thousand militia, on the Chateauguay river, near Lake Champlain. Threatened by so many enemies, Sir George Prevost issued an animated proclamation to the Canadians, and put the militia of the lower province on permanent duty. It will immediately appear how nobly they answered the appeal.¹

CHAP.
XCI.
1813.

¹ Ann. B. & C.
1813; and
Gen. Prevost's
Desp. Oct. 1813.
App. to
Chron. 217.
Chateauguay, 100.

Hampton, with the right wing of the army of invasion, was the first to take the field. Early on the 21st October he crossed the frontier, at the junction of the Chateauguay and Outard rivers; but though he had four thousand effective infantry, two thousand militia, and ten guns, he was so vigorously and gallantly resisted by the voltigeurs and frontier light infantry of the Canadians, not six hundred in number, under Colonel de Salavary, who fought with the steadiness of veteran soldiers in their woods, that after three days' desultory fighting, he was driven with disgrace back into the American territory, pursued and harassed by the Canadian militia. His troops were so discouraged by these reverses, that they became incapable of taking any further part in the campaign. Meanwhile Wilkinson, with the centre of the invading force, about ten thousand strong, left Sackett's Harbour, and, crossing Lake Ontario, mustered his troops in the end of October in Grenadier Island, opposite Kingston, where General de Rottenburg lay awaiting his attack. Having delayed till the principal forces of the upper province were concentrated around that great depot, the American general skilfully shifted his line of attack, and, embarking his troops on board three hundred boats, escorted by Chauncey, reached the lower end of the lake, and, dropping down the St Lawrence, landed on the 3d November near Point Iroquois. No sooner was the British general apprised of this circumstance than he de-

59.
Defeat of
the invasion
of Lower
Canada.

Oct. 25.

Oct. 26.

Nov. 3.

CHAP. tached Colonel Morrison, with eight hundred regulars and
 XCI. militia, to follow the motions of the fleet, and oppose
 1813. them wherever they attempted a landing. Morrison came
 Nov. 11. up with the enemy near Chrystler's Point, twenty miles
 above Cornwall, in number about three thousand, who
 had landed from their boats; and a violent encounter
 ensued. The Americans were unable, however, to bear
 Nov. 17. the attack of the British bayonet: they broke and fled
¹ Morrison's in disorder before the detachments of the 48th, 49th, and
 Official Ac- 89th, supported by the militia, and lost one gun, and two
 count, Nov. 12, 1813. hundred and fifty killed and wounded. Disconcerted by
 Ann. Reg. 1813, 235. this defeat, Wilkinson re-embarked his troops; and hav-
 App. to ing received at the same time accounts of Hampton's
 Chron. failure, he deemed the attack on Lower Canada hopeless,
 Christie, 105, 108. landed the men on the American shore, and put them
 Armstrong, into winter-quarters.¹
 ii. 8, 18.

60. A most gallant, and in its consequences very important,
 Gallant de- military event took place next year in the defence of the
 fence of Fort Fort Michilmackinac by a small British detachment under
 Michilmac- the command of Colonel Robert McDowall. This officer
 kinac by had been left in command of this important fort, situated
 Colonel on Lake Huron, which commands, as already mentioned,
 McDowall. the communication between the British provinces and the
 Indians to the west of the Lake Michigan. To insure
 its reduction, three different expeditions were set on foot
 by the Americans at the same time, in spring 1814: one
 from Fort Louis on the Mississippi, one from Detroit, and
 one from Chicuco. McDowall had under his command
 only two hundred and thirty-two men, of whom sixty
 were Canadian militia, and a hundred Indians. Out of
 this diminutive force he fitted out a small body, about a
 hundred strong, under the command of Major Mackay of
 the Canadian militia, who succeeded, by extraordinary
 gallantry, in wresting from the enemy about five hundred
 miles of territory to the westward, and advancing the
 British standards to the Mississippi, where they captured,
 and maintained themselves in, a fort erected by the

July 27.
 1814.

Americans. But, during their absence, the American cruising squadron, consisting of two ships mounting twenty-six guns, and several large schooners and small boats, hove in sight, under Commodore Sinclair, having upwards of nine hundred land troops on board. To oppose this force McDowall had now only one hundred and fifty men; but such was the ability of the dispositions which he made, that the enemy were worsted in several encounters, and driven back to their ships. And although reduced to great extremities by a long-continued blockade from the hostile squadron, he held out until Lieutenant Worsley succeeded, at the head of four of the garrison boats, in boarding and capturing, during the night, the two schooners which maintained the blockade: and the British having thus got the command of the lake, the Americans were obliged to raise the siege and abandon their enterprise.¹

CHAP.
XCI.
1-13.

¹ Personal information, Christie, 167. Armstrong, ii. 24.

This glorious defeat of an invasion so confidently announced and strongly supported, diffused the most heartfelt joy in Lower Canada, and terminated the campaign there in the most triumphant manner; and it was immediately followed by successes equally decisive in the upper province. All causes of apprehension for Montreal and the lower province being now removed, a strong body of troops was despatched under Colonel Murray from Kingston to repel the invasion of Upper Canada, and, if possible, clear that province of the enemy. They set out from Kingston, accordingly, and advanced towards Fort George, with a view to resume the investment, even amidst all the severities of a Canadian winter. The American general, however, did not await their approach, but precipitately evacuated that fort, and retreated across the Niagara, but not without having, by express orders, reduced the flourishing village of Newark to ashes.* Dec. 12.

61.
Total defeat of the enemy in Upper Canada, and evacuation of Fort George.

* “The post of Fort George, not being tenable against the enemy, must be abandoned, the garrison removed to Fort Niagara, and the exposed part of the frontier protected, by destroying such of the Canadian villages in its

CHAP.
XCI.

1813.

Dec. 18.

¹ Christie,
110, 111.
Armstrong,
ii. 19, 20.
Ann. Reg.
1814, 176,
177.

62.
Defeat of
Hull, and
burning of
Buffalo,
Dec. 28.

Such was the indignation excited in the breasts, equally of the British soldiers and the Canadian militia, by this inhuman act, which at once reduced above four hundred human beings to total destitution, amidst the horrors of a Canadian winter, that Colonel Murray resolved to take advantage of it to carry Fort Niagara, on the frontier of the United States. A detachment of five hundred men, accordingly, under the command of Murray, crossed the river Niagara in boats, and succeeded in surprising the fort with the loss of only five killed and three wounded. The garrison, nearly four hundred strong, with three thousand stand of arms, and vast military stores, fell into the hands of the victors. Immediately after this success, the troops attacked a body of Americans, who had erected a battery opposite Queenstown, from which they were discharging red-hot shot at that town, defeated them, and carried the fort.¹

Still following up these successes, General Drummond, with eight hundred men, crossed the Niagara to Black Rock, which was stormed, and the fugitives pursued to Buffalo, a few miles distant, where they rallied on a body of two thousand men who had assembled, under Hull, to defend that rising town. Such, however, was the vigour of the British attack, that the Americans were speedily routed with the loss of four hundred, while the victors were not weakened by more than a fourth of the number. Buffalo was immediately taken and burned: all the naval establishments there and at Black Rock were destroyed; while the Indians, let loose on the surrounding country, took ample vengeance for the conflagration of Newark, which had commenced this savage species of warfare.

front as would best shelter the enemy during winter.' Such were the orders of government. This new and degrading system of defence, which, by substituting the torch for the bayonet, furnished the enemy with both motive and justification for a war of retaliation, was carried into full execution on the 10th December. Newark was reduced to ashes, and orders were given to fire hot shot on Queenstown."—ARMSTRONG (*the American Secretary-at-War*), i. 29.

Though it had the desired effect, however, by making the Americans feel the consequences of their actions, of putting a stop to this barbarous system of hostilities, yet it was so much at variance with the British method of carrying on war, and so shocking to the feelings, both of the officers and men engaged in it, that Sir George Prevost shortly after issued a noble proclamation, lamenting the stern necessity under which he had acted in permitting these reprisals, and earnestly deprecating any further continuance of so inhuman a species of warfare.¹

This terminated the campaign of 1813 in Canada ; and though not unchecked by disaster, yet was it upon the whole eminently glorious, both to the arms of Britain and to the inhabitants of her noble American colonies. The superiority of the enemy, both in troops and all the muniments of war, was very great : twenty thousand regular soldiers, besides as many militia, were at their disposal ; the vessels built on the lakes were at their own door, armed from their own arsenals, and manned by the picked men of their commercial marine, now thrown almost utterly idle. On the other hand, the whole British force did not exceed *three thousand* regular soldiers,* who were charged with the defence of a frontier nearly a thousand miles in length ; and although they were supported by thirty thousand gallant militia, yet these troops could not be moved far from home, or kept embodied for any considerable length of time ; and they could not be relied on, except in small bodies, for offensive operations. The British naval force on the lakes required to bring every gun, and great part of its naval stores, from Great Britain, a distance of three thousand five hundred miles ; and the government could with difficulty spare, from the wants of a navy which was spread over the

CHAP.
XCL
1813.

Jan. 12,
1814.
† Christie,
111, 112.
Armstrong,
n. 19, 23.
Ann. Reg.
1814, 176,
177.

63.
General re-
sult of the
campaign.

* "Throughout the campaign, Prevost's regular force, covering a frontier of nine hundred miles from the Sorel to Fort St Joseph, did not exceed three thousand men." ARMSTRONG (*the American Secretary-at-War*), i. 113.

CHAP.
XCI.

1813.

globe, even a handful of sailors for this remote inland service. And by a strange infatuation, the result evidently of ignorance or undue estimate of their enemies on the part of the British government, scarcely any effort was made to enrol, among the numerous and skilful seamen of the coast of North America, such a force as would with ease and certainty have secured for them the command of the lakes.

64.
Its honour-
able charac-
ter to Sir G.
Prevost.

To have repelled all the efforts of the Americans in such circumstances, and with such forces, is of itself distinction; but it becomes doubly glorious when it is recollected, that this distant warfare took place during the crisis of the contest in Europe, toward the close of a twenty years' war, when every sabre and bayonet which could be spared was required for the devouring Peninsular campaigns, and when eleven millions sterling were sent in subsidies, in that one year, from Great Britain to the German and other Continental powers. The wisdom of the measures adopted by Sir George Prevost, the vigour with which attack at all points was repelled, and the imposing celerity with which a cautious defensive was converted, at its close, into a vigorous offensive warfare, can never be sufficiently praised, and justly place this campaign on a level with any in the long annals of British glory. If these considerations be duly weighed, it must appear evident, especially when the vast subsequent increase in the British population of Upper Canada is taken into consideration, that if the affections of our North American possessions are secured by a just system of colonial administration, and a continuance of the protective policy to which their greatness has been owing, Great Britain has now no reason to apprehend danger from the utmost efforts of the United States.

65.
Capture of
the Essex by
the Phœbe.
Prevost.

The naval operations of the year 1814 commenced with a successful attack on the American frigate *Essex* by the British frigate *Phœbe*, supported by the *Cherub* brig. The *Essex*, under Captain Porter, had set out in the

autumn preceding, on a cruise to the South Seas; and after having made some valuable captures, was at length overtaken with two of her prizes, one of which she had armed with twenty guns, and manned with ninety-five men, in the roads of Valparaiso on the 9th February. After a close blockade of three weeks, during which various attempts to escape were made, the British commander, Captain Hillyar, succeeded in bringing the *Essex* to action in the roads of Valparaiso before she could get back to the harbour, and without the aid of her lesser consort. This unequal combat, however, was maintained for forty minutes, by Captain Porter, with the utmost gallantry. The crews on both sides were strongly excited: the Americans having the motto flying, "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights;" the British, "God and our Country—Traitors offend both." Early in the action the *Phœbe* received a shot in her rigging, which for a short time deprived her crew of the management of the vessel, so that she dropped almost out of shot; but the mischief being shortly repaired, the action was renewed; and as the *Cherub* raked the *Essex* while the *Phœbe* exchanged broadsides with her, both firing with great precision, the carnage on board the American vessel was soon frightful. Twice she took fire; and at length Captain Porter, having exhausted every means of defence, and sustained a loss of sixty-nine men, of whom twenty-four were killed, was compelled to lower his colours. The loss on the side of the British was very trifling, being five killed and two wounded—a fact which sufficiently proves the inequality of the combat, though it had been managed with the greatest skill by the British commander. Nearly a hundred British sailors were on board the American vessel when the engagement commenced, who jumped overboard when it appeared likely she would be taken; forty of these reached the shore, thirty-one were drowned, and sixteen were picked up when at the point of perishing.¹

CHAP.
XCI.
1814.

Feb. 28.

1. James, vi.
285, 286.
Captain
Hillyar's
Account,
March 30,
1814. *Ann.
Reg.* 1814.
179. *Apoc.
to Chron.*
Cooper, ii.
262, 269.

Early in February the American sloop *Frolic*, pierced

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

66.

The Frolic
taken by the
Orpheus,
and the
Reindeer by
the Wasp.

nominally for eighteen guns, but really carrying twenty-two, was captured, after two shots only had been fired, by the British frigate *Orpheus* of thirty-six guns. The *Epervier*, British sloop of eighteen guns, however, was soon after taken by the American sloop *Peacock* of twenty-two; and on the 28th June, a most desperate combat took place between the British sloop *Reindeer*, of eighteen guns, and the American sloop *Wasp*. The preponderance of force was here in a most extraordinary degree in favour of the Americans;* but notwithstanding this advantage, Captain Manners of the *Reindeer*, one of the bravest officers who ever trode a quarterdeck, the moment he got sight of the American vessel, gave chase; and as soon as it was evident to the American captain that he was pursued by the *Reindeer* alone, he hove to, and the action commenced. Never were vessels more gallantly commanded and fought on both sides. The engagement lasted, yard-arm to yard-arm, for half an hour, at the end of which time the *Reindeer* was so disabled that she fell with her bow against the larboard quarter of the *Wasp*. The latter instantly raked her with dreadful effect; and the American riflemen, from the tops, picked off almost all the officers and men on the British deck. But Captain Manners then showed himself indeed a hero. Early in the action the calves of his legs had been shot away, but he still kept the deck: at this time a grape-shot passed through both his thighs; but, though brought for a moment to his knees, he instantly sprang up, and, though bleeding profusely, not only refused to quit the deck, but exclaiming, "Follow me, my boys; we must board!" sprang into the rigging of the *Reindeer*, intending to leap into that of the *Wasp*. At this moment, two balls from the

				Reindeer.	Wasp.
* Broadside guns,	.	.	.	9	11
Weight of metal	lb.,	.	.	189	338
Crew—men only,	.	.	.	98	173
Tons,	.	.	.	385	539

American tops pierced his skull, and came out below his chin. With dying hand he waved his sword above his head, and exclaiming, "O God!" fell lifeless on the deck. The Americans immediately after carried the British vessel by boarding, where hardly an unwounded man remained; and so shattered was she in her hull, that she was immediately after burned by the victors. Never will the British empire be endangered while the spirit of Captain Manners survives in its defenders.¹ *

CHAP.
XCI.
1815.

JAMES, vi.
294, 295.
COOPER, ii.
232, 233.

An action more prosperous, but not more glorious for the British arms, than that between the Reindeer and Wasp, took place next spring, which terminated in the capture of the noble American frigate *President*, one of the largest vessels of that class in the world, by the *Endymion*, Captain Hope, slightly aided by the *Pomona*. On the 14th January 1815, the *President* and *Macedonian* brig set sail from New York on a cruise, and were shortly after chased by the British blockading squadron, consisting of the *Majestic*, fifty-six guns, the *Endymion*, forty, and *Pomona*, thirty-eight. Being evidently no match for so great a superiority of force, Commodore Decatur, who commanded the American vessels, endeavoured to get back; but he was intercepted, and chased for fifty miles along the coast of Long Island, in the course of which the *Tenedos*, British frigate, also joined in the pursuit. Towards evening the *Endymion* gained rapidly on the American frigate, and opened a fire with her bow-chasers, which was vigorously returned by the *President* from her stern guns. Meanwhile the *Majestic* and *Pomona* fell behind out of gunshot.¹ At length the *Endymion* gained so much on the American as to permit her first broad-

47.
Action between the
President
and the
Endymion,
Jan. 14.

¹ Captain
Hayes' Official
Account.
Ann. Reg.
1815. App.
to Chron.
139.
COOPER, ii.
533, 545.
JAMES, vi.
294, 297.
BRENTON, ii.
528.

* The *Wasp* itself, with its gallant captain (Blakely) and crew, were in the same year lost during a cruise, and no trace of them was ever obtained. They had previously compelled the *Avon*, of 18 guns, to surrender, but not till the latter vessel was so cut to pieces that she sank immediately after. The Americans must allow the British empire to share with them the honours of the brave and skilful Captain Blakely, for he was born in Dublin.—COOPER, ii. 341; and JAMES, vi. 297, 299.

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

side guns to begin to bear, and a close running fight ensued; the two vessels sailing under easy way, within half-musket-shot distance. Commodore Decatur suffered so severely, especially in his rigging, under their fire, that he took the gallant resolution of laying himself alongside the *Endymion*, with the view of carrying her by boarding, and going off with his prize, leaving his own crippled vessel to the enemy, before the other British ships could get up.

68.
Capture of
the former
by the
British.

But the *Endymion* skilfully avoided this risk, which, with the enemy's great superiority of men, might have been serious, by keeping at a short distance, and preserving the advantage she had gained by a fire at half-gunshot range. Thus the fight continued for two hours longer, both vessels being most gallantly fought and skilfully handled. At the end of that time the *Endymion's* sails were so much cut away by the American bar-shot, that she fell astern; and the *Pomona* coming up, gave the *President* two broadsides with little or no effect, owing to the darkness of the night. But this circumstance saved the American's honour, as two vessels had now opened their fire upon him; and he accordingly hauled down his colours, and was taken possession of by the boats of the *Pomona*. In this long and close cannonade, the *President* lost thirty-five men killed and seventy-six wounded; the *Endymion* ten killed and twelve wounded; but her upper rigging, at which the enemy chiefly aimed, was very much cut away. This action was one of the most honourable ever fought by the British navy, and in none was more skilful seamanship displayed; for although at the close of the action the *Pomona* came up, yet during its continuance the superiority was strongly on the side of the *President*.^{1*} When she struck, there

¹ James, v.
366, 367.
Captain
Hayes' Official
Account,
Jan. 17.
Ann. Reg.
1815, 139.
App. to
Cannon.
Cooper, ii.
512, 541.

	<i>Endymion</i> .	<i>President</i> .
* Broadside guns, . . .	24	28
Weight of metal—lb, . . .	664	852
Crew—men only, . . .	319	465
Tons, . . .	1277	1533

¹ James, vi. 367.

In justice to the Americans, however, it must be observed, that as they

were no less than one hundred and eighty British seamen found in her crew, the greater part of whom had fought under English colours in the Macedonian, and been since enticed, in moments of intoxication, into the service of their enemies.

This was the last action between frigates that occurred during the war ; but several lesser combats ensued, honourable alike to the sailors and officers of both nations. Let it not be said these combats were trivial occurrences ; nothing is trivial which touches the national honour. Napoleon felt this at the battle of Maida, albeit not more momentous to his colossal power than the capture of a sloop to Great Britain. The superiority of her navy is an affair of life or death to England : when her people cease to think so, the last hour of her national existence has struck. On the 23d March, long after peace had been signed, the Hornet met the Penguin, and a furious conflict ensued, both commanders being ignorant of the termination of hostilities. Both vessels were of equal size and weight of metal, but the American had the advantage in the number and composition of her crew ; * and after a desperate conflict, in the course of which the brave Captain Dickinson of the Penguin was slain in the very act of attempting to board, the British vessel surrendered, having lost a third of her crew killed and wounded. The Hornet was shortly after chased by the Cornwallis, of seventy-four guns, and only escaped into New York by throwing all her guns overboard. Lastly, the American brig Peacock, of twenty-four guns, fell in with the British East India Company's cruiser, the Nautilus, of fourteen guns, which was of course captured after a few broadsides, although the British commander assured the American

CHAP.
XCI.
1815.

69.
Lesser
actions,
which, closed the war.

March 23.

June 30.

were chased by other vessels besides the Endymion, though they had not yet come up, they could not venture to range up alongside, when their great superiority in guns and metal might have been most effectually brought into play.

	Men.	B. s.	Total.
* Hornet, . . .	163	2	165
Penguin, . . .	105	17	122

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

¹ Ante, ch.
xxxiv. § 56.

² James, vi.
385, 387.
Cooper, iv.
551, 554.
Ann. Reg.
1813, 185;
and 1814,
174, 179.

that peace had been signed. Thus terminated at sea this memorable contest, in which the English, for the first time for a century and a half, met with equal antagonists on their own element; and in recounting which, the British historian, at a loss whether to admire most the devoted heroism of his own countrymen or the gallant bearing of their foes, feels almost equally warmed in narrating either side of the strife; and is inclined, like the English sailors who were prisoners in the hold of the French vessel that combated in the bay of Algesiras,¹ to cheer with every broadside which came in, for it was delivered, in descent at least, from English hands.²

70.
Financial
measures of
the American
government.

At the beginning of 1814, the long continuance of the war, the total destruction of the American trade, and blockade of their harbours, and the evident hopelessness of the contest at land, after the pacification of the European continent had enabled Great Britain to send its victorious troops to the fields of Transatlantic warfare, increased to a very great degree the discontent of that large party in the United States who had throughout opposed the contest. Indeed, it rose to such a pitch, as, in two of the northern states, had influence sufficient to prevent their sending their contingents of armed men to carry it on. The blockade of their harbours, and stoppage of their trade, had almost entirely ruined the American customs, the only source of revenue, except the sale of waste lands, which their government had hitherto had to rely on; and from sheer necessity Congress was driven to lay on a great variety of new taxes on excisable articles, to supply the alarming deficiency of the public revenue. These taxes were laid on wine licences, licences to distil spirituous liquors, on sales by auction of merchandise, ships and vessels, on sugars refined in the United States, bank-notes, and stamps for bills of exchange, and on imported salt. They were to continue during the whole period of the war, and for a year after its termina-

tion. A further loan of seven million five hundred thousand dollars was negotiated in August 1813, for the service of that year and the first quarter of the next. Thus the Americans, under the pressure of warlike necessity, were fast gliding into the long-established system of taxation in the European states, and losing the peculiar advantage they had hitherto enjoyed, of being placed beyond the hostility of the Old World, and consequently relieved from its burdens.¹

It may readily be imagined that these direct or excise taxes, to which they had hitherto been wholly unaccustomed, did not increase the popularity of the war in the United States; the more especially after the evident approach of a termination to the European struggle left the contest equally without an object as without hope. To such a height did these discontents rise, even among the democratic party, who had hitherto been the most violent supporters of the war, that government was obliged to do something indicating a disposition to recede from the inveterate system of hostility which they had hitherto pursued. In the end of March, a message from the President to Congress recommended the repeal of the Non-importation Act; and, in pursuance of the recommendation, a bill soon after passed both houses, by a large majority, repealing both the Embargo and Non-importation Acts. This decisive approach to pacific measures awakened sanguine hopes throughout the Union of reviving trade and a speedy termination of hostilities; but they were soon undeceived by a proclamation by the British government, which declared the ports north of New York, as well as those to the southward, in a state of blockade. In answer to this, the American government issued a counter proclamation, in which, after setting forth that a blockade of a coast two thousand miles in length was an unwarrantable stretch, and could not be enforced, ordered all vessels, whether national or privateers, bearing the flag of the United States, to pay no regard to such blockade,² and not to

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

Act, 24,
1813.¹ Arm-
istice, &c.
271.71.
Repeal of
the Non-
importation
Act.

March 31.

April 16.

April 25.

June 20,
² Ann. R. 2,
1814, 179,
181.

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

72.

Symptoms
of a break-
ing up of
the Union.
Jan. 12.

molest any vessels belonging to neutral powers bound for any harbour in the United States.

But the discontents of the Northern States had now risen to such a height as seriously threatened the dissolution of the Union. The two states of Massachusetts and New Hampshire continued to refuse to send their contingents to the army; and the governor of the former state thus addressed the State Legislature in the beginning of the year:—"If our conduct to both belligerents had been really impartial, all the calamities of war might have been avoided. We had assumed the character of a neutral nation; but had we not violated the duties imposed by that character? Had not every subject of complaint against one belligerent been amply displayed, and those against the other palliated or concealed? When France and England were engaged in an arduous struggle, and we interfered and assaulted one of them, will any man doubt our intention to assist the other?" At a subsequent period of the same year, the state of Massachusetts took still more decisive measures. Openly asserting their inherent right to frame a new constitution, they resolved to "appoint delegates to confer with delegates from New England on the subject of their grievances and common concerns, and to take measures, if they think proper, for procuring a convention of delegates from all the United States to revise the constitution." These propositions were the more alarming, that the general discontent was much increased by the vast augmentation of the taxes, which were progressively swelled to the end of the year, and had already arisen to the most alarming amount. The indirect taxes were advanced fifty per cent, the tax on auctions was doubled, and many new imposts were added, expected to produce eleven or twelve millions of dollars, or about two million five hundred thousand pounds. And with all these aids, so low had the credit and resources of the treasury fallen, that the government could not negotiate a loan,¹ and were driven to the neces-

Dec. 13.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1814, 178.
193.

sity of issuing treasury-notes to a large amount, which were to bear interest like English Exchequer bills, and supply the want of a circulating medium in the States.

CHAP.
XCI.
1844.

The greatest exertions were made during the winter in Canada, to augment the efficient military force of the provinces, and prepare in the most vigorous manner for the ensuing campaign. The Houses of Assembly warmly seconded the efforts of the British; thanks were unanimously voted to Colonel de Salavary and the other officers who had distinguished themselves during the preceding campaign; the embodied or regular militia was augmented to four thousand men, besides the voltigeur and frontier corps, which numbered as many more; and considerable sums were voted by the chief towns to expedite the transmission of the troops. In March a solemn embassy from the Indians waited on the governor at Quebec, to supplicate the powerful protection of Great Britain, in shielding them from the continual encroachments of the American states. "The Americans," said they, "are taking lands from us every day: they have no hearts, father; they have no pity for us, they want to drive us beyond the setting sun; but we hope, although we are few, and are here as it were upon a little island, our great and mighty father, who lives beyond the great lake, will not forsake us in our distress, but will continue to remember his faithful Red children." They received the strongest assurance of protection and support, and were sent back to their wilds loaded with presents, determined to avenge their beloved chief Tecumseh and prosecute the war with redoubled vigour.¹

73.
Prepara-
tions in
Canada,
and among
the Indians.

March 15.

¹ Christie,
117, 122.

No material movement occurred on either side on the Canadian frontier till the end of March, when the American general Wilkinson, on the extreme right on Lake Champlain, collecting a large force from Plattsburg and Burlington, attacked the Canadian outposts at La Cole Mill; but he was repulsed with considerable loss, with very little injury to the British detachments. A more

74.
Storming of
Fort Os-
wego, and
failure at
Sandy
Creek,
March 29.

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

serious attempt was made, in Upper Canada, by Sir James Yeo and General Drummond, on Fort Oswego, situated on Lake Ontario. This fort was an important station, as it served as a resting-place and depot in the transit of military stores from Sackett's Harbour, the grand arsenal on the lake, to its upper extremity in the neighbourhood of Niagara, where it was known the principal effort was to be made in the ensuing campaign. Three hundred seamen and marines were landed from the flotilla, who carried the place in gallant style, destroyed the barracks, carried off the stores, and brought away the guns. At this time the British had a superiority on Lake Ontario, though the Americans were assiduously labouring to augment their force; and accordingly Sackett's Harbour was closely blockaded, and an attempt was made by Captain Popham, who commanded the blockading squadron, to destroy the enemy's flotilla in Sandy Creek, which was conveying a considerable quantity of naval and military stores. This onset, however, which was gallantly made with two hundred seamen and marines, was repulsed with the loss of seventy men, in consequence of the assailants being suddenly attacked by forces three times more numerous, consisting of riflemen, militia, and Indians. The English prisoners were with difficulty rescued from the bloody tomahawks of the latter by their more humane American enemies.¹

May 31.

¹ Christie,
122, 129.
Ann. Reg.
1814, 149,
250. Arm-
strong, ii.
63, 74.

75.

Capture of
Fort Erie,
and battle of
Chippewa.
June 3.

The American forces destined for the invasion of Upper Canada were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Buffalo, Black Rock, and other places on the Niagara frontier. Early in June, two strong brigades crossed over, under General Ripley, containing about five thousand men, and not only effected a landing without opposition, but succeeded in making themselves masters of Fort Erie, with its garrison of a hundred and seventy men, without firing a shot. Having thus gained one stronghold on the British side, Ripley advanced confidently to the neighbourhood of Chippewa, and was making preparations to carry that

place, when General Riall, who had collected about fifteen hundred regular troops and a thousand militia and Indians, adopted the bold resolution, notwithstanding the enemy's great superiority of force, of hazarding an immediate attack. The action commenced at five o'clock in the afternoon, by the militia and Indians assailing the light infantry of the enemy. But the Kentucky Rifles fought stoutly: their marksmen among the trees dealt out death with no sparing hand; and it was only by the light companies of the Royal Scots and 100th that they were finally driven in. The main body, consisting of these regiments, the King's, and the militia, now advanced to the attack in column, the Americans receiving them in line, thus reversing the usual order of the British and French in the Peninsular campaigns. The result was the same as what had there so often occurred: the head of the British column was crushed by the discharges of the American line, which stood bravely, and fired with great precision; and though the British succeeded in deploying with much steadiness, yet General Riall was at last obliged to retreat, with the loss of one hundred and fifty-one killed, and three hundred and twenty wounded. The American loss was two hundred and fifty-one. After this repulse, the British retired to their intrenched camp: but the Americans, now commanded by General Brown, having discovered a cross-road, which enabled them to threaten his communications, Riall fell back to Twenty-Mile Creek, abandoning Queens-town, which was occupied by the enemy.¹

This well-fought action was the most considerable which had yet occurred during the war; and as it terminated unfavourably for the British, though with a great superiority of force on the part of the enemy, it demonstrated that increased experience and protracted hostilities were beginning to produce their ordinary effects in teaching a people, naturally brave, the art of war. Their triumph, however, was not of long duration. Brown advanced to the vicinity of Fort George, where, according to the plan

CHAP.
XCI.
1814.
June 5.

¹ General Riall's Account, July 6, 1814. Ann. Reg. 1814, 200. App. to Chron. Christie, 128, 130. Armstrong, 31, 86, 100.

76.
Second
battle of
Chippewa.

CHAP.
XCI.1814.
June 15.

of the campaign, he was to have met the flotilla; but as the British still had the superiority on Lake Ontario, he not only met there with none of the naval succour which he had expected, but found the English flotilla lying in the harbour, and their land forces considerably augmented. The forts, also, both of George and Niagara, were so strengthened as to leave no hope of a successful siege of them with the means at his disposal. Brown, accordingly, after remaining a week in the neighbourhood of Fort George, commenced his retreat to Chippewa, which he reached on the evening of the 24th. General Riall immediately moved out of his intrenched camp in pursuit: and General Drummond having come up at the same time with reinforcements from Kingston, an attack with the united body—in all, about three thousand, of whom eighteen hundred were regulars—was made upon the enemy, whose force was about five thousand strong. The British guns, nine in number, happily seized a commanding eminence, which swept the whole field of battle. With great resolution, however, and highly elated with their recent success, the Americans advanced to the charge. The action began about six in the evening, and the whole line was soon warmly engaged, but the weight of the conflict fell upon the British centre and left. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts, the latter was forced back, and General Riall was severely wounded and made prisoner. In the centre, however, the 89th Royals and King's regiments opposed a determined resistance: and the guns on the hill, which were worked with prodigious rapidity, occasioned so great a loss to the attacking columns, that Brown soon saw that there was no chance of success till that battery was carried; and a desperate effort was resolved on to obtain the mastery of it.¹

¹ General Drummond's Official Account, July 27, 1814. Ann. Reg. App. to Chron. 203. Christie, 132, 133. Armstrong, ii. 39, 41.

77.
Anecdotes of the war of 1812.

The Americans, under General Millar, advanced with the utmost resolution, and with such vigour, that five of the British cannon at first fell into their hands. So desperate was the onset, so strenuous the resistance, that the

British artillerymen were bayoneted by the enemy in the act of loading, and the muzzles of their guns were advanced to within a few yards of the English battery. This dreadful conflict continued till after dark, with alternate success, in the course of which the combatants fought hand to hand, by the light of the discharges of the guns, and the artillery on both sides was repeatedly taken and retaken. At length, after an hour's vehement struggle, the combatants sank to rest from pure mutual exhaustion, within a few yards of each other, and so intermingled, that two of the American guns were finally mastered by the British, and one of the British by the Americans; so that, on the whole, one gun was gained for England in this unparalleled struggle with her worthy offspring. During this period of repose, the loud roar of the battle was succeeded by silence so profound, that the dull roar of the falls of Niagara, interrupted at intervals by the groans of the wounded, was distinctly heard. Over the scene of this desperate strife the moon threw an uncertain light, which yielded occasionally to the bright flashes of musketry or cannon, when the combat was partially renewed. Drummond skilfully took advantage of this respite to bring up the left wing, which had been repulsed, so as to form a support to the centre, while the line was prolonged to the right, where there was some danger of being outflanked; so that the blood-stained hill now formed the pivot of the British right. Upon this, the American general, being in no condition to continue the contest, gave orders for a retreat, which was carried into effect about midnight, the whole army retiring into their camp near Chippewa. Next day the retreat was continued to Fort Erie, with such precipitation, that the whole baggage, provisions, and camp-equipage were thrown into the Rapids, and precipitated over the awful cataract of Niagara.¹

CHAP.
XCL.
1814.

¹ General Drummond's Official Account, July 27, 1814. Ann. Reg. 1814, 204. App. to Chron. Christie, 133, 134. Armstrong, ii. 33, 35.

In this desperate battle, the loss on both sides was very

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.
78.
Results of
the battle.

Aug. 8.

¹ Christie,
134, 135.
Armstrong,
ii. 94, 95.

79.
Unsuccess-
ful assault
on Fort
Erie.
Aug. 15.

severe, but more so to the Americans than to the British. The former lost nine hundred and thirty killed and wounded, including in the latter Generals Brown and Scott; besides three hundred prisoners and one gun. The latter were only weakened by eight hundred and seventy men, of whom forty-two were made prisoners; among the latter were General Riall and his staff. But the result of the action was of the highest importance, as it entirely stopped the invasion of Upper Canada, and threw the Americans, lately so confident of success, back into Fort Erie, where they were immediately besieged by a force little more than half their amount. The operations were pushed with great activity: three armed schooners, anchored off the fort, were captured by a body of marines, who pushed off in boats during the night; and the defences were so much injured, that Drummond determined to hazard an assault early on the morning of the 15th August.¹

This daring attempt, with two thousand men, to storm an intrenched camp resting on a fort, and garrisoned by three thousand five hundred, had very nearly succeeded. The assailants were divided into three columns, and the first, under Colonel Fischer, had actually gained possession of the enemy's batteries, at the point assigned for its attack, two hours before daylight. If the other columns had reached their destined points of assault at the same time, the fort and intrenched camp would have been won, and the whole invading force made prisoners. But the supporting columns got entangled, by marching too near the lake, between the rocks and the water, and came up later, when the enemy were on the alert, who opened a tremendous fire upon the head of the column, which threw it into confusion. Meanwhile the other storming party succeeded, after a desperate resistance, in effecting a lodgment in the fort, by creeping in through the embrasures of a bastion, and had actually turned its guns for above an hour upon the enemy. At this critical

moment, the stone building in the interior, which was still held, took fire, and the flames having caught a quantity of powder placed in it, the whole blew up, with an explosion so tremendous, that the troops, thinking a mine had been sprung, were seized with a sudden panic, and, in spite of all the efforts of their officers, rushed in disorder out of the fort. The enemy now turned their whole forces upon Fischer's column, which was driven out of the works it had won, and the assault was repulsed at all points. In this gallant but abortive attempt, the British lost one hundred and fifty-seven men killed, three hundred and eight wounded, and one hundred and eighty-six prisoners. The loss, heavy though it was, was more than compensated next day, by the arrival of two new regiments from Lower Canada; but notwithstanding this, General Drummond did not deem himself in sufficient strength to hazard a second assault, but contented himself with drawing closer the investment, and cooping the large American army up in a corner of the British territory, where they were rendered perfectly useless during the remainder of the campaign.¹

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

¹ General
Drum-
mond's Offi-
cial Ac-
count, Aug.
15, 1814.
Ann. Reg.
1814, 269.
Christie,
132, 133.
Armstrong,
ii. 99, 100.

The operations of the British armament, on the southern coasts of America, had hitherto been on a small scale, calculated rather to irritate than alarm; but the termination of the war in Europe having rendered the whole navy and great part of the army of Great Britain disposable, it was resolved to prosecute hostilities there and in Canada with much vigour, and on a scale commensurate with the strength and reputation of the empire. Three regiments of Wellington's army, the 4th, 44th, and 85th, were embarked at Bordeaux on the 2d June, on board the Royal Oak seventy-four, and Dictator and Diadem of sixty-four guns each, and on the 24th arrived at Bermuda, where they were joined by the 21st fusileers, and two regiments from the Mediterranean, two of which, however, were destined for Canada, in six frigates, forming altogether a force of three thousand five hundred men,

80.
Operations
in Ches-
apeake Bay.

June 2.

June 24.

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

which arrived in Chesapeake Bay in the middle of August. There this little army was reinforced by a strong battalion of marines. General Ross commanded the land forces, Admiral Cockburn the fleet; and no two officers could have been found whose vigour, judgment, and daring were better calculated to effect great things with small means. Their first measure was to take possession of Tangier Island, where they erected fortifications, built storehouses, and hoisted the British flag; inviting at the same time the Negroes in the adjoining provinces to join the British force in the island, and offering them emancipation in the event of their doing so. Seventeen hundred speedily appeared, were enrolled and disciplined, and proved of no small service in subsequent operations. This incitement of the Negro population to revolt, was a step of very questionable morality in a political point of view, and it in the end cost the British no small sum as a compensation to the injured proprietors.* But it marked, in an unequivocal manner, the perilous foundation on which society in the southern provinces of the United States is rested, and the heedlessness of the people who, placed on the edge of such a volcano, urged on the war which might at once lead to its explosion.

1 James, vi.
304, 305.
Brenton, ii.
521. Armstrong, ii.
124, 125.
Ann. Reg.
1814, 183.

81.
Preparations for the attack on Washington.

The chief approach to Washington is by the river Potomac, which discharges itself into the upper extremity of the bay of Chesapeake. It may also be reached by the Patuxent from the town of Benedict, on which river there is a good road to the metropolis. After much deliberation, it was determined by the British commander to make a dash at this capital, and to approach it by the latter river, partly on account of the greater facility of

* By the treaty of Ghent, the compensation to be paid to the injured proprietors was referred to the Emperor of Russia; and that prince, influenced doubtless in some degree by the danger of a similar mode of hostility in his own dominions, awarded the enormous sum of £250,000, or nearly £150 a-head, for each Negro that gained his freedom. See MR ROBINSON'S *Speech Chancellor of Exchequer*, 28th February 1825, *Parl. Deb.*

access which it afforded, partly in order to accomplish the destruction of Commodore Barney's powerful flotilla of gun-boats, which had taken refuge in creeks in the upper parts of its course. The latter part of this service was speedily and effectually performed. The ships of war having ascended the stream as far as Benedict, beyond which there is not a sufficient draught of water for large vessels, the boats of the fleet were despatched after the flotilla; and the Americans, finding escape impossible, committed it to the flames, which consumed in a few hours fifteen fine gun-boats. Another, which resisted the conflagration, was brought away, with thirteen merchant schooners which had sought protection under cover of the armed vessels. This brilliant stroke having at once destroyed the enemy's whole naval force in the river, it was determined immediately to make an attack on the capital. The troops were accordingly disembarked at Benedict, and, with the addition of some marines, amounted in all to three thousand five hundred combatants, with two hundred sailors to draw the guns; and with this handful of men, carrying with them two three-pounders, and provisions for three days, the British general commenced his march against the capital of a republic which numbered eight millions of inhabitants, and boasted of having eight hundred thousand men in arms.¹

CHAP.
XCI.
1814.

Aug. 20.

Aug. 21.

¹ Arm-
strong, ii.
125, 127.
James, vi.
303, 309.
Ann. Reg.
1814, 153,
184. General
Ross's
Official Ac-
count, Aug.
30, 1814.
App. to
Chron. 249.

The American government were far from being unprepared for this attack. From some hints imprudently dropped by the British commissioners who at this period were negotiating with those of America at Ghent, they had become aware that an attempt on the capital was in contemplation; and nearly a month before Ross landed in the Patuxent, measures had been taken for placing, in case of invasion, sixteen thousand six hundred men at the disposal of General Winder, to cover the capital. At the same time, a requisition for the whole militia of Pennsylvania and Virginia, ninety-three thousand strong,

32.
Prepara-
tions for the
defence of
Washing-
ton.

July 18.

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

was made, and cheerfully answered. But the result soon showed what reliance is to be placed on the nominal paper-musters of such ill-disciplined arrays, when real danger is to be faced. Of the ninety-three thousand combatants of Pennsylvania and Virginia, nothing was heard when the day of trial approached: of the sixteen thousand active troops placed at the disposal of General Winder, not one-half appeared at the place of muster: and when the British troops were within five miles of Washington, only six thousand five hundred bayonets, three hundred horse, and six hundred seamen to work the guns, were assembled round the standards of the American general. He had, however, twenty-six guns to the British two: and with this force, about double that of the British, he took post opposite BLADENSBERG, a small village on the left bank of the eastern branch of the Potomac, upon a ridge of heights commanding the only bridge by which that river could be crossed. The great road ran straight through the centre of his position, and the artillery was placed so as to enfilade all the approaches to the bridge.¹

¹ Ross's
Official Ac-
count, Aug.
30, 1814.
Ann. Reg.
1814, 219.
App. to
Chron.
James, vi.
303. Arm-
strong, ii.
123, 130.
British
Camp, of
Washing-
ton, 96, 102.

83.
Battle of
Bladens-
berg.
Aug. 24.

Ross's decision was soon taken. Forming his troops into three columns of brigade, the first consisting of the 85th, and the light companies of the other regiments under the command of Colonel Thornton: the second of the 4th and 44th regiments, under Colonel Brooke, the third or reserve of the 21st fusileers, under Colonel Paterson, he immediately gave orders for the attack. Thornton's men advanced in double-quick time, in the finest order, through the fire of the guns, dashed across the bridge, carried a fortified house at the other end, which was occupied and loopholed, dislodged the American riflemen from the thick copse on the opposite bank, and, quickly spreading out on either flank, advanced in extended order directly against the American batteries. So vigorous was the attack, so feeble the defence, that two guns were carried, and the first line thrown back in confusion

on the second, by the first division alone, not more than fifteen hundred strong, aided by the fire of a few rockets, before the second could get across the bridge. The Americans, however, rallied upon their second line, again advanced upon Thornton's men, now disordered in pursuit, when Brooke's troops, debouching from the bridge, advanced to their support, the 44th charging on the right, and the 4th on the left. Instantly the scene was changed: the Americans could not meet the shock. Ten guns were taken, and the whole army, totally routed, took to flight, and reached Washington in the utmost confusion, where they tarried not an instant, but hurried through to the heights of Georgetown to the westward. Hardly any pursuit was attempted by the British, partly from their having no cavalry, partly from the extraordinary heat of the day having so exhausted the troops, that even the stoutest men in the army were unable to proceed till it was somewhat abated by the approach of evening. Their loss was surprisingly small, being only sixty-one killed and a hundred and eighty-five wounded.¹

After two hours' rest, however, the march was resumed, and the troops arrived within a mile of Washington at eight at night, where two thousand of them were halted, and the remainder accompanied General Ross and Admiral Cockburn into the city. A proposition was then made to the American authorities to ransom the public buildings, by paying a sum of money. This having been refused, the British general, on the following morning, applied the torch not only to the arsenals and storehouses, but to the public buildings of every description. In a few hours the Capitol, including the senate-house and House of Representatives, the arsenal, dockyard, treasury, war-office, president's palace, rope-walk, and the great bridge across the Potomac, were destroyed. The navy-yard and arsenal, with immense magazines of powder, were set on fire by the Americans before they retired,² and with them twenty thousand stand of arms were con-

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

¹ Ross's
Official Ac-
count, Aug.
30, 1814.
Ann. Reg.
1814, 219.
Armstrong,
ii. 130, 131.

31.
Capture of
Washington-
ton.

² General
Ross's Ac-
count, Aug.
30, 1814.
Ann. Reg.
1814, 219.
App. to
Cronin,
James, vi.
310, 311.
Armstrong,
ii. 130, 131.
Camp, at
Washing-
ton, 117,
129.

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

sumed. A fine frigate, of sixteen hundred tons, nearly finished, and a sloop, the *Argus*, of twenty guns, already afloat, were burned by them before evacuating the city. Immense stores of ammunition, two hundred and six pieces of cannon, and one hundred thousand rounds of ball-cartridge, were taken by the British and destroyed; and having completed the ruin of all the warlike establishments in the place, they leisurely retired on the evening of the 25th, and reached Benedict by easy marches on the 29th, where they embarked next day without being disquieted by the enemy.

85.
Reflections
on this ex-
pedition.

The capture of the American capital by so inconsiderable a British force, notwithstanding all the preparations of the government for above a month to avert the danger, and the immense importance of the blow thus struck at the naval and military resources of the enemy, rendered this expedition one of the most brilliant ever carried into execution by any nation. As such, it excited at the time a prodigious sensation in the United States; and it has hardly done less service to future times, and the cause of historic truth, by demonstrating in a decisive manner the extreme feebleness of the means for national protection which democratic institutions afford, when not coerced by military or despotic power. Yet it is to be regretted that the lustre of the victory has been much tarnished to the British arms, by the unusual and, in the circumstances, unwarrantable extension which they made of the ravages of war to the *pacifique* or ornamental edifices of the capital. The usages of warfare, alike in ancient and modern times, have usually saved from destruction, even in towns taken by storm, edifices which are dedicated to the purposes of religion or embellishment. The Parthenon, after having stood two thousand years, and been the prey alternately of the Goth, the Crusader and the Saracen, was still entire when it was accidentally blown up by a bomb at the siege by the Venetians of the Acropolis in 1689. The majestic edifices of Rome were

really wasted away, not by the torches of Alarie or Genserie, but by the selfish cupidity of its unworthy inhabitants, who employed them in the construction of modern buildings.

It is no small reproach to Napoleon that he wantonly extended the ravages of war, as well as the hand of the spoiler, into these hitherto untouched domains; and in the destruction of the bastions of Vienna and the Kremlin of Moscow, gave sure proof of a little and malevolent spirit, unworthy of so great a man. The cruel devastation by the Americans on the Canadian frontier is no adequate excuse; they had been amply and rightly avenged by the flames of Buffalo and Black Rock; and Alexander had recently given example of the noblest revenge for such outrages by saving Paris. It would appear, that as the contest between Great Britain and America resembled in more points than one a civil war, so it partook occasionally of the well-known inveterate character of that species of hostility; and the British historian, in recounting the transaction, will best discharge his duty by acknowledging the error of his country, and rejoice that it was in some degree redeemed by the strict discipline observed by the troops, and the complete protection afforded to the persons and property of the inhabitants during their occupation of the American capital.*

* "The British officers pay inviolable respect to private property, and no peaceable citizen is molested." *National Intelligencer*, 25th August 1814, quoted in JAMES, iv. 311. "The value of the public property destroyed was 1,624,280 dollars, or £365,463 sterling."—*Ibid*.

It is but justice to the gallant officers employed in this expedition to observe, not only that they are noways responsible for the destruction of the public buildings of Washington, as they acted under distinct orders from their own government, but that they deserve the highest credit for carrying those barbarous instructions into execution in the most forbearing and considerate manner, confining the destruction to *public* edifices, and observing the strictest discipline in relation to private life and property. On the 14th August 1814, Admiral Cochrane officially announced to Mr Monroe, "that, under the *unavoidable* *impulsive* character of his orders, it became his duty to destroy and lay waste all towns and districts of the United States found accessible to the attack of British armaments." What a contrast to the glorious and withal politic forbearance of

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.
67.

Capture of
Fort Wash-
ington and
Alexandria,
Aug. 27.

The capture of Washington was quickly succeeded by an exploit of inferior magnitude, but equally vigorous and successful. In the Potomac river, Captain Gordon, in the Seahorse frigate, with the Euryalus brig and several bomb-vessels, skilfully overcame the intricacies of the passage leading by that river to the metropolis; and on the evening of the 27th arrived abreast of Fort Washington, constructed to command the river as Fort Lillo does the Scheldt. It was immediately bombarded; and the powder magazine having soon after exploded, the place was abandoned, and taken possession of, with all its guns, by the British. From thence they proceeded to Alexandria, and the bomb-vessels having assumed such a position as effectually commanded the shipping, the enemy were compelled to capitulate, and give up all their vessels, two-and-twenty in number, including several armed schooners, which were brought away in triumph. On returning down the river, heavily laden with their numerous prizes, the British squadron had a very serious danger to encounter from some American batteries which had been erected to cut off their retreat, and which were manned by the crews of the Baltimore flotilla; but such was the skill with which the vessels were navigated that none went aground, and the shells from the bombs were thrown with such precision that the Americans were driven from their guns, and the whole squadron emerged safely with its prizes from the Potomac.¹

Sept. 5.
James, vi.
313, 315.
Armstrong,
ii. 131, 134.
Brenton, ii.
522.

83.
Victory of
the British
near Balti-
more,
Sept. 11.

The successful issue of these attacks naturally suggested a similar expedition against Baltimore: and, after some deliberation, the British naval and military commanders agreed to undertake it. The fleet, accordingly, moved in that direction, and reached the mouth of the Patapsco, which leads to Baltimore, on the 11th September. Next

Wellington in the south of France! And both had their reward—Wellington, in the capture of Toulouse and surrender of Bordeaux; the “new and imperatible system,” in the failure at Baltimore and the defeat at New Orleans.—See ARMSTRONG, ii. 135.

day the troops were landed, and marched directly towards the city, while the ships moved up to co-operate in the attack that was contemplated. No opposition was attempted for the first six miles, though several intrenchments, newly thrown up, were passed, which had been abandoned; but when they approached Baltimore, a detachment of light troops was observed occupying a thick wood through which the road passed. General Ross, impelled by the daring courage by which he was distinguished, immediately advanced with the skirmishers to the front, and soon received a mortal wound in the breast. He survived only to recommend his young and unprovided family to his king and country. Colonel Brooke, however, immediately assumed the command; and the light troops coming up, the enemy fell back, still skirmishing from behind the trees with which the country abounded, to a fortified position, running across a narrow neck of land which separated the Patapsco and Back rivers. Six thousand infantry, with four hundred horse and six guns, were here drawn up in line across the road, with either flank placed in a thick wood, and a strong wooden palisade covering their front. Brooke, however, gave orders for an immediate attack: and it was made with such vigour that, in less than fifteen minutes, the enemy were routed, and fled in every direction, leaving six hundred killed and wounded on the field of battle, besides three hundred prisoners and two guns in the hands of the British.¹

Early on the following morning the march was resumed, and Brooke arrived within a mile and a half of Baltimore, where he found a body of fifteen thousand men, with a large train of artillery, manned by the sailors of the frigates lying at Baltimore, strongly posted on a series of fortified heights which encircle the town. The magnitude of this force rendered it imprudent to hazard an immediate attack with three thousand bayonets; but Brooke, relying on the admirable spirit of his troops, determined

CHAP.
XCI.
1814.

Sept. 12.
1 James, vi.
320. Am.
Reg. 1814,
p. 229.
Brooke's
Official Ac-
count, Sept.
17, 1814.

89.
Attack on
the town
abandoned.
Sept. 13.

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

on a night assault, when the enemy's artillery would be of little avail, and the whole dispositions were made for that purpose. At nightfall, however, and when the troops were just taking up their ground for the attack, advices were received from Admiral Cochrane, stating that the enemy, by sinking twenty vessels in the river, had arrested the further progress of the ships, and rendered naval co-operation impossible. Brooke, in these circumstances, wisely judged that the loss likely to be incurred in storming the intrenchments would more than counterbalance the prospect of advantage from the reduction of the town, and withdrew without molestation to his ships. The commanders of the Severn, Euryalus, Havannah, and Hebrus frigates had offered to lighten their ships, and lay them alongside of Fort-le-Henry, which commanded the passage, and the possession of which would have left Baltimore at their mercy; and it is to be regretted that any view to ulterior operations should have led to this offer not being accepted, as its acceptance would probably have led to the destruction of the Java frigate, and Erie and Ontario brigs, which lay at Baltimore, and have prevented the land troops from being deprived of the fruit of their gallant victory.¹

¹ James, vi.
320, 321.
Colonel
Brooke's
Official Ac-
count, Sept.
17, 1814.
Ann. Reg.
1814, 229.
App. to
Chron.
Armstrong,
ii. 134, 135.
Admiral
Cochrane's
Official Ac-
count, Sept.
15, 237.

96.

Lesser ac-
tions on the
coast.

A naval expedition, crowned with complete success, took place at this time under Sir John Sherbrooke and Admiral Griffith in the Penobscot river. They sailed from Halifax on the 1st September, and on their approach, the Fort of Custine, which commands the entrance of the river, was evacuated by the enemy and blown up. An American frigate, the John Adams, having run up the river for safety as high as the town of Hampden, where her guns were taken out and placed in battery, a detachment of sailors and marines was landed from the ships, which attacked and stormed the batteries, manned by double their force, upon which the frigate was set on fire and totally destroyed. The expedition then pushed on to Bangor, which surrendered without resistance, with

Sept. 3.

Sept. 5.

twenty-two guns: and thence to Machias, which also was taken by capitulation, the whole militia of the county of Washington being put on their parole not to serve again during the war. Formal possession was then taken of the whole country between the Penobscot and the British frontier of New Brunswick, a district a hundred miles broad; and a provisional government was established to rule it till the conclusion of the war. This success was not only important in itself, but still more so as giving practical demonstration of the disposition of the inhabitants of that part of the state of Maine, and evincing the ease with which, in the event of the continuance of hostilities, it might be severed from the United States.¹

Meanwhile, a great expedition was preparing in Lower Canada, intending to co-operate in a distant way with that of Sherbrooke and Griffith on the coast. Prevost's force had been progressively augmented by the successive arrival of brigades, detached, after the close of hostilities, from the army in the south of France; so that in the end of August, he had in all sixteen thousand regular troops in the two Canadas under his command, of whom twelve thousand were in the lower province. A force so considerable not only removed all danger of successful invasion by the American army, but rendered feasible a serious inroad upon the adjoining provinces of Maine and New York. Such an attempt was also advisable in itself, in order to make the enemy feel, in their own territory, the weight of that power whose hostility they had so needlessly provoked. A body of nine thousand men, accordingly, was collected on the frontier of Lower Canada, with a formidable train of artillery, and commanded, under Prevost, by several generals and officers who had acquired durable renown in the Peninsular campaigns.¹ If anything could have added to the well-founded expectations entertained of this noble force, it was the circumstance of its being in great part composed of the veterans who had served with Wellington in Spain

CHAP.
XCL.
1814.

1 Ann. Reg.
1814, 190,
199. Arm-
strong, ii.
139. James,
vi. 329, 331.

91.
Sir George
Prevost's
expedition
against
Plattsburg.

1 Ann. Reg.
1814, 190,
Christie,
140. James,
vi. 339.
Armstrong,
ii. 110.

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

and France, and the remainder of the not less heroic band which had so gloriously struggled against overwhelming superiority of numbers in the two preceding campaigns, and who burned with anxiety to emulate the deeds of their brethren who had gained their laurels in the fields of European fame.

92.
Miserable
state of the
naval force
to co-oper-
ate with it.

But, unfortunately, the naval part of the expedition, upon which, as in all Canadian warfare, the success of the land forces almost entirely depended, was by no means equally well provided. By a strange remissness on the part both of the British Admiralty and the local authorities, the flotilla on Lake Champlain, though consisting of a frigate, a brig, and twelve gunboats, was wretchedly equipped, and the crews were made up of a strange medley of English soldiers and Canadian militia, with not a fifth of English sailors among them. And, to complete the untoward circumstances attending the naval force, Captain Fisher, by whom the fleet had been equipped, and who possessed the confidence of Sir George Prevost, was removed from the command a week before the decisive action, and Captain Downie, a brave man, but strange to the sailors, put in his place.¹

¹ James, vi.
339. Arm-
strong, ii.
110, 111.
Ann. Reg.
1814, 190.
Christie,
140. Bren-
ton, ii. 525.

93.
Success of
the expedi-
tion in the
outset.

Sept. 6.
² Prevost's
Official
Account,
Sept. 11,
1814. Ann.
Reg. 213.
App. to
Chron.
James, vi.
341. Arm-
strong, ii.
111, 112.
Christie,
140, 141.
Cooper, ii.
489.

The first operations of the armament were attended with complete success. The American general, Izzard, had sailed from Sackett's Harbour on Lake Ontario, towards the upper part of the lake, with four thousand men, on the 10th August, to reinforce the troops in Fort Erie; so that the only forces which remained to resist Prevost on the banks of Lake Champlain, were fifteen hundred regulars and as many militia, under General Macomb. Prevost's advance, accordingly, met with no interruption; and on the 6th September his powerful army appeared before Plattsburg, then defended by three redoubts and two blockhouses, strongly fortified. So inconsiderable had been the resistance made by the Americans to the British advance, that General Macomb says, the latter "did not deign to fire upon them."² The three following days were

employed in bringing up the heavy artillery, and it had all arrived by the 10th ; but still the English general did not deem it expedient to make the attack till the flotilla came up. So backward had been the state of its preparations, that it only hove in sight on the morning of the 11th, and the shipwrights, as she moved through the water, were still busy at work on the hull of the *Confiance*, which bore the British commodore's flag.

The relative strength of the squadrons in this, as in every other naval action during the war where the British were defeated, was decisively in favour of the Americans : * but this disparity, already great in the number of vessels and men, and weight of metal, was rendered overwhelming by the wretched condition of the British crews, not a fourth of whom were sailors, and the unfinished state of the commodore's vessel. Sir George Prevost's solicitations, however, were so pressing for the squadron to operate, in consequence of the advanced period of the year, that on the 11th, while the clank of the builders' hammers was still heard on board the *Confiance*, Captain Downie gave the signal to weigh anchor. He relied upon the assurance given that the troops should commence an assault on the redoubts, at the same time that the squadron attacked the flotilla in the bay ; and it was not doubted that the early capture of the forts, by depriving the enemy's ships of the support of their batteries, would lead to their defeat, and the final decision of the naval contest on the lake. The moment, accordingly, that the *Confiance*, which led the British

CHAP.
ACL.
1-14.

94.
Prepara-
tions for
the naval
combat, and
relative
forces on the
two sides.

Sept. 11.

* Comparative force of the combatants : —

	British Squadron.	American.
Vessels,†	8	14
Broadside guns,	38	52
Weight of metal lb.,	765	1124
Aggregate of crews,	537	950
Tons,	1426	2540

— JAMES, vi. 346 ; and COOPER, ii. 495, 497.

† The *Finch*, a British brig, grounded out of shot and did not engage ; and five of the gunboats disappeared, and never fired a shot ; so these vessels are excluded from the comparison, as are the two American sloops which were not engaged.

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

¹ Cooper, ii.
495, 496.
James, ii.
341, 342.
Christie,
141, 142.
Captain
Pring's Ac-
count, Sept.
1, 1814.
Ann. Reg.
215. App.
to Chron.

flotilla, rounded Cumberland Head at a quarter to eight, Downie scaled his guns, as had been agreed on ; but although instructions to hold themselves in readiness had been given to the troops at daybreak, yet they were ordered to breakfast before they moved, and did not in consequence begin their march till the action at sea had commenced ; an unfortunate circumstance, as it postponed the military co-operation till it was too late. Meanwhile Downie gallantly led his little squadron into action : the American fleet, under its brave and skilful commander, Captain M'Donough, being moored in line in the bay, the Saratoga of twenty-six guns, bearing his flag, in the centre, and the brigs Eagle of twenty guns, Ticonderago of seventeen guns, and Pride of seven guns, and ten gun-boats disposed on either flank.¹

95.
Commence-
ment of the
action be-
tween the
two squad-
rons.

As the *Confiance* mounted thirty-seven guns, she was greatly superior to any single vessel in the American flotilla ; and if the British gunboats had all followed the example set them by their commander, the combat might, notwithstanding the Americans' great superiority on the whole, have been not altogether unequal. But while the *Confiance* was gallantly leading into action amidst a tremendous fire from the American line, the whole gun-boats, except three, and one of the cutters, took to flight, leaving Downie in the midst of the hostile fleet, with his own frigate, a brig, and a sloop, wholly unsupported either by the advance of the land forces or by his own smaller vessels.* Undaunted, however, by this shameful defection of the boats, the British commander, who nobly headed his squadron, drawing the whole hostile fire upon his own vessel, held steadily on without returning a shot, while his rigging and spars were fast falling under the well-directed fire of the American fleet ; but the wind failing just as he was on the point of breaking their line,

* This disaster, in all probability, would not have occurred, had Captain Fisher's public-spirited offer to command that force, made just before, been accepted.

he was under the necessity of casting anchor within two cables' distance, and bringing his broadside to bear on the enemy. Instantly the *Confiance* appeared a sheet of fire; her whole broadside, aimed at the *Saratoga*, which bore Captain McDonough's flag, was discharged at once with great effect. The *Linnet* and *Chubb* soon after came up, and took their appointed stations; but in a short time the latter was so crippled that she became unmanageable, drifted within the American line, and was obliged to surrender, while the *Finch* struck on a reef of rocks, and could not get into action.¹

The whole guns of the American flotilla were now directed against the *Confiance*, which, enveloped by enemies, still maintained a gallant fight. Broadside after broadside came from her, until at length the *Saratoga*, against which her fire was almost entirely directed, had all her long guns dismantled, and her carronades so disabled that she had not a single piece of ordnance left available. Nothing was now wanting but one or two of the gunboats to have given the British a decisive victory; but they had all fled. The *Confiance* herself was suffering severely from the concentric fire of the brigs and gunboats which clustered round her in every direction, some raking, some astern, as well as under her bows, and Captain Downie had fallen early in the action. Meanwhile her antagonist, the *Saratoga*, which she had completely silenced, lay at such a distance that she could not be taken possession of. So destructive, however, was the fire which the *Confiance* still kept up, that the *Saratoga* was on the point of surrendering, when, as a last resource, McDonough made an effort to wear the ship round, so as to bring her larboard side, hitherto untouched, to bear upon the British vessel. This skilful movement was successfully performed; the *Confiance* strove to do the same, but, from the inexperience of her motley crew, the attempt failed, and the larboard guns of the *Saratoga*, almost all untouched, now spoke out like giants, and soon

CHAP.
XCI.

1-14.

¹ *Jan. 1, 1814.*

314, 315.

² *Sept. 1, 1814.*

504, 505.

Christie,

142, 143.

Captain

Pring's

Official Ac-

count, Sept.

12, 1814.

Ann. Reg.

1814, 215.

504.

Total defeat

of the Brit-

ish squad-

ron.

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

¹ Cooper, ii.
505, 507.
James, vi.
341, 345.
Captain
Pring's
Official
Account.
Ann. Reg.
1814, 215,
217. Chris-
tie, 143.

97.
Retreat of
Sir George
Prevost.

compelled the *Confiance* to strike. The only remaining British vessel was now the *Linnet*; against her the whole guns of the American squadron were immediately directed; and after a quarter of an hour's heroic resistance, she too was compelled to surrender. Captain M'Donough, on receiving the sword of Lieutenant Robertson, who commanded the *Confiance* after Downie had fallen, said, with the magnanimity which is ever the accompaniment of true valour,—“You owe it, sir, to the shameful conduct of your gunboats and cutters, that you are not performing this office to me; for had they done their duty, you must have perceived, from the situation of the *Saratoga*, that I could hold out no longer; and, indeed, nothing induced me to keep up her colours, but my seeing, from the united fire of all the rest of my squadron on the *Confiance*, and her unsupported situation, that she must ultimately surrender.”¹*

While this desperate battle was raging on the lake, the army ashore, agreeably to Prevost's orders, was advancing towards the works of Plattsburg, and the guns of the British batteries opened on the American squadron as soon as the firing commenced, but too far off to have any effect. One column, under General Robinson, was directed to ford the Saranac, and attack the works in front, while another, led by General Brisbane, was to make a circuit and assault them in rear. Robinson's troops, however, being led astray by their guides, and deceived as to the real path, by a curious and highly characteristic stratagem,† did not reach the point of

* In this desperate conflict, the *Confiance* had forty-one killed, including the lamented Captain Downie, and sixty wounded; the total loss of the British squadron was fifty-seven killed, and ninety-two wounded: the Americans lost on board the *Saratoga*, twenty-eight killed, and twenty-nine wounded; their total loss was fifty-two killed and fifty-nine wounded. — JAMES, vi. 346; and COOPER ii. 507, 508.

† The following interesting note I have from an excellent and highly esteemed friend in Canada, Andrew William Cochrane, Esq., now high in office at Quebec:—

“Being travelling in the United States last September (1840), I made

attack till the shouts from the American works announced that the fleet had surrendered. To have carried the redoubts when the troops did get up, would have been a bloody undertaking, though probably certain of success, and would have formed a set-off at least to the naval disaster. But Sir George Prevost, deeming his instructions not to expose the troops under his command to unnecessary or useless danger, to be imperative,* and being of opinion, that after the command of the lake was lost, no further advance into the American territory was practicable, and consequently, that the men lost in storming the redoubts would prove an unavailing sacrifice, gave the signal to draw off, and soon after commenced his retreat. Such was the indignation which this order excited among the British officers, inured in Spain to a long course of victory, that several of them broke their swords, declaring they would never serve again; and the army, in mournful submission, leisurely wound its way back to the Canadian frontier, without being disquieted by the enemy.^{1†}

CHAP.
XCL.
1814.

1 Sir George
Prevost's
Official
Account,
Sept. 2,
1814, Ann.
Reg. 1814,
214. App.
to Chron.
James, vi
348. Chris-
tie, 144,
145. Arm-
strong, ii,
112, 113.

acquaintance with General Macomb, who entered freely and fully into details of the Plattsburg expedition, and spoke with strong reprobation of the cruel censures cast upon Sir George Prevost. He said that the forts might have been taken on the 6th or 7th (but then the fleet would have escaped, to capture or destroy which was considered one of the most important objects of the expedition); he doubted whether they could have been after that, without severe loss. He described the formidable double stockade, which he maintained would have delayed the best troops a long time to surmount or cut down; that the works were so situated, relatively, that the defenders could retreat from the one to the other; that though an overwhelming force might have forced them one after the other, the loss must have been severe, if, indeed, they succeeded at all; that, by a stratagem, he had caused the attacking division to lose their way, and to be led off in another direction, into the woods, which he had filled with militia in ambush; that he had done this by making the militia, during the night of the 10th, fill up the proper road of approach with young trees, *planted* so as to resemble the rest of the forest, and opening, at the same time, a road through the wood, away from the forts, which he caused to be beaten with ox carts, so as to look like a travelled wood path; and that it was here, as is well known, that the attacking division was led astray."

* "You will take care not to expose his Majesty's troops to being cut off; and guard against whatever might commit the safety of the force placed under your command." LORD BATHURST'S *Instructions to SIR GEORGE PREVOST*.

† It is satisfactorily proved that the capture of the forts could not, save by

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

93.

Reflections
on this ex-
pedition.

The actual casualties in this ill-fated expedition were under two hundred men, though four hundred were lost by desertion during the depression and facilities of the retreat. But the murmurs of the troops and of the people of Canada were loud and long at such a termination of the operations of an armament composed, so far as the military force was concerned, of such materials, and from which so much had been expected. The result was, that Sir George Prevost resigned, and demanded a court-martial. He was accused, accordingly, at the instance of Sir James Yeo, upon the charges of having unduly hurried the squadron on the lake into action, at a time when the Confidence was as yet unprepared for it; and, when the combat did begin, having neglected to storm the batteries, as had been agreed on, so as to have occasioned the destruction of the flotilla, and the failure of the expedition. The death of that ill-fated commander before the court-martial commenced, prevented these charges from being judicially investigated. But historic truth compels the expression of an opinion, that though proceeding from a laudable motive—the desire of preventing a needless effusion of human blood—the determination to abandon the attack on the forts by Sir George Prevost, though judicious with reference to the expedition he commanded, was unfortunate so far as the general interests of the war were concerned.¹

¹ Christie,
Postscript,
150.

99.
And on Sir
George
Prevost's
conduct.

Yet did his error, if error it was, originate in a sacrifice of the feelings of self to a sense of public duty. His personal courage was undoubted, his character amiable in the highest degree; the mildness and conciliatory spirit of his government had justly endeared him to the Canadians; and his general conduct in North America had been, in very difficult circumstances, truly admirable. Indeed, his

its moral influence, which, however, might have been very great, have influenced the issue of the naval conflict, as both fleets were fully a mile and a half distant from the nearest batteries, and so beyond range of either party. See *Memoirs of Sir G. Prevost*, 161, 166; and *Armstrong*, ii. 112.

defence of that province against the vastly superior forces of the Americans is one of the brightest pages in the military annals of Great Britain, and, after his death, justly called forth a public expression of satisfaction from the Prince Regent, and the conferring of additional honours on his family. The failure of the expedition against Plattsburg was not to be ascribed entirely to him: it arose from the unprepared state of the fleet before the expedition commenced, and the shameful defection of the gunboats, which deserted the heroic Downie when on the point of gaining a decisive victory. We have the authority of the greatest military master of the age for the assertion, that, after the destruction of the fleet, any further prosecution of the advance at land could have led to no beneficial result, as the troops could not have obtained supplies when the Americans had the command on the waters.* Prevost's error was, that he did not make his attack on the forts *simultaneously* with the action on the lake: he only began to move when the firing of the flotillas commenced.

It is true the storming of the forts would have had no material effect, except by distant encouragement, on the issue of the naval combat, as it took place beyond the range of the batteries on shore; but such moral influence would perhaps have proved decisive. After the destruction of the fleet, the period of decisive success was past: nothing could then be done but to put the best face possible on a retreat. That Prevost might have carried the American blockhouses and batteries, is indeed certain; but the examples of New Orleans and Chippewa prove

CHAP.
XCL.
1814.

160.
What if
Prevost had
stormed the
block-
houses?

* "I approve highly—in indeed I go further—I admire all that has been done by the military in America, so far as I understand it generally. Whether Sir George Prevost was right or wrong in his decision at Lake Champlain, is more than I can tell; though of this I am certain, he must equally have returned to Kingston after the fleet was beaten, and I am inclined to think he was right. I have told the ministers repeatedly that a naval superiority on the lakes is a *sine qua non* of success in war on the frontier of Canada, even if our object should be wholly defensive."—WELLINGTON to SIR GEORGE MURRAY, 22d Dec. 1814; GURWOOD, xii. 224.

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

that the Americans fight obstinately behind breastworks, and it could only have been effected by a heavy sacrifice of human life, which, with the prospect of a protracted war in Canada, was a serious consideration. His decision in regard to the expedience of an immediate retreat, therefore, after the fleet had been destroyed, was justified with reference to the single objects of that expedition. It is to be regretted only from its having occurred so immediately before the close of the war, and thereby afforded the Americans ground for representing as a complete triumph what, by a vigorous application of the military forces at his command, might have been converted into a drawn battle, in which the laurels, barren to both parties, were divided. But, in justice to Prevost, it must be added, that this contingent result could not have been, with certainty, foreseen by him, as the duration of the war was uncertain; and that the first thought of a general should be the immediate duty with which he is intrusted, rather than the ultimate results of a course which hazardous daring might perhaps induce.

101.
Sortie from
Fort Erie,
and its
evacuation
by the
Americans.
Sept. 17.

The British were in some degree consoled for this discomfiture by the repulse of a very formidable sortie made from Fort Erie. In the outset the Americans gained considerable advantages, and having succeeded, during a thick mist and heavy rain, in turning unperceived the right of the English pickets, they made themselves masters of two batteries, and did great damage to the British works. Speedily, however, the besiegers collected their troops, and the enemy were driven back with great slaughter. The loss on each side was about equal; that of the British being six hundred, of whom one-half were prisoners; that of the Americans five hundred and eleven. Both parties after this became weary of this destructive warfare, carried on in a corner of Upper Canada, and attended with no sensible influence on the fate of the campaign. On the 21st, as the low grounds around Fort Erie had become unhealthy,

Sept. 21.

Drummond retired to higher and better quarters in the neighbourhood of Chippewa, after in vain endeavouring to provoke the American general to accept battle. And soon after, General Izzard, who had come up from Sackett's Harbour to Fort Erie with four thousand additional troops, so far from prosecuting the advantages which so considerable an accumulation of force at that point promised, blew up Fort Erie, recrossed the Niagara, and withdrew with his whole troops into the American territory. "Thus," says Armstrong, the American war-secretary, "literally fulfilling his own prediction, that the expedition would terminate in disappointment and disgrace."¹

This total evacuation of the British territory, after so much bloodshed, and such formidable preparations of the Americans for its conquest, was mainly owing to the English having at length acquired a decisive superiority on Lake Ontario. During some months in autumn, Commodore Chauncey had the advantage both in the number and weight of his vessels; and while Sir James Yeo was taking the most active measures to turn the balance the other way, he had the virtue—for to a British seaman it was a virtue—of meanwhile submitting to be blockaded in Kingston by the American squadron. At length the *St Lawrence*, a noble three-decker of one hundred guns, was launched; Chauncey instantly withdrew, and was blockaded in his turn in Sackett's Harbour, and the British acquired the entire command of the lake for the remainder of the war. Sir James Yeo immediately availed himself of this advantage to convey a large quantity of stores and considerable reinforcements of troops to the upper end of the lake, and preparations were making for an active campaign in the ensuing year on both sides, the Americans having laid down two line-of-battle ships, and the British two frigates, on the stocks, when hostilities were terminated by the conclusion of peace between the two countries.²

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

Nov. 5.

¹ Armstrong, ii.

100, 108.

De Watteville's Official Ac-

count, Sept.

17, 1814.

Ann. Reg.

1814, 259,

260, Chris-

tie, 146,

147.

102.

The British

acquire the

superiority

on Lake

Ontario.

Oct. 13.

Oct. 20.

² Cooper, ii.

486, 490,

Christie,

149.

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

103.
Expedition
against New
Orleans.

To conclude this history of the American war, it only remains to notice the attack on New Orleans, which terminated in so calamitous a manner to the British arms. This rising town, which then numbered seventeen thousand inhabitants, was not a place of warlike preparation, or very important in a military point of view. But it was the great emporium of the cotton trade of the southern states, and it was supposed, not without reason, that the capture of a city which commanded the whole navigation of the Mississippi would prove the most sensible blow to the resources of the American government, as well as furnish a rich booty to the captors. The expedition, accordingly, which had been baffled at Baltimore, after having received strong reinforcements, was sent in this direction, and it was the dread of crippling it for this important stroke, that paralysed its efforts on the former occasion. The troops and squadron arrived off the shoals of the Mississippi on the 8th December: but the mouth of that great river having been found, from fortifications and sandbanks, to be unassailable, it was determined to disembark in the arm of the sea called the Borgne, which runs up towards New Orleans, and to march across to that city. There they steered accordingly, and found a flotilla of gunboats prepared to dispute with the boats of the fleet the landing of the troops. Immediately a detachment of seamen and marines was put under the command of Captain Lockyer; and, after a hard chase of six-and-thirty hours, he succeeded in coming up with and destroying the whole, six in number, manned by two hundred and forty men. This pursuit, however, had taken the boats thirty miles from their ships; adverse winds, a tempestuous sea, and intricate shoals, impeded their return; and it was not till the 12th that they could get back, nor till the 15th that the landing of the troops commenced. Incredible difficulties were undergone, both by the soldiers and sailors, in effecting the disembarkation and conducting the march at that inclement

season; and, what is very remarkable in that latitude, nothing retarded them more than the excessive cold, from which the the troops, and in particular the blacks, suffered most severely. At length, however, by the united and indefatigable efforts of both services, these obstacles were overcome; the troops, in number about four thousand five hundred combatants, with a considerable quantity of heavy guns and stores, were landed; an attack of the American militia was repulsed, after a desperate struggle, the same evening: Sir Edward Pakenham arrived next day, and the army advanced in two columns to within six miles of New Orleans, where preparations for defence had been made.¹

GENERAL JACKSON, an officer since become celebrated both in the military and political history of his country, commanded the military force destined for the defence of the city, which amounted to above twelve thousand men. He had turned to good account the long delays which the formidable obstacles that opposed the disembarkation of the British troops had occasioned, and the fortified position in which he now awaited an attack was all but impregnable. The American army was posted behind an intrenchment about a thousand yards long, stretching from the Mississippi on the right to a dense and impassable wood and morass on the left. This line was strengthened by a ditch about four feet deep which ran along its front, and was defended by flank bastions which enfiladed its whole extent, and on which a formidable array of heavy cannon was placed. On the opposite bank of the Mississippi, which is there about eight hundred yards broad, a battery of twenty guns had been erected, which also flanked the whole front of the parapet.¹

Attempts were made, for some days, to commence regular approaches against this formidable line of intrenchments, which was evidently much too strong to be carried by a *coup-de-main*; but it was soon found that the enemy's guns were so superior in weight and numbers,

CHAP.
NCL.
1814.

Doc. 23.
1. Brenton,
ii. 531, 533.
James, vi.
357, 359.
Ann. Reg.
1814, 122.
123. Ann.
1814, 121.
159, 165.

104.
Description
of the Amer-
ican posi-
tion.

1. Ann.
strong, 147,
170. Brenton,
ii. 533.
Camp, in
New Or-
leans, 147,
151. Ann.
Reg. 1815,
141, 142.

105.
Preparatory
movements
of the
British.

CHAP.
XCI.

1814.

Jan. 6.

1 General
Lambert's
Official Ac-
count, Jan.
10, 1815.
Ann. Reg.
1815, 141.
142. App.
to Chron.
Brenton, ii.
533. Brit.
Camp. in
New Or-
leans, 147.
161. Arm-
strong, ii.
167, 170.

that nothing was to be expected from that species of attack. All hands were therefore set to deepen a canal in the rear of the British position, leading from Lake Borgne, where they had disembarked, by which boats might be brought over the intervening land to the Mississippi, and troops ferried across to carry the battery on the right bank of the river; but this proved a work of such extraordinary labour, that it was not till the evening of the 6th of January that the cut was declared passable. The boats were immediately brought up and secreted near the river, wholly unknown to the enemy; and dispositions for an assault were made at five o'clock on the morning of the 8th. Colonel Thornton, with fourteen hundred men, was to cross the river in the night, storm the battery, and advance up the right bank till he came abreast of New Orleans; while the main attack on the intrenchments in front was to be made in two columns--the first, destined to carry the works, under the command of General Gibbs; the second, consisting entirely of light troops, and intended merely to effect a diversion, led by General Keane. Including seamen and marines, about six thousand combatants on the British side were in the field; a slender force to attack double their number, intrenched to the teeth in works bristling with bayonets, and loaded with heavy artillery.¹

103.
Dreadful
slaughter in
the British
columns
during the
assault.

Unexpected delays, principally owing to the rapid falling of the river, hindered the boats, fifty in number, which were to convey Thornton's men across, from reaching their destination at the appointed hour; and this, by preventing the attacks on the opposite banks being simultaneous, had a most prejudicial effect upon the issue of the operations. The patience of Pakenham being at length exhausted, the assault on the left bank was ordered, even before it was known whether the troops had been got across, and Gibb's column advanced to the works. By this time, however, the wintry dawn had begun to break, and the dark mass was discerned from the American

batteries, moving over the plain. Instantly a tremendous fire of grape and round shot was opened on both sides from the bastions upon it; but nevertheless the column, consisting of the 11th, 21st, and 44th, with the 93d in support, moved steadily forward, and reached the edge of the glacis. There, however, it was found that, through some neglect on the part of the commander of the 44th regiment, the scaling-ladders and fascines had been forgotten, so that it was impossible to mount the parapet. This necessarily occasioned a stoppage at the foot of the works, just under the enemy's guns, while the ladders were sent for in all possible haste; but the fire was soon so terrible that the head of the column, riddled through and through, fell back in disorder.¹

Pakenham, whose buoyant courage ever led him to the scene of danger, thinking they were now fairly in for it, and must go on, rode to the front, rallied the troops again, led them to the slope of the glacis, and was in the act, with his hat off, of cheering on his followers, when he fell, mortally wounded, pierced at the same moment by two balls. General Gibbs also was soon struck down; Keane, who put himself at the head of the support of this column, consisting of the 93d, which now advanced through the fire, shared the same fate; but that noble regiment, composed entirely of Sutherland Highlanders, a thousand strong, instead of being daunted by the carnage, rushed with frantic valour through the throng, and with such fury pressed the leading files on, that, without either fascines or ladders, they fairly found their way by mounting upon each other's shoulders into the work. So close and deadly, however, was the fire of the riflemen when they got in, that the successful assailants were cut off to a man. At the same time Colonel Ranney, on the left, also penetrated into the intrenchments; but the companies which carried them not being supported, were mown down by grape-shot as at Bergen-op-Zoom.² Finally, General Lambert, upon whom the command had now devolved from the death of

CHAP.
XV.
1815.

¹ Arm-
strong, ii.
170, 171.
Lambert's
Official Ac-
count, Jan.
10, 1815.
Ann. Reg.
1815, p.
142, 143.
App. to
Chron.
James's
Military
Occur-
rences, ii.
355.

107.
Final re-
pulse of the
British
attack.

² Lambert's
Official Ac-
count, Jan.
10, 1815.
142, 143.
Ann. Reg.
App. to
Chron.
James's
Military
Occur-
rences, ii.
355. Arm-
strong, ii.
170, 171.

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

Pakenham and the wounds of Gibbs and Keane, finding that to carry the works was impossible, and that the slaughter was tremendous, drew off his troops, who by this time had been thrown into great confusion. Owing, however, to the admirable countenance maintained by the reserve which covered the retreat, consisting of the 7th and 43d regiments, the men were withdrawn without any molestation from the enemy.

108.
Success of
Thornton on
the other
bank, but
which leads
to nothing.

While this sanguinary repulse, which cost the British two thousand men killed, wounded, and prisoners, was taking place on the left bank of the Mississippi, Colonel Thornton, with his division, had gained the most decisive success on the right. This able officer, with his fourteen hundred men, had repaired to the point assigned to him on the evening of the 7th, but found the boats not yet arrived; and it was not till near midnight that a number, barely sufficient to transport a third part of his troops across, were brought up. Deeming it, however, of essential importance to co-operate at the appointed time in the proposed attack, he moved over with a third of his men, and by a sudden charge, at the head of part of the 85th and a body of seamen, headed by himself, on the flank of the works, succeeded in making himself master of the redoubt with very little loss, though defended by twenty-two guns and seventeen hundred men, and amply stored with supplies of all sorts. He was just preparing to turn these guns on the enemy's flank, which lay entirely exposed to their fire, when advices were received from General Lambert, of the defeat of the attack on the left bank of the river. Colonel Dickson was sent over to

1 Thornton's
Official Ac-
count, Ann.
Reg. 147.
App. to
Chron. for
1815.
James's
Mil. Occur.
in. 356, 360.

examine the situation of the battery which had been won, and report whether it was tenable: but he did not deem it defensible except with a larger force than Lambert could dispose of for that purpose, and therefore this detachment was drawn back to the left bank of the river, and the troops at all points returned to their camp.¹

The British troops, after this bloody defeat, were in a very critical position, far advanced into the enemy's country, with a victorious army, double their own strength, in their front, and a desert country, fourteen miles broad, to traverse in their rear, before they reached their ships. Lambert, not deeming himself in sufficient strength to renew the attack, retreated on the night of the 18th, and effected the movement with such ability that the whole field-artillery, ammunition, and stores of every description, were brought away, excepting eight heavy guns, which were destroyed. The whole wounded also were removed, except eighty of the worst cases, with whom movement would have been dangerous, who were left to the humanity of the enemy: a duty which General Jackson discharged with a zeal and attention worthy of the ability and gallantry he had displayed in the action. The British troops were safely re-embarked on the 27th, and soon after in some degree consoled for their disasters by the capture of Fort Boyer, near Mobile, commanding the entrance to the bay in which that town is situated: which yielded, with its garrison of three hundred and sixty men and twenty-two guns, to a combined attack of the land and sea forces on the 12th February. On the very next day intelligence was received of the conclusion of peace between the United States and Great Britain at Ghent.¹

Conferences had for some time been going on at that city in the Netherlands, between the British and American commissioners; and as the termination of the Continental war had entirely set at rest, at least for the present, the question of neutral flags, and the United States were in no condition to sustain a war singly with Great Britain, for the mere assertion of sailors' privileges in opposition to the right of search to apprehend deserters, there was no difficulty in coming to an accommodation. Accordingly on the 24th December a treaty was concluded at Ghent, on terms highly honourable to Great

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

1109.

Re-embark-
ment of the
troops, and
capture of
Fort Boyer,
near Mobile.

Feb. 12.

General
Lambert's

Official

Account,

Feb. 14,

1815, Ann.

Reg. 1815,

159, 161.

App. to

Chron. and

Jan. 23,

1815. Ibid.

149.

James's

Mil. Occur.

ii. 364, 371.

Armstrong,

ii. 174.

1109.

Conclusion
of peace at
Ghent.

Dec. 24,

1814.

CHAP.
XCI.
1815.

Britain. A general restitution of conquests and acquisitions on both sides was stipulated, with the exception of the islands in Pasamaquoddy Bay, which were to remain as to possession *in statu quo* until the decision of the commissioners appointed by the two governments; and in the event of their differing in opinion, the decision of some friendly sovereign, whose judgment was to be final. The more important point of the boundary between the American state of Maine and the British province of New Brunswick, which has since become the subject of such angry contention between both the governments and the inhabitants of the two countries, was in like manner referred to two commissioners, one to be appointed by each party;* and, failing their decision, or in the event of their differing in opinion, to the decision of "some friendly sovereign or state, whose judgment shall be final and conclusive." A similar provision was made for the ascertainment of the disputed boundary, through the Lakes Ontario, Erie, Superior, and the Lake of the Woods. It was stipulated that neither party should keep up any armed vessels on the Lakes; in consequence of which all such were sunk in the mud. All hostilities with the Indian tribes were forthwith to

* "Whereas neither that part of the highlands lying due north from the source of the river St Croix, designated in the former treaty of peace between the two powers as the north-west angle of Nova Scotia, nor the north-westmost head of the Connecticut river, have yet been ascertained; and whereas that part of the boundary line between the dominions of the two powers which extends from the source of the river St Croix directly north to the above-mentioned north-west angle of Nova Scotia; thence along the said highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to the north-westmost head of Connecticut river; thence down along the middle of that river to the 45th degree of north latitude; thence by a line due west on said latitude till it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraguy, has not yet been surveyed it is agreed that, for these several purposes, two commissioners shall be appointed, sworn, and authorised, to examine and decide upon the said claims, according to such evidence as shall be laid before them by his Britannic Majesty and the United States respectively; and in the event of their differing, both parties agree to abide by the decision of such friendly sovereign or state as shall be mutually chosen." See *Ann. Reg.* 1815, 551; *State Papers*.

cease, on the part of both the contracting parties : and it was further provided, "that whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, and whereas both his Majesty and the United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to procure its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavours to accomplish so desirable an object." Nothing was said either regarding the flag covering the merchandise, or on the right of search for seamen, claimed and exercised by Great Britain.¹

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

1815, 67.
Treaty in
Ann. Reg.
1815, 672.
350. State
Papers and
Memors.
Sup. ii. 76.

Such was the treaty of Ghent, which put an end to the bloody and costly war between Great Britain and America. That it was advantageous to England, and that the United States emerged upon the whole worsted from the fight, is evident from the consideration, that neither the ostensible nor the real objects of the latter in engaging in the contest were attained. The ostensible objects were establishing the principles, that the flag covers the merchandise, and that the right of search for seamen who had deserted is inadmissible. The real objects were to wrest from Great Britain the Canadas, and, in conjunction with Napoleon, extinguish its maritime and colonial empire. Neither object was attained, for peace was concluded without one word being said about neutral rights : and so far from losing her North American possessions, Great Britain retained every part of them, and emerged from the contest with a much stronger and more defensible colonial dominion than that with which she went into it. Yet were the great questions really at issue in the war rather adjourned than decided : and the treaty itself is to be regarded rather as a long truce than a final pacification. The Maine frontier line remained undecided ; a territory as large as all England, and part of which is of vital importance to the security of our American possessions, was left in dispute between the parties ; the commissioners of the

111.
Reflections
on this
treaty.

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

two powers, as might have been expected, adhered to the views of their respective cabinets ; the award, in 1834, of the King of the Netherlands, who was chosen umpire, which divided the disputed territory between the parties, satisfied neither side, and by common consent was repudiated. The right claimed by Great Britain of searching merchant vessels remained untouched, and was therefore virtually conceded ; the important duty of searching for slaves, left unsettled, threatens, at no distant period, to render it again the subject of angry contention between the two nations ; and the triumphs of Plattsburg and New Orleans, with which the war terminated, have so elated the inhabitants of the United States, and blinded them to the real weakness of their situation, that there is too much room to fear, that, out of this premature and incomplete pacification, a future and calamitous war between the two countries may one day spring.

112.
Reflections
on the bat-
tle at New
Orleans.

The heroic valour displayed by Sir Edward Pakenham, General Keane, and their brave comrades, in the attempt to carry by storm the lines before New Orleans, must not make us shut our eyes to the gallant and honourable, but still imprudent, hardihood which made them unduly despise their enemy, and seek to gain by force what might have been achieved by combination. When we recollect that Colonel Thornton, with his column, carried the battery on the right bank of the river with hardly any loss, thereby completely turning the enemy's position, rendering it untenable against any considerable force cannonading from that side, and exposing the city to an immediate attack from a quarter where it had no defence, it is impossible not to regret the imprudent and needless display of valour which was attended with so grievous a loss, and caused to miscarry an enterprise so well conceived, and up to that point so ably executed. True, various unforeseen accidents conspired to mar the assault ; the boats did not get through

the canal so soon as had been expected, so that Thornton's co-operation on the right came too late to retrieve affairs on the left bank ; and the unhappy oblivion of, or delay in bringing up, the fascines and scaling-ladders, converted what might have been a successful assault there into a bloody repulse. But still these accidents are the usual attendants of a night assault, especially where the columns of attack are combined from different quarters ; and the point is— Might not the risk of incurring them have been avoided, by crossing the whole troops to the right bank of the river, as soon as the boats were got up and launched on its waters, thus rendering unavailing all the formidable intrenchments there ? This was what Napoleon, by the passage of the Danube at Enzersdorf, did in regard to those erected at so great a cost of labour by the Austrians in front of Essling. It would appear that the rapid and brilliant success of a small British force at Bladensberg, as well as on many occasions in Canada, when they met the troops of the United States in the open field, had rendered the English general insensible to the dangers of attacking them when behind formidable intrenchments, and caused him to forget that the American rifle, though unable to withstand the shock of the English bayonet in regular combat, is a most formidable weapon when wielded by gallant hands behind trees, or under shelter of the redoubts, which so rapidly, and often fatally, equalise the veteran and the inexperienced soldier.

Perhaps no nation ever suffered so severely by war as the Americans did from this contest, in their external and commercial relations. Their foreign trade, anterior to the estrangement from Great Britain, so flourishing as to amount to £22,000,000 of exports, and £28,000,000 of imports, carried on in one million three hundred thousand tons of shipping, was, literally speaking, and by no figure of speech, *annihilated* ; for the official returns show that the former had sunk in 1814 to £1,400,000, or little more than an eighteenth part of their former amount,

CHAP.
XCI
1815.

113.
Immense
losses of the
Americans
during the
war.

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

the latter to less than £3,000,000.* The capture of no less than fourteen hundred American vessels of war and merchandise appeared in the London Gazette during the two years and a half of the struggle, besides probably an equal number which were too inconsiderable to enter that register; and although, no doubt, they retaliated actively and effectively by their ships of war and privateers on British commerce, yet the number of these was too small to produce any considerable set-off to such immense losses.¹

1 Brenton,
ii. 539.114.
Total ruin
of the Ame-
rican re-
sources
during the
contest.

The rapid growth of British commerce,† when placed in juxtaposition to the almost total extinction of that of the United States, demonstrates decisively that, while the contest lasted, the sinews of war were increasing in the one country as rapidly as they were drying up in the other. In truth, the ordinary American revenue, almost entirely derived from customhouse duties, nearly

* Total of American exports and imports during three years before the rupture with Great Britain, and during the three years of its continuance. Dollars converted at 4s. 2d. to the dollar.

	Exports.			Imports.	
1805,	.	.	£19,909,589	.	£25,125,000
1806,	.	.	21,153,552	.	26,978,416
1807,	.	.	22,571,488	.	28,869,765
1812,	.	.	8,026,506	.	16,047,916
1813,	.	.	5,813,322	.	4,584,375
1814,	.	.	1,443,216	.	2,701,041

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 191.

† Table showing the official value of British exports and imports in the same years as in the preceding table.

Years.	EXPORTS.			IMPORTS.
	Foreign and Colonial.	British Manu- factures.	Total.	
1805	7,643,120	23,376,941	£31,020,061	£28,561,270
1806	7,717,555	25,861,879	33,379,424	26,899,658
1807	7,624,312	23,391,214	31,015,526	26,734,425
1812	9,533,065	29,508,508	38,041,573	26,163,431
1813	Records	destroyed	by fire.	...
1814	19,365,981	34,207,253	53,573,234	33,755,264

PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 98.

vanished during the continuance of the contest, and the deficit required to be made up by excise and direct taxes levied in the interior, and loans, which in the year 1814 amounted to no less than twenty millions five hundred thousand dollars, or above £4,100,000 sterling : an immense sum for a state, the annual income of which in ordinary times was only twenty-three million dollars, or £4,600,000. Two-thirds of the mercantile and trading classes in all the states of the Union became insolvent during these disastrous years ; and such was the suffering and public discontent in the northern states of Massachusetts and Connecticut, that it altogether overcame their sentiment of nationality ; and a part of the inhabitants, when peace arrived, were preparing steps to break off from the Union, assert their national independence, and make peace with Great Britain, the future protector of their republic.¹

CHAP.
XCI.
1815.

¹ Tocq. i.
289. Ann.
Reg. 1814,
193.

A war, fraught with such disasters to the United States, was not without its evils also to the inhabitants of Great Britain. In ordinary times, the closing of the North American market, which at that period took off, on an average of years, twelve millions' worth of British produce and manufactures, would have been most severely felt, and it was mainly to its stoppage that the great distresses in England in 1811 and the first months of 1812 had been owing. But this market had, from the operation of the American Embargo and Non-intercourse Acts, been long in abeyance ; commerce had discovered new channels ; and an ample compensation for its loss, for the time at least, had been found in the markets of Russia, Germany, and Italy, now suddenly thrown open to British enterprise by the triumphs of the allied arms. But a lasting effect, fraught with consequences injurious to British manufacturing interests, was found in the forcible direction of a large portion of the capital, and no inconsiderable part of the industry, of the United States to manufacturing employment ; an effect which

115.
Pernicious
effects of
this war to
the manu-
facturing
interests of
Great Bri-
tain.

CHAP.

XCI.

1815.

has survived the temporary causes which gave it birth, and, by permanently investing large capital in that species of industry, has rendered the subsequent exports of Great Britain, if the vast increase of population in the United States is taken into account, by no means so considerable as they were before the war. When the great and growing extent of the British colonies, and the prodigious market they have opened and are opening to British manufacturing industry, both in the eastern and western hemisphere, are considered, this dependence for the sale of so large a portion of our manufactures on any foreign nation whatever, may possibly appear to be fraught with serious danger, and its curtailment rather a benefit than an injury. But an unmixed evil has arisen from the jealousy of British manufactures which has necessarily grown up, especially in the northern States of the Union, from the growing importance of their own fabrics, and the animosity against this country which has in consequence arisen in those states which, when the war commenced, were most firmly attached to our alliance.

116.
Evils which
a rupture
with the
United
States
would pro-
duce.

When we consider the vast evils to both countries which must inevitably arise from a renewal of hostilities between America and Great Britain; when we recollect that our exports to the United States are still on an average eight millions annually in ordinary seasons; when we call to mind that England is the great market for the cotton of the southern states, and that the intercourse between the two countries is so immense, that out of two million and ninety-six thousand tons of shipping, which now (1840) carry on the foreign trade of the United States, no less than seven hundred and fifty-four thousand are employed in conducting the traffic between the two countries;¹ when we remember that the connection between them is so close, that failures to any great extent in the American provinces never fail to produce stagnation and distress in the manufacturing districts of Great

¹ Porter's
Parl.
Tables, ix.
591, 592.

Britain; and that two consecutive bad harvests in the British islands, by the strain on the money market of London which they occasioned, caused the whole banks of the southern states of America, including the national bank of the United States, to fall in 1839; it will appear hardly possible that human folly could go so far as to force on hostilities between the two nations. This will appear the more improbable, when it is recollected how strenuously and laudably the supreme government, in both countries, have laboured to remove or soften, of late years, all causes of discord between them: and how clearly the leading men in the United States, as well as in this country, are impressed with the indissoluble union which subsists between their interests, and the disastrous effect which a rupture could not fail to have upon them. Nevertheless, nothing is more certain than that hostilities with the United States are not only probable but imminent; that the deep wounds they will inflict upon either country will furnish no security against their occurrence; and that, however much the patriots of both may lament, it is also their duty to provide against them. The solution of this apparent paradox is easy, if the nature of the two governments is taken into consideration.

Democracy is universally and necessarily *expansive*; for the superabundant energy which it generates at home, can only find vent in foreign acquisition. Whether it is *aggressive* or not, depends upon the situation of the democratic power, and the means it enjoys of finding vent, either in the pacific establishment of colonies, or in warlike conquests with the sword. Carthage and Tyre in ancient, Genoa, Venice, and Great Britain in modern times, have chiefly poured forth their superfluous numbers and energy in colonisation; Sparta, Athens, and Rome, of old, and republican France in our own day, have forced their way into the adjoining states, not with the olive branch of colonial industry, but with the sword of ruthless conquest. If we would judge how rapidly and certainly democratic

CHAP.
XCL.
1815.

117.
Danger of
it notwith-
standing,
and real
sources
of it.

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

institutions render a powerful nation aggressive, we have only to look to the numerous wars of conquest which have been undertaken by Great Britain in the East, especially since the great democratic convulsion of 1832. America shares to the full in these spreading propensities of all republican communities; and such is the growth of its population, that expansion is to it the condition of existence. It is impossible that two such communities, brought in so many points into contact, and having so many subjects of national as well as individual rivalry, should not ere long be brought into collision. Large as it is, the New World is not, at least in their own opinion, large enough for both.

118.

Aggressive
disposition
of the Ame-
ricans, as of
all demo-
cratic states.

The pretensions the Americans have set up to an immense portion of the British possessions in Maine, and which they have succeeded by the treaty of 1842 in establishing to the extent of nearly a half, but which a glance at the map must convince every unprejudiced mind are wholly unfounded,* arise from this expansive and aggressive propensity of democracy. Their seizure of Texas, without the shadow of a title; their unprincipled invasion of Mexico in search of the silver of its mines, or the gold of California, their ceaseless encroachments on the Indians of the Far West—prove that they are noways behind their predecessors in the republics of Rome or Athens in aggressive ambition. The “multis utile bellum” is felt as strongly in the New as it ever was in the Old World. England has not been more incessant in its absorption of the lesser powers in India than the United States have been with America. This disposition, which is only inflamed with every acquisition it receives, must

* It has been established since the signing of the treaty of 1842, which, happily for both countries, set this question at rest, that the line contended for by the British was even less favourable to them than that originally intended by Franklin and the authors of the treaty of 1782. The discovery in the Foreign Office at Paris of the original map, with the boundary intended delineated in a broad red line by Franklin himself, from Metjarret to Mars-hill, by the south Arrooftook mountains, has set the matter at rest.—See Mr FEATHERSTONHAUGH'S *Pamphlet*, and BUCKINGHAM'S *Canada*, 517, 519.

ere long bring them in contact, either by warlike aggression or pacific annexation, with our North American provinces. They would willingly shoulder off or incorporate the white man in the North, as they have done the red man in the West, or the Spaniard in the South. No dangers, no ultimate consequences, will deter them; no wisdom on the part of government will be able to restrain them. The question will not be, what do Mr Webster and the enlightened patriots of Washington desire? but what have the ardent democrats of Maine, the Ohio, and the Mississippi determined? It is there that the ruling power of America is to be found: it is in their dispositions and passions that the spring of its future fortunes is placed. That they are essentially both expansive and aggressive, can be doubted by none who have watched the systematic efforts which they have made along the Canadian frontier for several years past to bring on a war with Great Britain. They would suffer little, at least in the first instance, from such a contest, for their connections are all inland, and their main dependence is on agricultural labour. If they derive no other satisfaction from hostilities, they will at least be sure of this, to them no small one, of seeing the commercial wealth and paper aristocracy of New York, Pennsylvania, and the great cities on the coast, the object of their undying jealousy, destroyed by the first convulsion consequent on a rupture.

Regarding, then, hostilities with the United States as not only probable, but, it is to be feared, ultimately unavoidable, it is of importance to gather such lessons from the past as may best avoid disaster in the future.

I. Democracy in war is just the reverse of paper credit; it is weakness in the outset, but strength in the end. Its uniform want of preparation, and resistance to present burdens for the sake of future advantages, induce the former; its inherent energy and inexhaustible resources, when fully roused, occasion the latter. It will be wisdom in British statesmen to calculate on both these occurrences.

CHAP.
XCL.
1845.

119.
Weakness
of America
in the out-
set, and
vigour in
the end.

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

They should recollect that in 1812 the Americans rushed into a long-meditated war with Great Britain with four frigates, eight sloops, and six thousand men; but they should recollect also that with these tiny forces they achieved more remarkable victories over the British at sea than the French did during the whole course of the revolutionary war, and baffled at land the veterans of the Peninsular campaigns. In a contest with America, therefore, more than with any other power, it is of the highest importance to strike hard and successfully in the outset. The superior military and naval establishments, more ample revenue, and larger share of patrician direction of Great Britain, give her the means of inflicting the most serious blows on America in the commencement of the war; while the extraordinary vigour of the American people, and their native courage, render it all but certain that success will come to be more nearly balanced in the end. Everything, therefore, will depend on the energy with which hostilities are *at first* conducted, and the skilful direction of the strokes which are first delivered.

120.
Necessity
of concentr-
ating the
British
forces in
such a war.

II. In such a contest, it is more than probable that England will, in the first instance, assume the offensive, and strive to make the United States feel the weight of her fleets and armies, before they have assembled any considerable or experienced forces for their defence. Towards success in such a warfare, however, it is indispensable that adequate forces should, from the very outset, be placed at the disposal of her military commanders, and the wretched system of starving the war in the beginning be from the beginning abandoned. Every shilling saved then will cost a pound before hostilities are over. The deplorable plan of sending out a seventy-four gun ship, four or five frigates, and three thousand soldiers, to keep the coasts of the United States in a state of alarm, must never again be renewed. Its failure in the two first campaigns against a much more unwarlike enemy, the Chinese, has sufficiently stamped its absurdity. If it

is, a repetition of the failure at Baltimore, and the disaster at New Orleans, may with confidence be anticipated. A squadron of ships of the line and armed steamers, such as that which tore down the ramparts of Acre, should at once be equipped and kept together; not less than ten, if possible fifteen thousand land troops, should be put on board. Such a force, if directed by able officers, would, with the powerful aid of war steamers, and the present gunnery of the British marine, destroy the whole naval establishments of the United States in a single campaign. The employment of a few thousand men, merely to land here and there, as we did at Baltimore, and as we have recently done in China, would infallibly terminate, after great expense, in disappointment and defeat. The Americans will not succumb, as the Chinese did when similarly attacked, when six thousand men appear before New York or Baltimore.

III. The military resources of the United States to resist such a system of warfare are perfectly trifling: and there is no likelihood, as long as the democratic regime continues in that country, of their consenting during peace to such assessment as is necessary to give them anything like a respectable force at the commencement of hostilities. The militia, which is established in every part of the country, cannot be regarded as affording a considerable addition, at any one point, to the military force of the United States. For it is not liable to be removed far from home, and therefore the defence of each place must rest with its own immediate neighbourhood; and being exercised only three days in the year, and for the most part destitute even of uniform, it cannot be relied on for proper operations in the field. But the experience of the last war demonstrates what, *à priori*, might have been already anticipated, that behind intrenchments or stockades, or in the defence of woody positions, this species of force, composed for the most part of brave men, habituated to the use of the rifle, may often be

CHAP.
XCI.
1-15.

121.
Military
force by
which we
are likely
to be op-
posed.

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

extremely formidable. And the example of the contest in the Tyrol, in 1809, is not required to demonstrate that, in such a warfare, skilful marksmen, well acquainted with the localities of the country they are employed to defend, may often succeed in defeating the best disciplined regular forces. It will be the wisdom of England, therefore, in any future hostilities, to make no attempt on the American coast but with a very powerful military force ; and if such is not at her disposal, to confine her efforts to a close blockade of the harbours of the United States, and bombardment of such towns as appear to be accessible to that species of attack.

122.

All attack
on private
property
should be
avoided.

IV. In such a warfare, it is of the last importance that hostilities should be directed against *public* property or merchandise *afloat* only ; and that the piratical system recently adopted in China, of threatening with destruction a city not fortified, if it does not redeem itself by a large contribution, should above all things be avoided. This was just Napoleon's system of war, which ultimately occasioned his ruin ; and it was by steadily resisting any retaliation even of such a system upon him that Wellington avoided lighting up a national resistance in the south of France. The conflagration of the public buildings, other than the arsenals, at Washington, was as injudicious as it was unwarranted ; it was that unhappy step which produced the vigorous resistance at Baltimore, and manned the redoubts at New Orleans. The announcing of "Beauty and Booty" as the object of that expedition, which the American writers assert was done,¹ was the mode of all others best calculated to awaken a vigorous spirit of opposition. In every mercantile community where opulence has made any progress, the great object of the citizens is, to extricate their property without serious injury from the perils of war ; and when the public defence has come to depend mainly on their exertions, it is seldom that they may not be paralysed by an offer of security to private property, and by restricting

¹ Arm. ii.
174.

hostility to the armaments of the state. On the other hand, a sense of danger to their own possessions, from the city falling into the hands of the enemy, is more likely than anything to rouse its burghers to an energetic defence; and the example of New Orleans may show what cost is incurred ere the resistance even of such urban militia can be overcome.

V. The last war has clearly demonstrated that the command of the lakes is decisive of a campaign on the Canadian frontier; and that without it the best-laid plans of defence may fail; and Wellington has recorded his decided opinion, that on a due ascendancy on the inland waters, the success of every contest between the British and Americans in that quarter is entirely dependent.¹ The two great discomfitures sustained at land in our North American possessions—the defeat of Proctor at the Moravian village, and the retreat of Prevost from Plattsburg—were the immediate consequences of the disasters on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain. The movement of Chauncey gained the ascendancy on Lake Ontario. Toronto was taken; and the serious invasion, which was arrested only by the heroism at Chippewa, was commenced. Knowing, then, where the danger lies, and where the means of averting it are to be found, it is the duty of the British government to be at all times prepared for hostilities, and in an especial manner ready at a moment's warning to equip or prepare a formidable naval force alike on Champlain, Erie, and Ontario. And on this subject it will be well to bear in mind two facts demonstrated by the experience of the last war, attention to which will prove of vital importance on the first renewal of hostilities.

First, that such are the facilities for ship-building on the Lakes which the United States enjoy, partly from being at home on their shores, partly from the woods in their neighbourhood not having been felled to any considerable extent, that the American government had entered

CHAP.
XCI.
1815.

123.
Absolute
necessity of
maintaining
a superior-
ity on the
Lakes.

¹ *Antec. ch.*
XCI. § 123.
note.

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

124.

Necessity of
timely pre-
parations
of the Brit-
ish, to
counter-
balance the
superior
advantages
of the Ame-
ricans for
ship-build-
ing on the
lakes.

¹ Cooper,
ii. 520.

into a contract with ship-builders at Sackett's Harbour, in December 1814, to have two sail of the line, of one hundred guns each, ready for sea on Lake Ontario within *sixty days* of the time when the timber was standing in the forest.¹ Second, that the rapidity of ship-building is much impaired on the British side, by the older civilisation of the country in the lower province, though it is otherwise in the upper, and the extent to which the forests near the waters on the Canadian shores have been felled for the market of Great Britain. In consequence, preparation and foresight are more imperatively required on the English than the American part. And let it be recollected, that early success, important in all wars, will probably prove decisive in the next contest with America, from the ardent passion which it will awaken in their democratic community, and the wide extent of defenceless shores which a superiority on the Lakes will at once expose to their incursions. Have we, then, an adequate supply of seasoned wood, and an ample stock of naval stores, ready to be turned instantly to the purposes of ship-building, so soon as hostilities break out, or appear imminent with the United States; and are these stores so well secured by fortifications as to be beyond the reach of a *coup-de-main*? These are questions upon which it well becomes the British government and nation to reflect: for with the answer to them our preservation of Canada, our retention with it of one-fourth of our commercial marine, and consequent maintenance of our maritime superiority and national existence, are indissolubly wound up.

125.

Errors of
the British
government
in the late
war.

VI. It must be evident to every observer, that the British government were much in error in many particulars connected with the late war with America. Undue contempt for their adversaries—ignorance of the peculiar style of frigates which they had constructed—imperfect and hasty manning of vessels—neglect in providing adequate crews of seamen for the vessels on the

lakes, lay at the root of all the disasters which were incurred. The extraordinary pressure of the later years of the war, the wants of a navy which had then six hundred ships of war in commission, and the absolute necessity of directing every spare hand and guinea to the prosecution of the contest with Napoleon, may excuse these neglects previous to the taking of Paris. But they furnish no apology for their continuance after that period; and it was precisely then that the greatest disasters were incurred. No excuse will remain for a repetition of such errors in any future contest. We know to what causes our past reverses have been owing, and we will have ourselves to blame if they are again incurred. And of all the necessities of such a contest, there is none so urgent as that of providing in its very outset adequate crews of *skilled* seamen, both for the squadrons on the lakes, and for the single vessels intended to combat the detached frigates which the Americans will certainly send out to cruise against our marine. Unless this is attended to, it is next to certain that disaster will be incurred; for they will man a few frigates at sea, and squadrons on the Lakes, with the choice of fifty thousand seamen, thrown idle by the blockade of their harbours, and having one half of their number English sailors.

VII. If due attention be paid to these measures of provident defence, it does not appear that any apprehension need be entertained that America will succeed, by force of arms, in wresting Canada from the British crown. It is vain for the United States to refer to their fifteen hundred thousand militia in arms: these local forces, for the most part wretchedly disciplined, and spread over an extent of territory equal to all Europe, can add little to the strength of an invading army. Such an irruption, if it is to be carried beyond the burning a few towns or arsenals on the frontier, must be conducted by means of regular forces; and the American democracy will never tax themselves, during peace, for the establishment of a

CHAP.
XCL
151.

126.
There is
little danger
of Canada
being con-
quered by
America.

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

powerful standing army. If, indeed, they could make war maintain war, and, like Napoleon, quarter half their troops permanently on other countries; or like the Romans, after the subjugation of Macedonia, proclaim a universal liberation from imposts to themselves as the result of their conquests, there can be no doubt that they would gladly accede to any augmentation of their standing army. But as there is no chance of their effecting such a transference of burdens to the shoulders of the vanquished, by the conquest of their only neighbours, the Mexicans and savages, taxation, to be effective, must begin at home; and therefore, while the present constitution lasts, it never will be attempted, at least for prospective objects. The militia of the North American provinces of Great Britain amount now to two hundred and sixty thousand; and, from a population of two million souls, they are capable of being raised to double that amount. Such a force, though of little service, from the difficulty of moving it, in offensive operations, is, with the aid of twenty thousand regular British soldiers, amply sufficient, especially in a woody country, to repel any invasion which the United States, with an army in peace of only twelve thousand men, could bring against it.

127.
The Americans are not likely to become a great naval power.

VIII. Notwithstanding the brilliant exploits of the American navy in the late war, and the serious conflicts which always will await the British in contending with them on that element, it may well be doubted whether the United States are ever destined to become a great naval power. Their reluctance to submit to any heavy or direct taxation during peace, with a view to secure the contingent benefits of war, must permanently prevent them from equipping an adequate number of ships. They have now (1849) a population of twenty-one millions, being nearly the population of the British islands at the close of the war with Napoleon: Great Britain had then two hundred and thirty ships of the line, and seven hundred and sixty-seven frigates and smaller vessels in her navy;

and America has now, including all building, just eleven ships of the line, seventeen frigates, and thirty-three brigs and sloops.¹ The prodigious outlet for population and industry in the basin of the Mississippi, the great fortunes to be realised there, and the evident determination of the inhabitants of the United States in that direction, leaves little doubt that agricultural industry will form the staple of the country for a course of ages. America, with its population of twenty-one millions, has now only fifty-six thousand sailors in her commercial marine : ² Great Britain, with its population of twenty-eight millions, has two hundred thousand. Of the fifty-six thousand sailors in the United States, it is understood that no less than thirty-three thousand are of British origin.³ And, what decisively proves that the situation of Britain is better adapted for seafaring employment than that of America, it appears, from the Parliamentary returns, that while the reciprocity system, during the twenty years of its continuance, has nearly extinguished the British trade with the Baltic powers, and augmented theirs with England in a similar proportion, alone of all other countries it has led to the increase of British in a much greater ratio than of American shipping in carrying on the trade of the United States.* And although, therefore, her tonnage is now very considerable, yet above a third of it is employed in the trade with Great Britain or her colonial possessions ; while of the total tonnage of the British

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

¹ Stat. Ann.
of America,
17.² Com. &c.,
1819.³ Captain
Murray's
America.

* Table showing the comparative progress of British and American tonnage in conducting the trade with the United States :

	British, Tons.	American, Tons.
1821, . . .	55,188	765,098
1822, . . .	70,669	787,961
1823, . . .	89,553	775,271
1824, . . .	67,351	850,033
1825, . . .	63,036	880,754
1826, . . .	69,295	942,206
1827, . . .	99,114	918,361
1828, . . .	104,167	868,381
1829, . . .	86,377	872,949
1830, . . .	87,231	967,227

{ *Continued.*

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

128.

Danger
from co-
lonial de-
fection.

islands not one-ninth part is employed in conducting the commercial intercourse with the American Republic.*

IX. After all that can be done to secure our North American possessions by the prudence and foresight of the mother country, their maintenance must always chiefly

	British, Tons.	American, Tons.
1831, . . .	215,887	922,952
1832, . . .	288,841	949,622
1833, . . .	383,487	1,111,441
1834, . . .	453,495	1,074,670
1835, . . .	529,922	1,352,653

British shipping has, during these fifteen years, increased 860 per cent.
American, . . . 77 —

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 167. Since that time, however, the shipping, both British and foreign, with America, has amazingly declined, as appears from the subjoined Table. The great American crash in 1836 explains the great decrease.

1836, . . .	82,453	236,293
1837, . . .	81,023	275,813
1838, . . .	83,203	357,467
1839, . . .	92,482	282,005
1840, . . .	138,201	426,867
1841, . . .	121,999	294,170
1842, . . .	152,833	319,524

—PORTER'S *Part. Tables*, vols. vi. to xii. p. 44, 48.

* Total American and foreign tonnage in the year 1838:—

	Tons.
American,	1,477,928
Foreign,	624,814

Total, 2,102,742

Of which to Great Britain and Ireland, . . .	269,466
— North American colonies, . . .	385,506
— East Indies, . . .	10,557
— West Indies, . . .	76,749
— Guiana, . . .	4,392
— Honduras, . . .	6,434
— Australia, . . .	1,053

Total tonnage to British Empire, 754,157

Tonnage of Great Britain in 1838 :

British,	2,876,236
Foreign,	1,222,803

Total, 4,099,039

Of which to America—British, . . .	109,951
— — American, . . .	373,810

Total to United States, . . . 483,761

— PORTER'S *Part. Tables*, ix. 591, 592; and 43, 44.

depend on the attachment and support of their inhabitants. Possibly their severance is destined to arise, not from foreign aggression, but from internal discontent; not from the ambitious projects of their neighbours, but from the selfish policy of their rulers in the mother country. Much as all must lament the effect which the unprincipled acts and criminal ambition of the revolutionists of Lower Canada have had, in alienating the affections of the simple-minded and industrious, and once loyal and devoted inhabitants of the lower province from the British government, the evil done is not yet irremediable: and, if met in the right spirit, it may be rendered, as passing evils often are, of lasting benefit. It will bring to light and force into notice many evils that otherwise might have lain unobserved, and clearly suggest the necessity of their removal. The vast increase of the British inhabitants of Upper Canada, the province of our North American possessions most exposed to incursion from the United States, is an additional ground for security. But the attachment and co-operation even of that gallant and loyal race can be permanently relied on only in one way, and that is, by the adoption and steady prosecution of a good system of colonial government. It is not going too far to assert, that the system of free trade, and sacrificing everything to cheapening prices in the mother country, is one calculated to snap asunder the unseen chain which has hitherto held together the vast fabric of the British empire. And if from the persisting in this selfish and ruinous policy, the colonies are lost to England, there cannot be a doubt that the British empire will soon be ruined; we shall be reduced to two islands, oppressed with debt, eaten up by paupers, importing a third of its subsistence from foreign countries in foreign bottoms.

What should be the leading principle of a wise colonial government is no longer a matter of doubt: it was announced eighteen hundred years ago as the rule of all intercourse between man and man; and subsequent expe-

CHAP.
XCL.

145.

120.
True prin-
ciple of
colonial
govern-
ment.

CHAP.
XCI.
1815.

rience has only tended to demonstrate its universal application as well to individual as to national transactions. It is simply to do as we would be done by. Consider the colonies as distant provinces of the empire; regard them in the same light as Yorkshire or Middlesex; treat them accordingly, and it will be long indeed ere they will seek to throw off the British connexion. Legislate for them as you would wish they should legislate for you, if Quebec or Calcutta were the seat of the central government, and Great Britain and Ireland the remote dependencies. Seek no profit of them which you are not willing that they should make of you; subject them to no burdens for your own advantage which you are not willing to bear for theirs; give them, in so far as distance and circumstances will admit, the same privileges and rights which you yourselves enjoy. Protect their industry from the ruinous competition of foreigners: give them something to lose if British connection is dissolved. Let them feel that they are really, if not formally, represented in the Imperial Parliament; and that their interests are as well attended to as those of London or Manchester, by the representatives of Great Britain. It was neglect of these first principles, so easy to see, so hard to practise, which lost the British the United States in North, and the Spaniards the whole of South America; it is in their observance that the only real security for our present magnificent colonial empire is to be found. And this affords another example of the all-important truth, which so many other passages of contemporary history tend to illustrate, that the laws of morality are not less applicable to social and political than to private conduct; and that the only secure foundation for national prosperity is to be found in the observance of that system of combined justice and good-will in the concerns of nations, which the Gospel has prescribed as the rule for private life.

CHAPTER XCII.

CONGRESS OF VIENNA, AND RETURN OF NAPOLEON
FROM ELBA.

THE glorious termination of the war excited a degree of enthusiastic joy in the British dominions, of which it is impossible to give an adequate idea, and of which subsequent ages will scarcely be able to form a conception. A great proportion of the people had grown into existence during the continuance of the contest, and inhaled with their earliest breath an ardent desire for its success: all capable of reflection felt, that whatever opinion they might have entertained as to its policy in the outset, the fate and character of the British empire had been irrevocably staked upon the throw, and that their own and their children's freedom depended upon its result. The progress of the struggle had been watched with intense, and often hopeless anxiety: its conclusion was marked by a splendour as unlooked-for as it was unexampled. With whatever diversity of feelings its commencement had been regarded by the great parties who divided the nation, its long continuance had united in their wishes all but a few soured and inveterate party leaders: the bloody triumphs of the French Revolutionists had alarmed even the warmest votaries of liberty: the stern despotism of Napoleon had alienated their affections; his unrelenting war against freedom terrified their adherents.

The patriots rejoiced in the result, because it secured the

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

1.

Extraordi-
nary and
unexampled
consequences
by Great
Britain
after the
peace.

CHAP.
XCH.

1814.

2.

Views of
different
parties on
the war.

glory and independence of their country: the partisans of the aristocracy, because it closed a gulf which threatened to swallow up all ancient institutions: the friends of liberty, because it had been achieved by the united efforts of the European people, and appeared likely to terminate in the establishment of lasting freedom in France. The former anticipated the commencement of an era of unexampled prosperity from the sacrifices which had been made: the latter beheld, in the necessities to which the Continental sovereigns had been reduced, and the spirit which they had been compelled to call forth, the dawn of a brighter day in the annals of freedom. The visit of the allied sovereigns to England, in the summer of 1814, wound up these feelings to the very highest pitch. All ranks, from the throne to the cottage, shared in the general enthusiasm. In the anxiety and animation of public events, the distresses and the joys of private life were for a time forgotten: misery itself lost its poignancy in the contagion of general exultation. No other subject was spoken of in the streets, no other canvassed in company, hardly any other thought of in private. The feelings of the whole British nation resembled those of a crowded audience in a theatre, when the genius of the actor, and the enthusiasm of a multitude, break down the barriers of individual restraint, and draw from assembled thousands one simultaneous burst of common emotion.

3.

Anticipations of the
effects of
the termination
of the results
of the Revolution.

Even after "the festive cities' blaze" was no longer seen, and the roar of artillery had ceased to cause the heart to throb, more thoughtful observers reflected with feelings of extraordinary thankfulness for the past, and sanguine anticipations for the future, on the marvellous events of the war. There seemed a poetical justice in its result, an equity in the retribution which had befallen the great and guilty nation, which spoke at once the present God. Anticipations the most sanguine on the future progress of liberty in France itself, were formed by its most zealous supporters in this country. "Deplorable as have been

the excesses," it was said, "which stained with blood the hands of the first apostles of freedom in that country, their labours have not been in vain. A constitutional monarchy has at last been erected: guarantees of liberty have been established. Compared with the freedom she will enjoy under the Restoration, her condition under the old monarchy was slavery itself. The blood of Robespierre was but for a season; the carnage of Napoleon has passed away; but the glorious fabric of freedom has emerged unsullied even from the sanguinary hands of its founders, and a brighter era opened on the human race, from the very crimes which appeared to overcast its prospects."

Such hopes are the dream of the poet: they constitute the denouement of romance, they form the charm of the melodrama: but they are not the history of man. A constant struggle with evil, a perpetual contest for the mastery with the powers of sin, is his destiny from the cradle to the grave of nations. The crimes committed during the Revolution had been too great, the breaches formed too wide, the blood shed too profuse, the injuries inflicted too serious, to admit of a pacific and prosperous society, blessed with the enjoyment of real freedom, being built up out of the ruins they had produced. Human passions do not subside like the waves of the ocean when the winds are stilled; human iniquity, once let loose, cannot be restrained so soon as the original actors in it have been destroyed. The winged words spoken, the immortal thoughts written, the irreparable deeds done, must work out their appropriate effect; for good or for evil they are committed to the stream of time, and generations yet unborn must reap their fruits. Irreligion, passion, the thirst for illicit gratification, are easily let in to a nation: they find a ready entrance in the deceitful desires of the human heart; they are admitted amidst a chorus of joyous hopes and sanguine anticipations. Ages must elapse, generations unborn descend to their tomb, possibly a new dominant race be introduced from distant and uncorrupted

CHAP.
XCH.
1-14.

4.
Very different was the real issue of excesses.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

states, before they can be extirpated. The effect of noble thoughts, of just principles, of elevated conceptions, is never lost ; it is more durable upon the human race than the immediate results of sin, and often finally improves its fortunes. But in the first instance it is incomparably more slow, in the purification of mankind, than the passions of vice are in corrupting them. He knew the destiny of mortals, and the laws of the moral world well, who said, "For I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me, and showing mercy unto thousands of them that love me and keep my commandments."

5.
Munificent
grant to the
Duke of
Wellington
and his
chief gene-
rals.
July 7.

The peace with France formed the subject of universal thought throughout the nation ; but its conditions were so glorious to this country, that they could hardly form the subject of debate in parliament, and mere congratulatory addresses are hardly worthy of a place in history. Munificent provision, though not beyond his deserts, was made in testimony of the national gratitude to the Duke of Wellington. It was proposed by government that £300,000 should be voted to that illustrious commander, in addition to the £100,000 already bestowed on him by parliament ; but when the subject was brought forward in the House of Commons, it was proposed by Mr Whitbread and Mr Ponsonby, highly to their honour, considering the persevering resistance they had made to the war, that it should be increased to £400,000, making half a million in all which he had received from the gratitude of his country. The enlarged sum was voted without a dissentient voice ; so completely had the transcendant services of the British hero stifled the voice of envy and stilled the passions of political hostility. Sir Thomas Graham was raised to the peerage by the title of Lord Lynedoch, with a pension of £2000 a-year to himself and his two following heirs : similar honours and pensions were bestowed on Marshal Beresford and Sir Rowland

April 12.

Hill, who became Lords Beresford and Hill. All these grants were in like manner passed unanimously ; and the gratitude of the crown was appropriately evinced by raising all his principal officers, including Picton, Cole, Leith, Clinton, and almost all the names which have now acquired a durable place in history, to the honours of knighthood ; while ribbons and stars were profusely scattered among their less elevated brethren in arms. Wellington himself, with the unanimous approbation of the nation, was elevated to the rank of duke.¹

CHAP.
XIII.

1-14.

¹ *Parl. Deb.*
xxx. 824,
834. *Ann.*
Reg. 1814,
137, 154.

A striking and impressive scene occurred when the British hero was presented to the House of Commons, to receive publicly the thanks of the House for the achievements which had shed such lustre on his country. He was received with loud cheers, all the members standing ; and the Speaker addressed him in the following eloquent and dignified terms :—" My Lord, since I last had the honour of addressing you from this place, a series of eventful years has elapsed, but none without some mark and note of your rising glory. The military triumphs, which your valour has achieved upon the banks of the Douro and the Tagus, of the Ebro and the Garonne, have called forth the spontaneous shouts of admiring nations. Their names have been written by your conquering sword in the annals of Europe, and we shall hand them down with exultation to our children's children. It is not, however, the grandeur of military success which has alone fixed our admiration, or commanded our applause ; it has been that generous and lofty spirit which inspired your troops with unbounded confidence, and taught them to know that the day of battle was always a day of victory ; that moral courage and enduring fortitude, which in perilous times, when gloom and doubt had beset ordinary minds, stood nevertheless unshaken ; and that ascendancy of character, which, uniting the energies of jealous and rival nations, enabled you to wield at will the fate and fortunes of mighty empires. For the repeated

6.
Wellington's reception by the House of Commons, and the Speaker's address, July 1.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

thanks and grants bestowed upon you by this House, in gratitude for your eminent services, you have thought fit this day to offer us your acknowledgments; but this nation well knows that it is still largely your debtor. It owes to you the proud satisfaction that, amidst the constellation of illustrious warriors who have recently visited our country, we could present to them a leader of our own, to whom all common acclamation conceded the pre-eminence; and when the will of Heaven and the common destinies of our nature shall have swept away the present generation, you will have left your great name—an imperishable monument—exciting others to like deeds of glory; and serving at once to adorn, defend, and perpetuate the existence of this country among the ruling nations of the earth.”¹

1 Ann. Reg.
1814, 139.
Parl. Deb.
xxviii, 481.

7.
Solemn
thank-giv-
ing in St
Paul's for
peace.

July 6.

Indescribable was the enthusiasm which these eloquent and impressive words excited in all who listened to them, and rapturous the applause which ensued when Lord Castlereagh moved that they should be entered on the journals of the House.* The Duke of Wellington replied in modest and suitable terms, in which, without pretending to disclaim all merit himself, he ascribed the success which had been achieved mainly to the persevering support he had received from the government, and the fortitude and discipline of the troops under his command. A few days afterwards, a solemn thanksgiving was returned in St Paul's by the Prince Regent and the royal family, accompanied by the whole ministers and privy council, the Houses of Lords and Commons, the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and functionaries in London, and the principal persons of the British empire who were then assembled in London. The multitude were deeply impressed when the august procession, decked out with all the splendour of royalty, passed through the streets; and when the Duke of Wellington, with the sword pre-

¹ The Author was present on the occasion. The impression the scene produced will never be effaced.

sented to him by the State before him, sat down on the right hand of the Prince Regent in the cathedral, one burst of almost overpowering emotion thrilled through every one in its immense extent. But who can rely on the permanent affection of the ever-changing multitude? Could the eye of prophecy have pierced the depths of futurity, it would have beheld the hero of England, then "the observed of all observers," and almost sinking under "the electric shock of a nation's gratitude," reviled by the majority of his countrymen, execrated by the mob, and narrowly escaping death from their infuriated hands, in the vicinity of that very spot, on the anniversary of his great and crowning victory of Waterloo! Themistocles, the saviour of Athens, was obliged to seek refuge from his countrymen at the court of the Great King; Scipio, the conqueror of Carthage, died an exile on a foreign shore—his ungrateful country did not possess his bones.¹

CHAP.
XIII.

179.

An important discussion, alike interesting from the simple character of the people whose fate was at issue, and the principles in regard to the future settlement of Europe which it involved, took place in parliament on the subject of Norway. It has been already mentioned, that it was part of the secret engagements contracted by Alexander with Bernadotte, at Abo in 1812, that he should receive that kingdom in exchange for the Continental possessions of the Swedish crown which were ceded to Russia, and that, by the subsequent treaty with Great Britain, not only had the consent of the cabinet of St James's been obtained to this arrangement, but his Britannic Majesty engaged, if necessary, to assist in an active manner with his fleet to carry the treaty into effect.² The period had now arrived when Bernadotte claimed the performance of these stipulations, and when it became necessary for Great Britain to perform her engagements for the coercion of the Norwegians into obedience to this transfer. The court of Denmark had

8.
Interference
of Great
Britain to
force the
annexation
of Norway
to Sweden.

2. Art. 1. ch.
VIII. § 2. 3.
ibid. § 4.
ibid. § 7.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

1 Ante, ch.
LXXXIV. §
48.

acceded to it, by the treaty which admitted them into the Grand Alliance,¹ as indeed it was impossible for them to do otherwise, after the overthrow of the external power of France by the battle of Leipsic and evacuation of Germany. But the Norwegians loudly protested against this forcible transfer of a free people to the rule of their hereditary enemies; and not only refused to admit the Swedish authorities, in obedience to the injunctions of the King of Denmark, but made preparations to resist any forcible occupation of their territory. They even despatched envoys to Great Britain to interest the English people in their cause. In consequence, a Swedish army assembled under the Crown Prince, on the frontier, and Great Britain despatched some vessels of war, to commence a blockade of the harbours of Norway. This proceeding excited the liveliest interest in Europe, both from the importance of the questions at issue to the parties, and the indication which it afforded of the intentions of the allied powers in regard to other countries, which, in like manner, it might be deemed expedient to transfer from their ancient dominion to new sovereigns. It became the subject of warm debates in the British parliament; and the arguments there urged are the more worthy of attention, that they were brought forward in the only assembly in existence where the subject could with perfect freedom be discussed.²

² Ann. Reg.
1814, 118,
119.

9.
Argument
on the sub-
ject of Nor-
way by the
Opposition.

On the side of the Opposition, it was maintained by Earl Grey, Lord Grenville, and Mr Wynne — “ British policy never sustained a deeper shock, nor British character a deeper stain, than in the conduct which has recently been pursued in regard to Norway. If indeed it were incumbent on this country, on a fair construction of the treaty with Sweden, to assist by the co-operation of force in the reduction of Norway, it might fairly be urged that the evil, how great soever, was beyond the reach of remedy, and that even oppression must be enforced, rather than breach of faith incurred. But are we bound by the treaty

to employ force to compel the Norwegians to submit to a forcible junction with Sweden ? Nothing can be clearer than that we are not. It is merely stipulated ‘that we are to use our good offices to obtain the annexation, and even to employ force, if necessary.’ But force was not to be employed, unless the King of Denmark refused to join the northern alliance. If, then, force had been already employed to compel that junction, we had done all that we engaged, and are liberated from any further obligations. Now, when were we called on to interpose force to compel this junction ? When Denmark has joined the northern alliance—when her troops have marched in support of the common cause—and when she has not only ceded Norway, but has expressly fulfilled that condition, upon the refusal of which the employment of force was made to depend.

“We are clearly, therefore, not bound to co-operate by force, either by the letter or the spirit of the treaty ; and if not, are we called upon to interpose by the nature of the transaction, or the merits of the hostility to which we have chosen to make ourselves a party ? Here the argument is, if possible, still stronger. The King of Denmark had no right to transfer the people of Norway against their will. He might withdraw himself from their protection ; he might absolve them from their allegiance to him ; but he had no right to transfer that allegiance to another state ; it became then the privilege of the people to determine to whom their allegiance should be transferred. Authority is not necessary to support a position so plain, so entirely in unison with the first principles of natural justice. If it were necessary to quote opinions of weight on such a point, our greatest international lawyers, Grotius, Puffendorf, and Vattel, are unanimous upon it. They state that a sovereign may, in case of necessity, withdraw his garrisons from their towns, but that, this being done, it rests with the people themselves to select the state to which they will transfer

CHAP.
XIII.
1814.

10.
Denmark
had no right
to transfer
the allegi-
ance of
Norway.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

their allegiance. Provinces of an empire, indeed, such as Franche-Comté and Lorraine, have often been transferred without the consent of the inhabitants; but that does not apply to the cession of an integral independent state, such as Norway. And whenever such a stretch has been attempted, as in the subjugation of Corsica by France, or the transfer of Scotland by Baliol to Edward I., the iniquitous measure has met with the unanimous condemnation of subsequent times, and the heroes who strove to resist it have been the admiration of the historian, the theme of the poet, in every subsequent age. If a more recent example is required, look at Spain. Ferdinand VII. ceded his people to Napoleon by the treaty of Bayonne; but, instead of acquiescing in the transfer, they strenuously resisted it, and for the last six years our whole efforts have been directed to aid them in withstanding a usurpation similar to that which we are now with as little justice about to force on the Norwegians.

11.
The conduct
of Sweden
had de-
served no
such recom-
pense.

“Have the services of Sweden in the common cause been so important, the fidelity of the Crown Prince to his engagements so conspicuous, as to call for such an act on the part of Great Britain? It is notorious that the very reverse is the case. Have Sir C. Stewart and Mr Thornton never stated in their despatches that Sweden was backward in aiding the common cause? Have her troops ever taken the part assigned to them in the combined operations? Even at the battle of Leipsic, Sir C. Stewart has loudly complained that Sweden hung back, and that the utmost efforts were necessary to bring her troops into action. Subsequently, instead of directing his troops to the theatre of war in Flanders, the Crown Prince employed them entirely against Denmark; and, during the campaign in France, his inactivity became so conspicuous, that the Hanseatic Legion, intended to have been under his direction, was transferred to that of General Bulow, and two entire corps of his army were at

once withdrawn from his orders, and placed under the directions of Marshal Blücher. It is, then, for such a lukewarm, suspicious ally that we are to incur the odium of concurring in the subjugation of a freeborn and gallant people?

CHAP.
XIII.

1814.

“The policy of this co-operation is as mistaken as its principle is unjust. Sweden is attached to France, because it may be aided, and cannot be injured by it; it is jealous of Russia, because it may be injured, and cannot be benefited by it. The Crown Prince will never lose his attachment to the land of his birth; in his case, national partiality, old recollections, will conspire with new interests and acquired desires to attach him to the French alliance. Rather than see Norway annexed to Sweden, it would be incomparably better to see it erected into an independent power. And as such a power, if independent, would necessarily be closely connected with this country, it would prove of essential service in furnishing materials for our navy from a quarter from whence the supplies are never likely to fail. But fail they unquestionably will if this annexation is persisted in; for, on the first general war in Europe, Sweden will join with France, from inevitable and well-founded dread of the power of Russia.”¹

12.
Impolicy of
this step.

¹ Parl. Deb.
xxviii. 768,
769.

On the other hand, it was argued by Lord Castlereagh, Lord Harrowby, and Lord Liverpool—“This question is to be determined, not by the general considerations which have been brought forward with such glowing eloquence on the opposite side, but by the necessities of the case when the treaty with Sweden was concluded, and the plain meaning of that treaty itself. It was the anxious desire of this country, at the time when the co-operation of Sweden was essential to the interests of Europe, to obtain the assistance of that power against the common enemy; and to that end we engaged to put Sweden in possession of Norway, which being in the hands of a hostile state, rendered it impossible for the Swedish government to send

13.
Answer of
the Admi-
nistration.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

forces to any considerable amount to the Continent until it was secured from attack on that vulnerable side. The Emperor of Russia, accordingly, by his treaty with Sweden, bound himself to secure to the latter power the crown of Norway; and Great Britain pledged itself by its treaty to the same effect, by using its good offices with Denmark, and if necessary by naval co-operation. It was certainly provided that we should not employ force without making an attempt to induce Denmark to join the general confederacy, and that power has done so. But unless there was something illegal in the original treaty, can it be maintained that we are bound to stop short at the nominal cession, and do nothing to put our ally in possession of the territory which we had expressly agreed he should possess?

14.
Legality of
the transfer,
and its con-
sonance
with ordi-
nary usage.

“As to the justice of the treaty itself, that is a different question, which it is too late to discuss, as it has been concluded and acted upon, and formed part of the public convention of Europe. But even if that question were to be again opened up, nothing can be clearer than that the treaty with Sweden might be defended on the best principles of justice and expedience. Many weighty authorities, indeed, have laid it down, that a sovereign cannot, without the consent of the inhabitants, alienate his *whole* dominions: but they also state, what common sense sufficiently demonstrates, that a particular town or province may be validly ceded without such consent. By all the treaties which have terminated the great wars of Europe, large cessions of territory have been made; they were, in fact, the price of the pacification, and without them that blessing could not have been obtained. In particular, this was done by the treaties of Westphalia, of Utrecht, and of Amiens; and by all concluded by Napoleon, large provinces were ceded without any complaint being made by the gentlemen opposite. Sicily, Naples, Flanders, and almost all the smaller states of Italy, as much independent states as Norway, have at different

times been thus transferred. Did not Lord Chatham boast that he would conquer Germany in America?—a saying which, according to the doctrine now advanced, would be founded in gross injustice. If the consent of the people to their cession were requisite to the legal validity of their transfer, treaties would be nugatory; every attempt at pacification would only lead to a difficult and often ineffectual negotiation with the subjects of the territory proposed to be ceded; and wars would be interminable, from the impossibility of guaranteeing to the victorious party any advantage which might induce him to terminate his hostility. The obligation on the part of subjects to submit to such transfers is but a part of the general result of the social union, by which the original liberty of each citizen is to a certain degree impaired for the public good.

“Whether or not the Crown Prince has in every instance exerted himself with the greatest vigour for the prosecution of hostilities against the common enemy, is not now the question. Suffice it to say, that his co-operation on the whole has been of the most essential service, and such as fully entitles him to his stipulated reward. Had he not, by his accession to the alliance, created a formidable diversion in the rear of the French army which penetrated into Russia, we might have been at this moment occupied, instead of discussing the *minutiae* of our engagements with Sweden, in anxiously deliberating on the means of averting invasion from our own shores. The policy of strengthening Sweden is equally clear: the great evil of modern Europe, which has hitherto led to such frequent wars of ambition by the greater powers, has been the number of lesser states with which they are surrounded, at once a field for their hostility and a prey to their cupidity. It is our wisdom, therefore, so to strengthen the second-rate powers as may render the balance more even, and prevent their dominions from becoming, as heretofore, the mere battle-field

CHAP.
XIII.
1-14.

15.
Value of the
services of
Sweden,
and policy
of the
measure.

CHAP.
XII.
1514.

in which the greater powers find an arena for their contests and the prize of their hostility. The resistance of the Norwegians to this projected union with Sweden has been entirely fomented by the Danes, who, having secured their equivalent in Pomerania, are now striving also to retain Norway: it has been consequent on a journey of the heir-presumptive of the crown of Denmark, who went from Copenhagen to Norway, and was declared king of that country. The terms of the proposed union have hitherto been studiously concealed from the Norwegians: but when they come to be known, all opposition on their part will cease, as it has already done with a large portion of the most respectable and enlightened inhabitants.”¹

¹ Parl. Deb.
xxviii. 783,
807.

16.
Continued
resistance of
the Norwe-
gians.
Feb. 24.

Upon a division, parliament supported ministers in the course they had adopted on this subject in both houses: the majority in the Peers being eighty-one, in the Commons, two days afterwards, no less than a hundred and fifty-eight. The resistance of the Norwegians, however, still continued; and it became necessary for the Swedish government to have recourse to actual hostilities to effect the occupation of this much-coveted acquisition. A proclamation of the King of Sweden, containing an engagement to leave to the nation the power of establishing a constitution on the footing of national representation, to its inhabitants the right of taxing themselves, and not to consolidate the finances of the two countries, met with very little attention. As little respect was paid to a letter addressed to them by the King of Denmark two months afterwards, in which he counselled them to submit, disavowed the act of Prince Christian, who had gone to Norway, and been proclaimed King of that nation, and forbade all the officers in his service to remain in the country in its present state. Prince Christian, however, was not discouraged; he traversed the mountains between Sweden and Drontheim, and was everywhere met by crowds of peasants, shouting with enthusi-

April 13.

astic ardour, "We will live or die for Old Norway's freedom." When he arrived at the monument in the pass of Gutbrandsthal, famous for the destruction of a band of Swedish invaders, and read the inscription, "Woe to the Norwegian whose blood does not boil in his veins at the sight of this monument!" thousands of voices rent the sky with the exclamation, "Thou shalt not leave us!" CHAP. XCII.
1814.

Continuing his journey to Drontheim, he was unanimously saluted as Regent: the Danish flag was taken down to the sound of a funeral dirge; the Norwegian banner hoisted amidst shouts of acclamation. Norway was declared independent; peace was declared with Great Britain; a deputation was appointed to wait on the British government to deprecate the proposed coercion; and Count Axel Rosen, the Swedish envoy, who came from the government of Stockholm, commissioned to receive execution of the treaty, was informed that, till the declaration of independence was communicated to the powers of Europe, no answer to his requisitions could be made.¹ Feb. 19.
Feb. 21.

The engagements of the allied powers, however, towards Sweden, were too stringent to permit of any attention being paid even to these touching appeals of a gallant people struggling for their independence. Mr Anker, the Norwegian envoy to the court of London, was informed by Lord Liverpool of the situation and obligations of the British government, and desired to return to Norway: but still the Norwegians were undismayed, and on the 19th April, the Diet, by a considerable majority, conferred the crown on Prince Christian and his male heirs. M. Morier was afterwards despatched by the British government to endeavour to effect a pacific settlement of the differences, and soon after the envoys from all the allied powers arrived in Norway with a similar purpose, but all their efforts were fruitless: they departed from Drontheim without having induced either Christian or the Diet to submit, and preparations on both sides were immediately made for war.² 17.
Failure of
all attempts
at a nego-
tiation.
April 19.

July 10.
July 24.
Aug. 17.
¹ Ann. Reg.
1814. 43.
² Mém.
de Charles
Jeanne, iv.
156, 161.

CHAP. XCII.	It belongs to the northern historians to relate in detail the circumstances of the brief but interesting campaign which followed. Suffice it to say, that the Norwegian
1814.	flotilla was defeated near the Hualorn islands, with hardly
18.	any loss to the Swedish squadron; and that, Bernadotte
Conquest of Norway by Sweden, July 26.	having put himself at the head of the invading army, twenty thousand strong, the frontier was immediately
Aug. 2.	crossed. The Swedish General Gahn was, in the first instance, worsted in an attempt to force the mountain
Aug. 4.	passes, yet Friedrichstadt was captured two days after. The strong position of Isebro was soon after forced with
Aug. 10.	considerable loss to the Norwegians: General Vegesack overthrew a body of six thousand gallant mountaineers; Sleswick was abandoned, and taken possession of by the
Aug. 11.	invaders; the passage of the Glommen was won; preparations were made for the bombardment of Friedrichstein, before which Charles XII. lost his life; the ridge of the
Aug. 12.	Kgolberg was carried after a brave resistance; and measures were taken for surrounding, with a very superior force, the army of Prince Christian, posted near Moss. Further resistance would now have been hopeless; the
Aug. 14.	match was evidently unequal; and therefore Prince Christian made proposals to the Crown Prince, which were accepted. By this convention the Danish prince resigned all pretensions to the crown of Norway; and, on the other hand, the Crown Prince accepted the constitution for Norway which had been fixed by the Diet of
Oct. 5.	Eswold, and engaged to govern it with no other changes than were necessary to the union of the two kingdoms. After some local disturbances, and great heartburnings among the peasantry, this convention was submitted to; the Diet at Christiana, by a majority of seventy-four to
1 Ann. Reg. 1814, 41, 48. Mon. de Charles Journ. 173, 197. Bulletin of Bernadotte. Aug. 6. i 14. Ibid.	five, agreed to accept their new king, and consent to the union of the two kingdoms. The terms arranged were in the highest degree favourable to the Norwegians, who preserved the substance, though not the form, of independence, ¹ and a degree of popular power which would be

inconsistent with good government in a less primitive state of society. Bernadotte has since ruled them with leniency and judgment; and though many old patriots still mourn over the loss of their political independence, Norway has had no real reason, from its subsequent government, to regret its union with the Swedish monarchy.

CHAP.
XIII.
1814.

Although the military events of this miniature contest are of little importance, yet the moral and political questions which it involves are of the highest interest, and by much the most material which arose for the consideration of the statesmen of Europe upon the overthrow of the French Empire. By that great event, dominions which had been incorporated with it under the sceptre of Napoleon, containing thirteen millions of souls, besides states embracing a still greater number, forming part of his allied dependencies, had been in great part bereft of their former government, and lay at the disposal of the allied powers. It became, therefore, a matter at once of the highest importance, and of no small difficulty, to provide properly for the political distribution of the conquered or rescued states. For, on the one hand, the general interests of Europe imperatively required that the old arrangements should not in every instance be specifically resumed, as experience had demonstrated that, if they were so, the weakness of the intermediate states rendered them an immediate prey to the ambition of the greater. On the other, the attachment of the people to their old sovereigns and form of government was often strong, always respectable; and it ill became the champions of European independence to terminate their work of deliverance by an act of injustice which might be paralleled to any, to terminate which they had taken up arms.

1st.
Re-
storation
of the
old gov.
t.

In these difficult circumstances, where state necessity and insurmountable expedience pointed to one course, and a sense of justice and regard to the rights of man appeared to demand another, it is not surprising that the

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

20.

And the
true ground
on which it
is to be
rested.

decision of the allied powers should have been the subject of impassioned declamation or sincere regret, and that the annexation of Norway to Sweden, of great part of Saxony to Prussia, of the Grand-duchy of Warsaw to Russia, the Milanese to Austria, and Genoa to the kingdom of Piedmont, should have been represented as acts of violence and spoliation, equal to any which had stained the arms of Napoleon. Without pretending to vindicate all those measures, and fully admitting the principle, that the end will not justify the means, there is yet this important fact to be observed, which draws a broad and clear line of distinction between all these acts of incorporation, and those which were so loudly complained of under the government of the French Emperor. All these states, which were disposed of, some against their will, by the Congress of Vienna, were at the close of hostilities *at war* with the allied powers: they were part of the French empire, or of its allied dependencies: and if they were allotted to some of the conquering powers, they underwent no more than the stern rule of war, the sad lot of the vanquished from the beginning of the world. What was complained of in Napoleon's usurpations, was not the provinces which he wrested from his *enemies* at the close of war, but the crowns which he tore from the brows of his *allies*, or neutral states, during peace. The contest, moreover, on the termination of which they were partitioned, was one of the grossest aggression on their part: their forces had all formed part of the vast crusade, at the head of which Napoleon had crossed the Niemen, and carried the sword and the firebrand into the heart of Russia; and if they in the end found the scales of fortune turned against them, and lamented their forcible transference to the rule of another, they underwent no other fate than the just law of retribution. They experienced no more than they had inflicted on the Austrians, the Prussians, and the Dutch; than they had attempted to inflict on the Spaniards and the Russians.

Another subject in the highest degree interesting, both to the domestic historian of Great Britain and the general annalist of Europe, which underwent a thorough discussion, and was placed on a new footing at this period, was the English CORN LAWS.

During the greater part of the eighteenth century, England had been to a certain, though not a large, extent an exporting country; and so great was the influence of the landowners in the legislature, that they had obtained the grant of a bounty of five shillings a quarter on the exportation of wheat to foreign states. By the statute 1 William and Mary, c. 12, passed in the year 1688, exportation was permitted when wheat shall be at or under 48s. the quarter, and a bounty of 5s. a quarter was allowed. The bounty was repeatedly suspended during the next century when grain was high, and a great variety of temporary statutes were passed to alleviate passing distress; but this bounty continued to be the general law of the country till 1765, when, by the 3 Geo. III., c. 31, it was entirely abolished, and all import duties were repealed. This continued the law till 1791, when, by the 31 Geo. III., c. 30, the old bounty of 5s. was revived when wheat shall be under 44s. the quarter; when above 46s., exportation was prohibited. On imported wheat, if prices were under 50s. a duty of 24s. 3d. was imposed: from 50s. to 54s., the duty fell to 2s. 6d.; and above 54s., the duty was only 6d. This scale was to a certain degree modified by the 44 Geo. III., c. 109, passed in 1804, by which act export was allowed when wheat was at and under 48s., with a bounty of 5s.: above 54s. there was no export: import, if prices were under 63s., was allowed only on payment of a duty of 24s. 3d.; from 63s. to 66s., at a duty of 2s. 6d.; above 66s. at a duty of 6d. The object of these, and an immense number of intermediate temporary or partial acts, was to prevent that grievous evil to which society is subjected in the great fluctuation of the prices of grain,¹ and secure, as

CHAP.
XCII.

1-11.

21.
Historical
sketch of
the Corn
Laws.¹ Parl. Deb.
XXVII. 670,
682.

CHAP.
XCII.
1814.

far as human foresight could, the advantage of a plentiful supply and steady prices in the article of human subsistence.

22.
Progress of
exportation
and impor-
tation dur-
ing the last
hundred
years.

Under the operation of these statutes, Great Britain long continued an exporting country. From 1697 to 1766, a period of nearly seventy years, the annual amount of exports of corn was, with the exception only of six years, much greater than that of imports—and this excess had, in the middle of the eighteenth century, sometimes reached as much as nine hundred thousand quarters.* From 1766, however, the balance turned the other way, and the amount imported generally, though not always, exceeded that exported; until, during the dreadful scarcity of 1800 and 1801, and the scarcely less severe season of 1810, the quantity imported had ranged from one million two hundred thousand to one million five hundred thousand quarters.† This was a most important change, and that in prices was hardly less so; for on an average of ten years for the last hundred and

* Quarters of wheat exported and imported from England:—

	Quarters Exported.	Quarters Imported.	Price of wheat per Quarter.
1748	545,387	385	£1 12 10
1749	629,049	382	1 12 10½
1750	947,602	279	1 8 10
1751	661,416	3	1 14 2
1752	429,279	0	1 17 2½

Parl. Debates, xxvii. 682.

	Wheat.		Price of Wheat.
	Quarters exported.	Quarters imported.	
† 1800	22,013	1,264,520	£6 7 0
1801	28,406	1,424,766	6 8 6
1802	149,304	647,664	3 7 2
1803	76,580	373,725	3 0 2
1804	63,073	461,140	3 9 6
1805	77,959	920,834	4 8 0
1806	29,566	310,342	4 3 0
1807	24,365	400,759	3 18 0
1808	77,567	81,466	3 19 2
1809	31,278	448,487	5 6 0
1810	75,785	1,530,691	5 12 0
1811	97,765	292,638	5 8 0
1812	46,324	129,866	6 8 0
1813	Records destroyed by fire.		6 0 0

Parl. Debates, xxvii. 682, 683.

fifty years, the price of wheat had doubled, and, as compared with the middle of last century, had more than tripled.* These facts naturally awakened the anxious solicitude of the legislature and the country at the close of the war, when the restoration of a general peace exposed the British farmer anew to the competition of the foreign producer, and the vast change of prices consequent on the suspension of cash payments in 1797, and the subsequent boundless expenditure of the war, had rendered him so much less qualified to bear it.

Agriculture had immensely advanced under the combined influence of foreign exclusion and domestic encouragement in the later years of the contest. Capital to the amount of several hundred millions sterling had been invested in land, and was now producing a remunerating return; the home cultivators, notwithstanding an increase of nearly fifty per cent in the number of the people during the last twenty-five years, had kept pace both with the wants of the people, and the rapidly augmenting luxury of the age; the importation of grain for the three preceding years had been a perfect trifle. It had thus become a very grave question, whether these advantages should

CHAP.
XIII.
1814.

23.
Pressing
reasons for
a protection
to native
agriculture.

* Average price of wheat during ten years :—

	s.	d.
Ending 1655,	51	7½
1665,	50	5½
1675,	40	11½
1685,	41	4½
1695,	39	6½
1705,	42	11
1715,	44	2½
1725,	35	4½
1735,	35	2
1745,	32	1
1755,	33	2½
1765,	39	3½
1775,	51	3½
1785,	47	8½
1795,	54	3½
1805,	81	2½
Eight years to 1813,	101	9½

—*Report of Committee on Corn Laws, 1814; Parl. Deb.* xxvii. 687.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

now be thrown away, and the nation, after having by a painful process of foreign warfare been raised to a state of independence of foreign supplies, should at its close, by the inundation of Continental grain, consequent on the expenses and high prices which that very war had occasioned, be reduced to a state of dependence on external powers for the most necessary articles of subsistence.

24.
Mr Huskisson's and the government's arguments in favour of the Corn Laws.

On the one hand, it was argued by Mr Huskisson, Mr Vansittart, and Mr Frankland Lewis—"The two grand objects which the House has to obtain by the proposed measures, are to render the nation independent of foreign supply, and to keep the price of corn as nearly equal as possible. Under the system begun in 1765, which has now been in operation for nearly fifty years, the country has been gradually becoming more and more dependent on foreign countries for a supply of grain, and prices have been kept in a continual state of fluctuation. All this has happened in consequence of deviating from a system which, for nearly sixty years previously, had rendered the country nearly independent of foreign supply, and during which period the fluctuation of prices had never exceeded one-third. Instead of which, during the last forty years, large importations had taken place, and the fluctuations have risen as high as three to one, instead of one to three. What must be the state of the law which produced these evils, if they have been produced by law, of which there can be no doubt? and is not some remedy necessary?"

25.
Great fluctuation of prices in consequence of the existing state of the law.

"It is impossible that temporary fluctuation can raise the price of labour in proportion to the rise in the price of grain? and as the agricultural labourers constitute the largest class, and their earnings approach nearest to what is necessary for mere existence, any temporary rise in the price of grain is more severely felt by them than by any others, and this evil has exhibited itself in augmented poor-rates and many other forms. The fluctuation of prices is an evil as much to be guarded against as too

high a price : a total prohibition of exportation, it is true, may raise the price ; but a medium may be found which will at once keep the price steady, and not unduly elevate it. Notwithstanding all that has been said about the importance of importation of grain, it is well known that *in no year has it reached higher than a tenth or twelfth of the annual consumption*. If no foreign corn had been imported, the nation would have saved in the last twenty years sixty millions sterling ; nor can it be said, that without this importation sixty millions' worth of our manufactures would have remained unsold ; for what would those sixty millions have effected if they had been invested in land ? What improvements would they have effected in our agriculture—what increased means of purchasing our manufactures would they have given to our cultivators ! When the law permitting the importation of corn was first passed, there was a violent outcry against it ; but what had been its effect ? Why, that Ireland had come to supply England with corn, for which she had received several millions which had been employed in improving her soil, which, but for that law, would have gone to Holland or some other country. The importations from Ireland now amount to three millions annually, with a probability of a still greater increase. Are we prepared to throw away that benefit to our own subjects ?

“Circumstances over which we have no control have of late years given an extraordinary impulse to British agriculture, and rendered us again independent of foreign nations. Having paid the price of our independence, would it be wise now to permit the domestic culture of the country to be destroyed, and render us again dependent on foreign nations ? Such an advantage would be readily seized on by any power, and used to the annoyance, it might be the subjugation, of any country which should subject itself to such an evil. If the law is left in its present form, agriculture will speedily recede ; the low

CHAP.
XCII.
1-14.

26.
Probable
effects of
increased
importa-
tion.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

price of corn produced by foreign importation will at once diminish the supply of grain, and throw out of employment a vast multitude of agricultural labourers: and thence will arise a double evil at once to the landowners, the farmers, and the nation. A loss of capital to a prodigious extent will ensue; rents will be immediately lowered; the best market for our manufactures, the home market, will be essentially injured. The true wisdom of the legislature will be to impose a fluctuating scale of duties, which shall, when prices are high, let in importation from all the world, and, gradually rising as prices fall, shall, when they reach a certain point of depression, operate as a prohibition against it. Assuming 63s. the quarter, then, as the turning point at which the prohibitory duty of 24s. 3d. should operate, the true principle appears to be to adopt a sliding scale, which shall add a shilling to the duty for every shilling that wheat falls, and take off a shilling for every shilling that it rises; so that at 86s. there should be no duty at all: and, at the same time, to lower these duties to one-half on grain imported from our own colonies.”¹

¹ Parl. Deb.
xxvii. 722,
726.

27.

Argument
on the other
side by Mr
Rose and its
opponents.

On the other hand, it was contended by Mr Rose and Mr Canning —“ Taking it for granted that no one entertains the slightest idea of introducing an entirely free importation, the great point is, at what price is importation to be restrained, and exportation permitted? The last average price of wheat at Dantzic is 36s., and the charges thence to the port of London are 26s., which in the war had risen as high as 82s. The supply of wheat in times of scarcity is now almost entirely from Poland, and the prices there are chiefly determined by those in this country. Now, if there be no restraint in the way of export, corn may be sent out of the country to such an extent as to be altogether beyond the reach of the artisans and labourers. It is mere legislation in favour of a particular class in society, to make the regulating price for the duties on the importation of corn a very high one, while at the

same time free and unrestrained exportation is permitted. What in such a case becomes of the consumer? The middle and labouring classes have for many years endured, with exemplary patience, such a rise in the price of the necessaries of life as has exposed them to the severest privations. What, then, can be more unjust than now, when they may with confidence look forward, from the return of peace, to a fall of prices, to perpetuate their distresses by such forced measures of legislation as shall permanently retain prices at the war level? The interests of the grower and consumer, when properly understood, are by no means incompatible; but the question is, whether, in the measures recommended by the committee, and now pressed upon the House, the only point considered has not been the interest of the grower.

“ The poor-rates must be inevitably and seriously augmented, if the present high rate of prices continue; and will not that abstract a large portion of the profits which they will bring to agriculture? This was sorely felt in 1800 and 1801, during which years this burden was in many places doubled. The revenue will be materially affected by the virtual prohibition in ordinary years of all imports of grain, and the consequent cessation of the whole duties obtained on its introduction. We are told the farmer requires protection, and would be ruined by foreign competition. How do the facts tally with this assertion? From 1801 to 1811 the population of England alone has increased one million four hundred and forty-eight thousand; that of the whole British islands probably two millions five hundred thousand: in that period the average excess of importation over exportation has increased by five hundred and eighty-six thousand quarters; not a fifth part of the wants of the increased population, at a quarter a head; and even that includes two years of the severest scarcity ever known. This clearly demonstrates that the remainder has been obtained by the additional produce of our own cultivation, and in

CHAP.
XVII.
1811.

28.
Security of
the farmer
against
foreign com-
petition.

CHAP.
XCH.
1814.

fact the advances made in that branch of industry of late years have been immense, as every part of the country demonstrates. If, then, agriculture is already so flourishing, why seek to prop it up at the expense of the other classes by artificial legislative enactments?

29.
Alleged
onesided-
ness of the
supposed
enactment.

“To one class of society the committee and their supporters in this House hold out an expectation, that by increased cultivation bread will become cheap; to another, that by raising the prices of importation, and lessening those of exportation, corn will become dearer. These propositions cannot both be true; and there appears every reason to believe that the benefit to the landowner and farmer will be incomparably less than the detriment to the consumers. The former have hitherto in one way or other been indemnified for their burdens; but the latter have not; and it will be the height of injustice to pass a law which shall render the price of grain permanently twice as high as it was before the war began. Delay in a question of such importance, and so vital in its consequences to the country, is loudly called for; and during the prorogation of parliament information may be collected, which will probably be the means of adjusting it more in conformity with the interests of all classes in the nation.”¹ *

¹ Parl. Deb.
xxvii. 666,
706.

30.
Progress of
the bill,
which is
at length
carried.

The arguments of Mr Huskisson and Sir Henry Parnell proved entirely successful in the House of Commons, by whom the resolutions proposed by Sir Henry Parnell as the chairman of the committee, with the modification contended for by Mr Huskisson, were carried without a division; and the sliding scale, commencing with a duty of 24s. at 63s. the quarter, and declining 1s. with every

* It is impossible in such a question as the corn laws, where details and figures constitute the foundation of the subject, to give any idea, in an abstract of a few pages, of the arguments on either side. This debate, with the report of the committee on which it is founded, will be found to contain more ample information, both on the statute law, regarding the corn laws, and the influence they had on prices for one hundred and fifty years before 1814, than any other documents in existence.—See *Parl. Debates*, xxvii. 670, 690.

shilling the price advanced, was agreed to. But the reception of these resolutions by the country was very different. Great alarm arose in the large towns and manufacturing districts, that their interests were about to be sacrificed to those of the landed proprietors; petitions for delay and farther inquiry flowed in from all quarters; Mr Canning presented one from Liverpool, signed by twenty-two thousand names; and such was the effect of these remonstrances, that after the subject had been repeatedly before the House, it was finally carried by General Gascoigne, by a majority of ten, that the bill should be taken into consideration that day six months; in other words, it was lost. The bill was, however, brought forward again in the next session of parliament, when it was made the subject of most able debates in the two Houses of parliament; but at length it was carried by large majorities in both Houses—that in the Commons being one hundred and sixty-four, in the Peers one hundred and twenty-four.¹

CHAP.
XCII.
1814.

June 6.

¹ Parl. Deb.
xxx. 123,
149.

“High prices and plenty,” says Adam Smith, “are prosperity; low prices and scarcity are misery.” In this profound saying is to be found the true principle which, in every old and opulent community, of necessity renders unavoidable a corn law and heavy duties upon the importation of foreign grain, excepting during periods of actual scarcity. It is in their very riches, the multitude of their cash transactions, in the weight of their taxes, the magnitude of their debt, the immensity of their currency—the bequest of previous ages of credit, of long-established civilisation—that the reason for this necessity is to be found. The prices of labour, of cultivation, of the implements of husbandry, of horses, of seed-corn, are necessarily higher in the old-established community than in the comparatively infant state, for the same reason that prices are higher in the metropolis than in the remote provinces of the same empire, or in the metropolis itself during the season of gaiety or fashion, than in the other times of

31.
Reflections
on this sub-
ject.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

the year. This reason being permanent, and founded in the nature of things, is of universal application. Of the many causes concurring to the same effect, by far the most important is that which arises from the accumulation of wealth. The amount of a nation's strength, in that particular, forms the measure of its weakness in competition for agricultural production with younger and poorer states. Machinery and the division of labour, the acquisitions of science, the discoveries of art, are of boundless efficacy in cheapening, in rich and old states, the production of manufactures; but they have scarcely any influence in diminishing the cost of those of the fruits of the earth. Machinery is of little applicability to the labour of the husbandman: man's first and best employment is, by the beneficence of nature, reserved for his exclusive use in every period of his progress. The manufacturers of England find no difficulty in underselling those of Hindostan in the Indian market, in fabrics made of cotton which grew on the banks of the Ganges; but its farmers strive in vain with those of Poland or Illinois in the supply of the London market with wheat.

32.
Great benefit which protection to home agriculture affords to home manufactures.

Nor do the manufacturing classes suffer by such regulations as in ordinary seasons confine the supply of the home market to domestic cultivators; for their effect is to augment the riches, and increase the means of purchasing manufactured articles, in the hands of the best consumers of domestic fabrics. It would be a poor compensation to the British manufacturer, if a free importation of grain ruined the cultivator of Kent or East Lothian, who consumed at an average five pounds' worth of British manufactures, to remind him that by so doing you had fostered the serf of Poland or the Ukraine, who did not consume to the amount of eightpence. The best trade which any nation can carry on, as Adam Smith remarked, is that between the town and the country; and subsequent experience has amply demonstrated the truth of the

observation.* No nation can pretend to independence, which rests for any sensible portion of its subsistence in ordinary seasons on foreign, who may become hostile, nations. And if we would see a memorable example of the manner in which the greatest and most powerful nation may, in the course of ages, come to be paralysed by this cause, we have only to cast our eyes on imperial Rome, when the vast extent of the empire had practically established a free trade in grain with the whole civilised world. The result was, that cultivation disappeared from the Italian plains, where from the presence of long-established opulence it had become so expensive; and, its fields being devoted to pasturage, grain was mainly obtained by importation from Egypt and Libya. The race of Roman agriculturists, the strength of the empire, became extinct; the culture of the plains was carried on only by slaves and cattle. The legions could no longer be recruited save from foreign bands; vast tracts of pasturage overspread even the fields of Lombardy and the Campagna of Naples; and it was the plaintive confession of the Roman annalist, that the mistress of the world had come to depend for her subsistence on the floods of the Nile.[†]

CHAP.
XIV.
1844.

[†] Tacit.
Annal. xii.
43. *Græcæ,*
vi. 235.

* Table showing the exports of manufactures from Great Britain and Ireland in 1836, with the population, and proportions per head consumed of them in the under-mentioned countries, viz.:—

	Population in 1836.	Consumption in 1836.	Proportion per head.
Russia.	60,000,000	£1,742,133	20 0 8½
Prussia.	14,000,000	160,172	0 0 3½
France.	32,000,000	1,591,381	0 0 11½
Sweden.	3,000,000	113,308	0 0 9
British North American colon.	1,500,000	2,730,291	1 11 6
British W. Indies.	900,000	3,784,153	3 17 6
British Australia.	100,000	1,180,000	11 15 0
Great Britain and Ireland.	26,000,000	133,000,000	4 17 0

—PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, 1836, vi. 102.

† "At, Hercule, olim ex Italiæ legionibus longinquas in provincias commectus portabantur, nec nunc infirmitate laborant: sed Libyam peritis et Egyptum exerceamus, navibusque et casibus vita populi Romani permisceat."—TACITUS, *Annal.* xii. 43.

CHAP.
XCH.

1814.

33.

Extraordi-
nary diffi-
culties
which be-
set Louis
XVIII. in
France.

While England was occupied with this momentous subject, forced on its immediate attention by the return of pacific relations with the Continent of Europe, France was painfully emerging from the crisis which had terminated in the overthrow of Napoleon. No task that ever fell to the lot of man to perform, was probably more difficult than that which now devolved on the French monarch; for he had at once to restrain passion without power, to satisfy rapacity without funds, and to lull ambition without glory. During the dreadful struggle which had immediately preceded the fall of the empire, the evils experienced had been so overwhelming, that they had produced a general oblivion of lesser grievances, and a universal desire for instant deliverance. But now that the terrible conqueror was struck down, and the parties whose coalition had effected his overthrow were called on to remodel the government, to share the power, to nominate the administration, irreconcilable differences appeared among them. Mutual jealousies, as rancorous as those which had rent asunder the empire at its fall, already severed the monarchy in the first days of its restoration; and opposite pretensions, as conflicting as those which brought about the Revolution, tore the government even from its cradle. The seeds of the disunion which paralysed the Restoration were beginning to spring even before Louis XVIII. had ascended the throne: and his subsequent reign, till the Hundred Days, was but an amplification of the causes which produced the return of Napoleon.¹

¹ Cap. Cent
Jours, i. 42,
44. Thib. x.
117, 119.
Thiers, xvii.
passim.

34.

Commence-
ment of
divisions
in his
councils.

The republicans in the senate, the veterans of the Revolution, the hoary regicides decorated with the titles of the empire, had joined with Talleyrand and the royalists to dethrone Napoleon, solely on the promise that their wishes should be attended to in the formation of the new constitution, and that they should individually obtain a large share in the appointments and influence of the monarchy. The most extravagant expectations had, in

consequence, been formed as to the extent to which popular power was to revive with the Restoration: the constitution of 1791 was openly talked of as the basis of the restored monarchy: it was declared that the king would only be recalled on condition that he implicitly subscribed the constitution chalked out by the senate. The Emperor Alexander, who had already begun to yield to the flattery of the French Liberals, publicly supported these principles, and used his influence to procure from Louis XVIII., even before he left London, a declaration in their favour; while M. Blacas, who was the most confidential adviser of the king, warmly espoused the opposite side, and counselled the monarch to disregard altogether the restraints sought to be imposed on the royal prerogative. The Count d'Artois, when he arrived at Paris, embraced the same views. These divisions soon transpired, parties were formed, leaders took their sides; and to such a length did the dissensions arise, that it required all the influence of Talleyrand and Fouché, who had now come up to the scene of intrigue, to procure the proclamation of Louis XVIII. by the senate until its conditions had been formally agreed to.¹

The ideas of the French king, however, matured by long misfortune and reflection, were completely formed. He was determined to steer a middle course between the royalists and the republicans; and hoped, without submitting to such conditions as might alienate the former, to acquiesce in all the reasonable demands of the latter. With these views, he resolved to make no terms with his subjects, but simply mount the throne of his ancestors, and, when there, grant of his own free will such a constitution to his subjects as might satisfy even the warmest friends of civil liberty. A commission was accordingly formed, consisting of nine members of the legislative body, nine of the senate, and four commissioners appointed by the king, to frame a constitution. Their labours were not of long duration; they continued only from the 22d

CHAP.

XXV.

1814.

¹ Chap. 3. 66.
46. 7. 8.
137. 1. 1.
Thiers, xvij.

35.
Views of
the king,
and forma-
tion of the
Constitu-
tion.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

June 4.

to the 27th May ; at the close of which time the celebrated CHARTER was produced, which was solemnly promulgated with great pomp, to both the senate and legislative body, on the 4th June, in the Bourbon palace. The king there read a speech which he had composed himself ; he addressed the peers and deputies as the representatives of the nation, and announced that he had prepared a charter which would be read to the meeting. He concluded with these words :—" A painful recollection mingles with my joy at thus finding myself for the first time in the midst of the representatives of a nation which has given me such numerous proofs of its affection. I was born, I hoped to remain all my life, the most faithful subject of the best of kings—and now I occupy his place. But he yet breathes in that noble testament which he intended for the instruction of the august and unhappy infant to whom it has been my lot to succeed. It is with my eyes fixed on that immortal work—it is penetrated with the sentiments which dictated it—it is guided by the experience, and seconded by the counsels of many among you, that I have drawn up the constitutional charter which shall now be read."¹

¹ *Moniteur*,
June 5,
1814. *Thib.*
x. 101, 102.
Cap. Hist.
de la Rest.
ii. 34, 35.

36.

Injudicious
expressions
used by the
king's min-
isters in the
legislative
body.

These words were received with loud applause from all sides : but a feeling of surprise, a murmur of dissatisfaction, ran through the assembly, when M. d'Ambray, the chancellor, declared, that " the king, taught by twenty-five years of misfortune, had brought his people an ordinance of reformation, by which he extinguishes all parties, as he maintains all rights. *In full possession of his hereditary rights* over this noble kingdom, the king has no wish save to exercise the authority which he has received from God and his fathers, by himself placing limits to his power. He has no wish but to be the supreme chief of the great family of which he is the father. It is he himself who is about to give to the French a constitutional charter, suited at once to their desires and their wants, and to the respective situation of men and

things." It concluded with the words, "Given at Paris in the year of grace 1814, in the nineteenth year of our reign."¹ The veterans of the Revolution, at these expressions, recollected the words of Mirabeau, when Louis XVI., in 1789, announced his concessions to the States-General: "The concessions made by the king would be sufficient for the public good, if the *presents* of despotism were not always dangerous."²

The concessions in favour of freedom contained in the charter, though ushered in by these injudicious and ominous expressions, were such as might have satisfied, in the outset of the revolutionary troubles, the warmest friend of real freedom. The great foundations of civil liberty—liberty of conscience and worship, freedom of the press, equality in the eye of the law, the right of being taxed only by the national representatives, the division of the legislature into two chambers, and trial by jury,—were established. The Chamber of Peers owed its existence to the charter; it came in place of the Senate of Napoleon, the adulations and tergiversations of which latter body had so degraded it in public estimation, that its existence could no longer be maintained. This Upper House, the members of which were all nominated by the king, consisted of six ecclesiastical peers, twenty of the old noblesse, twelve of the dignitaries of the Revolution, ninety-one of the Senate of Napoleon, and six generals of the ancient regime. A considerable number of the Senate were by this selection excluded, consisting chiefly of the most dangerous democratic characters. The powers of the legislative body were greatly enlarged by the charter—in fact, it was rendered the depository of nearly the whole public authority; and the constitution was received in consequence by that assembly with sentiments of the most lively gratitude. Yet were there two circumstances connected with the chamber of representatives worthy of notice, and singularly characteristic of the scanty elements for the construction of a really free government which

CHAP.
XCII.
1814.

1 Charter in
Moniteur,
June 5,
1814; and
Ordonnance
of Laws,
June 4,
1814.

36.
Its provi-
sions in
favour of
public free-
dom.

Art. 14.

now existed in France. The first was, that an annual pension was secured to every member of it, of the same amount as they had enjoyed under Napoleon; the second, that no person could be elected a deputy unless he paid 1000 francs (£40) of direct taxes annually to government, and that the right of election was limited to persons paying 300 francs (£12) of direct taxes yearly. This restriction threw the nomination entirely into the hands of the more opulent class of society, and confined it to less than eighty thousand persons out of above thirty millions.¹

Abstractly considered, however, the charter contained, in many points, the elements of true freedom. All public burdens were to be borne equally by all classes in proportion to their fortune; all were declared equally admissible to all civil and military employment; prosecution or imprisonment was forbidden except in the cases provided for by the law, and according to its forms; universal liberty of conscience and worship was secured, though the Roman Catholic ministers were alone to be entitled to support from the state. Publication of thoughts was permitted, provided the laws were attended to which guarded against the abuses of the press: a universal amnesty for the past was proclaimed: the conscription abolished: the person of the king declared sacred and inviolable—his ministers alone responsible for his actions. The king was alone invested with the power of proposing laws; he commanded the forces by sea and land, declared war and made peace, concluded all treaties and conventions, nominated to all public employments, civil and military, and “was intrusted with the right of making all the regulations *and ordinances* necessary for the execution of the laws *and the safety of the state.*”² Laws, in general, might be introduced by authority of the king,

¹ An ambiguous and perilous power, the exercise of which, in after times, was made the pretext for chasing the elder branch of the House of Bourbon from the throne, and in its ultimate effects restored the government of the sword.

either in the first chamber of peers or in that of deputies; but the consent of both was essential to their validity, and those relating to taxes could only be proposed, in the first instance, in the lower house. The Chambers were entitled to petition the king to propose a particular statute, and indicate what they desired should be its tenor: but this could only be done after it had been discussed and carried in secret committee. If carried there, and in the chamber itself, it was then, after the lapse of ten days, to be sent to the other chamber; and if agreed to by it also, the petition was then submitted to the king, who might grant or reject it; but, if rejected, it could not again be brought forward during that session. The king alone was intrusted with sanctioning and promulgating the laws, and the civil list was to be fixed for the whole of each reign during the first session held under it. The cognisance of cases of high treason was confined to the Chamber of Peers; that of ordinary offences to the courts of law, with the assistance of juries; all judges were to be named by the king, and hold their offices for life, except the *juges de la paix*, who were subject to removal; and justice, except where privacy was requisite from a regard to public decency, was to be administered with open doors. The Code Napoleon was continued as the ordinary law of France; the ancient noblesse resumed their titles; the new noblesse preserved theirs; the king was declared the sole fountain of honours in future; the Legion of Honour was kept up; the deputies were elected for five years, but every year a fifth retired, and re-elections to that extent took place.¹

Every one must admit that these changes contained the elements of a wise system of government, and were calculated, so far as they went, to combine the blessings of freedom and equal rights, with those of protection to life and property, and stable administration. But what are laws without the support of public morality? and what are the most anxious provisions for the liberty of

CHAP.
XCII.
— 1-14.

¹ Chamber of Peers,
Moniteur,
June 5,
1814.

39.
Its obvious
defects.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

the subject if the spirit is wanting, in the governors and the governed, by which it is maintained? Amidst all the numerous and anxious provisions for freedom which the charter contained, four circumstances were remarkable, which, to the sagacious observer, augured ill both as to the degree of protection to civil liberty which in the progress of time the new constitution might afford, or even the extent to which it was understood in the country, and the stability which the charter might attain amidst the receding waves of the Revolution. 1. No provision was inserted to prevent or restrain arbitrary imprisonment, or limit the period during which a person arrested might be detained before trial. 2. No attempt was made to limit or abolish the oppression of the police; a set of civil functionaries who impose such excessive and unnecessary restraints on human action, in all the Continental states, that it may safely be affirmed real freedom is inconsistent with their existence. 3. The upper house, instead of being composed of great proprietors, hereditary in their functions, respectable from their fortunes, illustrious from their descent, was made up for the most part of salaried officials, destitute of property, nominated by the crown, who enjoyed their seats, though their titles were hereditary, only during life. 4. No provision was made, more than in Revolutionary times, for the establishment of the church or public instruction on an adequate basis; but the teachers in both were left to languish, as public functionaries, in the obscurity and indigence bequeathed to them by the perfidy and rapacity of the Revolution. No blame, it is true, could be attached to the French sovereign or his ministers for these defects; they could not by possibility have been supplied; but that only demonstrates that the crimes of the Revolution had rendered impossible the construction of durable liberty in France.

It was comparatively an easy task, however, to frame a constitution which might balance, in form at least, the conflicting powers of the Revolution; the real difficulty

was, to reconcile the adverse interests, calm the furious passions, allay the dread of punishment, and provide for the destitute multitudes which its termination had left in France. Restoration is always a work of difficulty. Henry IV. had perished under it; James II. fled before it; but in France the difficulties were now of such overwhelming magnitude, that it is not surprising that the feeble dynasty of the Bourbons ere long sank beneath them. The only thing to be wondered at is, that they were able for any time to keep possession of the throne. The public joy at the Restoration had been as sincere as it was general: it arose from the sense of deliverance from instant and impending evils which had become insupportable. But when these evils had passed away; when the allied armies no longer oppressed the country; when the conscription had ceased to tear the tender youth from their weeping mothers, and France was left alone with its newly enthroned monarch, its losses, and its humiliation, the bitterness of the change sank into the soul of the nation. Whole classes, and these too the most powerful and important, were in secret alarm or sullen discontent. The holders of national domains—an immense body, amounting to several millions—were devoured with anxiety. It was to no purpose that the government had guaranteed the possession of their estates; they were a prey to a secret disquietude, because it was not participant in the iniquity by which they had been acquired; they felt the same uneasiness at the restoration of lawful government, that the resettlers of stolen property do at the approach of the officers of justice. The Bourbons who had suffered injury might forgive; the Revolutionists who had inflicted it, never could.¹

CHAP.
XIII.

1814.

10

R. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

1. 1. 1. 1.

¹ "Forgiveness to the injured does belong;

But they never pardon who have done the wrong."

The regicides, and numerous able and powerful men, who had been involved in the actual crimes of the Revolution, felt still greater apprehensions: the unqualified

¹ *Cap. C. 11.*
Journ. 1. 10.
52. 1. 1. 1.
107.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

41.

Terrors of
the regi-
cides and
army.

amnesty contained in the charter was far from removing their inquietude; conscience told them that they deserved punishment. The fact of the Restoration seemed an act of accusation against them, a condemnation of all they had done since the commencement of the convulsion; and they incessantly demanded fresh guarantees and additional securities.* The army was in despair. Defeated in the field, driven back into France, humiliated in the sight of Europe, they had now the additional mortification of being in great part disbanded, and universally condemned to inactivity. The wandering life of camps, the excitement of the battle-field, the joys of the bivouac, the terrors of the breach, the contributions from provinces, the plunder of cities, were at an end; and instead, they found themselves dispersed over the provincial towns of France, or sent back to their homes, a prey to ennui, and destitute of either interest or hope in life. The titled generals, the civil and military *employés* who had been fastened by the imperial government on the provinces beyond the Alps and the Rhine, now wrested from France, returned in shoals to the capital, bereft of their employments, cast down from their authority, in great part without the means of subsistence. The marshals and numerous dignitaries of the Emperor who had obtained estates or revenues in Germany, France, and Italy, as appendages to their titles, found themselves deprived of half, often of nearly the whole, of their income by the loss of these possessions, and destitute of all hope of improving their fortunes by fresh conquests.¹

If these were the sad realities of disaster in war to the most influential and formidable classes of society, the

* So true are the words of Corneille,

“ Mais une grande offense est de cette nature,
Que toujours son auteur impute à l'offensé
Un vif ressentiment dont il se croit blessé;
Et quoiqu'en apparence on les réconcilie,
Il le craint, il le hait, et jamais ne s'y fie,
Et toujours alarmé de cette illusion

Sitôt qu'il peut la perdre il prend l'occasion.”—*Rodogune*, Act i. s. 7.

¹ Cap. i. 52,
54. Thib. x.
117, 118.

difficulties of government were still greater : and the most profound sagacity, the most fruitful invention, could hardly discover a mode either of appeasing the public discontents, or of satisfying the innumerable demands upon the public treasury. The Count d'Artois, in his progress towards Paris, had taken as his watchword, " Plus de droits réunis (excise), plus de conscriptions : " and the latter promise had formed an express article in the charter. But how was the first to be realised without depriving the crown of a large, and what had now become an indispensable, part of the public revenue ? * or the latter without reducing by at least two-thirds the ranks of the army, and throwing twenty thousand officers, without pay or occupation, back in fearful discontent to their hearths ? The Tuileries were besieged from morning to night by clamorous crowds, composed of men as far divided in principle as the poles are asunder, but uniting in one loud and importunate cry for employment or relief from the government. One-half were royalists, demanding compensation for the losses they had sustained during the Revolution, or a return for the fidelity with which they had adhered to the cause of the exiled monarch, or aided his return : the other half, dignitaries or persons in employment under the imperial regime, who had been deprived of all by the overthrow of Napoleon, or the contraction of the French empire to the limits of the ancient monarchy. Here were to be seen frail emigrants dressed still in the costume of 1792, with knee-breeches, shoe-buckles, and powder in their hair : there, chiefs from La Vendée distinguished by their rural

CHAP.
XIII.

1644.

42

Part of the total
of the revenues of
the provinces
ceded.

* The "droits réunis," or excise, had constituted in latter times a considerable part of the ordinary revenue of Napoleon. They had amounted, in

		Francs	£
1811, to	.	127,734,000	or 5,100,000
1812. ..	.	144,000,328	or 5,800,000
1813. ..	.	146,660,621	or 5,900,000

And, taking the proportion of Old France to the provinces ceded, the abolition of this impost would occasion a loss of 100,000,000 francs, or £4,000,000, annually. — See DUC DE CALTA, i. 306, 309.

CHAP.
XCII.
1814.

garb, long locks, and undaunted aspect. Deputations, from Bordeaux and the towns of the south, succeeded each other without intermission; while the dowagers of the Faubourg St Germain, emerging from their long retirement, were introduced to the palace by the ladies of the imperial household, not less clamorous than themselves for honour and employments. The wants of the troops were still more pressing, and they were of a kind which could not be resisted. Eight months' pay was due, when the Restoration took place, to the officers and soldiers of the army; ten months' arrears to the commissaries and civil administrators. To meet these accumulated embarrassments, Louis XVIII. had an exhausted treasury, a diminished territory, and a bankrupt people. So excessive had been the taxation, so enormous the requisitions in kind, during the two last years of Napoleon's reign, that the provinces which had been the seat of war were almost wholly unable to bear any taxation; and such was the general exhaustion of the country, that the arrears of the last two years had reached the enormous amount of 1,308,000,000 francs (£52,320,000), of which only 759,000,000 francs (£30,400,000) were deemed recoverable. And while the most rigid economy, and extensive reductions on the part of the government, could do no more than bring down the expenditure to 827,415,000 francs, or £33,096,600, the receipts only reached 520,000,000 or £20,800,000; and even this sum was obtained with the greatest difficulty, and by adding above a third to the direct taxes.¹

¹ Cap. i. 32.
62. Duode
Gaeta, ii.
16, 26.
Tlib. x.
167, 168.
Finance
Report.
1811. Moni-
teur, Sept.
23, 1811.
Moniteur,
Sept. 24.
Chateaub.
Mem. vi.
320, 321.

43.
System of
government
which the
Bourbons
pursue 1.

It would have required the genius of Sully, united to the firmness of Pitt, to have made head with such means against such difficulties; and the capacity of the king and his ministers was far indeed from being equal to the task. Striving to please both parties, they gained the confidence of neither: aiming at a middle course, they incurred its dangers without attaining its security. They left the crown, in the midst of pressing perils, without either

moral or physical support. The celebrated saying of Napoleon, "*Ils n'ont rien appris, ils n'ont rien oubliés.*" conveyed an accurate idea of the cause to which their errors were owing. They had not power or vigour enough to undertake a decided part, and yet sufficient confidence in their legitimate title to venture on a hazardous one. Their system was to retain all the imperial functionaries, civil and military, in their employment: to displace no one, from the prefect to the humblest court officer: to continue to the military their rank, their titles, and, so far as it was possible, their emoluments: to make no change in the nation, in short, except by the substitution of a king for an emperor, and the introduction of a few leading Royalists into the cabinet. By this conduct, which, so far as it went, was well conceived, they hoped to gain the powers of the Revolution by injuring none of its interests. But they forgot that mankind are governed by desires, passions, and prejudices, as well as interests and selfishness: and that Napoleon had so long succeeded in governing the empire only because, while he sedulously attended in deeds to the interests of the Revolution, he carefully in words and forms flattered its principles. The latter part of his policy was entirely forgotten by the Bourbons, and in nothing more than in their treatment of the army. Their capital error consisted in this, that while they wholly depended on the physical forces of the Revolution, they made no attempt to disguise their aversion to its tenets; and that, without endeavouring to establish any adequate counterpoise to its powers, they irrecoverably alienated its supporters.¹

They abolished the national colours, the object of even superstitious veneration to the whole French soldiers, and substituted in their room the white flag of the monarchy, with which hardly any of the army had any association, and the honours of which, great as they were, had been entirely thrown into the shade by the transcendant glories of

CHAP.
XCII.
1814.

¹ Cap. i. 58,
64. Thib. x.
127, 130.

44.
Their great
errors, espe-
cially in
regard to
the army.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

the empire. They altered the numbers of the whole regiments, as well infantry as cavalry, destroying thus the heart-stirring recollections connected with the many fields of fame in which they had signalised themselves, and reducing those which had fought at Rivoli or Austerlitz to a level with a newly raised levy. The tricolor standards were ordered to be given up; many regiments in preference burned them, in order that they might at least preserve their ashes. The eagles were generally secreted by the officers; the men hid the tricolor cockades in their knapsacks. They altered the whole designations of the superior officers, resuming those of the old monarchy, now wholly forgotten. Thus generals of brigade were denominated marshals of the camp; generals of division assumed the title of lieutenant-generals. Catholic and Protestant soldiers were alike compelled to go to mass, to confess, to take the communion. The Imperial Guard, which in the first instance was intrusted with the service of the Tuileries, was speedily removed, and its place supplied by troops obtained from Switzerland and La Vendée. That noble corps was even removed from Paris, under pretence of avoiding quarrels with the foreign troops in occupation of the capital; the whole officers on half-pay were directed to return to their homes, there to await their ulterior destination; and the most severe orders were issued to the troops who had returned from foreign garrisons, to prevent any allusion even to the name of the Emperor. Six companies of *gardes du corps*, several red companies of guards, or military household—in fine, the whole military splendour of Louis XV. was revived; and these new troops, in their yet unsullied uniforms, supplanted alike the old troops and the National Guard in the service of the palace. These things were submitted to in silence, but they sank deep into the heart of the army and the nation. But while they did thus so much to irritate the feelings and alienate the affections of the army, they

committed the capital error of leaving the regiments retained in the service together. They neither disbanded them, nor made any change in their construction. They left the old officers with the old soldiers. Their former recollections were perpetuated by daily intercourse, and new discontent was strengthened by being felt together; while conspiracy was rendered easy by the habits of previous subordination. It will appear in the sequel with what fatal effects this mistake was attended on the future fortunes of the monarchy.¹

CHAP.
XIII.
1811.

¹ Thib. x.
128, 133.
Cap. i. 59.
64. Cha-
teaub. Mem.
vii. 312,
313.

The civil regulations of the new government, though not so important in themselves as those which related to the military administration, were not less material in their ultimate effects; for they exposed the court to the most fatal of all attacks in Parisian society—the assaults of ridicule. An ordinance of the police forbade ordinary work to proceed on Sunday: this regulation, though expressly enjoined by religion, and loudly called for by the interests of the working classes, became the object of unmeasured obloquy, because it abridged the pleasures or interfered with the gains of an unbelieving and selfish generation. The restoration of all the services of the Roman Catholic Church, with extraordinary pomp in the Tuileries, excited the ridicule and awakened the fears of a revolutionary people, by a great majority of whom these rites were regarded as the remnants only of a worn-out and expiring superstition. The ladies of the ancient regime indulged in cutting sarcasms against those of the new noblesse; not one of the marshals' wives, or duchesses of the empire, was placed in the Royal household; and female animosity added its bitter venom to the many other causes of jealousy against the court. The restoration of the ancient orders, and especially of that of St Louis, the crosses of which were distributed with profusion, gave rise to so general a rumour of an intention to supersede or undermine the Legion of Honour, that the King, by an express ordinance, was

45.
Errors of
their civil
administra-
tion.
July 14.

July 19.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

¹ Thib. x.
135, 140.
Cap. i. 62,
65, Montg.
viii. 60, 68.

46.
Injudicious
regulations
regarding
the army.

obliged to clear himself from the imputation. In fine, the civil government of the Restoration, while in all essential particulars favourable to the interests of the Revolution, yet in language, form, and ceremony, had restored the most antiquated and obnoxious traditions of the monarchy ; and the French had discernment enough to see that, in the intoxication of success, words and forms betrayed the real thoughts, and that acts favourable to revolutionary interests were forced on the government only by state necessity.¹

The army was reduced, partly from the embarrassment of the finances, partly from the policy of government, to a degree inconsistent with either the safety of the country or the attachment of the troops themselves. The abolition of the conscription, so loudly called for by its ruinous effects, at once revealed the exhaustion of the physical strength of the monarchy. Reduced successively to a hundred and forty thousand, and eighty thousand men, it was still encumbered with officers, and, except from La Vendée, the recruits came in with extreme tardiness.* Above a hundred thousand leaves of absence had been given ; and the soldiers, when once they had reached their homes, were in no hurry to return. The dynasty of the Restoration was ere long to the last degree unpopular among the troops ; the throne had, literally speaking, no armed force on which it could depend, except a few regiments of Guards and Swiss at Paris. The general discontent of the army was greatly augmented by an ordinance which put every officer not in actual employment on half-pay, a reduction hitherto unknown in the French army ; and still more by another, which absolutely forbade any officer of whatever rank, not in actual service, to reside at Paris, if not already domiciled there. These were the circumstances which induced the fall of Louis XVIII., and occasioned the incalculable evils to France

* It was not nominally reduced below 140,000 ; but the actual numbers enrolled were far below the nominal strength.

of the Hundred Days; the consequences of the civil errors were remote, and of comparatively little importance. It was the alienation of the affections of the military, before any other force to supply their place had been organised, and when the throne had no moral support in the nation, which was the fatal mistake. And, in fact, such was the discontent of the troops arising from their disasters, that it is more than doubtful whether any human wisdom could have averted the catastrophe.¹

CHAP.
XCH.
1214.

¹ Thib. x.
140, 149.
Cap. i. 61,
62.

Notwithstanding these obvious and flagrant errors, the cabinet of Louis XVIII. was far from being destitute of men of ability. M. Blacas, the real premier and principal confidant of the king, had an ingenious mind and an upright heart. But his information was limited; he judged of France as he had seen it through the deceitful vision of the emigrants, and was entirely ignorant of the vast, the irremediable changes, both in the opinion of the influential classes, and the distribution of political and physical power, which had taken place during the Revolution. M. d'Ambray, the chancellor, an old lawyer of eminence in Normandy, and M. Ferrand, a monarchical theorist, caused considerable damage to the Restoration, by the long declamations in favour of now antiquated and jealously received doctrines regarding the authority of legitimate monarchs, with which they prefaced all the royal decrees. The Abbé Montesquieu was inclined to the liberal side; he had embraced the principles of the Constituent Assembly, and shared a large portion of the confidence of the king. Guizot, then little known, had already conceived those doctrines of mingled conservatism and philosophy to which his genius has subsequently given immortality; the Abbé de Pradt, at the head of the Legion of Honour, and M. de Bourrienne, as postmaster general, had each brought talents of no ordinary kind to the direction of their several departments. But the ability of the whole cabinet could not stem the difficulties with which they were surrounded; and if they

47.
Character of
the ministers of the
Restoration.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

had been gifted with far greater practical sagacity and acquaintance with men than they actually possessed, they would have been shattered by the unpopularity of General Dupont as minister-at-war; an appointment the most unfortunate that could have been made, for it continually reminded the army of the disaster of Baylen—the first and most humiliating of its closing reverses. To such a pitch, indeed, did the public discontent on this head arise, that the court were subsequently obliged to remove that ill-fated general, and substitute Marshal Soult in his room; but the army was by this time in such a state of ill-humour, that even his great abilities proved wholly unable to give it a right direction; and his strong leaning to the exiled Emperor subsequently proved in no slight degree instrumental in bringing about his return.¹

Dec. 5.
¹ Cap. i. 66,
67, Thib. x.
146, 150.
Montg. viii.
86, 91.

48.
General
cause of
complaint
alleged
against the
govern-
ment.

As the restoration of Napoleon was entirely a military movement, and the discontents of the people, founded or unfounded, had scarcely any share in bringing it about, the briefest summary will suffice of the domestic events in France which preceded the Hundred Days. Such was the exasperation of the popular party and the Imperialists at the Bourbons, that by mutual consent they laid aside their whole previous animosities, and combined all their efforts to decry every measure of the government, and misrepresent every step, judicious or injudicious, which they took. A clamour was raised against everything. The celebration of a solemn and most touching funeral service in Notre Dame, soon after the return of the royal family, to the memory of Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and the Princess Elizabeth,* was set down as the commencement of persecution against the leaders of the Revolution. The exhumation of the remains of several Vendean and Chouan leaders, to re-inter them in consecrated ground, was looked

May 14.

* It was one of the most imposing spectacles ever witnessed, being attended by all the monarchs, generals, and ministers then in Paris—including the whole marshals of France: the interior of the cathedral was all hung with black, and lighted with a profusion of lamps. *Personal observation.*

on as a proof of the most deplorable superstition; and the erection, under the auspices of Marshal Soult, after he had been made minister-at-war, of a monumental edifice in Quiberon Bay, to the memory of those who had fallen victims there to loyal fidelity and revolutionary perfidy, as an indication of a desire to revert to the principles of the Chouans and Vendéans. A solemn ceremony, with which, on the anniversary of the death of Louis XVI., his remains and those of Marie Antoinette were removed from their place of sepulture in the garden of Descloseaux, in the Rue Anjou, was regarded as a decided attack on the whole principles of the Revolution.¹ Few remains of the royal martyrs were to be found; what could be collected, had owed their identification and preservation from insult to the pious care of M. Descloseaux, the proprietor of the garden where they were laid, who worthily received the order of St Michael and a pension, as the reward of his fidelity. M. de Chateaubriand, who was present at the exhumation, has declared that he recognised the head of Marie Antoinette by a peculiar conformation of the jaw-bone, which he had observed during the enchantment of her smile.* The bones and ashes were carefully enclosed in lead coffins, and translated with extraordinary pomp to the royal mausoleum at St Denis. "In those subterraneous abodes," says Chateaubriand, "where slept so many kings and princes of former days, Louis XVI. now was placed *alone*. How have so many of the dead been removed? whence is it that St Denis has become a desert? Let us rather ask how its vaults have been re-opened? who has prepared their desolate chambers? The hand of the Man who seated himself on the throne of the Bourbons. Oh, Providence! he thought he was preparing the sepulchre of his race, and he was only constructing the tomb of Louis XVI.!"²

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

Oct. 16,

Jan. 1,
1815.¹ *Ante*, ch.
viii. § 98.² *Hist. Parl.*
xl. 23, 37.
Trib. x.
150, 174.
Chateaub.
vi. 336, 337.

* "Au milieu des ossements je reconnus la tête de la Reine, par le sourire que cette tête m'avait adressé à Versailles."—CHATEAUBRIAND, *Mémoires*, vi. 336.

CHAP.
XCII.1814.
49.Extraordi-
nary finan-
cial difficul-
ties.

The miseries and insolvency entailed on the nation by the ruinous wars of Napoleon, formed a necessary part of the financial exposé of the ministers, and constituted the best vindication of the great reductions in all departments which had become unavoidable. This was immediately set down as a direct and scandalous attack on the glory of the Empire. The unalienated national domains were, by a just proposition which passed both Chambers, restored to their rightful owners. This act of partial restitution, joined to a proposition of Marshal Macdonald in the Chamber of Peers, to provide an indemnity to the victims of the Revolution,* which he called a debt of honour, and to the military men who had been mutilated in the service of their country, which he denominated a debt of blood, though based on the equitable principle of doing evenhanded justice to both parties, excited the most general apprehensions. It is unnecessary to go further. Every act of the government of the Restoration—some wise and natural, others injudicious or ill-timed—was misinterpreted, and ascribed to the worst possible motives; and the great party and numerous interests of the Revolution, conscious of their sins, trembled, like Felix in holy writ, when the government spoke of a future world, or alluded even to a judgment to come.¹

¹ Thib. x.
150, 203.
Hist. Parl.
xl. 29, 38.

While the French government were thus striving, amidst

* For the indemnity of the victims of the Revolution, he submitted the following calculations to the Chamber of Peers:—

	Francs.	Sterling.
Value of national property (sold), . . .	4,000,000,000 or	£160,000,000
Movable effects (confiscated), . . .	900,000,000 . .	36,000,000
	4,900,000,000	196,000,000
Deduct inscribed on the public funds, . . . 300,000,000		
National domains (unsold), . . . 300,000,000		
	600,000,000	24,000,000
Remained to be provided for,	4,300,000,000	£172,000,000

- See THIBAUDEAU, x. 199; and BUCHEZ and ROUX, xl. 29, 30.

the chaos of revolutionary passions, to close the wounds and mitigate the sufferings of the Revolution, negotiations of the most important character for the general settlement of Europe had commenced, and were already considerably advanced, at Vienna. It had been originally intended that the Congress of Vienna should have commenced its sittings on the 29th July; but the visit of the allied sovereigns to England, and their subsequent return to their own capitals, necessarily caused it to be adjourned; and it was not till the end of September that the august assemblage commenced, by the entry of the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia into the Austrian capital. They were immediately followed by the Kings of Bavaria, Denmark, and Würtemberg, and a host of lesser princes; while Lord Castlereagh, and subsequently the Duke of Wellington, on the part of England, and M. Talleyrand on that of France, more efficiently than any crowned heads could have done, upheld the dignity and maintained the interests of their respective monarchies. But although the sovereigns and ministers in appearance kept up the most amicable and confidential relations, it was easy to see that their interests and views were widely at variance; and that the removal of common danger and the division of common spoil had produced their usual effect, of sowing dissension among the victors.¹

A preliminary question of precedence first arose as to the rank of the different states assembled, and their representatives; but this was at once terminated by the happy expedient of Alexander, that they should be arranged and should sign in the alphabetical order of their respective states. But a more serious difficulty soon after occurred as to the states which should in their own right as principals take part in the deliberations; and it was, in the outset, suggested by the ministers of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain, that they should in the first instance come to an agreement as to the disposal of the territories wrested from France and its allies, before they

CHAP.
XIII.

1-11.

50.

Continues
narrative of the
Congress of
Vienna.

Sept. 25.

¹ Hist. Parl.
xl. 41. Cap.
i. 70, 73.
Hard. xii.
452, 453.

51.

Preliminary
questions
which were
discussed.

Sept. 22.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

Oct. 5.

entered into conferences with France and Spain. This proposal was naturally resisted by Talleyrand and the Spanish plenipotentiary ; and it was their earnest endeavour in an energetic note to show, that the treaty of Chaumont, though formally to endure for twenty years, had in reality expired with the attainment of all its objects, and that France at least should be admitted into the deliberations. Lord Castlereagh, who early perceived the necessity of a counterpoise to the preponderating influence of Russia in the conferences, supported this note of M. Talleyrand's ; and Prince Metternich, who was actuated by similar views, did the same. In consequence, it was agreed that the committee to whom the questions coming before the Congress should be submitted, should be the ministers not only of the four allied powers, but of France, Spain, Portugal, and Sweden. The Cardinal Gonsalvi, on the part of the court of Rome, was afterwards received, through the personal intercession of the Prince Regent of England ; while the plenipotentiaries of Murat, king of Naples, the Kings of Sicily, of Bavaria, the Low Countries, Saxony, and Denmark, besides the ministers of the Swiss and Genoese republics, though not admitted to the conferences of the greater powers, were in attendance at Vienna, and had their interests attended to by such of their more powerful neighbours as were disposed to support them.¹

¹ Hard. xii.
454, 456.
Cap. i. 75,
77. Hist.
Parl. xl. 41.

52.
Points on
which the
great powers
were united.

This preliminary difficulty, as always occurs in such cases, furnished a key to the course which the different powers were likely to take in the approaching negotiation ; but a considerable time elapsed before the real divisions appeared. Much was done, in the first instance, without any difference of opinion taking place. Territories, inhabited by thirty-one million six hundred and ninety-one thousand persons, were at the disposal of the allied powers, and there was for each enough and to spare. It was at once agreed, in conformity with the secret articles of the treaty of Paris, that Belgium, united

to Holland, should form one kingdom under the title of the Netherlands: that Norway should be annexed to Sweden; that Hanover, with a considerable accession of territory, taken from the kingdom of Westphalia, should be restored to the King of England; that Lombardy should be placed under the rule of Austria, and Savoy under that of Piedmont. So far all was easily arranged; but the questions how Poland, Saxony, and Genoa were to be disposed of, were not so easily adjusted. The first of them gave rise to dissensions so serious, that they not only completely broke up, for the time, the Grand Alliance which had effected the deliverance of Europe, but, had it not been for the unexpected, and in that view most opportune, return of Napoleon from Elba, they would in all probability have led to the flames of war again breaking out, and to the allied forces being con-
 ducted to mutual slaughter.¹

Alexander loudly insisted that the whole Grand-duchy of Warsaw should be ceded to Russia as an indemnity for the sacrifices she had made, and the losses she had sustained, during the war. He represented, that were he to return to St Petersburg without having obtained some adequate compensation for the sacrifices the nation had undergone, it would be as much as his crown was worth; that Poland was already *de facto* occupied by the Russian troops, and the Poles expected a revival of their nationality solely from a union with the Russian empire, or their separate establishment under a prince of the Russian imperial family; and that, considering the immense losses which Russia had sustained during the war, and the vast exertions she had made, it was in the highest degree reasonable that she should now obtain a territory essential to her security, and extending along no inconsiderable part of her frontier. These arguments, in themselves by no means destitute of weight, were powerfully supported by the significant hint, that he had three hundred thousand men ready to march at a moment's notice;² that his

CHAP.
XIII.
1-14.

¹ Hard, xii.
155, 157.
Cap. i. 78,
79.

53.
Alexander
demands the
whole of
Poland as
a separate
monarchy,
of which he
was to be
the head.

² Note of
Russia,
Dec. 18,
1814. Cap.
i. 37. Hard.
xi. 456, 458.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

troops already occupied the whole of Poland ; and that, by representing the Russian alliance as the only means of restoring their lost nationality, the whole warlike force of the Poles would soon be ranged on his side.

54.
Views of
Prussia on
Saxony.

Prussia, entirely under the influence of Russia, as well from gratitude as situation, entered warmly into these pretensions, and supported them with all her influence at the Congress. She had her own views, independent of the immense debt of gratitude which she owed to that great power for deliverance from the thralldom of Napoleon, in this adhesion. It had been stipulated in the treaty of Kalisch, which formed the basis of the Grand Alliance, that Prussia was to be "reinstated, at the close of hostilities, in all respects, statistical, financial, and geographical, as it had stood at the commencement of the war of 1806, with such additions as might be deemed practicable."¹ The Prussians now demanded fulfilment

¹ Ante, ch.
lxxiv. § 31.Oct. 22 and
Dec. 2.

of this promise ; and claimed, besides various provinces on the left bank of the Rhine which were at the disposal of the Allies by the dissolution of the French empire, the whole of Saxony. Prince Hardenberg, the able minister of the court of Berlin, supported this demand in an elaborate note ; and insisted that, as Russia claimed a considerable part of Prussian Poland to round her proposed acquisitions on the Vistula, it was indispensably necessary that Prussia should be largely indemnified in Germany ; that the interests of Europe imperatively required that a powerful intermediate state should be placed between Russia and France ; and that the recent dangers which had been escaped, clearly pointed to the side on which

² Note, Oct.
22, and Dec.
16, 1814.
Schoell,
Traité, de
Paix, xi. 45,
49. Haud.
xii. 458,
463. Cap.
i. 81, 84.

the necessary additions should be made to her territory. On condition, then, of obtaining Saxony and an indemnity on the Rhine, Prussia proposed to cede to Russia her provinces in Poland ; and, to appease the jealousy of the German powers at this aggrandisement of Russia, suggested that the fortifications of Thorn and Dantzic should be demolished.² In conclusion, he strongly con-

tended that, as so reconstructed, Prussia, with a population of nine million eight hundred thousand souls, would not be strengthened in the same degree as Russia would be by the acquisition of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, and Austria by Lombardy and the Milanese.

The views of France, Austria, and England were decidedly opposed to these sweeping annexations of territory to the northern powers. Independent of the obvious peril to the security of the other European states, if Russia were augmented by the greater part of Poland, and brought down by means of her outwork Prussia to the Elbe and the Rhine, which was sufficient to range the courts of Paris and Vienna on his side, Lord Castlereagh in an especial manner, and with the most energetic ability, opposed the union of the crowns of Poland and Russia, on the same head, or the annexation of Saxony to Prussia, as contrary to the great principles of justice on which the war against Napoleon had been maintained.* The conduct of the British minister on this occasion was worthy of the cause for which he had contended, and the nation which he represented; and he met with cordial support from both M. Talleyrand and Prince Metternich, who beheld with undisguised apprehension these proposed additions to the power of their nearest neighbours. The former of these statesmen, in particular, resisted the annexation of Saxony to Prussia, as a measure of severity to a fallen monarch alike inexpedient and unjust. Alexander expected the resistance of Austria and England to his designs, and no serious alienation ensued in consequence between him and their ministers; but he was quite unprepared for the vigorous stand made by

CHAP.

XCH.

1814.

55.

Views of
England,
France, and
Austria,
on the pro-
posals
made.

* Lord Castlereagh declared in repeated memorials, "that he opposed firmly, and with all the force in his power, in the name of England, the erection of a kingdom in Poland, the crown of which should be placed on the same head with, or which should form an integral part of the empire of Russia: that the wish of his government was to see an independent power more or less extensive established there, under a distinct dynasty, and as an intermediate state between the three great monarchies." *Memorial, 16th December 1814*; See CAMPBELL, *Cont. Journ.* i. 86.

CHAP.
XCII.

1814.

France on the occasion. He openly charged Louis XVIII. with black ingratitude, and his displeasure was manifested without disguise to M. Talleyrand. At the same time he contracted close relations with Eugene Beauharnais, who was at Vienna at the time; warmly espoused the cause of Murat, in opposition to the Bourbon family, in the contest for the throne of Naples; and spoke of the unfitness of the elder branch of the Bourbons for the throne, and the probability of a revolution similar to that of 1688 in England, which might put the sceptre into the hands of the house of Orleans.¹

¹ Cap. i. 78,
88. Hard.,
xii. 461,
468. Schoell,
Trait. de
Paix, xi.
50, 56.

56.

Military
prepara-
tions on both
sides.

Jan. 13.

To such a height, ere long, did the divisions arise, that they were soon not confined to mere indications of ill-humour at the Congress. Both parties prepared for war. Alexander halted his whole armies in Poland on their return to Russia, where they were kept together, and retained in every respect on the war footing. Hardenberg declared that, "as to Prussia, it would not abandon Saxony: that it had conquered it, and would keep it, without either the intention or the inclination of restoration;" and the cabinet of Berlin, to support the declaration, armed its whole contingents, as if war were on the point of breaking out. At the same time, the Grand-duke Constantine, who commanded the whole Russian armies, two hundred and eighty thousand strong, in Lithuania and Poland, published an animated address, in which he announced the intention of the Emperor his brother to restore to the Poles their lost nationality, and called on them to rally round his standards, as the only means of effecting it.* On the other side, the three powers were not idle. Austria put her armies in Galicia on the war footing: France was invited to suspend the disarming, which the ruined state of her finances had

* "The Emperor, your powerful protector, invokes your aid. Rally around his standards: let your arms be raised for the defence of your country and your political existence." — CONSTANTINE'S *Proclamation*, 11th Dec. 1814; *CAPITULO*, i. 86.

rendered so necessary; British troops in great numbers were sent over to Belgium; the absent forces in America, rendered disposable by the prospect of peace with that country, were destined on their return to the same quarter; and in the midst of a Congress assembled for the general pacification of the world, a million of armed men were retained round their banners ready for mutual slaughter.^{1 2}

Matters were at length brought to a crisis, by the conclusion of a secret treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between Austria, France, and England, at Vienna, on February 3, 1815. By this treaty it was stipulated that the contracting parties should act in concert, and in a disinterested manner, to carry into effect the stipulations of the treaty of Paris. It set out with the preamble, that the “high contracting parties, convinced that the powers whom it behoved to carry into effect this treaty should be maintained in a state of perfect security and independence, to enable them worthily to discharge that important duty, consider it in consequence as necessary, with reference to the pretensions recently manifested, to provide against every aggression to which their own possessions, or any of them, might be exposed, from a feeling of resentment at the propositions which they have felt it their duty to submit, and to sustain by a common agreement the principles of justice and equity which they had advanced in carrying out the provisions of the treaty of Paris.” On this narrative, the three contracting powers agreed mutually to support each other if one was attacked; and, in order to do so with effect, to maintain

CHAP.
ACII. —
1514.

¹ Hall, x. i.
467, 468.
Cap. i. 91,
97.

57.

Secret
treaty be-
tween Aus-
tria, France,
and Eng-
land.

Feb. 3.

	Mil.
* Viz. Russia,	280,000
Prussia,	173,000
Austria,	220,000
Anglo-Belgian,	80,000
Piedmont,	60,000
Lesser German powers,	100,000
France,	100,000
Total,	1,013,000

CHAP.
XCH.

1814.

severally a hundred and fifty thousand men, of whom thirty thousand should be cavalry. In the event of war breaking out, the views of the Allies were to be strictly regulated by the terms of the treaty of Paris, so far as the extent and frontiers of their several possessions were concerned, and a commander-in-chief was to be appointed. The plan of the proposed operations was traced out by Generals Radnauski and Langejeus on the part of Austria, Marshal Wrede on that of Bavaria, and General Ricard on that of France; and they were intended to meet the case supposed, that the Russian armies would invade Moravia, and move upon Vienna. The Kings of Hanover, Bavaria, and Piedmont were invited to accede to this treaty, which they immediately did; so that, in effect, by it the whole forces of Western and Southern Europe were arrayed against Russia and Prussia.¹

¹ See the articles in Cap. i. 94, 96; and Hard. xii. 468, 470.

58.
Effect of
this treaty
on the ne-
gotiations.

Feb. 4.

What pains soever the principal powers concerned may have taken to prevent this treaty from coming to the knowledge of the other sovereigns at the Congress, it to a certain extent transpired, and produced a considerable modification in the views of the northern powers. Fortified by this support, Metternich took a bolder tone, and in reply to the menacing note of Hardenberg, transmitted an answer, in which, after representing that the safety of Austria, already compromised in Poland by the increase of Russia, would be destroyed by the incorporation of Saxony with Prussia, he explained in what sense the secret articles of the treaties of Kalisch and Riechenbach, so far as they related to the aggrandisement of the latter power, were to be understood, and contended that they would be amply carried into effect by the cession to Prussia of a portion of Saxony on the right bank of the Elbe, containing eight hundred thousand souls. The reply to that note clearly showed that the northern powers had taken the alarm; for Hardenberg, in the name of Prussia, agreed to relinquish the possession of Thorn, and the district of Tarnapol adjoining it. Several other notes were

Feb. 6.

interchanged; Russia abandoned several districts of Poland; Prussia agreed to be satisfied with a part of Saxony. It was evident that the high pretensions of these powers had undergone an abatement: but nothing had definitely been fixed on, when an event occurred which resounded like a thunderbolt from one end of Europe to the other, extinguished all these jealousies, and instantly drew the bonds of the old Grand Alliance as close together as they had been in the days of Leipsic and Paris.¹

One of the most important matters which came under the consideration of the Congress of Vienna, though not so difficult of adjustment, was the reconstruction of the Germanic confederacy. The old Empire and younger Confederation of the Rhine having been both swept away by the changes of time, it became necessary to create some new bond of union, which should at once provide for the security, and furnish a shield to the rights of the lesser Germanic states, and prevent that catastrophe which had uniformly occurred in former wars, of the French crossing the Rhine, and finding their battle-field and the sinews of war in the territories of the lesser states of Germany, before the jealousies or foresight of the greater powers would permit them to arm for their relief. The mutual jealousies of Prussia and Austria rendered this no easy matter; but the judgment and tact of Lord Castlereagh and Prince Metternich proved adequate to the task. He proposed the union of the whole Germanic states into a great confederacy, bound to afford mutual support in case of external attack, and to be directed by a diet, in which Austria and Prussia were each to have two voices, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Hanover, each one: but with the power to these greater states of making separate war and peace for themselves. The legislative power was to be vested in an assembly composed as well of the representatives of the larger states, as of those of the lesser ones and free towns; but the powers of this assembly had regard only to matters of internal and pacific arrange-

CHAP.

XIII.

1815.

Feb. 8.

¹ Hard. xii.
499, 490.
Cap. 3. 177,
178 Schöell,
Geschichte
Austria, vi.
121, 124.

59.

Formation
of the Ger-
man Confe-
deracy.

CHAP.

XCII.

1815.

ment, and did not extend to the declaration on their own authority of peace and war. As this constitution subjected the whole of Germany to the political direction of a diet, in which Austria and Prussia had four votes out of seven, it practically gave those states, if they drew together, the entire government of the confederacy, so far as external relations went. But such was the influence of the greater powers, and such the sense which was still entertained of the necessity of a strong barrier against the aggressions of France, that Talleyrand was unable to stir up any resistance to it, and it was agreed to without opposition.¹

¹ Hard. xii. 473, 475. Schoell, xi. 257, 277; and Cong. de Vienne, vi. 147, 213.

60.
Formation of the kingdom of the Netherlands.

² *Ante*, ch. lxxxix. § 47.

³ Schoell, xi. 116, 117.

Austria having renounced all claim to the Low Countries, which had been found by experience to be rather a burden than an advantage to the monarchy, little difficulty was experienced in arranging the affairs, and establishing the kingdom, of the Netherlands. It had been one of the secret articles of the treaty of Paris,² that the Netherlands and Holland should be united into one kingdom, under a prince of the house of Nassau; and this stipulation was now carried into effect by the reunion of the whole old seventeen provinces into a monarchy, under the title of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.* The great fortress of Luxembourg, with its adjacent territory, was only excluded, and, from its military importance, was declared to form part of the German confederation, of which it was one of the frontier bulwarks; but the King of the Netherlands acquired it also as Duke of Luxembourg.³ By patent, dated 16th March 1815, the King of Holland took the title of King of the Netherlands and

* It had been proposed by Elizabeth, in conjunction with Henry IV., to re-form the seventeen provinces of Flanders into one state, to form a barrier at once against France and Austria. Mr Pitt was the next statesman who embraced the project. He is a bold man who gainsays what in such remote periods was concurred in equally by Henry IV. and Sully, Elizabeth and Barleigh, Metternich and Wellington. Mr Pitt thought they should be given to Prussia. Vide *Ante*, Ap. A., Chap. xxxix. But all concurred in the opinion, that the interests and balance of power in Europe required that they should be kept together.

Grand-duke of Luxembourg, which title was immediately recognised by all the courts of Europe.

Holland ceded to Great Britain by this arrangement the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice; but in return Great Britain restored to the King of the Netherlands the noble island of Java—a colony worth all the other islands in the Eastern archipelago put together, and which, under British management, since its capture in 1810, had become so flourishing, that it promised soon to yield a larger surplus revenue than the whole of our Indian possessions put together. The uncalled for restitution of this splendid possession, though owing to an honourable generosity, was one of the greatest errors ever committed by the English government, and is the most important political mistake chargeable against Lord Castlereagh. But the attention of that great man, absorbed by objects of Continental interest, was not at that moment sufficiently drawn to the great and growing colonial empire of Great Britain. The dominions thus acquired by the house of Orange embraced some of the richest and most flourishing provinces in Europe, containing in all, with Holland, no less than five million four hundred and twenty-four thousand inhabitants, peopled at the rate of 1829 to the square league. It was a condition of its erection, that the new kingdom should be ruled by a representative government, framed very much on the model of that of France, and that the kingdom of the Netherlands, jointly with England, should undertake the burden of a loan of fifty million florins (£4,200,000), formerly borrowed by Russia from the capitalists of Amsterdam.¹

The affairs of Switzerland, at the same time, occupied the attention of the Congress; but as the desire for aggrandisement on the part of none of the great powers was turned in that direction, they were adjusted with ease and with great impartiality. The confederacy was declared to embrace the whole nineteen cantons, as they

CHAP.
XCVI.

1814.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

1815.

CHAP.
XCII.

1815.

¹ Ante, ch.
lxxxiv. §
56.

stood by the convention of Bâle on 29th December 1813,¹ on an equal footing, which effectually excluded the unjust principle that one state should be subjected to another state. The Valais, Geneva and its territory, with the principality of Neuchâtel, were united to Switzerland, and formed so many cantons. The bishopric of Bâle, with the town of Bienne, was restored to the canton of Berne; and a great variety of lesser arrangements were adopted, to regulate the pecuniary concerns of the different cantons, regarding which these mountaineers were in the highest degree tenacious. This constitution was formally acceded to by the whole cantons on 27th May 1815, and has ever since formed the basis of the Helvetic confederacy.²

May 27.
² Schoell,
xi. 96, 115;
and Recueil,
viii. 336.63.
And of
Saxony.

The decision of the question regarding Saxony was somewhat more expeditious. The unhappy Frederick Augustus, who, since the fatal overthrow of Leipsic, had inhabited the castle of Friedrichsfeld as a sort of state prisoner, was invited by the allied sovereigns to approach the vicinity of Vienna, and arrived at Presburg on the 4th March, just two days before intelligence arrived of the departure of Napoleon from Elba. By the intervention of Great Britain, this intricate and delicate negotiation was adjusted; the share of Saxony devolving to Prussia was reduced to a territory containing one million one hundred thousand souls; and Hanover was contented with a portion containing two hundred and fifty thousand. Prussia accepted these modifications; and the King of Saxony, threatened with the total loss of his dominions in the event of refusal, had no alternative, after long holding out, but compliance. Under protest, therefore, that his consent to the alienation of so large a portion of his dominions was constrained, he submitted to the conditions; the King of Prussia was authorised, by a note of the Congress, to take possession of the ceded territory; and at length, by a formal treaty concluded on the 18th May, peace was finally ratified between the contending

March 12.

May 18.

parties. By this treaty, Saxony ceded to Prussia, in perpetuity, the whole of Lower Lusatia, part of Upper Lusatia, the fortress and circle of Wittenberg, the circle of Thuringia, and various other territories on the right bank of the Elbe, containing one million one hundred thousand souls. Prussia at the same time acquired a portion of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, containing eight hundred and ten thousand inhabitants, in addition to the whole territories which she possessed before the battle of Jena on the left bank of the Rhine; acquisitions which raised her population to above ten millions of souls, and elevated her to the rank of a first-rate power. Dresden, Leipsic, and not quite two-thirds of his old dominions, remained to the King of Saxony; and although Europe deeply sympathised with an ancient and respectable house, under this cruel partition of its territories, yet it was impossible to deny that the sovereign had brought the catastrophe upon himself, and that, as he had cast in his lot with Napoleon, largely participated in his conquests, and to the last resisted all the efforts of the Allies to detach him from his alliance, he could not in justice complain if he shared his fall.¹

It only remains to add, before finally taking leave of the Congress of Vienna, that on two points of importance—the one to the internal interests of Europe, and the other to the general interests of humanity—its deliberations, actuated by philanthropy and guided by wisdom, conferred a lasting benefit on mankind. 1st, Wise regulations were established for securing the free navigation of its great rivers, particularly the Rhine, the Necker, and the Meuse, without at the same time abrogating the just rights of the potentates who were interested in the dues of the passage. Moderate duties were established, to be drawn by a central board, and allotted to each of the proprietors who substantiated titles, in proportion to their respective interests. The rents amounted to five hundred and eleven thousand florins, or £42,000 a-year. 2d,

CHAP.
XCII.

1815.

¹ See the Treaty, in Marten's N. R. ii. 272; and Schoell, xi. 61, 72.

64.
Acts of the Congress for the free navigation of the Rhine, and the abolition of the slave trade.

CHAP. XCII. The great and important subject of the abolition of the
 — slave trade occupied a considerable portion of the atten-
 1815. tion of the Congress. The House of Commons had peti-
 Feb. 19, tioned the King of England to use his endeavours to
 1810. procure the abolition, by all civilised nations, of this
 infamous traffic, and several states had concluded treaties
 with Great Britain, more or less stringent, for its limita-
 March 3, tion or abolition. In particular, this had been done by a
 1813. treaty with the court of Rio Janeiro in 1810, and one with
 that of Sweden in 1813. Denmark had previously set the
 Jan. 1, first example of the great deed of justice, by abolishing
 1794. the traffic in 1794, by an edict to come into operation
 after the lapse of ten years. Before leaving Paris Lord
 Castlereagh had addressed a circular to all the allied
 powers, earnestly requesting their co-operation in this
 great object; and not only had they all expressed opin-
 ions favourable to the proposed abolition, but the King
 of the Netherlands, by a decree in June 1815, abolished
 June 15, the trade in his dominions. A treaty was also concluded
 1815. between England and Spain, by which the King of Spain
 engaged to take efficacious measures for abolishing it
 throughout his dominions; and at the Congress of Vienna
 a great step was made in the same career by a treaty
 July 5, with Portugal, by which it was absolutely prohibited to
 1814. the subjects of Portugal to the north of the equator: no
 less than £600,000 was the price paid by England for
 Jan. 21 and this concession to the principles of humanity. Great re-
 22, 1814. sistance, however, was made by France and Spain to the
 efforts of Lord Castlereagh, to procure the consent of
 their respective courts to the entire abolition of the slave
 trade within any limited period; and all that he could
 Feb. 8, obtain was, a joint declaration, signed by all the powers,
 1815. of their abhorrence of the traffic, and their desire for its
 being effectually put an end to, but leaving the period for
 its entire abolition to be fixed by separate negotiations
 between the different powers.¹

Italy presented in some respects a more complicated

field for diplomacy. The cessions, indeed, of Lombardy to Austria, and of the Genoese republic to the kingdom of Piedmont, were at once agreed to without any difficulty, despite the earnest remonstrances of the citizens of the latter commonwealth, who passionately desired the restoration of their ancient form of government : so strongly was the necessity felt of strengthening the states on the French frontier, and above all the kingdom of Sardinia, in whose hands the keys of the most important passes from France into Italy were placed. But the conflicting claims of Murat and the old Bourbon family to the throne of Naples, excited a warm interest at the Congress : the more especially as Alexander out of pique at the resistance of the court of France to his views in regard to Poland and Saxony, now openly supported the claims of the former to the crown, grounding his support on the engagement of Austria to maintain him in his throne, and enlarge his territory, entered into when he joined the Grand Alliance. The other powers, however, were far from sharing these sentiments : the court of Rome felt the utmost alarm at the close proximity of an ambitious prince, who openly coveted, and had more than once attempted to seize, the papal territories ; and Austria was little inclined to permit the permanent establishment of a revolutionary throne so near the inflammable materials of her Italian provinces. Murat, in a laboured memorial, earnestly appealed to England to support him on his throne, in terms of the engagement undertaken by Lord William Bentinck and General Nugent ; but Lord Castlereagh officially announced to the Congress in the end of February, that Murat had so completely failed in the performance of his own engagements, that he had virtually liberated the Allies from theirs, and that they were not bound to maintain him. Meanwhile, Murat was so far from anticipating any danger to his Neapolitan crown, that he was dreaming of the sceptre of the whole of Italy south of the Po ; and with that view, in spite of all

CHAP.
XIII.1795
1796Austria
FranceNapoleon's
return.

Feb. 25.

CHAP. the representations of Austria and the court of Rome,
 XCII. kept military possession of the three legations of Bologna,
 — 1815. Ferrara, and Ravenna, as the frontier provinces of his
 anticipated dominions. Nay, so far did he carry his
 Feb. 15. extravagance, that on the 15th February he made a
 formal demand for the passage of eighty thousand men
 through the Austrian territories in Italy, to act against
 France; a proposition which only tended to increase the
 apprehensions of the cabinet of Vienna, and led to the
 force of that power, in the Italian Peninsula, being
 augmented to a hundred and fifty thousand men.¹

¹ Schoell,
 Trait, de
 Paix, xi.
 189, 195.

66.
 Conference
 for the re-
 moval of
 Napoleon
 from Elba,
 when he
 leaves that
 island.

This military position and demand excited the jealousy
 of the allied powers; the more especially as, towards
 the end of February, rumours reached Vienna of con-
 stant correspondence between the isle of Elba and the
 adjoining shores of Italy, and of an intended descent by
 Napoleon on the coast of France. These rumours soon
 acquired such consistency, that the propriety of removing
 him from the neighbourhood of Italy had already been
 more than once agitated in the Congress; and various
 places of residence for him, in exchange for Elba, had
 been proposed—among others, one of the Canary islands,
 which was suggested by the Portuguese minister, and St
 Helena or St Lucie, which were proposed by Lord Castle-
 reagh. Alexander, however, still firmly held out for
 adhering to the treaty of Fontainebleau, and maintaining
 the fallen Emperor in possession of the island of Elba:
 alleging, as a reason, that his personal honour had been
 pledged to his great antagonist for that asylum, and that
 he would not be the first to break it. But Metternich,
 better informed, was so strongly impressed with the
 impending danger, that he secretly despatched a letter
 to Fouché at Paris, inquiring, What would happen if
 Napoleon returned?—what if the King of Rome with a
 squadron of horse appeared on the frontier?—and what
 would France do if left to its spontaneous movement?
 The sagacious minister of police replied, that if one regi-

ment sent against Napoleon ranged itself on his side, the whole army would follow its example—that if the King of Rome was escorted to the frontiers by an Austrian regiment, the whole nation would instantly hoist his colours: and that, if no external stimulus was applied, the nation would seek refuge in the Orleans dynasty. These dangers, however, were only appreciated by the few who had foresight equal to the Austrian statesman or French revolutionist: and all heads at Vienna were involved in a whirl of gaiety, splendour, and dissipation, which gave rise to the witty saying of the Prince de Ligne, “the Congress dances, but it does not advance;” when, on the 7th March, intelligence was brought to Metternich, on the eve of a great ball at Vienna, that NAPOLEON HAD SECRETLY LEFT ELBA.¹

CHAP.
XIII.

1815.

¹ Cap. i.
177, 180.
Hard, xii.
175, 176.
Schödl, x.
297, 298.

If a thunderbolt had fallen in the middle of the brilliant circle assembled in the imperial saloon at Vienna, it could not have excited greater consternation than this simple announcement. It was deemed expedient, nevertheless, to conceal the alarm which all really felt, and next day Metternich, Wellington, and Talleyrand went to Presburg, to announce to the King of Saxony, as had been previously arranged, the determination come to by the Congress in regard to the cessions of territory which he was required to make, under the pain of losing his crown. The affairs of Saxony, however, were soon adjusted. All minor differences were immediately forgotten: the strides of Russia, the aggrandisement of Prussia, the terrors of Austria, were buried in oblivion: all lesser subjects of alarm were absorbed in the pressing danger arising from the return of Napoleon to the throne of France. Alexander was profoundly irritated at the event. Alone, he had for long contended against the other powers at the Congress for the maintenance of Napoleon in the island of Elba, as a thing to which, whether right or wrong, his personal honour was engaged. He felt it,

67.
Prodigious
sensitiveness
excited in
the Con-
gress by this
event,
March 7.

CHAP.
XCII.

1815.

1 Sir C.
Stuart's
Despatch, to
Lord Claiter-
reagh,
March 8,
1815. Cap.
i. 179, 185.
Thib. x.
224, 225.

therefore, as a personal injury, when the object of his solicitude was himself the first to break his engagement. Much uncertainty at first prevailed as to the place of his destination, and many suspected it was Naples, where Murat was openly preparing for hostilities : but all doubt was soon removed. The posts of the succeeding days brought intelligence by the way of Turin, that he had landed in the Gulf of St Juan, near Frejus ; that he had taken the road for Paris through the mountains of Gap : and at last, that Labedoyère and the garrison of Grenoble had joined him, and he was making an unresisted and triumphant progress towards Lyons.¹

43.
Decided
measures of
the Congress
against
Napoleon.

March 12.

As the revolt of the army and the approaching downfall of the throne of Louis XVIII. could no longer be doubted, the Congress took the most vigorous measures to provide against the danger. The cabinet of Vienna felt it to be its duty to take the lead on this occasion ; not only as its apprehensions had been the main cause of the late divisions which had prevailed in the deliberations of the Allies, but because Napoleon, relying on his family connection with the imperial House of Hapsburg, had disseminated with profusion on his road to Grenoble a proclamation, in which he declared that he had returned to France with the concurrence of Austria, and that he was speedily to be supported by a hundred thousand of the troops of that nation. Metternich, therefore, in the first formal meeting held to deliberate on the course which should be pursued, stated that it would be worthy of the allied powers, and of the highest importance in the existing crisis, to express their opinion on an event which could not fail to create a great sensation in every part of Europe : that Napoleon Buonaparte, in quitting the island of Elba, and disembarking in France at the head of an armed force, had openly rendered himself the disturber of the general peace ; that as such he could no longer claim the protection of any treaty or law ; that the powers who had signed the treaty of Paris felt them-

selves, in an especial manner, called upon to declare in the face of Europe in what light they viewed that attempt: that they should add, that they were resolved at all hazards to carry into effect the whole provisions of the treaty of Paris: and that they were all prepared to support the King of France with their whole forces, in the event of circumstances rendering their assistance necessary. These sentiments, which had been previously concerted with Talleyrand, specially in order to detach the cause of Napoleon from that of the independence of the French monarchy, met with the unanimous and cordial concurrence of all present: and, in consequence, a declaration was forthwith drawn up and signed by all the powers, which, in the most rigid terms, proscribed Napoleon as a public enemy, with whom neither peace nor truce could be concluded, and expressed the determination of the powers to employ the whole forces at their disposal, to prevent Europe from being again plunged into the abyss of revolution.^{1 1/2}

CHAP.
XIII.

1795

1801, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000

This energetic and decisive proclamation was immediately forwarded to Paris by the way of Strasburg, with

1. The powers which signed the treaty of Paris, re-assembled in Congress at Vienna, informed of the escape of Napoleon Buonaparte, and of his entry with an armed force into France, went to their own charge, and to the interests of nations, to make a solemn announcement of their sentiments on the occasion. In 1801, after this manner, the convention which had established him in the island of Elba, Buonaparte has destroyed the sole legal title to which his political existence is attached. By reappearing in France with projects of treacherous overthrow, he has not less deprived himself of the protection of the laws, and made it evident in the face of the universe that there can no longer be either peace or truce with him. The powers, therefore, declare that Buonaparte has placed himself out of the pale of civil and social relations, and that, as the general enemy and disturber of the world, he is abandoned to public justice. They declare at the same time that, fully resolved to maintain unshaken the treaty of Paris of 19th May 1801, and the dispositions sanctioned by that treaty, they will employ the whole means at their disposal to secure the preservation of general peace, the object of their efforts: and although firmly persuaded that the whole of France will combine to crush this last mad attempt of criminal ambition, yet, if it should prove otherwise, they declare that they are ready to employ all their arms and powers, and all the powers at their disposal, to give the King of France all necessary assistance, and make common cause against all those who shall compromise the public tranquillity. METTUN, TALLEYRAND, WELLESLEY, HARTSWELL, NASSAU, L. WELLESLEY, SCHOEN, *Recueil des Papiers d'Etat*, v. 1.

CHAP.
XCII.
1815.
69.
Military
preparations
of the allied
powers.

instructions to the courier intrusted with it, to circulate as many copies as possible in the different towns and villages through which he passed in his route from the Rhine to the capital. Nor were the efforts of the allied sovereigns confined to mere denunciations on paper: the most vigorous measures were immediately taken to assemble a powerful force in the field. The Russian troops in Poland, two hundred and eighty thousand strong, were directed to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's notice. Alexander declared, "that he was ready to throw into the crusade the three hundred thousand men of whom he had the disposal, to put an end to these revolts of Prætorian Guards; and that, as he had been the most culpable in having retained Napoleon so long at Elba, so he would be the first to repair his fault:" Austria put on the war footing her armies in Italy and Germany, amounting to two hundred and fifty thousand men: Prussia called forth the landwehr in all her dominions, and raised her forces to two hundred thousand men, of whom a hundred and fifty thousand were ordered to march to the Low Countries: the lesser States of Germany all called out their respective contingents, and, amidst songs of triumphs and threats of vengeance, moved towards the Rhine: while England, now delivered from the pressure of the American war, exerted extraordinary activity, both in pouring troops into Flanders, and providing for the equipment of the newly raised forces of the Belgians. Numerous levies were raised in Hanover, and the old troops had already begun their march for the Flemish frontier. Even Denmark and Sweden, forgetting their recent divisions, began to arm, and took measures to join the general coalition of Europe: and the Swiss cantons, departing from the cautious neutrality they had hitherto preserved, prepared to take an active part in the strife, and assail France on the side where it was most vulnerable.¹ At the same time, Spain and Portugal joined in the general

¹ Chap. i.
194, 196.
S. loc. cit.
Hist. des
Trait. de
Paix, xi.
213, 214.

league, and slowly organised their battalions to march towards the Pyrenees. And thus was verified the saying of Chateaubriand, "that if the cocked-hat and surtout of Napoleon were placed on a stick on the shores of Brest, it would cause Europe to run to arms from one end to the other."

CHAP.
XIII.
1815.

The imminent danger which the whole powers ran from the return of the French Emperor, speedily led to a decision of the long-debated questions regarding Poland and Saxony. Russia at length agreed to accept of the grand-duchy of Warsaw, without the fortress of Thorn and its dependent territory, with the exception of a portion of it, containing eight hundred thousand souls, which was to be ceded to Prussia; and it was expressly stipulated that Poland should not be incorporated with Russia, but should form a separate kingdom, preserving its own laws, institutions, language, and religion. After a great deal of negotiation, a treaty was concluded on these bases on the 3d May, between Russia and Saxony; another, on the same day, between Prussia and Russia; and a third, between Austria, Russia, and Prussia. By these arrangements, Saxony ceded to Russia in perpetuity the grand-duchy of Warsaw, to be erected into a separate kingdom in favour of the Emperor of Russia, but not incorporated with that empire: the ancient town of Cracow, with a small territory adjacent, was erected into a separate republic, containing in all sixty-one thousand souls, with the shadow at least of independence. By this treaty a portion of Poland recovered its long-lost nationality: above four millions of Sarmatians were restored to the rank of a separate people: the Russian viceroy at Warsaw maintained regal state, surrounded by Polish soldiers, Polish uniforms, Polish ministers, and Polish institutions. A constitution establishing the elements of freedom, defective indeed in some essential particulars, but still a vast improvement upon its old stormy *comitia*, was guaranteed: and so great was the growth of

70.
Settlement
of the affairs
of Poland.

May 3.

CHAP.
XII.

1815.

¹ See the
Treaties in
Martens'
N. R. ii.
236, 251 ;
iv. 127 ; and
abridged in
Schöell,
Traité de
Paix, xi.
74, 69.

the nation, and the improvement of its strength, under the regular and stable government which followed, that on occasion of the revolt of 1830, it singly withstood, guided by the genius of Skrynecki, the whole military force of Russia for nine months, and was at length subdued only by the accession of Prussia to the league of its enemies. Such as they were, those blessings were mainly to be ascribed to the philanthropic disposition of the Emperor Alexander, and the determined stand made by Lord Castlereagh : but, in common with many other guarantees of real freedom, they perished fifteen years afterwards under the assault of democracy, roused into frantic activity by the triumph of the Barriades which subverted the throne of Charles X.¹

71.
Situation of
Napoleon at
Elba. Com-
mencement
of a con-
spiracy in
France in
his favour.

It was not surprising that the European powers strove to reconcile their divisions, and accommodate their differences, at the Congress of Vienna ; for Napoleon had now landed in France, and was making rapidly for Paris, the ancient seat of his power. With a blindness to the future and probable course of events, which now appears scarcely conceivable, but of which, at the time of the treaty of Fontainebleau, Lord Castlereagh had fully appreciated the danger, the unreflecting generosity of the allied sovereigns had assigned to Napoleon, in independent sovereignty, a little island on the Tuscan coast, within sight of Italy, within a few days' sail of France, and in a situation of all others the most favourable for carrying on intrigues with both countries. As if, too, they had purposely intended to invite a second descent, he was placed there with an ample revenue, an armed force,—which was soon raised, by veterans who flocked to his standard from the adjacent shores, to above a thousand tried and experienced soldiers,—and three small vessels of war at his disposal ; while there was not a single English line-of-battle ship or frigate to prevent an expedition sailing against the coast of France. Sir Neil Campbell and the other allied commissioners, in-

deed, were there, and enjoyed a large share of the society of the Emperor; but they were merely a species of accredited diplomatists at his court: they could only report to their respective cabinets what was going on, and were not entitled to restrain his proceedings, nor had they any armed force at their disposal to coerce his attempts. A brig of eighteen guns, indeed, cruised off the island: but it was wholly unable to blockade Porto Ferrajo, or prevent the descent of the Emperor at the head of his Guards on the adjacent shores. It might have been foreseen what would be the result of this extraordinary facility afforded to the dethroned conqueror. In him, as in all mankind, the desire to reign, when its pleasures had been once felt, was insatiable.* A constant correspondence was maintained by Napoleon with his adherents in France and Italy: his friends and relatives were continually in communication with or visiting him; and soon a vast conspiracy was formed, with its centre in Paris, and its ramifications throughout the whole army and a great part of the civil functionaries, having for its object to overturn the dynasty of the Bourbons, and replace the Emperor on the throne.¹

The inferior officers and soldiers of the army were in an especial manner the seat of this conspiracy. The marshals and generals, worn out with war, and glad at any price to secure the peaceable possession of their titles and fortunes, had in good faith, for the most part, embraced the party of the Restoration. But though the troops had formally taken the oath to the new government, yet in their hearts they had never renounced their allegiance to the Emperor: and their devotion to him was only the more profound, that time had weakened the remembrance of their disasters, and that no present

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

¹ Sir N. Campbell's MS. Thib. x. 223, 225. Cap. 1. 104. M. 2. 2. v. 1. 98, 99.

72.
Its great ramifications in the army.

* "Mille exemples simulans nous pavoient l'un l'autre:
Et n'est rien qui n'eût été fait, ni dû, ni permis.
Et depuis qu'une fois elle m'a capitulé,
L'ennemi est devenu et le sort et la nation."

CORNÉILLE, *Nicomède*, Act II. scène I.

CHAP.
XCII.

1815.

fatigue or sufferings interfered with the charm of old recollections. In them was verified the old saying, that strong passions are increased, weak ones only, diminished by time or absence. The snows of Russia, the overthrow of Leipsic, the disasters of France, were forgotten : he appeared only to their memories as the hero of Rivoli or Austerlitz—the resistless chief who led them, conquering and to conquer, to almost every capital of continental Europe. These feelings were all but universal in the troops and in the officers, from the colonels downwards. While the generals and marshals besieged the ante-chambers of the Tuileries, and signed loyal addresses, resounding with the fleurs-de-lys, Henry IV., and the white flag, the poor soldiers, often the last depositaries, in a corrupted age, of fidelity and attachment, in secret adhered to their old allegiance : they guarded the Emperor's eagles as their household gods, kept the tricolor cockades with pious care in their knapsacks, spoke with rapture of his exploits in their barracks, and worshipped his image in their hearts. Various words to signify the beloved object were invented, and, though known to thousands and tens of thousands, the secret was religiously preserved. He was called “Père la Violette,” and the “Petit Caporal :” and the rumour spread through the army, “that he would appear with the violet in spring on the Seine, to chase from thence the priests and emigrants who have insulted the national glory.”¹

¹ Cap. i.
110, 113.
Thib. x.
224, 225.

73.
Napoleon's
correspon-
dence with
Murat. His
profound
dissimula-
tion, and
life in Elba.

Its close proximity to the Italian shore led naturally to a secret correspondence between the island of Elba and the court of Naples. Murat, ever governed by ambition, and yet destitute of the firmness of purpose requisite to render it successful, now found that his vacillation of conduct had ruined him with the aristocratic, as it had formerly done with the revolutionary party, and that the Allies were little disposed to reward his deviation from his engagements by the lasting posses-

sion of the throne of Naples. He threw himself, therefore, once more into the arms of France; and it was arranged that the descent of Napoleon on the coast of Provence should be contemporaneous with the advance of his troops to the Po, and the proclamation of the great principle of Italian unity and independence. At the same time, various illustrious strangers of both sexes visited Napoleon at Elba: among the former was Lord Ebrington, who has given the world a most interesting account of his conversations with the fallen hero; among the latter, the Polish lady who had fascinated him before the battle of Eylau,¹ and the French ladies who had alleviated his anguish amidst the desertions of Fontainebleau.² Amidst this varied society, by some of whom the great intrigue which was going forward was conducted, the language of the Emperor was always the same, and his profound powers of dissimulation were never more strikingly evinced. To the English he spoke only of the new constitution in France, the errors and difficulties of the King; the irretrievable folly of the Bourbons; the inapplicability of British institutions to the present state of French society; the impossibility of finding a Chamber of Deputies not either servile or turbulent; the entire termination of his own political existence, and the calm eye with which he now looked back on the stormy scene in which he had no longer any interest.³

To Sir Neil Campbell, in particular, he was apparently communicative and confidential in the highest degree. Almost every morning he admitted him to his breakfast table, when the conversation ranged over every subject of history and politics; they then strolled out along the beach in company with some of the other commissioners, and he not unfrequently embarked with Sir Neil alone in a small boat, under pretence of fishing, and when he got a little way out from the shore said, "Now, we are out of their hearing: ask me anything, and I will tell you." By these means the Emperor so far gained upon

CHAP.
XIII.

1815.

¹ Ante, ch.
xlii. § 47.

² Ante, ch.
lxxxix. §
24, note.

³ Lord Ebrington's conversations with Napoleon, 5, 46. Sir Neil Campbell's MS. Cap. i. 191.

74.
Napoleon's
exclusive con-
fidence to
Sir Neil
Campbell.

CHAP.
XCII.

1815.

the confidence of that able officer, that he contented himself with reporting these precious conversations to his cabinet; and, deeming no danger at hand, though not unlikely at some future period to occur, was frequently absent for days together, at Florence or Leghorn, where he had several interesting acquaintances, among whom were fascinations of no ordinary kind. But even if he had been every day at the Emperor's side, it would have been of hardly any avail, for there were no visible preparations going on; if there had, he had no force whatever at his disposal to check them; and his instructions were merely to attend General Buonaparte to Elba, to see him established there, and remain as long as the ex-Emperor might desire his presence.¹*

¹ Sir Neil Campbell's MS. Cap. i. 121, 126. Lord Ebrington's conversations with Napoleon in Elba, 23, 36.

75.
Napoleon's preparations for embarking from Elba.

All things being at length in readiness, and the preparations in France, by means of the inferior officers of the army, the veteran republicans at Paris, and the old Imperial functionaries still retained in office by the government, completed, Napoleon, on the 26th of February, gave a brilliant ball at Porto Ferrajo to the principal persons of the island, over which the grace and beauty of his sister, the Princess Pauline, who presided, threw an unusual lustre. Sir Neil Campbell unfortunately was absent, having sailed on the 17th in the Partridge for Leghorn: and so well had the preparations for departure been concealed, that Captain Adige, who commanded that vessel, had no conception that any departure was intended, and set out from Leghorn the very day of Napoleon's embarkation. Sir Neil was well aware that Napoleon meditated an outbreak, and some recent indications, particularly the arrival of three feluccas

* "You will pay every proper respect and attention to Napoleon, to whose secure asylum in Elba it is the wish of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent to afford every facility and protection; and you will acquaint Napoleon, in suitable terms of attention, that you are directed to reside in the island till further orders, if he should consider that the presence of a British officer can be of any use in protecting the island and his person against insult or attack."

LORD CASTLEREAGH'S *Instructions to Sir Neil Campbell*. *Paris, 1801*. *Appeal*. 1811.—SIR NEIL CAMPBELL'S *MS. Papers*.

from Naples, made him suspect that it would ere long occur; but as he had no force at his disposal, and the single British cruiser, the Partridge of eighteen guns, was wholly unequal to the encounter of the whole flotilla of Napoleon, he contented himself with warning government of the chance of his escape,* and had gone to Leghorn principally to concert measures with Lord Burghersh, the British envoy at Florence, on the means of averting the danger which appeared approaching, by detaching a line-of-battle ship and frigate which lay at Genoa to cruise off the island, when in his absence it actually occurred.¹

CHAP.
XCV.
1815.

1 Sir Neil
Campbell's
MS. Jour.
Captain
Admiral
Repe. to
Admiral
Penrose,
March 15,
1815.

While Napoleon's mother and sister were doing the honours of the ball, he himself walked around the room, conversing in the most affable manner with the guests. Meanwhile, secret orders had been despatched to his Guards, to hold themselves in readiness on the quay. At three o'clock in the afternoon, next day, they were all drawn up there, in number about eleven hundred, of whom four hundred were of the Old Guard, under the command of Bertrand, Drouot, and Cambronne. Napoleon joined them at half-past four, and orders were immediately given for commencing the embarkation. By seven o'clock it was completed, and the Emperor stepped on board the Inconstant brig, which contained four hundred of his old comrades in arms. His air was calm and serene: he merely said, in an under voice to those around him, "The

76.
He leaves
Elba, and
steers for
the gulf of
St. Juan.

* "If I may venture an opinion upon Buonaparte's plan, I think he will leave General Bertrand to defend Porto Ferrajo, as he has a wife and several children with him, to whom he is extremely attached, and probably will not communicate his intentions to him till the last moment. He will take with him General Drouot, and those of his guards upon whom he can most depend, embarking General Cambronne (a desperate, uneducated ruffian, who was a drummer with him in Egypt) in the Inconstant, L'Etoile, and the other vessels mentioned in the memorandum: he will go himself, probably a day or two before the troops, with General Drouot in the Caroline, and the place of disembarkation will be Geta on the coast of Naples, or Civita Vecchia, if Murat has previously advanced to Rome."—SIR N. CAMPBELL to LORD CASTLEREAGH, dated Leghorn, 26th February 1815: SIR N. CAMPBELL'S MS. Papers, Despatch, No. 45.

CHAP.
XCH.

1815.

die is now cast." The eyes of Bertrand gleamed with joy; Drouot was pensive and thoughtful; Cambronne seemed entirely occupied with the arrangement of his soldiers. It was dark when the flotilla, which consisted in all of seven small vessels, got under weigh: Napoleon had given out to the inhabitants, that he was going to the coast of Barbary to chastise the pirates, who from time immemorial had infested the coasts of Elba; and sealed instructions were delivered to the captain of the *Inconstant*, not to be read till they were fairly at sea. The night was calm, the wind light from the south; and it was not till they were two leagues from the harbour that the captain opened his orders, and saw that his destination was the gulf of St Juan on the coast of Provence. He immediately steered in that direction, and the transports of the soldiers could no longer be restrained. "Officers and soldiers of my Guard," said Napoleon, "we are going to France." Loud cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* immediately burst out on all sides: but after the first transport of enthusiasm was over, sad presentiments filled the breasts of the soldiers; the recollection of Moscow and Leipsic returned to their minds; and even the bravest hesitated as to the result of an expedition, in which the Emperor, at the head of a thousand men, set out to brave the military force of all Europe.¹

¹ Sir Neil Campbell's Journal, MS. Cap. i. 153, 154. Beauch. iii. 141, 143. Thib. x. 225, 226.

77.
Voyage, and landing there.

Feb. 27.

During the night the wind fell, and at daybreak they were only six leagues from the nearest point of Elba. Napoleon shut himself up in his cabin, and dictated those proclamations to the people and army, which soon thrilled through France, from Calais to Bayonne. Some of the least resolute on board, seeing the wind fail, suggested that it would be prudent to return to Porto Ferrajo; but the Emperor replied, "If the ships are too heavily laden, throw all the baggage overboard: the idea of returning to Elba is pusillanimous; we bear France on the point of our swords." Opposite Leghorn on the 27th, a French frigate was descried five leagues to windward; but it did

not approach. The Zephyr French brig soon after came within hail : the soldiers took off their caps, and lay flat on deck to avoid discovery ; and the captain having asked if they had come from Elba, and how Napoleon was, he himself answered, “ Il se porte à merveille.” Suspecting nothing, the brig passed on : on the evening of the 29th, the lofty towers of Antibes were descried ; and Napoleon, amidst loud cheers, read his proclamation to his soldiers, who all mounted the tricolor cockade. Without molestation the fleet pursued its course ; soon the olive-clad slopes of Cannes opened to the view ; and at three o'clock on the afternoon of the 1st March, the whole vessels cast anchor in the gulf of St Juan. The Old Guard, under Drouot, was immediately landed without opposition ; shortly after, Napoleon himself descended into the long-boat of the brig, and approached the shore : on reaching the land, it was moored to the trunk of an olive-tree. “ That is a good omen,” cried the Emperor, whose mind on momentous occasions was singularly alive to superstitious impressions ; and he caused it to be mentioned to his soldiers, who received the omen with joyfulness. Stepping ashore, he gave a few napoleons to his attendants, to buy horses from the neighbouring peasants ; spoke cheerfully, and with the magic which he had so wonderfully at his command, to the men : encouraged his officers by animated and varied conversation ; and at night the watches were set, and the troops bivouacked, as on the eve of the battles of Austerlitz or Wagram.¹

The dangers of the passage were now over ; but there remained the perils of the shore, which were sufficient to daunt the most resolute breasts. Though the great conspiracy, having for its object the overthrow of the Bourbons, had ramifications in almost every regiment in the army, yet it was in a few instances only that the superior officers had been gained : and it was as yet uncertain whether or not the men would disobey the orders of those of them who had not. The first attempt was unsuccessful.

CHAP.
XIII.

1815.

Feb. 29.

March 1.

¹ Fleury de
Chaboulon,
i. 23, 24,
153, 156.
Cap. i. 139,
141.

73.
He marches
by Gap to
Grenoble.

CHAP.
XCII.1815.
March 1.

ful ; twenty-five of the Old Guard were sent to Antibes to endeavour to seduce the garrison by the name of the Emperor ; but General Corsin, who commanded in that fortress, arrested the men ; and on a second detachment being brought up, which began to read at the foot of the rampart the proclamations issued by Napoleon, he cut the matter short by threatening to discharge the guns. This check spread great discouragement among the soldiers, and induced a moment's hesitation in the mind of the Emperor ; but he had gone too far to recede : and at four o'clock in the following morning he took the road by Gap to Grenoble, through the mountains. This road, after quitting the Var at Sisteron, ascends into the Alpine range, which it never quits till it arrives in the neighbourhood of the latter town. No district of France could have been selected more favourable to the Emperor's designs, for it contains no great towns or wealthy districts ; and the inhabitants, strongly imbued with the feelings of Helvetic independence, fearless and active as are all mountaineers, were in great part holders of national domains, and strongly imbued with the principles of the Revolution. They received him, in consequence, with open arms ; and his versatile disposition flattered the prevailing wish wherever he went. Everywhere he spread the announcements most likely to be agreeable to the simple people to whom they were addressed.¹

¹ Fleury de Chaboulon, i. 157, 171. Cap. i. 145. Beuch. iii. 149, 154.

79.
Napoleon's varied language to the soldiers and people.
March 2.

Sometimes he declared that he was weary of war ; that he would be as pacific as the Bourbons ; that he would abolish the *droits réunis*, and never revive the conscription : at others, that Austria had engaged to support him with a hundred thousand men : that Murat was following him with eighty thousand ; in fine, that the Congress had dethroned Louis XVIII. On all occasions he styled the people citizens, and spoke the language most calculated to revive the revolutionary fervour in their minds : “ Why had he come to France ? why had he hoisted the tricolor flag ? It was to restore the liberty

of 1789: to recognise all the privileges conquered by the Revolution; to secure the proprietors of the national domains menaced by the Bourbons; to give equal rights to all." Meanwhile the advance was pressed with extraordinary activity. In the first two days they marched fifty-four miles; at Digne, on the 4th, his proclamations were printed; near Sisteron the troops admired the good fortune which had left the formidable pass of the Saulce, between the Durance and an overhanging precipice, unguarded; at Gap he rested a few hours, and distributed his proclamations. Continuing his march with ceaseless vigour, he was already approaching Grenoble, when, on the 6th March, General Cambronne, at the head of the leading companies, met on the road of Vizille the advanced guard of the troops detached from the garrison of that fortress to arrest his progress. It was all in vain. "He advanced," says Chateaubriand, "without opposition, through those provinces where some months before they were ready to murder him. In the void formed around his gigantic shadow, if a few soldiers entered, they were invincibly attracted by the fascination of his eagles. His enemies sought him and found him not: he was shrouded in his glory as the lion of the Sahara desert is hid in the dazzling rays of the sun. Enveloped in a cloud of fire, the bloody phantoms of Arcola, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Eylau, the Moskwa, Lützen, Bautzen, formed his cortege, amidst a million of dead. From the midst of that column of fire and smoke, issued a few trumpet notes at the approach of towns, and their walls fell down at the sound. When Napoleon passed the Niemen at the head of four hundred thousand infantry and a hundred thousand cavalry, to invade the palace of the Czar, he was less wonderful than when, breaking his ban, casting his fetters in the face of kings, he came alone from Cannes to Paris to sleep quietly in the chateau of the Tuileries."¹

CHAP.
XCI.

1815.

March 4.

¹ Fleury de
Chaboulon,
i. 139, 147.
Cap. i. 145,
146. Beau-
champ, iii.
149, 161.
Chateaub.
vi. 359, 364.

Hitherto the march of Napoleon had been unresisted,

CHAP.
XCII.1815.
80.Defection of
Labeledoyère,
and his
character.

and the dispositions of the peasants in the country through which he had passed had been favourable ; but nothing was yet decided. It was not by the mountaineers of Dauphiny, but by the troops of France, that the contest for the throne was to be determined : in such an enterprise as he was now engaged in, the conduct of the first regiment generally determines the rest, and everything depends on the issue of the crisis which in the outset arrives. According to the plan which had been agreed on before Napoleon left Elba, part of the garrison of Grenoble, under the command of Colonel Labeledoyère, was to march out to meet him ; and from their treason the defection of the whole army was anticipated. Labeledoyère was an officer of handsome figure and elegant manners, descended of a respectable family, young, enthusiastic, and daring. He had owed his promotion and appointment to the royal court, but his heart dwelt on the glories of the empire : he had readily yielded at Paris to the seductions of the saloons of Hortense, recently created Duchess of St Leu, one of the most fascinating supporters of Napoleon ; and his mind, debased by the chicanery of the Revolution, saw nothing dishonourable in holding a high military command under the Bourbons, and employing the power it gave him to aid in their destruction. Charity forbids us to stigmatise such conduct by its true appellation. Infidelity and selfishness had totally perverted the human heart, and almost dried up the springs of conscience in many breasts. Marlborough himself, in similar circumstances, did the same. It is the strongest proof of the peril of revolution, and the infernal agency at work in its origination, that it overturns the whole principles of virtue in all hearts save those fortified by religion, and converts bravery and honour themselves into treachery and treason.¹

¹ Cap. i.
147, 148.
Chateaub.
xi. 359, 360.

An accidental circumstance, however, had well-nigh frustrated all these arrangements, and overthrown at its very outset this deep-laid conspiracy. General Marchand,

the governor of Grenoble, although an old comrade of Napoleon in Egypt, was a man of honour, faithful to his trust, and entirely ignorant of the treason at work in his garrison. He had despatched towards Vizille a battalion of infantry and some guns, not under Labedoyère, with orders to observe the enemy, and retire before them to the ramparts of Grenoble, but on no account to permit any communication with Napoleon's soldiers. It was with these men that Cambronne's advanced guard first came up: and he was filled with consternation upon finding, when he approached, that no signs of defection appeared, that no parleying was permitted between the troops, and that resistance was evidently prepared. He immediately despatched an aide-de camp to the Emperor, with the alarming intelligence. "We have been deceived," said Napoleon to Bertrand, "but it is no matter—forward!" Advancing then to the front of the advanced guard, in the well-known surtout and cocked hat which had become canonised in the recollection of the soldiers, he said aloud to the opposite rank, in a voice tremulous with emotion, "Comrades, do you know me again?" "Yes, sire," exclaimed the men. "Do you recognise me, my children?" he added. "I am your Emperor: fire on me if you wish: fire on your father: here is my bosom," and with that he bared his breast. At these words, the transports of the soldiers could no longer be restrained; as if struck by an electric shock they all broke their ranks, threw themselves at the feet of the Emperor, embraced his knees with tears of joy, and with indescribable fervour again raised the old cry of *Vive l'Empereur!* Hardly had they risen from the ground, when the tricolor cockade was seen on every breast; the eagles reappeared on the standards; and the whole detachment sent out to combat the Emperor, ranged itself with fervent devotion on his side. The spot where this memorable meeting occurred is marked by a tree which overhangs the road, amidst those savage Alpine solitudes:¹ few more interest-

CHAP.
XCII.

1815.

64.

Memorial de
Bertrand à
Napoleon
written from
the troops,
March 7.

¹ Cap. i.
149, 150.
Fluury de
Chaboulon,
i. 173, 174.
Personal
observation
of the spot.

CHAP.
XCII.

1815.

82.
His entry
into Gre-
noble.

ing scenes are to be met with, even on the time-hallowed shores of the Mediterranean sea.

Meanwhile Labedoyère had assembled his regiment, and, in defiance alike of the commands of General Marchand, and of the injunctions of the prefect, who in vain endeavoured to retain him in his duty, left Grenoble at the head of his men, in the most violent state of excitement. Hardly was he out of the gates, when he drew an eagle from his pocket, which he embraced before the soldiers, who shouted *Vive l'Empereur!* and a drum having been opened containing tricolor cockades, which were immediately distributed among the men, the whole, amidst tumultuous shouts of joy, advanced and met Napoleon. He bestowed on Labedoyère the most flattering marks of regard, and the united columns, now nearly three thousand strong, in the afternoon approached the fortress. Marchand and the prefect did their utmost to induce the garrison to resist, but all their efforts were in vain; the *prestige* of the Emperor was irresistible; and, finding their orders disregarded, they took the part of men of honour, and retired from situations of trust in which they could no longer exercise their functions. Soon after Napoleon arrived at the gates of Grenoble, behind which an enthusiastic crowd of soldiers and citizens was assembled, in the most vehement state of exultation. The gates were locked, but they were soon forced open: and Napoleon made his entry by torch-light, amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants, and took up his abode at the Cheval Blanc, kept by an old veteran of his Guard.¹

¹ Flcury de
Charboulon,
i. 174, 177.
Cap. i. 130,
132.

83.
His decrees
from the 10th
March 8.

Three decrees of great importance were issued by the Emperor from Grenoble. The first declared that all the acts of government should henceforth run in his name; this was in effect to resume the throne. By the second, the National Guards of the five neighbouring departments were called out and placed in activity. By the third, the fortress of Grenoble was intrusted to these National

Guards. At the same time, he explained in conversation to M. Champollion the view which he took of the altered state of his affairs. "The Bourbons," said he, "had accustomed the people to political rights: he was prepared to follow out the same system—in a word, to apply to the cause of the Revolution the results of a constitutional government." In conformity with these ideas, he said, in answer to an address from the authorities and citizens of Grenoble, "I have been too fond of war: I will wage it no longer: I return to restore its rights to the nation: I desire only to be its first citizen." In proclamations drawn in the masculine spirit of ancient oratory, one addressed to the French people, the other to the army, he repudiated the idea of their defeat, ascribed their misfortunes to treachery, and invited them again to range themselves around the tricolor standard.¹

CHAP.
XIII.

1-15.

March 1.
¹ *Moniteur*,
March 21,
1-15.
Fleury de
Chaboulon,
i. 224, 230.

"Soldiers!" said he, "we have not been conquered! Two men, sprung from our ranks, have betrayed our laurels, their country, their prince, their benefactor. Shall those whom we have seen during twenty years fly over every part of Europe to raise up opposition against us; who have passed their lives in the enemies' camps uttering execrations against our beautiful France; shall they pretend to command us, to enchain our eagles—they who have so often quailed beneath their glance? Shall we suffer them to reap the fruits of our glorious labours—to take possession of our honours, of our effects—to calumniate your glory? Should their reign continue, all would be lost—even to the recollection of your glorious days: with what bitterness do they denounce them! how do they seek to detract from what the world admires! and if any defenders of your glory yet remain, it is among our ancient antagonists on the field of battle. Soldiers! in my exile I have heard your voice: I have come hither through all perils, despite all obstacles: your general, called to the throne by the choice of the people, and elevated on your bucklers, is restored to you. Come and join

84
His noble
proclamation
to the
troops.

CHAP.

XCII.

1815.

him : come and range yourselves under the standards of your chief : he has no existence but in yours : his interest, his honour, his glory, are no other than yours. Victory will march at the *pas de charge* ; the eagle, with the national colours, will fly from steeple to steeple, till it lights on the towers of Notre Dame. There you will be able in safety to boast of what you have done : you will be the deliverers of your country. In your old age, surrounded and respected by your fellow-citizens, you will recount your great deeds : you will say with pride— ‘ And I, too, was part of that army which entered twice into the walls of Vienna, which passed twice through those of Rome, of Berlin, of Madrid, of Moscow : which delivered Paris from the stains that treason had affixed to it. Honour to those brave soldiers, the glory of their country ! and shame to the criminal Frenchmen, in what rank soever fortune may have originally placed them, who have combated twenty-five years with the stranger to tear in pieces their country ! ’¹

¹ *Moniteur*,
March 21,
1815. *Cuv.*
i. 135, 157.

85.

Measures
taken at
Paris on the
news being
received.

While Napoleon was thus thundering forth proclamations destined to strike again the strong chord of French nationality, to thrill every patriotic heart with emotion, and in their ultimate effects to convulse Europe from end to end, the court of the Tuileries, thunderstruck with the intelligence, vacillated between affected indifference and real apprehension. On the morning of the 3d March, a telegraphic despatch from the prefect of Toulon announced the landing of Napoleon in the gulf of St Juan : and soon after the full details were received. M. Blacas treated the enterprise with contempt, as the last effort of a madman. Louis XVIII. judged differently : from the outset he declared that it threatened the most serious consequences. The Duc de Berri, desirous of glory, could not conceal the joy which he felt at an event which he doubted not would add his name to those of the paladins of the monarchy. Three days after the first news had been received, the confidence of the court continued unabated,

March 3.

and exhaled in an indignant proclamation, which proved a feeble counterpoise to the heart-stirring appeals of Napoleon, which were already beginning to convulse France.¹ As, however, the unresisted approach of the Emperor to Grenoble, and the defection of the garrison of that fortress, became known, alarm spread through all classes, and even the most devoted adherents of the Bourbons began to tremble for the result. An indescribable confusion pervaded the court; and while the columns of the *Moniteur* were filled with loyal addresses from the marshals, superior officers, and all the constituted authorities, that general quiver, the invariable precursor of revolution, was distinctly visible in all classes. A royal proclamation convoked the two Chambers with all possible expedition: the Comte d'Artois was despatched, in company with the Duc d'Orléans and Marshal Macdonald, to Lyons, the former to secure the adhesion of the Constitutionalists, the latter to steady the wavering fidelity of the army. A special messenger was despatched to the Duc d'Angoulême, who, with the duchess, had recently before set off for Bordeaux to celebrate the first anniversary of the raising of the Royalist standard in that city, to warn him of the danger, and the necessity of rousing the southern provinces; the Duc de Bourbon was sent down to la Vendée, to endeavour, by the great name of Condé, to revive the devoted fidelity of the peasants of the Bocage;¹

CHAP.
XIII.

1815.

March 6.

¹ *Moniteur*,
March 6,
1815. *Cop.*
i. 155, 162.
Tab. x.
226, 227.
Banch. iii.
168, 175.

* " Buonaparte has escaped from the island of Elba, where the imprudent magnanimity of the allied sovereigns had given him a sovereignty, in return for the desolations which he had brought into their dominions. That man, who, when he abdicated his power, retained all his ambition and his fury: that man, covered with the blood of generations, comes at the end of a year, spent seemingly in apathy, to strive to dispute, in the name of his usurpation, and his massacres, the legitimate and mild authority of the King of France. At the head of a few hundred Italians and Piedmontese, he has dared again to set his foot on that land which had banished him for ever; he wishes to reopen the wounds, still but half-closed, which he had made, and which the hand of the king is healing every day. A few treasonable attempts, some movements in Italy excited by his insane brother-in-law, inflamed the pride of the cowardly warrior of Fontenoy-leau. He exposes himself, as he imagines, to the death of a hero; he will only die that of a traitor. France has rejected him: he returns; France will devour him." *Monit.* 7, 6th March 1815.

CHAP.
XCII.

1815.

So,
Ineffectual
attempt to
stimulate a
Royalist
resistance.

while the command of an army of reserve, to be formed at Essone and Fontainebleau, destined specially for the defence of the capital, was intrusted to the Duc de Berri.

Great efforts were made by the court to stimulate a Royalist resistance ; but they were only partially successful. Louis went in person to the Chamber of Deputies, and pronounced in person a noble address. " In this moment of danger," said he, " when the public enemy has invaded our country, I come into the midst of you to draw closer the bonds which unite us together. I have again seen my country : I have reconciled it with foreign nations, who will prove themselves, be assured, faithful to the treaties they have signed. I have laboured for the good of my people : I have received the most touching marks of their love. Can I, at the age of sixty, devote my life better than in its defence ? I fear nothing for myself, therefore. He who has brought the torch of civil war brings amongst us also the scourge of foreign warfare : he comes to place our country under a yoke of iron : he comes to destroy that constitutional charter which I have given ; that charter which will constitute my best epitaph in the eyes of posterity." But it was all in vain. In Paris, indeed, the young men of the universities, aware that France owed to the Bourbons its first decided step in the path of freedom, which Napoleon would speedily close, and that the conscription and wars would soon decimate their ranks if the Imperial regime were restored, enrolled themselves with alacrity as volunteers. But the youth of the country, constituting nine-tenths of the physical strength of the nation, hung back. They had a latent dread of the resumption of the national domains by the Royalist government, because they felt that justice demanded their restitution : they identified Napoleon with their cause and that of the Revolution, because he had risen from their ranks ; and they were so thoroughly exhausted by previous wars, that neither for one party nor the other could they be

induced to make any movement whatever. The great bulk of the influential citizens in towns were favourable to the government of the Restoration, and entertained a serious dread of the resumption of supreme power by Napoleon; but they were few in number, unarmed, and undisciplined. The rural population regarded the Bourbons with undisguised aversion; but they, too, were apathetic, and desired only to remain with their ploughs. The whole real strength of the nation, at least for an immediate struggle, was placed in the army; and it, with the exception of a few regiments of royal guards at Paris, was unanimous, in all but the superior ranks, in favour of the Emperor. It was not difficult to foresee what must be the result of a civil war commenced among a people placed in such circumstances.¹

The court, however, was strongly supported, in words at least, by the marshals and dignified functionaries of the empire. Marshal Soult, as minister at war, issued a vehement proclamation to the troops, in which he stigmatised the ex-Emperor's enterprise as the work of an insensate madman, and conjured them by every feeling of honour, patriotism, and fidelity, to abide by the lily banner.* The columns of the *Moniteur* were loaded for

CHAP.
XIII.
1-15.

1 Fleury de
Chaboulon,
i. 227, 231.
C. p. 3, 193,
161, 165.
x. 227, 228.

87.
Soult's and
Ney's pro-
testations of
fidelity.

* "Soldiers! That man who so lately abdicated in the face of all Europe a usurped power of which he made so fatal a use—Bonaparte—has descended on the French soil, which he should never have seen again. What does he desire? Civil war. Whom does he seek? Traitors. Where will he find them? Will it be among the soldiers, whom he has deceived and sacrificed a thousand times, in misleading their valour? Will it be in the bosom of their families, whom his bare name fills with a shudder? Bonaparte despises us enough, to think that we are capable of abandoning a legitimate and beloved monarch, to share the lot of a man who is now but an adventurer. He believes it, madman that he is! And his last act of insanity reveals him entirely. Soldiers! The French army is the bravest army in Europe—it will also be the most faithful. Let us rally round the spotless lily banner at the voice of the father of his people, of the worthy inheritor of the virtues of the great Henry. He has himself traced to you the path which you ought to follow: he has put at your head that prince, the model of French chevaliers, whose happy return to his country has chased the usurper from it, and who now sets forth by his presence to destroy his single and last hope." LE MARÉCHAL DE CAUL, D'ARTEMATIE, *Moniteur*, 7th March 1815; and THIERRY, x. 228, 229. Contrast this with Soult's proclamation to his soldiers, on March 14, 1814, *ibid.* Chap. LXXXVII. § 61; and say what is the consistency or fidelity of a revolution.

CHAP.
XCII.
—
1815.

above a fortnight with addresses in the same strain from the municipality of Paris and the other great towns in France, the whole courts of law, universities, and colleges in the kingdom: the marshals and officers in command, whether of armies or garrisons: in fine, the whole authorities and constituted bodies throughout the monarchy. Recollecting what followed, a more melancholy instance of human baseness is not to be found in the annals of mankind, Benjamin Constant, in an eloquent article in the *Moniteur*, thundered against the insensate madman, who, after having thrice deserted his faithful followers, now sought again to light in Europe the torch of war.* Marshal Ney, in particular, expressed in the loudest terms his indignation at the insane attempt of the Emperor; and such faith did the government put in his fidelity, that they intrusted him with the command of the army assembling at Lons-le-Saulnier to stop the progress of the invaders. On the 7th March, he presented himself at the levee at the Tuileries to take leave of the King, previous to setting out for his command. "Sire," said he, "I will bring back Buonaparte in an iron cage."† "Farewell!" replied the monarch, "I trust to your honour and fidelity." These words, coming from so renowned a warrior and so brave a man, made a great impression, and nothing was talked of in Paris for some days but Marshal Ney, his fidelity, and the iron cage.¹

¹ Cap. i.
164. Beau-
champ, iii.
172, 173.
Moniteur,
March 6 to
18, 1815.
Chateaub.
vi. 363.

* "It is he who during fourteen years has undermined and destroyed liberty. He had not for doing so the excuse of recollections: he was not born to the throne. It is his fellow citizens whom he has enchained—his equals he has enchained. What sort of liberty does he now promise us?—Are we not a thousand times more free than under his empire? He promises us victory; and thrice has he left his troops in Egypt, in Spain, in Russia, to the triple agency of cold, misery, and despair. He has brought on France the humiliation of being invaded; he has lost not only his own conquests, but those we had made before his time. He promises us peace, and his name is the signal of universal war. The people who should trust to his word would become the object of European hatred; his triumph would be the commencement of a combat for life or death with the civilised world."—See CHATEAUBRIAND, *Mémoires*, vi. 363.

† The truth of this statement is undoubted: Marshal Ney admitted he had said so at his subsequent trial.—See *Procès de Ney*, 37; and CAPILLIGIE, i. 264.

Mortier received the command in the north of France; Angereau was sent to Normandy; full powers were forwarded to Massena at Toulon; Oudinot was at Marseilles: and everything announced the most vigorous resistance. But meanwhile the progress of Napoleon was unopposed: defection after defection succeeded in the army; and it was unhappily soon apparent that the corps of thirty thousand men, which, by direction of Marshal Soult, had been formed in echelon on the frontier, between Besançon and Lyons, to observe the threatened movements of Murat, was giving the most fatal examples of disaffection. This circumstance was immediately ascribed to the treacherous forethought of the war minister; the clamour daily became louder as the defection of one regiment after another was ascertained; and at length it arose to such a height, that he was publicly denounced in the Chamber of Deputies as a confederate of Napoleon, and obliged to resign his appointment. His successor, Clarke, began in the right spirit, when, in the order of the day announcing his appointment to the army, he said, "No capitulation can be entered into without infamy; and, sooner or later, without punishment. To what a deplorable illusion do those abandon themselves who now yield to the voice of a man who is coming to tear asunder France by the hands of Frenchmen, and abandon it a second time to the fire and sword of strangers!" But though a momentary confidence was restored by the energetic conduct of the new war minister, the accounts from the south daily added strength to the melancholy conviction that all was lost. The Comte d'Artois, with the Duc d'Orleans and Marshal MacDonald, had arrived at Lyons, the second city in the kingdom, and the first likely to be exposed to the seduction of Napoleon; and though they were received with enthusiasm by the higher, more opulent, and educated classes, yet the lower orders hardly attempted to conceal their joy at the return of the tricolor standard.¹ The

CHAP.
XCII.

B-15.

C3.

Dismissal of
Soult, and
the Corps
of Angereau
Lyons.

March 12.

¹ Cap. i.
201, 203.
Reuch.
iii. 194.
201, Trib.
x. 230, 231.

CHAP.
XCII.

1815.

National Guard, as usual in all serious crises, was divided and irresolute; while the disposition of the soldiers was so manifest, that they refused to obey the orders given for putting the city in a state of defence, and already began to murmur because they had not been led out to join the standard of their beloved Emperor.

§9.
Advance of
Napoleon
to Lyons.
March 12.

It was soon apparent from the agitation among the troops, the ardent enthusiasm of the inferior officers, and the universal disregard of the orders of the superior, that the crisis was approaching, and that Napoleon might ere long be expected on the opposite bank of the Rhone. In effect he soon appeared, surrounded by an immense concourse of soldiers, national guards, and peasants, on the road leading from Port-Beauvoisin. The Comte d'Artois, on being informed by the prefect that the case was hopeless, left Lyons, and retired on the road to Paris. MacDonald waited a little longer, but without being able to produce any impression on the troops; and hardly had he left the city, when Napoleon, at the head of his advanced guard, entered the suburb of La Guillotière, and amidst the enthusiastic cheers of an immense crowd, composed for the most part of the lowest class of the inhabitants, by whom he was conducted to the palace of the archbishop, where he received the keys of the city. None of the constituted authorities, however, and few of the respectable citizens, attended his levee. This great success at once gave the Emperor the command of the centre of France; emissaries joined him from all quarters, and were despatched by him in all directions; and he openly assumed the direction of the government.¹

¹ Flory de
Chaboulon,
i. 207, 216.

§9.
Important
decrees issued from
the city.
March 13.

Considering himself as now virtually in possession of the supreme authority, he issued three decrees, the first dissolving the Chambers of Peers and of Deputies, enjoining the Deputies to return forthwith to their homes, and convoking the electoral colleges for an extraordinary assembly in the May ensuing; the second banishing anew the whole emigrants returned to France, who had not

already obtained letters of amnesty from the imperial or republican governments; the third abolishing titles of honour and nobility, and restoring the whole laws of the Constituent Assembly in that respect, under reservation of those who had obtained titles for national services, and which had been verified at the council. By a fourth decree, not less important than the former, the whole emigrant officers in the army, who had received commissions since 1st April 1814, were struck off the list, and the minister at war was absolutely prohibited from granting them any pay, even for past services. These decrees at once indicated the spirit of the government of the Hundred Days, which was never departed from during the whole of their continuance. It was no longer the Imperial conqueror, whose will was law, and who was striving to reconstruct the scattered fragments of monarchical power, who was at the head of affairs. It was the Consul of the Revolution who was now in the ascendant; and the Emperor, constrained by misfortune to court the alliance of those whom, of all men, he most cordially detested, was glad to purchase the passive acquiescence of the nation, by the adoption of principles which he had spent his life in combating.¹

CHAP.
XCII.
1815.

¹ Moniteur, March 21, 1815. Cap. i. 207, 211. Beauch. iii. 265, 215. Fleury de Chaboulon, i. 217, 222.

Meanwhile, Marshal Ney travelled rapidly, on the way to the army, to Auxerre, where he alighted at the hotel of M. Gamotte, the prefect, his brother-in-law, and a warm partisan of Napoleon. Doubts were there, for the first time, instilled into the marshal's mind as to the possibility of upholding the cause of the Bourbons; and these increased as he advanced nearer to Lyons, and perceived the vehement fermentation which was arising in all the towns and among the troops, on the approach of Napoleon. The Emperor, well aware of the vacillating and irresolute character of his lieutenant everywhere but on the field of battle, besieged him incessantly with emissaries, who represented the cause of the Bourbons as irrevocably ruined, appealed to his old recollections, and repeated

91.
Flagrant
treason of
Marshal
Ney.

CHAP.
XCII.

1815.

with warmth, "The Emperor has no rancour against you; he stretches out his arms to receive you; he agrees with you as to the stranger: there will be no more war: the national principles are about to triumph." These earnest appeals from his old companion in arms proved too strong for the fidelity of the marshal. In charity to so brave an enemy, let the British historian adopt the version of his deplorable and disgraceful treachery which he himself has given. "I had, in fact," said he at his trial, "kissed the hand of the king, his majesty having presented it to me when he wished me a good journey; the descent of Buonaparte appeared to me so extravagant that I spoke of it with indignation, and made use, in truth, of the expression of the iron cage. In the night of the 13th of March—down to which time I protest my fidelity—I received a proclamation drawn by Napoleon, which I signed. Before reading it to the troops, I read it to General Bourmont, who was of opinion that it was necessary to join Buonaparte, and that the Bourbons had committed such follies that they could no longer be supported." On the 14th, accordingly, the fatal proclamation was published to the troops, which afterwards cost him his life, and has for ever disgraced his memory.¹ France was far indeed from

¹ Cap. i.
211, 215.
Procès de
Marshal
Ney, 32.
Beauch. iii.
235, 245.

* "Officers and soldiers! the cause of the Bourbons is irrevocably lost! The legitimate dynasty which the French nation has adopted is about again to mount the throne; it is to the Emperor Napoleon, our sovereign, that it alone belongs to reign over this beautiful country. What care we whether the noblesse of the Bourbons shall determine again to emigrate or remain amongst us? The sacred cause of liberty and of our independence shall no longer be blasted by their presence. They have sought to wither our military laurels, but they are deceived. Those laurels are the fruit of noble toils, which are for ever engraven in our memories. Soldiers! the time has gone by when mankind were to be governed by stifling their voice; liberty triumphs at last, and Napoleon, our august Emperor, is about to establish it for ever. Let this noble cause henceforth be ours, and that of all Frenchmen; let all the brave men whom I have the honour to command be penetrated with that great truth. Soldiers! I have often led you to victory; now I am about to unite you to that immortal phalanx which Napoleon leads to Paris, and which will arrive there in a few days; and there our hopes and our happiness will be for ever realised. *Vive l'Empereur!*"—*Le Maréchal de l'Empire*, PRINCE DE LA MOSKWA, *Louise-Sarah*, 12th March 1815; *Moniteur*, 21st March 1815; and CAPITULE, i. 215.

the days when the Chevalier Bayard, addressing the Constable de Bourbon with dying voice, when stretched on the wayside in the valley of Aosta, with his eyes fixed on the cross of his sword-hilt, said, "Pity not me; pity those who fight against their king, their country, and their oath."

Ney himself read the proclamation to his troops, and as soon as it was over, threw his hat in the air, waved his sabre, and cried, "*Vive l'Empereur!*" The enthusiasm of the soldiers knew no bounds; the privates, drummers, and inferior officers of all the regiments, foot and horse, mixed, crowded in ecstacy round the Marshal to express their gratitude; caps and sabres were waved aloft in air with frantic joy. But the superior officers kept aloof; and many honourable men, particularly Lecourbe and Beauregard, openly expressed their detestation at a step which, recalling the shameless treachery of the Prætorian Guards in the lower empire, had for ever disgraced the French army. The defection of Ney, which was immediately followed by that of his whole army, proved at once fatal to the royal authority. Not only was there no longer any obstacle whatever to the approach of Napoleon to Paris, but every possible facility was afforded to it; for, the troops sent out to oppose him having all joined the Imperial standards, he was advancing at the head of a formidable force to the capital. Nor were affairs less menacing in the northern and eastern provinces. In the former, Lefebvre Desnouettes, having set out from Paris for that purpose, had penetrated into La Fère, corrupted its garrison, and having been checked by the firmness and fidelity of General Abouville, the governor, renewed his attempts on the principal towns of Picardy, the garrisons of which were with difficulty retained in their duty. Meanwhile d'Erlon, at Lille, led out his troops on the road to Paris to join in the conspiracy; but he was met on the way by Mortier, on his road to take the command in the northern fortresses, sent back to Lille, and arrested.¹

CHAP.
XIII.
—
1815.

92.
General de-
fection of
the army.

¹ Deauch, ii.
207, 223.
Cap. i. 218,
221. Thib.
x. 232, 233.

CHAP.
XCII.

1815.

93.
Conduct of
the court in
the last
extremity.
March 11.

It was by this fortunate event alone that the means of escape were left open to the royal family.

In this extremity the measures of the government were as vigorous as the exigency of the circumstances required; but all their efforts were rendered unavailing by the want of any armed force to defend the throne. The Chamber of Deputies met, in pursuance of the summons of the king; loyal addresses were carried by a vast majority, thanks in profusion voted to the officers and soldiers who, in this trying crisis, had adhered to their duty and their oaths; the garrisons of Antibes and La Fère were declared to have deserved well of their country; Marshals Macdonald and Mortier received the warmest applause from both houses; and the court for a brief season flattered themselves that by these measures, and the influence of the legislature on the public mind, the progress of treason in the army and disaffection in the people would be arrested. The intrepid Royalists, with Chateaubriand and Marmont at their head, proposed to send the royal family into different parts of France, and retain only the king in Paris, to barricade the streets, and summon the National Guards from the provinces for his defence. "Let us," said Chateaubriand, "line the quays and terraces of the palace with cannon. Let Buonaparte attack us if he dare in that position; let him bombard Paris if he chooses; let him render himself odious to the entire population, and we shall see the result. Let us resist only three days, and victory is our own. The king defending himself in his palace, will awaken a universal enthusiasm. If he must die, let the last exploit of Napoleon be the murder of an old man. Louis XVIII., in sacrificing his life, will gain the only battle he has fought: he will gain it for the human race." But it was all in vain. The Chamber felt its weakness against the only armed force in the kingdom. The time was past when a vote of the legislature could make the arms drop from the soldiers' hands; the Revolution had accustomed them

to violent changes in the government; the Prætorian Guards laughed at votes of the Chambers, and were resolved to have an Emperor of their own selection. The fatal news of the treachery of Marshal Ney, and the defection of his troops, paralysed every heart. It at once demonstrated that the army had determined to place the Emperor on the throne, and that all hope for the Royalists was lost. Driven from every other position, the government endeavoured to stop the movement by frequent and earnest appeals to the charter, which were carried by great majorities in both Chambers, by whom Napoleon was denounced as a public enemy. But what was the charter to an impassioned soldiery, or the denunciation of the conqueror by the legislature to the ruthless veterans who sighed for the restoration of the glory, licence, and plunder to which he had accustomed them?¹

Every post brought accounts of the desertion of fresh bodies of men, and the universal transport which had seized upon the army. The defection of Lyons, and of Ney in Burgundy, determined the troops assembled as the last reserve at Essonne and Fontainebleau: and the despatches of the Duc de Berri and Marshal Oudinot, who commanded them, announced that they could no longer be relied on. As a last resource, the aged king appealed to the honour and loyalty of the French character, but in vain. "I have pledged myself," said he, "to the allied sovereigns for the fidelity of the army in the face of Europe. If Napoleon triumphs, five hundred thousand strangers will immediately inundate France. You who follow at this moment other standards than mine, I see in you nothing but children led astray: abjure your error: come and throw yourselves into the arms of your father, and I pledge my honour that all shall be forgotten." Vain words! The army rejected with contempt the proffered amnesty: the Chamber of Deputies in vain called on the youth of France to imitate those of Prussia, and enrol themselves for the defence of their country.² Fruitless

CHAP.
XIII.
1815.

March 16.
1. M. 27, 28.
March 16.
Hist. Parl.
xl. 63, 75.
Chateaub.
vi. 374.

94.
The universal
defection
of the troops
compels the
King to fly.

March 18.
2. Proclama-
tion, March
18, 1815.
Moniteur,
March 18.
Cic. v. 223,
255, 261, 5.
x. 239, 241.
Bacon, l. 1.
223, 241.
Hist. Parl.
xl. 63, 80.

CHAP.
XCII.
—
1815.

was the promise that the approaching campaign should count triple to the troops, and a national recompense be awarded to those who distinguished themselves by their fidelity. All, all was shattered against the treason and revolt of the army.

95.
The king
retires from
Paris and
goes to
Ghent.

At length the fatal hour arrived. On the 19th March a review of the national and royal guards took place ; but few of the former, and still fewer volunteers, were to be seen ; and after it was over, the latter, instead of taking the road to Fontainebleau, as had been announced, to combat the enemy, defiled by that to Beauvais, evidently to cover the retreat of the royal family. At dinner, the king announced to the few faithful friends who still adhered to him, that he was about to abandon the Tuileries. Tears fell from every eye ; the mournful prospect of a second exile, of France subjected again to military despotism, vanquished, overrun, and probably partitioned, arose in gloomy prospective to every mind,

March 19. The king, calm and resigned, addressed a few words of comfort to each, and, after making a few necessary arrangements, signed a proclamation dissolving the Chambers, directing the members forthwith to separate and to assemble again at such place as the king should appoint. This proclamation, drawn up on the night of the 19th, appeared in the *Moniteur* of the 20th, when Paris was, literally speaking, without a government ; for the king and royal family departed at midnight, taking the road to

March 20. Beauvais. They travelled rapidly ; by noon on the 20th they were at Abbéville, and in the evening at Lille, the capital of French Flanders. There they received proofs of fidelity to which, in old France, they had long been strangers. The inhabitants, untouched by the profligacy of the Revolution, crowded round the illustrious exiles with unfeigned enthusiasm, and manifested such sympathy, that the king was induced to establish his residence there for a few days ; and more than one royal ordinance bears date from that place. Louis, in that

March 21
and 22.

extremity, and on the verge of his dominions, evinced the inherent firmness of his race. He abated nothing of his lofty bearing, would not abandon an iota of his hereditary rights : he seemed to say—"You may kill me, but you cannot kill the ages engraven on my forehead." It was soon discovered, however, that the garrison could not be trusted. In vain Marshals Maedonald and Mortier exerted themselves, with an energy worthy of the ancient loyalty and present warlike renown of the French army, to retain the troops in the path of their duty. The contagion was universal ; the intelligence that Napoleon had entered Paris, rendered the excitement irresistible ; the men maintained that it was intended to give them up to the stranger, and loudly declared that they would not imbrue their hands in the blood of their fellow-soldiers. Meanwhile, the royal guard and volunteers who had followed the King into French Flanders, worn out by marching, misled by perfidy, repelled from every fortified gate, melted away or disappeared ; and the unhappy Louis, finding treachery and disaffection thickening on all sides around him, was glad to leave Lille, abandon the French territory, and take the road by Ypres to Ghent, where he established his court on the 25th, and remained during the melancholy period of the Hundred Days.¹

Meanwhile Napoleon travelled so rapidly from Lyons that his faithful Guard could not keep up with his carriage, and on the 19th he reached Fontainebleau. He has himself described the journey from Frejus to Paris as being the happiest period of his life :² and it is not surprising that it was so ; for it at once restored his fortunes and penetrated his heart : it was prodigal of enthusiasm and redolent of joy ; it banished melancholy and revived hope. During that enchanting journey the Emperor seemed to tread on air. Borne aloft on the enthusiasm of the soldiers and the ardour of a portion of the people, he literally flew to empire : the throne of the Bourbons sank before his approach, the glories of the Empire seemed to

CHAP.
XIII.

1-15.

March 25.
Hist. Parl.
xI. 80, 81.
Cap. i. 243,
249. Beau-
champ, iii.
249, 255,
325, 340.
Chateaub.
Mém. vi.
417.

96.
Napoleon
arrives at
Fontaine-
bleau, and
reaches
Paris at
night.
² Las Cases,
iv. 242.

CHAP.
XCII.

1815.

1 Ante, ch.

lxxxix. §

26.

2 Moniteur,

March 21,

1815. Hist.

Parl. xl. 86.

87. Cap. i.

251, 253.

Thib. x.

251, 253.

Fleury de

Chaboulon,

i. 239.

97.

Universal

transports

among the

Imperial

party.

redescend upon his brows. Such was the rapture which this marvellous resurrection inspired in his mind, that it was not even for a moment damped by the sight of Fontainebleau, and the spot where he had addressed his faithful Guard.¹ With almost infantine joy he wandered over the splendid apartments of the palace, the successive scene of his festivity and his wretchedness, and conversed familiarly with his attendants on the beauty of the undulated outline of the forest, and the vast marble basins where the swans exhibited their stately plumage.²

It was not surprising that such all-absorbing transports had seized the mind of the Emperor, for the intelligence from Paris exceeded his most sanguine expectations. Couriers from Lavalette, the postmaster, who had long secretly, and now openly, espoused his cause, announced, early on the morning of the 20th, that the king and royal family had left the Tuileries the night before, and that the Emperor's arrival was anxiously expected. He set out, in consequence, at two o'clock in the afternoon, but purposely delayed his progress, so that it was a quarter to nine at night before his carriage entered the court of the Tuileries. This was done in order that the population of the capital, with the majority of whom the Emperor was well aware he was not popular, should not be made acquainted with his arrival, and accordingly they remained in ignorance of it. But the doors of the palace, and the whole inner court of the Carrousel, from the triumphal arch to the foot of the great staircase, were filled with a crowd of generals, officers, and soldiers, who were in the secret, and who received their beloved chief with the most unbounded transports of joy. The moment that the carriage stopped he was seized by those next the door, borne aloft in their arms, amidst deafening cheers, through a dense and brilliant crowd of epaulettes, hurried literally above the heads of the throng up the great stair into the saloon of reception, where a splendid array of the ladies of the imperial court, adorned with a profusion of violet

bouquets, half-concealed in the richest laces, received him with transports, and imprinted fervent kisses on his cheeks, his hands, and even his dress. Never was such a scene witnessed in history. If it was not such a demonstration of national enthusiasm, it was more personally gratifying than the English joy at the return of Charles II. ; for it was not the gratitude of a people for the restoration of a government, but the transports of a party for the return of a man.¹

CHAP.

XIII.

1776.

¹ Chap. i.

253, 254.

T. 36, 37.

252, 253.

CHAPTER XCIII.

HUNDRED DAYS: TO THE CLOSE OF THE BATTLE OF LIGNY.
MARCH 21—JUNE 17, 1815.

CHAP.
XCIII.
1815.
1.
Great diffi-
culties of
Napoleon.

NAPOLÉON might well have asked on this night, like Voltaire on his last return to Paris, whether they meant to make him die of joy; and he has without doubt truly described this day as the most delightful of his life. But it was also his last of unmixed satisfaction. After the transports of the first reception were over, and he retired to rest in the imperial apartments of the Tuileries, he had leisure to reflect on the situation in which he was placed, and the means he possessed of maintaining his position on the dizzy pinnacle on which he was again elevated. On landing in the gulf of St Juan, his first words had been "*Voilà le Congrès dissous*;"* but he had too much penetration not to be aware that the effect would be just the reverse: that his return would at once terminate all the divisions, and still all the jealousies which were beginning to alienate the European sovereigns; and that legions as formidable as those beneath which he had already sunk would ere long inundate his dominions. To meet the forces of coalesced Europe, the means at his disposal were fearfully diminished. Nothing, indeed, could exceed the ardour and enthusiasm of the army and of the imperial functionaries, and he could reckon with

* "*Here is the Congress dissolved.*"

certainly on their cordial support; but the troops under arms did not exceed a hundred thousand, and even if the whole veterans were recalled to his standards, their number would not be more than doubled. The civil *employés* were incapable of forming a corps in the field; and, amidst all the transports of his journey from St Juan, he had perceived, with secret disquietude, that his supporters were chiefly to be found in the very lowest class, and that the more respectable peasants in the country, and citizens in the towns, gazed with silent wonder on his progress. The want of any cordial demonstration of attachment in Paris itself, save among the military, his immediate adherents, and the lowest of the people, had struck him with astonishment. General support from the physical strength of the nation he could not hope for: the recollection of the conscription was too recent, the horror at war too strong, the exhaustion of the military population too complete, to permit any effectual aid: and, strange to say, the mighty conqueror who had been borne to the throne on the shoulders of the army, found his chief embarrassment to arise from the want of military resources.¹

CHAP.

XCHII.

1-15.

¹ Cap. i.
255, 256.
Thib. x.
253, 257.
Fleury de
Chaboulon,
i. 259, 260.

The very next morning showed on what an altered and precarious footing his authority was now placed. The whole troops in Paris, indeed, assembled with tumultuous joy in the court of the Tuileries: enthusiastic cheers burst from them when the Emperor appeared: and they received with rapture the veterans of the Old Guard, who had now been forwarded by post-horses from Lyons, and whose sunburnt visages, worn shoes, and dirty garments, showed the fatigues they had undergone in keeping up with the rapid advance of their chief. But when he came to make his appointments for the actual government, a very different disposition manifested itself. The imperial party were all in raptures at Napoleon's return: but very few among them were willing to accept the perilous honour of a situation of responsibility in his

²
His great
diff. they in
allazup
his appoint-
ments.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

government. A secret sense of their shameful tergiversations ; a feeling that they were disgraced in the eyes of Europe, by their successive treacheries to the empire and the restoration ; a clear perception of the danger with which any prominent situation would be attended under this second revolutionary dynasty, kept almost all the leading men in the outset aloof from his service. Fouché was the first person he sent for : it was a signal proof to what straits the Emperor was reduced, when he was obliged to commence with the old blood-stained regicide, for whose treachery to himself he had formerly said with truth, that the scaffold would have been the appropriate punishment.¹*

¹ Fleury de
Chab. i.
261, 263.
Cap. i. 256,
254. Thib.
x. 260, 261.

3.
His civil
and military
appoint-
ments.

Fouché, aware of his importance as the head of the old Republican party, upon whose temporary alliance with the army the Emperor's power was entirely founded, made his own terms. He at first proposed that he should be made minister of foreign affairs ; but Napoleon was desirous that he should return to his old situation as head of the police, to which he at length acceded, from a belief, which the event proved to be well founded, that it would give him the entire command of the interior. Cambacérès was offered the situation of minister of justice ; he at once declined it, and was only prevailed on to accept, on the engagement that he should not be called on to take part in any political measures. Even Caulaincourt refused the portfolio of minister of foreign affairs ; he was too well aware of the ban under which he would be laid by the potentates of Europe, to undertake its responsibility. M. Molé resolutely declined the same office, and frankly avowed to the Emperor that he thought the drama was concluded, that the dead could not be resuscitated. Napoleon admitted the immense difficulties of his situation, and that they proceeded chiefly from the impracticable character of the party with which he was

" " Duc d'Orreote, votre tête doit tomber sur l'échafaud." Fouché.
Mémoires, i. 417, 418.

linked in the civil administration of the empire. As a pledge of his adoption of their principles, he appointed Carnot minister of the interior, with direction of the whole organisation of the national guard; Caulaincourt, by his positive command, was compelled to accept the portfolio of foreign affairs, as Maret, by a similar compulsion, was that of secretary of state; while Davoust, who had been in disgrace during the whole of the Restoration, without difficulty accepted the situation of minister at war.¹

CHAP.
XCIII.

1-15.

¹ Fleury de
Chab. i.
262, 263.
Thib. x.
260, 261.
Hist. Parl.
ch. 57, 58.
Cap. i. 260,
261.

The same disinclination for office—a most unusual and ominous circumstance in France—was manifested in all the inferior departments of government. The situation of prefect, formerly solicited with such eagerness, and accepted with such gratitude, became now so much the object of aversion, that it was bestowed on persons who would never have been deemed competent, or who had been actually disgraced, under the imperial government. Among the rest M. Frochot, who had been so severely stigmatised by the Emperor for his weakness in the conspiracy of Malet,² reappeared as prefect of the departments of the Rhone. A general stupor prevailed in all the provinces—even those of which the inhabitants had in the first instance manifested the greatest joy at the Emperor's return. The people of the eastern provinces in particular, among whom the revolutionary spirit had always been most ardent, and who, from their localities having been the theatre of war during the last invasion, were most exasperated against the Allies, were thunder-struck by the declaration of the Congress of Vienna of the 13th March, and contemplated with undisguised apprehension a return of the innumerable hordes of Cossacks and Calmucks, from whom they had so recently been delivered, to ravage their fields. Anxiety and disquietude pervaded the whole of France, the result partly of shame, partly of distrust, partly of terror.³ It was evident that the once colossal power of the Emperor

4.
General
stupor of the
people over
France.

² Ante, ch.
lxxxv. § 42.

³ Cap. i.
264, 272.
Thib. x.
261, 266.
Beauch. li.
271, 284.
Fleury de
Chab. i.
265, 275.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

had been irrevocably shaken by his first overthrow, and consequent abdication; confidence at once in his good fortune and his stability of character was at an end; while the efficiency and vigour of his administration was essentially impaired by the alliance, evidently forced, which had taken place between him and the Jacobins, and the admission of many of the most dangerous of their faction into the most important offices of government.

5.
Efforts of
the Duc and
Duchesse
d'Angou-
lême to
stimulate a
Royalist
resistance
in the south.

The march of Napoleon to the capital had been so rapid, that the provinces were in great part ignorant of his having advanced beyond Grenoble, when they were informed of his arrival at Paris. Thus their inhabitants were stupified by this portentous event; and in the south and west at least, far from being disposed to transfer their allegiance, and trample under feet their oaths, at the beck of the Prætorian Guards of the capital, Guienne, Languedoc, Provence, and Bordeaux spontaneously took up arms. The Duc d'Angoulême, in the southern provinces, actively commenced the organisation and direction of the newlevies; while the presence of the Duchess at Bordeaux, whither she had gone, as already noticed, to be present at the anniversary of the 12th March, when the Royalist standard was first hoisted in that city, roused to the highest pitch the loyal enthusiasm of its inhabitants. Such was the ardour which her character and the chivalrous gallantry of her bearing excited, that fifteen thousand national guards, in that city and its department alone, declared for her; and even the troops of the line in the adjoining forts of Blaye and Chateau-Trompette, whom she passed in review, seemed to have caught the generous flame, and to incline at least to support her cause. At Toulon the Duc d'Angoulême was most favourably received, both by the regular soldiers and the national guards; Marshal Massena, who commanded there, remained firm in his allegiance; and so unanimous was the desire to resist the imperial government, that the old Republicans stood side by side in the volunteer ranks with the young Royal-

March 14.

March 18.

ists. Encouraged by these favourable appearances, a vast but withal skilfully combined plan of operations was concerted. It was agreed that the army of the south, fifteen thousand strong, should march in two divisions, the one by Avignon and Valence, the other by Gap and Grenoble, on Lyons, the common centre of their operations; while the army of Bordeaux, of equal strength, should move towards La Vendée and Brittany, and awaken the dormant but inextinguishable loyalty of the western provinces.¹

How formidable, widespread, and well-combined soever this movement undoubtedly was, it was soon shattered against the treason of the army, the magic of the Emperor's name, and the deplorable subjection of the provinces to Paris, which had resulted from the centralisation of the Revolution. Grouchy, whose former zeal for the Bourbons, and recent desertion of their cause, was a sufficient guarantee for his fidelity, was sent with all the troops he could collect at Lyons against the Duc d'Angoulême; while Clausel, whose republican principles had long kept him in comparative disgrace with the Emperor at the zenith of his fortunes, was despatched with a large body of men, drawn together in the central provinces, against the Duchess. The instructions of both officers were brief and simple—"to put an end at any sacrifice to the civil war." The unbounded sway of the Emperor with the soldiers rendered this a more easy task than had been anticipated. Marching through the central provinces, and distributing everywhere the Emperor's proclamations, Clausel soon rallied the whole troops of the line there to his standard, and approached the Gironde with so formidable a force, that the regular soldiers in the forts of Bordeaux were entirely paralysed. They all declared that, although they would not permit any injury to be done to the Duchess, they would not combat against their comrades in arms.² In vain, with the spirit of Maria Theresa, she appealed to their loyalty, their oaths, their patriotism, and every feeling which

CHAP.
XCHII.

1815.

¹ Fl. Revue
Chab. i.
316, 322.
Cap. i. 275,
280. Thib.
x. 269, 275.
Beauch. iii.
384, 400.

6.
Termina-
tion of the
civil war in
the southern
provinces.

May 24,
April 3,
² Cap. i.
275, 284.
Beauch. iii.
434, 469.
Thib. x.
283, 284.
Flcury de
Chab. i.
313, 317.

CHAP.
XCH.

1815.

could rouse men of honour; she addressed not the simple and loyal Hungarians, but the corrupted and demoralised French. A mournful silence, interrupted only by isolated demonstrations of attachment, met all her heroic appeals; and with a heart penetrated with grief, she was obliged to leave the city and embark on board a British vessel, which soon conveyed her far from the treason of her country to the more faithful shores of England.

7.
Progress of
the war
near Lyons,
April 3.

The efforts of the Duc d'Angoulême in the southern provinces, though attended in the end with no better success, were, in the outset, of a more encouraging description. The chief Royalist army there, under the command of the Duke in person, advanced in the beginning of April from Toulouse, eight thousand strong, composed for the most part of national guards, towards Valence, and defeated a body of regular soldiers at the bridge of La Drome. Encouraged by the successful result of this action, in which he displayed equal courage and conduct, the prince advanced to Valence and threatened Lyons. This was a very serious matter, and gave much uneasiness to Napoleon. He was no sooner informed of it, by telegraph, than he despatched Grouchy to that city, with full powers to combat or negotiate, but with the most positive instructions, at all hazards, to terminate the civil war. This soon became no difficult matter. While the principal army, which advanced by Valence, was gaining this success, the second Royalist corps, under General Ernouf, occupied Sisteron, and advanced to Gap, on the same road which Napoleon had so recently traversed. But there the men were so moved by the accounts which they received from the peasants of his marvellous progress, and the proclamations from his nervous pen which they saw placarded on the walls, that the regular soldiers all mounted the tricolor cockade, and declared for the cause of Napoleon.¹

¹ Fleury de
Craab, i.
319, 322.
Cap. i. 293,
295. Beau-
champ, iii.
393, 433.

By this defection the right flank of the Duc d'Angoulême was uncovered; Grouchy was advancing with a

powerful force in front from Lyons; and, at the same time, intelligence arrived that General Gilly, with another body of regular troops, was marching from Nismes upon the Pont St Esprit to cut off his retreat. In these circumstances, to retire became unavoidable; and no sooner had the retrograde movement commenced, than the hatred of the peasants of Dauphiny to the Royalist cause, and to their ancient enemies the Provençals, broke out on all sides with such vehemence, that the situation of the prince became extremely critical. The obvious danger of a prince of the blood-royal falling into the hands of Napoleon, now induced the Duke's generals to urge him in the strongest manner to provide for his individual safety, which he might easily have done by escaping into the adjoining provinces of Piedmont; but he positively refused, with true honour, to separate from his companions in arms. A convention was therefore proposed to General Gilly at Pont St Esprit, and at once agreed to, by which it was stipulated that the royal army should lay down its arms and be disbanded, and an entire amnesty be awarded to all persons engaged in the enterprise. Grouchy, however, would not ratify the capitulation, and at first retained the Duke in captivity in defiance of its provisions. The first telegraphic despatch announced the conclusion of the capitulation, and Maret prevailed on Napoleon to ratify it. A few hours after, a second telegraphic despatch declared that Grouchy had not ratified the convention; but Monnier, the under-secretary of state, did not communicate it to the Emperor till the evening, by which time, in consequence of the answer to the first, the prince was already free. A violent ebullition of the imperial wrath immediately took place: but it was soon over, and Napoleon was secretly rejoiced in the end that he was saved the necessity of acting with severity towards a descendant of Henry IV. Soon after, the Duc de Bourbon retired from La Vendée, where he had failed in exciting any insurrection: resistance speedily

CHAP.
XCVIII.

1815.

S.

Termination of the civil war in the southern provinces. April 4.

April 5.

CHAP.
XCHII.

1815.

¹ Fleury de
Chab. i.
329, 331.
Thib. x.
264, 285.
Cap. i. 293,
395. Beau-
champ. iii.
483, 521.

9.
Military
treaties be-
tween the
Allies.

disappeared on all sides ; and on the 20th April a hundred guns, discharged from the Invalides, and repeated from all the fortresses of France, announced that the civil war was terminated, and the imperial authority everywhere re-established. To the honour of Napoleon, it must be added, that no executions or bloodshed stained his restoration ; and that, with the exception of a few measures of police against the emigrants and Royal Guards, and the vigorous application of the laws against the Bourbons, no measures of severity marked the commencement of the Hundred Days.¹

The Emperor's authority was now fully established in France ; but it was not in France that the real obstacles to his sovereignty were to be found. It was at Vienna that the enemies alone capable of overturning his empire existed ; and the intelligence of his marvellous successes, by revealing the hitherto unsuspected extent of the sway which he still had over the French army, only made more apparent to them the necessity of the most vigorous measures for his overthrow. The Powers in this crisis acted with a vigour and unanimity worthy of the highest praise, and which in the end proved the salvation of Europe. Calmly measuring with prophetic eye the extent of the danger, they saw, in the elevation of Napoleon to the throne on the bucklers of the troops, the clearest proof that he would infallibly be driven to war. They perceived that a rapacious soldiery, which hailed his return as the restoration of the days of their glory, would never be at rest till again plunged into conquest ; and that, even if the Ethiopian had changed his skin and the leopard his spots, and the Emperor were really desirous of peace, he would inevitably be forced into hostilities by the passions and necessities of his followers. Proceeding on these principles, the declaration of 13th March was not allowed to remain a dead letter ; and on the 25th March a treaty was concluded, which in effect revived the treaty of Chaumont, for the preservation of

Europe from the renewed dangers which now menaced it. By it the cabinets of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Great Britain “engaged to unite their forces against Buonaparte and his faction, in order to prevent him from again troubling the peace of Europe: they agreed to furnish a hundred and eighty thousand men each for the prosecution of the war, of which a tenth was to be cavalry, and, if necessary, to draw forth their whole military forces of every description.” By a secret treaty concluded on the same day, it was solemnly stipulated that the contracting parties should not lay down their arms till they had effected the complete destruction of Napoleon. The ratifications of this treaty were exchanged on the 25th April: and, within a fortnight after, it was acceded to by all the lesser powers in Europe. The contingent of Bavaria was fixed at sixty thousand men—that of Piedmont at thirty thousand—that of Hanover at twenty-six thousand.¹

The forces at the disposal of the coalition were immense. According to the returns which were laid before the Congress in their secret sittings, of the military resources of the European states banded in this alliance, the number of troops which they could dispose of for active operations, without unduly diminishing the garrison and other services in their respective interiors, amounted to the enormous number of nine hundred and eighty-six thousand men.* Germany, arrayed in the Germanic

* The composition of the principal armies of this alliance, as it was, is as follows:

I. Army of Upper Rhine (Schwarzenberg), viz.—	
Austrians,	150,000
Bavarians,	65,000
Württemberg,	25,000
Baden,	16,000
Hessians, &c.,	5,000
	<hr/> 261,000
II. Army of Lower Rhine (Blücher), Prussians, Saxons, &c., .	155,000
III. Army of Flanders—British, Belgians, Hanoverians, Brunswickers,	
	155,000
IV. Russian Reserve, Barclay de Tolly,	168,000
	<hr/> 742,000

—PROTHO, iv. Appendix, p. 62; and CARRIAGE, i. 350, 351.

CHAP.
XIII.

1815.
Napoleon.

¹ See the
Treaty of
Munich, 1815.
N. R. 172, 173;
and Cap.
321. Schoell,
Treaty of
Peace, &c.
218, 221.

19.
And im-
mense force
at the disposal
of the coalition.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

March 31.

confederation, was to take a part in this great alliance worthy of its vast strength and ancient renown ; and the forces of its lesser powers, animated by experienced wrongs and inspired by recent victory, promised to be of a very different mould from the old and unwilling contingents of the empire. After making every reasonable deduction for the sick, absent, and non-efficient, it was calculated that six hundred thousand effective men might be brought to bear on the Rhine, the Alps, and the Flemish frontier early in June. In a secret meeting held at Vienna on the 31st March, it was resolved forthwith to form three great armies, by which active operations were to be commenced as soon as possible: the first of two hundred and sixty-five thousand, chiefly Austrians and Bavarians, on the Upper Rhine, under Schwartzenberg ; the second, of a hundred and fifty-five thousand Prussians, on the Lower Rhine, under Blücher ; the third, of an equal number of English, Hanoverians, and Belgians, in the Low Countries. It was resolved that military operations should be commenced early in June ; before which time it was hoped that the great Russian army, a hundred and seventy thousand strong, could be on the Upper Rhine from Poland, and, entering France by Strasburg and Besançon, form a reserve to the invading armies from the eastward. In addition to these great armies, lesser diversions, but still of no inconsiderable importance, were to be attempted on the side of Switzerland, which had declared for the Allies, and the Pyrenees ; the former by a united force of Austrians, British, and Piedmontese, the latter by the Spaniards and Portuguese ; while England was also to send succours to organise the formidable strength of La Vendée in the cause of loyalty and religion.¹

¹ Conferences, 623. Mem. and Protocol, March 31, 1815. Schoell, Congr. de Vienne, iv. 170, Cap. i. 328, 331, and Schoell, Trait. de Paix, xi. 213, 215.

11. Preparations of the British government for the war.

From these arrangements, as well as the geographical position of the country which they occupied, it was evident that the British troops in Flanders would be first exposed to the shock of war ; while at the same time it was of the highest importance to the general cause not

to lose the vantage-ground which they there possessed, or to permit, as had so often previously been done, the advanced post of Europe against France to be converted into that of France against Europe. The preparations of the newly elected monarchy of Belgium could not be expected to be in any state of forwardness ; the Hanoverian levies were not as yet raised ; and the flower of the British army was in Canada, or scattered over the American coast. In these circumstances, everything depended on the vigour of the British cabinet and the unanimity of the British people ; and neither was wanting on the occasion. On the 6th April, a message from the Prince Regent formally announced to both Houses of Parliament the events which had recently occurred in France, in direct contravention of the treaty of Paris, the communications entered into with his allies on the subject, and the necessity of augmenting the military forces both by sea and land. The address, which, as usual, was an echo of the message, was moved in the House of Lords by the Earl of Liverpool, and in the Commons by Lord Castlereagh ; and so strongly were the members of both houses impressed with the awful nature of the crisis, and the necessity of making a vigorous effort in the outset to meet it, that the address in the House of Peers was carried without a dissenting voice, and in the Commons by a majority of one hundred and eighty-three, the numbers being two hundred and twenty to thirty-seven. Lord Castlereagh put the matter upon its true footing in the concluding sentence of his speech : " Some may think that an armed peace would be preferable to a state of war ; but the danger must be fairly looked at : and, knowing that good faith was opposite to the system of the party to be treated with—knowing that the rule of his conduct was self-interest, regardless of every other consideration, whatever decision you come to must rest on the principle of power, and not on that of reliance upon the man."¹

¹ Parl. Deb. xxx. 371 ; and 418. 133. Ann. Reg. 1815, 12, 13.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

12.

Finances
and budget
of Great
Britain.
April 19.

Nor were the financial, naval, and military preparations of Great Britain on a scale incommensurate to the magnitude of the undertaking to which she was committed, and the engagements she had contracted with foreign powers. On the 19th April, the House of Commons, by a majority of one hundred and twenty-five,—the numbers being one hundred and eighty-three to fifty-eight,—renewed the property-tax, producing now fully £15,000,000 annually, for another year—a decisive proof that they were in earnest in supporting the government. The whole war taxes were continued, and supplies to an unprecedented extent voted; those for the navy being £18,000,000 while those for the army rose to the enormous amount of £24,000,000, besides £3,800,000 for the ordnance. With these large sums, two hundred and seven thousand regular soldiers were maintained, besides eighty thousand militia, and three hundred and forty thousand local militia—in all, six hundred and fifty thousand men in arms; and the ships of the line placed in commission were fifty-eight. The subsidies to foreign powers amounted to no less than £11,000,000; and the whole expenditure of the year, when all was paid, reached the enormous sum of £110,000,000. To provide for this expenditure, the permanent and war taxes were calculated to produce £80,000,000, and loans to the amount of £39,000,000 were raised for the service of Great Britain and Ireland; but these sums, great as they were, proved unequal to the charges of the year. When the whole expenditure of the war was wound up at the close of the year, the unfunded or floating debt had risen to £48,725,000; the capital of the funded debt was £792,000,000; the annual charge of it was £42,000,000; but of that sum no less than £12,968,000 was for the support of the sinking-fund. If that noble establishment had been kept up, even at that diminished amount,^{1*} by maintaining the indirect taxes, set apart by the wisdom of former times for its

¹ Finance
Accounts,
1816. Ann.
Reg. 1816,
435. Parl.
Deb. xxxi.
796, 814.
James, vi.
App. No.
25.

* See Appendix A, Chap. xciii.

support, it would have paid off the whole national debt by the year 1845 ; and the nation, from the effects of the long peace, purchased by the sacrifices of the war, would have discharged the whole burdens contracted during its continuance.

In addition to these immense military and naval preparations, the subsidies which Great Britain became bound to advance to foreign powers were so considerable, that it might truly be said that the whole military force of Europe was this year arrayed in English pay against France. Such was the exhaustion of the finances of the greater powers, from the unparalleled efforts they had made during the two preceding years, that they were wholly unable to put their armies in motion without this pecuniary assistance. By a treaty concluded at Vienna, between Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, the former of these powers agreed to furnish to the three latter a subsidy of £5,000,000, to be paid by monthly instalments to the ministers of these powers in equal proportions ; and if peace was concluded within the year, they were to receive after its signature, Russia four months', and Austria and Prussia two months' subsidy each, to provide for the return of the troops to their own dominions. Sweden obtained £521,000, Hanover £206,000, the lesser German powers £1,724,000. The stipulated sums paid to the greater powers required to be enlarged ; and the total sum paid by Great Britain in the year to foreign powers exceeded £11,000,000.¹* It

* The subsidies paid were:—

Austria,	£1,796,220
Russia,	3,211,000
Prussia,	2,382,813
Hanover,	206,000
Spain,	147,363
Portugal,	1,000,000
Sweden,	521,000
Italy and Netherlands,	78,152
Minor Powers,	1,724,000
Miscellaneous,	867,134
Total,	£11,065,232

— *Finance Accounts*, 1816; *Ann. Reg.* 1816, p. 420.

CHAP.
X. 111.

1815.

11.

See the
Ann. Reg.
1815, Mar.
1815, N. R.
Ann. Reg.
1815, 1816.

April 50.

1 See the
Treaty,
Ann. Reg.
1815, Mar.
1815, N. R.
Ann. Reg.
1815, 1816.
State P.
pass.

CHAP.
XCIII.
1815.

is the most astonishing proof both of the resources of the English empire, and of the admirable system of finance and currency by which they had been sustained, that at a period when the financial resources of all the other countries in Europe were entirely exhausted, it alone was able not only to make head against its own gigantic expenditure, but to retain all the other armies of the Allies in its pay.

14.
Napoleon's
difficulties.

Nothing which vigour and activity could do was wanting on the part of Napoleon, to provide the means of defence against this prodigious phalanx of enemies, ready to overwhelm him. But such was the exhaustion of the military strength of the country in consequence of his preceding wars, and the apathy or despair of the people from the effects of long-continued disaster, that all his efforts were unable to raise anything like an adequate force. The arsenals and fortresses were nearly empty, especially on the eastern frontier, which was most exposed to danger, from the exhaustion of the preceding campaign or the abstractions of the allied armies; twelve thousand pieces of cannon in fifty-three fortresses had been ceded by the treaties at Paris; and the regular troops in arms did not amount to a hundred thousand men. The treasury, after the first six weeks' expenditure, was exhausted; arrears of taxes were almost irrecoverable; the national credit was equal to nothing. To provide forces for withstanding the hostility of combined Europe, with such means and in such a country, was indeed a herculean task; but the genius of Napoleon was equal to the undertaking, and but for the surpassing firmness of Wellington, and the gallantry of the British troops, his efforts would in all probability have proved successful.¹

¹ Jom. iv.
614, 615.
Cap. I. 356.
Tab. x.
364.

15.
His military
preparations.

His first step was to restore to the old regiments, with their eagles, their numbers ennobled by so many heroic deeds, and so unwisely taken away by the late government. These precious memorials of past glory were given

back to the troops with every pomp and circumstance likely to reanimate the spirits of the soldiers. The skeletons of two additional battalions were next organised for each regiment ; and to provide men to fill their ranks, the whole retired veterans were by proclamation invited to join their respective corps. Two additional squadrons were in like manner added to each regiment of cavalry ; and thirty new battalions of artillery were raised, chiefly from the sailors of Cherbourg, Brest, and Toulon. Forty battalions, in sixteen regiments, were added to the Young Guard, entirely drawn from veterans, who had served six campaigns ; and two hundred battalions of the national guard were organised to take the duty of the garri-son towns and interior, and thus permit the whole regular troops to be moved to the frontier. By these means the Emperor calculated that the effective strength of the army, by the 1st June, would be raised to four hundred thousand men, of which one-half might be disposable for active operations in the field ; and by the 1st September his sanguine temperament led him to hope that he would have five hundred battalions of troops of the line and fifty-two of the Guards, mustering six hundred thousand combatants, besides sixty thousand admirable horse.¹

To provide arms and the muniments of war for so prodigious a multitude out of the exhausted arsenals, and with the worn-out finances of the empire, was a still more difficult matter ; but the ardent genius of the Emperor, appealing to the generous feelings, and rousing the national spirit of the people, was here, too, attended with surprising success. The whole workmen in all the manufactories of arms in the country were doubled ; twenty thousand muskets a-month were thus obtained ; but this supply, great as it was, was far from meeting the exigencies of the moment. To procure additional stores of warlike implements, bodies of permanent workmen were established in many places, in imitation of the

CHAP.
XIII.
1-15.

¹ *Jour.* iv.
614, 615 ;
and *Camp.*
de 1815,
139, *Cap.* i.
358, 359,
Thib. x,
364, 365.
Charras,
Camp. de
1815, 22,
27.

16.
His orders
to clean
arms and
replenish
the arsenals,
and to collect
which he
collected
for the cam-
paign.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

corps of workmen on the plains of Grenelle, during the Revolution. The old arms were called in by proclamation, repaired, and served out to the young soldiers : the foundries were everywhere set to work with the utmost vigour to replenish the arsenals with guns : purchases of horses, to a vast extent, were made in all the fairs of the empire : all those of the gendarmerie were taken, and requisitions made from the peasants of draught horses for the use of the artillery and waggon trains. Great part of these purchases were not, as may well be believed, paid for in ready money : orders on the treasury at distant dates were lavishly given, and, under military government, could not be refused ; and they constituted no small part of the embarrassment of the government of the second Restoration. But, in the mean time, the things were got. The arming of the troops and equipment of the guns went on with extraordinary rapidity ; and an order on the different communes to furnish each a certain portion of the clothing of a battalion, soon provided them with uniforms. Before the beginning of June, two hundred and twenty thousand men, almost all veteran soldiers, were completely armed, equipped, clothed, and in readiness to take the field ; an astonishing proof of the patriotic spirit of the people, and the enthusiastic ardour with which, in the last struggle of their country, the old soldiers had thrown themselves into the breach.¹

¹ Jom.
Camp. de
1815, 133,
139. Ar-
chives de
la Guerre ;
and Cap. i.
259, 360.
Thib. x.
365, 366.
Charras,
38, 39.

17.
Fouché,
Carnot, and
other Re-
publicans ;
their great
influence.

In military arrangements, the power of the Emperor was unfettered, and his genius and prodigious activity appeared in their highest lustre ; but in civil administration he was entirely in the hands of Fouché and the Republicans ; and they steadily pursued one object, which was to provide a counterpoise to his power in the revival of the republican spirit of the people. Carnot, entirely engrossed in the herculean task of reorganising the national guard, left the direction of civil affairs entirely to that astute Jacobin ; and he made such skilful use of his unbounded power and influence as head of the

police, that the old regicides and Jacobins were everywhere called up again into activity, and the election for the approaching Chamber of Deputies, summoned for the Champ de Mai, had almost entirely fallen into their hands. His language in this respect was undisguised to his Republican allies. "If that man there," said he, "shall attempt to curb the Jacobin ideas, we will overturn him at once and for ever." Napoleon knew and deeply resented this conduct; but his precarious situation compelled him to dissemble, and continue Fouché in power; for he had no hold of the nation, apart from the army, but through the medium of the Republicans. Such was their influence in the present precarious state of his fortunes, that he was obliged by a decree to call out the national guards over the whole kingdom: the very thing, of all others, to which he was most averse. In truth he was surrounded by a crowd of selfish and unprincipled men, the very dregs of the Revolution, who were actuated by no other principle but the common one of turning his pressing necessities to the best account for their own private advantage. Meanwhile, however, such was the address of the Emperor, and the charm of his conversation, that he succeeded in detaching many of the leading men of talent in Paris, who had formerly taken a prominent part against him, from the Royalist cause. Among the rest, M. Sismondi, the great historian, and Benjamin Constant, the able supporter of constitutional freedom, who had so recently published a just and eloquent declamation against him, were entirely won over to his side; and they were intrusted with the arduous duty of aiding in the formation of a constitution. One of the most extraordinary of the many extraordinary gifts with which this wonderful man was endowed, was the power he possessed of subduing the minds of men, and the faculty he had acquired of dazzling penetration the most acute, and winning over hostile prepossessions the most confirmed, by the mere magic of his fascinating conversation.¹

CHAP.
XIII.
1815.

Cap. i.
384, 385.
Constant,
Cent Jours,
23, 41.
Chateaub.
vi. 433,
154.

CHAP.
XCH.

1815.

18.

Constant's
account of
Napoleon's
conversation
with
him at this
time.

Benjamin Constant has left a precious account of a conversation which Napoleon had with him at this period, which bears every mark of truth. "The nation," said the Emperor, "has rested twelve years from political agitation: for a year it has reposed from war: that double rest has made it now feel the need of activity. It now wishes, or thinks it wishes, a Tribune and popular assemblies. It did not always do so: it threw itself at my feet when I arrived at the government. You must recollect it was so, for you were in opposition. Where was your support, where your strength? Nowhere. I took less power than they wished to give me. At present all is changed: the taste for constitutions, debates, harangues, has returned. Nevertheless, it is only the noisy minority who wish it: be assured of that. The people wish only for me; you have seen them pressing on my footsteps, descending from their mountains to see me. Nothing was wanting but a signal from me to make them fall on the Royalists and nobles. But I will never be a king of the *Jacquerie*. If it is possible to govern with a constitution, all in good time: I desire nothing better; though it is not so easy as some suppose. I wished the empire of the world; and, to obtain it, boundless authority was necessary. Possibly, to govern France alone, a constitution may be practicable. It is still a problem; but I am willing to try it. I wished the empire of the world—who would not have done so in my place? The world invited me to rule: princes and people vied with each other, crouching beneath my sceptre. Give me your ideas: public discussions, free elections, responsible ministers, the liberty of the press: I have no objections to them—I am the man of the people; if they really wish for liberty, I will give it them; I was never an oppressor from inclination. I had great designs; fate willed it otherwise. I am no longer a conqueror: I cannot be so. I have now but one mission, that of restoring France, and giving it such institutions as are fit for it.¹ But I do not wish to

¹ Constant, *Cent Jours*, 59; and *Journ. Camp. de 1815*, 84, 86.

awaken false expectations : a long and difficult struggle awaits us ; I have need of the support of the nation ; I am willing to give it as much freedom as it can enjoy without relapsing into anarchy. I am growing old ; I have need of repose ; the rest of a constitutional king may suit me, and still more my son."

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

The financial difficulties of the Hundred Days were singularly lessened by the comparatively prosperous condition in which the treasury was found, from the diminished expenditure and increased economy of the Bourbon government. Nearly forty millions of francs (£1,600,000) had been left by Louis XVIII. in the exchequer, or in the balance due by the receivers-general ; and an equal sum fell in shortly after, at stated periods, from the sale of national wood, which they had previously made, but for which the bills were not yet all due. It was from these resources that the first and indispensable expenses of the Imperial government were defrayed, but they were soon exhausted by the vast purchases for the army ; and, as the capitalists had no confidence whatever in the dynasty of Napoleon, it became a very difficult matter to say how the treasury was to be replenished. As a last resource, the sinking fund, hitherto invariably respected, was offered as a security to a company of bankers, and at first refused ; but their acceptance was at length purchased by such exorbitant interest, that the four millions of francs to which it amounted annually, produced only thirty-one millions of francs ; in other words, the government borrowed at twelve per cent. The bills due by the receivers-general were discounted at the rate of seventeen and eighteen per cent ; and by these extraordinary resources, and forestalling the ordinary revenue, eighty millions of francs (£3,200,000) were raised in April and May, which kept the treasury afloat till the battle of Waterloo terminated at once the difficulties and the political existence of Napoleon.¹

19.
Financial
measures of
Napoleon.

¹ Hist. Parl.
xl. 87, 121.
Cap. i. 377,
380.

The task of framing a constitution, in a country so

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.
20.

Formation
of a con-
stitution.

long habituated to that species of manufacture as France had been since the Revolution, proved much less difficult than that of restoring the finances. The commission to whom this duty had been devolved, presided over by Benjamin Constant, consisted chiefly of the old patriots of 1789 who had survived the Revolution: and it was governed, accordingly, by the visionary ideas of perfectibility which had characterised that dreamy period. The first draft of a constitution which they submitted to the Emperor, was accordingly so democratic, that even in his present necessities it was at once rejected by him. "I will never," said he, "subscribe to such conditions: I have the army on my side, and after what it has done on the 20th March, it will know how to defend France and its Emperor." Defeated in this attempt, the Liberal party in the commission drew up another constitution; and this one, styled the "additional act," the work of Constant and Regnaud St Jean d'Angely, was little different from the Charter of Louis XVIII. Two Chambers, one of Peers and one of Commons, were established on nearly the same footing as they had been by the former government. But three particulars in this new constitution were very remarkable, and demonstrated how much more clearly Napoleon saw the exigencies of the times, and the necessity of bulwarks to power, than the Bourbons had done. 1. The peerage was declared to be *hereditary*—not for life only: a provision which at once announced the intention of reviving a feudal nobility. 2. The punishment of confiscation of property, a penalty so well known in the dark ages, abolished by the Charter, was restored in cases of high treason. 3. The family of the Bourbons was for ever proscribed, and even the power of recalling them denied to the people. It was in vain to disguise, that while these articles indicated in the strongest manner an intention to prevent a second restoration of the royal family,¹ they pointed not less unequivocally to the practical abrogation of the power of self-government, and

¹ *See Ad-
ditionnel,
Moniteur,
April 25,
1815. Cap.
i. 384, 396.
Hist. Parl.
xl. 129.*

the construction of a strong monarchy for the family of the Emperor; and thus the publication of the "*Acte Additionnel*," on the 25th April, excited unbounded opposition in both the parties which now divided the nation, and left the Emperor in reality no support but in the soldiers of the army.

The public feeling appeared in an article which was inserted in the *Censeur Européen*, the very existence of which demonstrated how the Emperor's authority had declined from the palmy days of the empire. It was entitled, "On the influence of the mustache on the reason, and the necessity of the sabre in government." "What," exclaimed the fearless writer, "is glory? Has a lion, which makes all the animals of the surrounding country tremble, glory? Has a miserable people, which knows not how to govern itself, and is to its neighbours an object only of terror and hatred, glory? If glory is the sole attribute of men who have done good to their race, where is the glory of a conquering people?" All classes, though for different reasons, exclaimed against the *Acte Additionnel*. Some complained that the initiative to framing laws was, contrary to all the principles of a free government, taken from the Chamber of Deputies; others, that the rule of clubs and popular societies was not re-established as in 1793. The Royalists were discontented at the abolition of feudal distinctions; the Democrats, at the restoration of the titles which had been created during the empire; and a still larger number complained of it as a cruel deception of the people, that a constitution was promulgated by the sole authority of the Emperor, before the military and civil electors, convoked from all parts of the empire for the Champ de Mai, had enjoyed an opportunity of considering it. So vehement did the clamour become, especially among the Republicans, that Carnot, who felt himself compromised with his party by the *Acte Additionnel*, wrote to the Emperor, strongly representing that dissatisfaction was

CHAP.
XCHII.1815.
April 25.21.
Violent op-
position
which it
excited.

April 23.

April 29.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

¹ Jem.
Camp. de
1815, 111,
112. Carnot
to Napo-
leon, April
29, 1815.
Cap. i. 395,
396.

universal, civil war on the point of breaking out; and that it was indispensable to publish a decree, forthwith authorising the Chambers to modify the constitution in the next session, and to submit the modification to the primary assemblies of the people. But Napoleon replied, "With you, Carnot, I have no need of disguise: you are a strong-headed man, with sagacious intellect. Let us deliver France, and after that we will arrange everything. Let us not sow the seeds of discord, when the closest union is required to save the country." To the honour of Carnot it must be added, that from that moment he made no opposition to a dictatorial power being for the time placed in the hands of the Emperor.¹

22.
Ineffectual
attempt of
the French
diplomacy
to open a
negotiation
with the
allied
powers.

While Napoleon was vainly striving to blend into one united whole the fervent passions and wounded interests of revolutionary France, Caulaincourt was strenuously endeavouring to open up a diplomatic intercourse with the allied powers. In this vital matter everything depended on the success or failure of the first step; for if the Allies had consented to a negotiation of any kind with the Emperor, it would have been a recognition of his authority and a virtual revocation of the decree of the 13th March. But all his efforts were ineffectual: and what is remarkable, the Emperor Alexander, who in 1814 had most warmly espoused his cause, was now the most decided against him. "We can have no peace," he said with energy to a secret agent who approached him with overtures from the Emperor Napoleon; "it is a mortal duel betwixt us. He has broken his word: I am freed from my engagement. Europe requires an example." "Europe," said Metternich, in an official article from Vienna in the *European Observer*, "has declared war against Buona-

April 26.

parte. France can and ought to prove to Europe that it knows its dignity sufficiently not to submit to the domination of one man. The French nation is powerful and free: its power and freedom are essential to the equilibrium of Europe. France has but to deliver itself from

its oppressor, and return to the principles on which the social order reposes, to be at peace with Europe." The spirit of Germany was hourly more and more exalted by those declarations: already the excitement was as widespread, the enthusiasm as universal, as when the allied armies first approached the Rhine. Thus all attempts of Caulaincourt to open a negotiation, all the declarations of Napoleon that he aspired now only to be the first in peace, proved ineffectual. His insincerity was universally known: the necessities of his situation universally appreciated. Napoleon, on the 1st April, addressed a circular to all the sovereigns, commencing in the usual style from one sovereign to another, "Sir, my brother," and concluding with the strongest protestations of his desire to commence a new strife in the arena of peace.* But all his efforts were ineffectual: none of M. Caulaincourt's couriers could reach their destined point: one was stopped at Kehl, another at Mayence, and a third near Turin. At the same time Caulaincourt was informed in a confidential communication with Baron Vincent, that it was no longer possible to make the allied sovereigns swerve from their determination, or separate them from each other.¹

CHAP.
XIII.

1815.

April 1.

* Cap. i.
304, 313.
Thib. x.
206, 205.
Napoleon to
the allied
sovereigns,
April 1,
1815. C. p.
i. 311.

Murat was the first who raised the standard of war.

"The true nature of the events which have taken place, may not be fully known to your Majesty. They were the result of an irresistible power; the work of the unanimous wish of a great nation, which knows its duties and its rights. The dynasty which force had imposed upon the country, was not suited to it; the Bourbons were neither associated with its sentiments nor its habits. France required to separate from them. France has raised a liberator; the indeciment which I had led me to the greatest of victories no longer existed. I returned; and from the moment when I landed on the shore, the love of my people has borne me to the capital. The first wish of my heart is to repay so much affection by an honestable tranquillity; my sweetest hope is to render the re-establishment of the Imperial throne a guarantee for the peace of Europe. Enough of glory has successively adorned the standards of all nations; the vicissitudes of fate have sufficiently often made great reverses follow the most glorious success. A religious war is now opened to sovereigns; I will be the first to descend into it. After having exhibited to the world the spectacle of great combating, it will be now sweeter to exhibit hereafter no other rivalry but that of the advantages of peace; no other strife but that of the felicity of nations." *Napoleon to the allied sovereigns, April 1, 1815; Moniteur, April 2; and Cap. i. c. 311, 312.*

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

23.

Murat com-
mences hos-
tilities, and
advances to
the Po.

March 31.

Anxious to deprive Napoleon of such an ally, and prevent the distraction of its forces by an Italian contest, when it was necessary to combine every effort for the overthrow of Napoleon, Austria had offered to guarantee to him the disputed marches, and procure for him the recognition of all the sovereigns at Vienna of his right to the throne of Naples, if he would declare for the Allies. But at that very moment the brave but infatuated King, transported by the intelligence of the success of Napoleon in France, and deeming the time had arrived when he might strike with effect for the independence of Italy and the throne of that beautiful peninsula, suddenly commenced hostilities. On the 31st March he crossed the Po, and published from Rimini a sonorous proclamation, in which he called on the Italians to unite with him in asserting their independence. "The moment," said he, "is arrived, when great destinies are about to be accomplished: Providence at length has called us to become an independent people. From the summit of the Alps to the extremity of Sicily, one cry is heard—the independence of Italy." But although these sentiments found a responsive echo in the general breast, yet the event soon proved on what a sandy foundation all projects for Italian independence were rested, which were based on the military operations of the Italian people.¹

¹ Bot. iv.
417. Thib.
x. 319, 320.
Cap. ii. 15,
16.

24.

His defeat
and over-
throw at
Tolentino,
and restora-
tion of the
Bourbons to
the throne
of Naples.April 9
and 11.

Although the King of Naples was at the head of a well-disciplined, splendidly equipped, and beautifully dressed army of fifty thousand men, of whom thirty thousand advanced to the Po, the remainder being left in reserve in his own dominions, yet was his overthrow so easily effected, that it could hardly be called a war. The Neapolitan troops, in the first instance, gained a slight success; but the Austrian generals, Bellegarde, Bianchi, and Frimont, quickly united their forces and attacked Murat at Tolentino. The Neapolitans fled like a flock of sheep at the first fire. A second engagement completed their rout, and dispersed the fugitives through

the Roman States, from whence, in the utmost terror, they regained their own frontier. Murat, himself, wholly deserted by his troops, was glad to embark at Naples for Toulon, which he reached in safety; while his queen, Caroline, escaped on board an English merchant vessel, and was conveyed to Austria. Thus fell the throne of the Buonaparte family in Naples; and thus was accomplished the prophecy of Napoleon, who, when he heard of his commencing hostilities, said that his brother-in-law would ruin himself by taking up arms in 1815, as in 1814 he had ruined him by failing to do so. Nothing now remained to prevent the Sicilian family from resuming their ancient throne of Naples, which they accordingly immediately did, and were recognised by all Europe.¹

While these important events were in progress in Europe, the monarch whose fall had occasioned them all, and around whom this terrible conflagration was breaking forth, was living in seclusion, but yet not forgotten, at Ghent. Louis XVIII. maintained in that ancient city the state of a sovereign; M. Blacas, General Clarke, and Chateaubriand had followed him in his exile, and kept up diplomatic communications with foreign courts, the ambassadors of all of whom still in his exile waited on the dethroned monarch. Ambition and intrigue were not wanting; Ghent had its saloons and coteries as well as either Paris or Vienna. But what contributed most of all to give the court there consideration in the eyes of Europe, was the nomination of M. Lally Tollendal and Viscount Chateaubriand to the offices of ministers of state; and the powerful declamations which they soon began to launch out against the usurper of the French throne. The Duke of Wellington visited the king in his seclusion, and he had the satisfaction of hearing from the Duke the assurance, that "he regarded the restoration of the Bourbons as essential to the equilibrium of Europe." Clarke furnished valuable

CHAP.
XVIII.

1-15.

App. 1, 20.

1. Th. 3, v.
319, 322.
Cap. 1, 15,
17, 18, 19.
417, 419.

25.

Louis
XVIII. at
Ghent.Chateaubriand and
his writings.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

information in regard to the situation and strength of the French army when he left the ministry of war at Paris : while Chateaubriand, in the *Moniteur de Gand*, which appeared daily, combated the proclamations and state papers of Napoleon, published in the *Moniteur* at Paris, with such ability, and inveighed with such impassioned eloquence against his government, that he contributed in a powerful manner to uphold the spirit of the European alliance. Fouché, who had never put trust in the restored fortunes of Napoleon, was not long of renewing his intrigues at the probable theatre of future power. Before the royal exiles had been long at Ghent, Madame de Vitrolles, wife of the nobleman who had made so narrow an escape from the Imperial wrath at Troyes, arrived, bearing a holograph note of the Comte d'Artois, in which he expressed eternal gratitude to the able minister who had saved M. de Vitrolles. Fouché went no farther at present : the courtiers were charmed to find an ally in so powerful a man, and a minister of Napoleon ; and all the influence of Chateaubriand could not prevent the arch-traitor from being looked upon by the needy crowd, sighing for the Tuileries, as the firmest supporter of the monarchy. The only difficulty was to make Louis XVIII. overcome his repugnance to the regicide author of the *mitrallades* at Lyons.¹

¹ Cap. ii.
41, 63. Thib.
x. 311. 315.
Chateaub.
vi. 428, 429.

26.
War in La
Vendée.

May 1.

La Vendée had in the first instance disappointed the expectations of the Duc de Bourbon and the French Royalists ; but the course of events in that province proved in the end eminently serviceable to the restoration of the monarchy. The Duc de Bourbon, who had first been sent there, was personally unknown to the Vendéans ; his name had never figured in their heart-stirring annals, and thus he failed to rouse them to exertion. But in the beginning of May, when the Marquis Louis de Larochejaquelein made his appearance on their coast, the glorious name at once produced a general insurrection among them ; and an animated proclamation from him drew

thousands to the royal standard. M. de Suzannet was soon at the head of four thousand armed peasants in the Bocage; M. d'Autichamp raised a still larger number; M. de Sapineau was intrusted with the command of a third, five thousand strong; and Auguste de Larochejaquelein led a fourth. The presence of twenty thousand armed men in the thickets of La Vendée occasioned no small uneasiness to the Emperor; and he despatched Generals Lamarque and Travot, to command a formidable army of fifteen thousand men for their subjugation, while Fouché opened in secret a negotiation with their chiefs. The astute minister, foreseeing a second restoration, and having already commenced measures to secure his ascendancy in the event of it, despatched two able emissaries—M.M. de Malartic and de la Berandière—with instructions, by the most conclusive of all arguments, to put an end to the civil war. “Why,” said he, “should the Vendéans go to war? French blood will soon flow in sufficient streams without theirs being mingled with it. Let them wait a month or two, and all will be over. Above all, let not the English interfere in the business; for they come only to profit by our divisions. Conclude an armistice till the inevitable restoration. La Vendée is but an incident in the great European war about to break out in the plains of Belgium. The contest between the Blues and the Whites is henceforth without an object.” By these means, which were entirely in accordance with his whole policy throughout the Hundred Days, Fouché hoped to have the merit, in the eyes of Napoleon, of terminating the contest in La Vendée; in those of the Bourbons, of detaching above fifteen thousand men from his standard at the most critical period of his fortunes; and of the nation, of closing the frightful gulf of civil war. Fouché, at the same time, sent a confidential agent, M. Gaillard, to Ghent, who entered into negotiations with the royal family;¹ and M. de Leon to Vienna, bearing holograph notes to Metternich and Tal-

CHAP.
XCVII

1815.

¹ Chap. II. 79.
 81. Fouché,
 Mémoires, II.
 302, 303.
 Bonaparte, iv.
 157, 163.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

leyrand, the latter the French ambassador in that capital. In these letters, he not only entered into correspondence with the allied powers, but opened the subject, in the event of the restoration of Louis proving inexpedient, of elevating the Duke of Orleans to the throne, or of reinstating the family of Napoleon in the person of his son.

27.
Measures of
Napoleon to
crush it.

These deep-laid schemes proved entirely successful, and their favourable result was much aided by the divisions which prevailed among the Vendean chiefs themselves.

Louis de Larochejaquelein aspired to the supreme command; and his great name and family influence, as well as the support of the English government, with which he was in close communication, fully entitled him to the honour. But his pretensions were contested by the other chiefs, particularly d'Autichamp and Suzannet; not from any distrust of his qualifications for the lead, but from a secret and not unnatural jealousy of external influence, and, above all, of British co-operation. Thus there was no cordial union among them, and this appeared in the very outset of operations; for Larochejaquelein, buoyant with courage, and ardent to enrol his name in the records of Vendean fame, was desirous at once to commence hostilities; while the other chiefs were inclined to follow Fouché's advice, and wait at least till the war broke out on the frontier, before they declared themselves. Larochejaquelein, however, who deemed his honour pledged to follow out his engagements with the British government, and whose heroic spirit could brook no delay, took up arms, and moved to the sea-coast, to cover the disembarkation of military stores and equipments which had commenced from the British vessels. He was followed by Lamarque at the head of eight thousand men, and several inconsiderable actions took place, in which the Vendean displayed their accustomed valour, and reached in safety Croix de Vie on the shore, where the English vessels were lying, and the disembarkation was continued under their protection.¹

May 29.

¹ Beauch.
iv. 180, 182.
Cap. ii. 81,
82. Thib. x.
367, 368.

But there the effect of Fouché's ambiguous counsels appeared: d'Autichamp, Suzannet, and Sapineau, determined not to enter into communication with the British, withdrew with their divisions and disbanded their men. Thus Larochejaquelein, with his division, five thousand strong, was left alone to withstand eight thousand veteran soldiers who pressed upon him. Yet, with this handful of men, he was not discouraged, but with a heart swelling with indignation at the desertion of his countrymen, and with the glorious recollections of his race, marched to meet the enemy. He sought only what he soon found -- a glorious death. The Vendéans fought with their accustomed gallantry; but the loss of their chief spread a fatal discouragement among their ranks: the Marquis de Larochejaquelein, impelled by a generous ardour, spurred his charger out of the line, reached an eminence close to the enemy's troops to reconnoitre a body of men which he saw approaching, belonging to the troops of the Marais, fell mortally wounded, breathed a short prayer for his king and country, and expired. Auguste de Larochejaquelein soon after was severely wounded; and the Vendéans, despairing of the combat after the loss of their chiefs, gave way and dispersed. This action terminated the war in La Vendée, as the other leaders had all gone into Fouché's plan of awaiting the issue of events. But the heroic Louis de Larochejaquelein did not die in vain: his firmness retained at a critical time fifteen thousand veteran French in the western provinces, when the campaign was just beginning in Flanders; and who can say what effect they might have had if thrown into the scale when the beam quivered on the field of Waterloo? ¹

Meanwhile Napoleon was engaged with the meeting of the deputies at Paris, and the preparation of the great fête of the Champ de Mai, on a scale of magnificence which might at once captivate the people of the capital, and recall to the Republican party the popular demonstrations of the Revolution. On the 30th April a decree

CHAP.
ACTIV.

1815.

23.

Defeat of
the Ven-
deans, and
pacifica-
tion of
La Ven-
dée.1 Beauch.
ix. 180, 185.
Thib. x.
367, 368.
Cap. iii. 81,
82.

29.

Composi-
tion of the
Chamber of
Deputies.
April 30.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

was passed, convoking the electoral colleges for the nomination of deputies to the Chamber of Representatives, and ordaining that the deputies named should repair to Paris, to be present at the assembly of the Champ de Mai, and to form the Chamber, to which the "*Acte Additionnel*" should be submitted. The election of deputies was everywhere a vain formality, and did not afford the smallest indication of the real state of the public mind. In most of the departments not a tenth part of the qualified persons came forward to the vote; in some, particularly those of Bouches du Rhone and La Vendée, the deputies were appointed by five electors; in twenty nine no election whatever took place. The respectable citizens everywhere kept aloof from contests conducted under the auspices of Fouché, Carnot, and the violent republicans; the men of property deemed it unnecessary to mix themselves up with an ephemeral legislature, or to make any effort for a cause which would soon be determined by the bayonets of the Allies. Thus the elections fell into the hands, as in the commencement of the Revolution, of a mere knot of noisy orators, ignorant declaimers, and salaried agents of administration: and a legislature was returned, in which the great majority was composed of needy unprincipled adventurers, base, worn-out hacks of the police, and furious Jacobins, whose presumption, as usual, was equalled only by their ignorance. Nothing could be expected but rashness and imbecility from such a legislature, and yet it was to be called to duties requiring above all others the soundest judgment, the purest patriotism, the most exalted courage.¹

Aware, however, how strongly the French are influenced by theatrical representations, no pains were spared by the Emperor to render the approaching ceremony in the Champ de Mai as imposing as possible. For above a month workmen had been engaged in preparing for it; the most glowing descriptions of its probable magnificence had been frequently given in the public journals, and the

¹ Cap. i.
397, 398.
Thib. x.
332, 333.
Fouché,
Mém. ii.
337, 338.
Montg. viii.
170, 171.
Charras, 53.

30.
The Champ
de Mai at
Paris.

preparations were on a scale which recalled the famous assembly on the same spot on the 14th July 1790. A cardinal, two archbishops, and several bishops, presided over the religious part of the ceremony: the Emperor appeared, surrounded by his chamberlains, his pages, and all the pomp of the empire: the marshals, the generals, the great officers of state, were there, attended by brilliant staffs and retinues, and all the circumstance of military and civil splendour: four thousand electors, chosen by the electoral colleges throughout France, were assembled, deputations from all the regiments around Paris attended, and the presence of thirty thousand national guards of the metropolis added to the imposing aspect of the ceremony. The day was fine: above two hundred thousand spectators crowded round the benches, arranged in the form of an amphitheatre, where the persons appointed to take part in the ceremony were stationed; and the commencement of the votes of the electors in their primary assemblies, when announced, showed that the "*Acte Additionnel*" was approved by an immense majority of the electors; the numbers being fifteen hundred thousand to five thousand.* It is a striking proof of the vanity of all such references to the popular voice, that of the immense number of votes which appeared in the majority, certainly not one in a thousand knew what they were voting about; and not one in ten thousand, if they had, would, in all probability, have approved of the new constitution.²

Napoleon addressed the electors in these words:—"Gentlemen, and deputies of the army and navy in the Champ de Mai—Emperor, consul, soldier, I owe every-

CHAP.
XCVII.

1815.

ANNEX.

A. 1.

² Thib. x.
332, 335.
Cap. ii. 94.
Rev. Mém.
v. i. 117.
169. *Moni-*
teur, June
2, 1815.

* The numbers were:—

	Yes.	No.
64 Departments,	1,278,007	42,7
Army,	122,7	120
Navy,	21,000	155
Total,	1,501,707	48,2

Moniteur, 24 June 1815; and THIBAUTEAU, x. 334.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

31.

Napoleon's
speech on
the occa-
sion.

thing to the people. In prosperity, in adversity, in the field of battle, in council, on the throne, in exile, France has been the only object of my thoughts and actions. Like the King of Athens, I have sacrificed myself for the people, in the hope of seeing the promise realised, of thereby securing to France its natural frontiers, its honours, its rights. Indignation at beholding those sacred rights, the fruit of twenty-five years of victory, disregarded or lost; the cry of withered honour, the wishes of the nation, have brought me back to the throne which is dear to me, because it is the palladium of the independence, the rights, and the honour of the French people. Frenchmen! in traversing amid the public joy the different provinces of the empire to arrive in my capital, I trusted I could reckon on a long peace; nations are bound by treaties concluded by their governments, whatever they may be. My whole thoughts were then turned to the means of founding our liberty on a constitution resting on the wishes and interests of the people. Therefore it is that I have convoked the assembly of the Champ de Mai. I soon learned, however, that the princes who resist all popular rights, and disregard the wishes and interests of so many nations, were resolved on war. They intend to enlarge the kingdom of the Low Countries, by giving it for a barrier all our frontier places in the north, and to reconcile all their differences by sharing among them Lorraine and Alsace. We must prepare for war! Frenchmen! you are about to return into your departments. Tell your fellow-citizens that the circumstances are perilous; but that with the aid of union, energy, and perseverance, we shall emerge victorious out of this struggle of a great people against its oppressors; that future generations will severely scrutinise our conduct; that a nation has lost all when it has lost its independence. Tell them that the stranger kings whom I have placed on their thrones, or who owe to me the preservation of their crowns, and who, in the days of my prosper-

city, have courted my alliance and that of the French people, now direct all their strokes against my person. Did I not know it is against our country they are aimed, I would sacrifice myself to their hatred. But my wishes, my rights, are those of the people : my prosperity, my honour, my glory, can be no other than the prosperity, the honour, and the glory of France." At the conclusion of these eloquent words, Napoleon took the oath on the Gospels to observe the constitution, which was immediately taken by the officers of state, marshals, deputies, and soldiers present ; and the eagles were, at the same time, delivered with extraordinary pomp to the regiments.¹

But in the midst of all this seeming unanimity and enthusiasm, opinion at Paris was extremely divided ; a formidable opposition against the Emperor was organised in the bosom of the Chamber of Deputies, and some of his principal ministers were engaged in such secret correspondence with his enemies, that he was on the point of sending them to the scaffold. From the very outset of their sittings, the hostility of the Chamber of Deputies to the Emperor was unequivocally evinced, and mutual ill-humour appeared on both sides. When the choice of M. Lanjuinais, the old Girondist, to be president, was announced to the Emperor, instead of his brother Lucien, whom he had designed for that dignity, his first impulse was to refuse to confirm the appointment, and he coldly answered, "I will return my answer by one of my chamberlains." When this expression was repeated, it raised a perfect storm in the Chambers. To return an answer by a chamberlain was a direct insult, it was said, to the national representatives. The Emperor was obliged to submit, and all the influence of the court failed in the appointment of the vice-presidents : M. Flauguergues, Dupont de l'Eure, Lafayette, and Grenier, all known for their extreme popular principles, were elected. Napoleon opened the Chamber of Deputies in person ;

CHAP.
XVIII.

1799.

¹ Moniteur, June 2, 1815. Chap. II. 99. Title, x. 337, 338.

32.
Great divi-
sions of opo-
nents at
Paris.

June 6.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

A great review of the forty-eight battalions of the national guard was still more unsatisfactory ; hardly any cries of *Vive l'Empereur* were heard from the ranks, and it was followed by a procession of the *fédérés* of the suburbs, so hideous and disorderly, that it recalled the worst days of the Revolution, and excited no small apprehensions in the minds of those around the Emperor. Everything announced that the reign of lawyers, adventurers, and democracy was returning in the Chambers, and with it the ascendancy of Jacobins, massacre, and revolution in the metropolis. Napoleon was so disconcerted with the democratic spirit which had risen up in his absence, that he often said—"what these Bourbons have done in a few months during my absence, years will be required to undo."¹

¹ Hist. Parl.
xl. 147, 152.
Cap. ii. 103,
111. Thib.
x. 352, 354.
Fouché, ii.
340, 341.
Chateaub.
vi. 450.

33.
Napoleon
sets out for
the army.
June 7.

June 4.

The spirit of the Chamber of Peers named by the Emperor was abundantly pliant ; but that of the Deputies, daily more refractory, soon became so hostile, that the Emperor, to avoid the pain of witnessing its absurdities, was glad of an excuse for setting out for the army. A proposition to declare him the "saviour of the country," was almost unanimously rejected ; in the midst of the most pressing external dangers, their attention was exclusively occupied with the means of propagating liberal principles, and rendering more popular the constitution. The "*Acte Additionnel*," so recently sworn to with such solemnity, was already ridiculed as an unworthy compromise, which would not for a moment bear the lights of the age. Everything showed that the Chambers contemplated the speedy seizure of the supreme power. The answer of Napoleon to their address on the eve of his departure evinced the disquietude which filled his mind, and contained the words of true patriotic wisdom—"This night," said he, "I shall set out for the army ; the movements of the enemy's corps render my presence indispensable. During my absence I shall learn with pleasure that a committee of the chamber is meditating on the consti-

tution. The constitution is our rallying point ; it should be the pole-star in moments of storm. Every political discussion which should tend, directly or indirectly, to diminish the confidence which we feel in our institutions, would be a misfortune for the state : we should find ourselves in the midst of shoals without rudder or compass. The crisis in which we are engaged is a terrible one : let us not imitate the Greeks of the Lower Empire, who, pressed on all sides by barbarians, rendered themselves the laughing-stock of posterity, by occupying themselves with abstract discussions at the moment that the battering-ram was thundering at their gates."¹

To direct public affairs during his absence, the Emperor appointed a provisional government, consisting of fourteen persons—viz. his brothers Joseph, who was the president, and Lucien : his eight ministers, Cambacérès, Davoust, Caulaincourt, Fouché, Carnot, Gaudin, Mollière, and Decrès : with Regnaud St Jean de Angely, Boulay de la Meurthe, Desermont, and Merlin, who were admitted into the Council, though not holding office, on account of their talents for public speaking, and the consideration they enjoyed with the popular party, so powerful in the representative Chamber. In truth, however, Carnot and Fouché were the only persons in this large number who were really in communication with influential parties in the state : so that the power was substantially in their hands. And though both old regicides and republicans, they were very far indeed from being united now in regard to the course which should be pursued, and both had a cordial hatred and utter distrust of each other. Fouché regarded Carnot as an obstinate old mule, who would any day sacrifice himself and his party to the maintenance of a principle : Carnot, with more justice, looked on Fouché as a supple villain, who had never any principle at all, but was at all times ready to elevate himself on the shoulders of whatever party appeared likely to gain the ascendant. Yet was his influence such that

CHAP.

XVIII.

1795.

Hist. Parl.

t. vi.

24.

Fouché's

Speeches

1795-1796

Fouché's

Speeches

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

¹ Cap. ii.
134, Fouché,
ii. 329, 330.
Thib. x.
364, 366.

Napoleon, though well aware of his treachery, did not venture to dismiss him from the ministry. Shortly before his departure, a secret despatch from Metternich to the minister of police came to the knowledge of the Emperor; and the messenger who conveyed it, in his terror, revealed various important details of the correspondence.¹

35.
The Em-
peror dis-
covers
Fouché's
treachery,
but is
obliged to
dissemble
and keep
him in
power.

Napoleon was no sooner informed of it, than he ordered Fouché to be sent for, openly charged him before the Council with being a traitor, and declared he would have him shot next morning. But Carnot calmly replied: "You have it in your power to shoot Fouché, but to-morrow, at the hour he suffers, your power is annihilated." "How so?" cried Napoleon. "Yes, Sire," said Carnot: "this is not a time for dissembling. The men of the Revolution only allow you to reign, because they believe that you will respect their liberties. If you destroy Fouché, whom they regard as one of their most powerful guarantees, to-morrow you will no longer have a shadow of power." The Council agreed with Carnot; the idea of a military execution was abandoned; and Fouché was not a man to let any legal evidence of his secret treasons exist—so that the affair blew over. Napoleon's suspicions, however, were not allayed, although he could not convict his minister in legal form, and his last words to him before leaving Paris were these:—"Like all persons who are ready to die, we have nothing to conceal from each other: if I fall, the patriots fall with me; you will play your game ill if you betray me. With me, all you Revolutionists will perish under the Bourbons; I am your last dictator: reflect on that." It is a striking proof of the ascendancy which guilt acquires in revolutions, that this arch-intriguer, who, while directing the ministry of the interior under Napoleon, was on the one hand secretly corresponding, by means of his agents, with Metternich and the Allies, and on the other with d'Autichamp and the Vendéans, and who was at the same time rousing into

¹ Fouché,
ii. 329, 331.
Cap. ii. 134.
156, 1416.
x. 361, 369.

fearful activity the old Jacobin party over all France, though known to be a traitor by all parties, could not be dispensed with by any.

Napoleon's plan of the campaign was in a great measure based on the fortification of Paris, which, by the indefatigable efforts of General Haxo and the engineers, had by this time acquired a considerable degree of consistency. No one knew better than the Emperor the value of such central fortifications; he felt that it was mainly owing to their want that all his efforts had proved abortive in the preceding year. Under Haxo's able direction, the whole heights to the north of Paris, from Montmartre to Chaumont, were strengthened with redoubts; the canal of Ourcq was finished, so as to cover the plain between la Villette and St Denis, and the latter town was retrenched, and protected by the inundation of the Rouillon. To the west of Montmartre, which formed the most elevated point of the line, was erected a series of intrenchments, which extended as far as the Seine at Clichy; and the space at the other extremity, between Vincennes and Charenton, was also fortified with redoubts. These works were nearly completed, and armed with seven hundred pieces of cannon: they rendered Paris almost impregnable, even to the greatest force, on the whole northern semicircle. But on the south it was still undefended, and there, accordingly, it was subsequently approached by the English and Prussian armies. Lyons also was strongly fortified with field intrenchments, mounting three hundred and fifty guns. Relying on the strength of these two important points to retard any decisive success on the part of the Allies, Napoleon resolved to act with the main body of his forces, which amounted to a hundred and thirty thousand men, with three hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, on the offensive in Flanders, near the frontiers of which that formidable force was already collected between the Meuse and the Sambre.^{1*}

CHAP.
XIII.
1815.

364.
Napoleon's
plan of the
campaign.

¹ Jom.
Camp. de
1815, 137.
Jom. Nap.
Camp. of
Waterloo,
ix. Book of
Mem. 49.
52. Charnes.
25, 37, 50.
59.

* The disposition of the force on the 1st of June was as follows:—D'Elber's
VOL. XIII.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

37.

And disposi-
tion of his
troops.

Other lesser armies were stationed at other points on the frontier, with instructions to retire if outnumbered, and retard the enemy as much as possible. Suchet commanded two divisions, numbering nine thousand combatants, on the frontiers of Savoy; a small corps of observation of five thousand was placed at Befort, under Lecourbe; while Rapp, with three divisions, amounting to nineteen thousand, was stationed at Alsace, with his headquarters at Strasburg. Fifteen thousand men were detained in distant and necessary inactivity on the frontiers of la Vendée and Brittany; while small divisions were at Marseilles, Toulouse, and Bordeaux, to overawe the Royalists in these cities. In all, not more than seventy thousand men were arrayed in these lesser corps to resist not less than four hundred thousand enemies, preparing to invade France on the south and east; but they were merely regarded as the nucleus of so many armies, numbering three times the present amount of combatants, which might be assembled before the distant allied hosts could be brought together. Everything depended on the grand army under the immediate command of Napoleon.^{1*}

¹ Vict. et
Cong. xxiv.
159, 160.
Vaud. iii.
110. Jom.
iv. 624,
and Camp.
de 1815,
139, 141.
Cap. ii. 123,
124. Nap.
Camp of
Waterloo.
49, 52.
Charras,
40, 41.

38.

Wellington's plan
of the cam-
paign.

Wellington on his side had profoundly meditated on the plan of the approaching campaign, which, in common with all the allied generals, he conceived would be one of invasion on their part. After much reflection, he had resolved to enter France on the side of Flanders, between the Marne and the Oise; but in order to conceal this design from the enemy, he suggested that the Austrians and Russians should invade, in the first instance, by Befort and Humingen, in order to attract the enemy's principal forces to that quarter. It was finally arranged

corps had its headquarters at Valenciennes; Reille's at Avesnes; Vandamme's at Ro-croy; Gerard's at Metz, and Lobau's at Laon. The four corps of cavalry under Grouchy were cantoned between the Aisne and the Sambre; and the whole were to be reinforced by the Imperial Guard then at Compiègne on the road to Paris. Their total force was 126,088 men, with 344 guns. — See *Charras, Campagne de 1815*, 55, 60.

* See Appendix, B, Chap. XCIII.

that Schwartzenberg was to cross the Rhine in two columns at Bâle and Mannheim, which were to converge by Befort and Strasburg, upon Chalons-sur-Marne. Thither also the Russians, who were to pass the Rhine lower down, were to follow by Metz and Verdun. As soon as they had made some progress, the British and Russians united were to march direct upon Paris by Laon, from Mons and Namur. These great wings of invasion were to be connected by Kleist's Prussians, who were to invest the fortresses on the Meuse in the direction of Sedan. Wellington had ninety-five thousand effective men under his orders; Blucher a hundred and ten thousand: but of the large host clustered round the British standards, a considerable part were raw Belgian and Hanoverian levies, upon whom little reliance could be placed; and for the actual shock of war, Wellington could only depend on the British and King's German Legion, not more than forty-three thousand strong, and the old Hanoverians and Brunswickers, about ten thousand more. The British army was far from being equal, in composition or discipline, to that which crossed the Pyrenees, a large part of which was absent in Canada; and their place had been supplied by a number of second battalions, and troops which had never seen service or acted together. But several of the most distinguished Peninsular regiments were there: the foot and horse Guards appeared in splendid array; twelve thousand noble cavalry, of whom eight thousand were British, seemed confident against the world in arms; a hundred and eighty guns, admirably equipped, were in the field; Pieton, Hill, Clinton, Kempt, Paek, Cole,¹ and many of his old comrades, surrounded Wellington; the spirit of the army was at the highest point, and the troops possessed that confidence in themselves and their leader, which is the most important element toward military success.² Blucher's army was of a less heterogeneous character: his troops, almost all veterans of one nation,

CHAP.
XCIII.

1-15.

¹ Siborne, i.
353.² Cap. ii.
149, 155.
Mem. of
allied sove-
reigns. Plo-
tho. iv. 247.
254. Die
Grosse
Chron. iii.
37. Clarras,
7, 8.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

and inspired with the strongest hatred against the French, were filled with a well-founded confidence in themselves and their gallant commander ; and having acted together in two previous campaigns, they had acquired that most valuable quality in soldiers—a thorough knowledge of their duties, and a firm reliance, founded on experience, on each other.

39.
Napoleon's
plan of op-
erations.

Napoleon's plan of operations was suggested by the necessities of his situation, and the vast advantages likely to be gained by a decisive success in the outset. He had a choice of three lines of operation. He might attack the Prussians by the Meuse, and cut off Blücher from his base : he might assail the British, by Mons or Ath, and force Wellington back upon Antwerp : or he might throw himself, by the Sambre, upon the point of junction of the two armies. The two former courses were inexpedient, because they would only tend to hasten, by throwing the one back upon the other, that concentration of the allied forces which it was his great object to prevent. He determined, therefore, to collect all his forces into one mass, and, boldly interposing between the British and Prussian armies, separate them from each other, and strike with the utmost vigour, first on the right hand and then on the left. It was thus that, with a force not exceeding sixty thousand men, he had so long kept at bay the united armies of Blücher and Schwartzemberg, two hundred thousand strong, on the plains of Champagne : and what might not be expected, when he had a hundred and thirty thousand admirable troops, all veterans, and animated with the highest spirit, and not more than a hundred and ninety thousand in the field to combat ? “The force of the two armies,” says Napoleon, “could not be estimated by a mere comparison of the numbers ;¹ because the allied army was composed of troops more or less efficient, so that *one Englishman might be counted for one Frenchman, but two Dutchmen, Prussians, or soldiers of the Confederation*, were required to make up

¹Nap. Book,
ix. 60, 61.
Charras,
87, 88.
Brialmont,
ii. 394.

one Frenchman ; and their armies were under the command of two different generals, and formed of nations divided not less by their sentiments than their interests."

CHAP.
XCH.

1815.

Soult was, on the 2d June, appointed major-general of the army, and he immediately took the command, and issued a proclamation,* which strangely contrasted with that which, not three months before, he had thundered forth as minister-at-war to the Bourbons. It left no further doubt that he had played false to the former government, when he held the office of minister-at-war, and had purposely placed in the Emperor's way the regiments most likely to revolt. Napoleon left Paris at one o'clock in the morning of the 12th, breakfasted at Soissons, slept at Laon, and arrived at Avesnes on the 13th. He there found his army all concentrated between the Sambre and Philippeville, and the returns on the evening of the 14th gave a hundred and twenty-eight thousand eight hundred men present, under arms.† It was divided into five corps d'armée under d'Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gerard, and Lobau, with four corps of reserve cavalry under Pajol, Excelmans, Kellermann, and Milhaud, with the Imperial Guard under Mortier. The camp was placed behind small hills, just a league from the frontier, in such a situation as to be screened from the enemy's view : and it contained three hundred and fifty pieces of cannon.‡ The arrival of the Emperor raised the spirits

40.
Disposition
and force of
the French
troops, and
Napoleon's
address to
them.

Atlas,
Plate 96.

* "All the efforts of an impious league can no longer separate the interests of the great people and of the hero whose brilliant triumphs have attracted the admiration of the universe. It is at the moment when the national will manifests itself with such energy, that cries of war are heard, and foreign armies advance to our frontiers. What are the hopes of this new coalition? Does it wish to extirpate France from the rank of nations, to plunge twenty-eight millions of Frenchmen into a degrading servitude? The struggle in which we are engaged is not above the genius of Napoleon, nor beyond our strength. Soldiers! Napoleon guides our steps—we fight for the independence of our beautiful country—we are invincible!"—See NAPOLEON'S *Memoirs*, Book ix. pp. 65, 66.

† See Appendix C. Chap. XCIII.

‡ Clausewitz estimates Napoleon's force, at the opening of the campaign, at 129,000 men, Wellington's at 92,000, and Bücher's at 115,000. See CLAUSEWITZ, viii. 27 ; and *De Gresse Chronicle*, iii. 135. It is probable some abatement must be made from all these numbers, for stragglers, non-effective, &c.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

of the soldiers, already elevated by their great strength, to the very highest pitch; and the following proclamation was on the same evening issued to the troops:—"Soldiers! This is the anniversary of Marengo and of Friedland. Then, as after Austerlitz and Wagram, we were too generous; we gave credit to the oaths and protestations of princes whom we allowed to remain on their thrones. Now, however, coalesced among themselves, they aim at the independence and the most sacred rights of France. They have commenced the most unjust of aggressions. Are we not, then, the same men? Soldiers! at Jena, when fighting against those same Prussians, now so arrogant, you were as one to two: at Montmirail as one to three. Let those among you who have been in England recite the story of their prison-ships, and the evils they have suffered in them. The Saxons, Belgians, and Hanoverians, the soldiers of the Rhenish confederacy, groan at the thought of being obliged to lend their arms to the cause of princes, enemies of justice and of the rights of nations. They know that the coalition is insatiable; that after having devoured twelve millions of Poles, twelve millions of Italians, six millions of Belgians, a million of Saxons, it will also devour the lesser states of Germany. Fools that they are! a moment of prosperity blinds them. If they enter France, they will find in it their tomb! Soldiers! we have forced marches to make, battles to fight, perils to encounter; but with constancy the victory will be ours; the rights, the honours of the country will be reconquered. For every Frenchman who has a heart, the moment has arrived to conquer or die."¹

¹Nap. Book,
ix. 70, 73,
74. Viet. et
Cong. xxiv.
161, 162.
Jom. iv.
625. Die
Grosse
Chron. iii.
128, 129.
Charras,
56, 69.

41.
Positions
and views
of Wellington
and
Blucher.

Wellington and Blucher, at this critical period, were well informed from the outset in regard to the positions and strength of the enemy; but they were impressed with the idea that the war was to be on their part an offensive one, and that Napoleon would never venture to attack on their own ground two armies, each of strength little inferior to his own. Should he do so, they relied

upon secret information to be forwarded to them from Paris of his intended movements; and Wellington fully expected that if any attack was made on him, it would be on his right by the roads of Mons or Ath, for which reason the whole British cavalry had been quartered in that direction.* Even so far back as in May preceding, the general orders he issued to his troops proved that he expected to be attacked, if an invasion was attempted, on the right.† The most rigorous measures had been adopted by the French to prevent any intelligence crossing the frontier; but notwithstanding that, Wellington knew on the 6th June that Napoleon was expected to be in Laon on that day, and that the number of troops collected in Maubeuge and the adjoining towns was immense; and he had long been aware that arrangements had been made to bring the Imperial Guard from Paris to Maubeuge in forty-eight hours.‡ In consequence, orders had been given to declare Antwerp, Ypres, Tour-
CHAP.
XIII.
1815.
June 6.
June 7.

* That Wellington had such secret information is evident, if proof were requisite, from his despatch, 16th May 1815, where he gives a detail of the French army, which corresponds exactly with that given by Gourgaud.—See *Gurw.* xii. 394. That letter concludes with these words:—"From all that I have heard lately, I should doubt the regiments of infantry being all of twelve hundred men: I am certain, however, that *the person who gives us the intelligence believes they are so.*" And in his letter to Prince Wrede, enclosing the accounts of the army, on the same day, he says, "Je vous écris deux mots pour vous envoyer les résultats de l'intelligence que je viens de recevoir de France d'une manière assez certaine." And to the Prince Schwarzenberg on the same day—"Je vous envoie un mémoire tiré des *intelligences* que j'ai reçues aujourd'hui des forces de l'ennemi, et de leurs dispositions. Le gros de l'armée est sur cette frontière, et j'ai des nouvelles et arrangements pris des arrangements pour faire arriver la Garde à Maubeuge dans l'espace de 48 heures." *Wellington to Schwarzenberg, 16th May 1815; Gurwood, xii. 527.* And in his letter of 13th June, he says: "*I have accounts from Paris of the 10th, on which day Napoleon was still there; and I judge from his speech to the Legislature, that his departure was not likely to be immediate.*"—*Gurwood, xii. 462.*

† *Wellington to Lord Hill, 5th April 1815; Gurwood.*

‡ "All accounts from the frontier agree in the notice of a collection of troops about Maubeuge. Buonaparte was expected to be at Laon on the 6th; and there were, on all parts of the road between Paris and the frontier, extraordinary preparations for the movement of troops in carriages. The number of the latter collected is immense in some of the towns."—*Wellington to Sir H. Hardeley, Brussels, 10th June 1815; Gurwood, xii. 449.*

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

June 10.

¹ Grolman
Damitz, i.
103. Garw.
xii. 449,
457, 470.
Clauswitz,
viii. 34, 35.
Brialmont,
ii. 395, 396.
Charras,
104.

moment that the enemy crossed the frontier. On the 10th he received intelligence, which proved to be premature, that the Emperor had arrived in Maubeuge on the preceding day;* but till he was in possession of more authentic accounts, he did not deem it advisable to take any steps to concentrate his army; and when the French troops, above a hundred and twenty thousand strong, who were perfectly concentrated in a square of four leagues, crossed the frontier in front of Fleurus on the morning of the 15th, Wellington's men yet lay in their cantonments, from the Scheldt to Brussels and Nivelles; and Blücher's, scattered over the frontier from thence to Liège—a distance for both armies of seventy-five miles broad, by from twenty to twenty-five deep—were only on their march to the point of rendezvous.¹

42.
Delay in
collecting
the English
army.

It was not, however, from the want of authentic accounts of the approach of the enemy that the troops were not concentrated. On the 12th June, information was communicated to the Duke that the French army was assembled on the frontier, and prepared to attack.† The arrival of the Imperial Guard at Avesnes on the 13th, was made known to the Prussian commander on the 14th, by a drummer of that corps who had deserted.‡

* “I have received intelligence that Buonaparte arrived at Maubeuge yesterday, and I believe he has gone along the frontier towards Lille.”—WELLINGTON to SIR H. HARDINGE, *Brussels*, 10th June 1815; GURWOOD, xii. 457.

† “On the 12th June, Lieutenant-Colonel Von Wessel, whose regiment, the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion, formed an extensive line of outposts in front of Tournay, reported to Major-General Sir H. Vivian, to whose brigade the regiment belonged, that he had ascertained, from information on which he could rely, that the French army had assembled on the frontier, and was prepared to attack. Vivian repaired to the outposts to verify this information, and learned that the French army was concentrating, and that if the Allies did not advance, they would attack. Vivian communicated what he had seen and heard to Lord Hill and the Earl of Uxbridge, by whom the circumstances were made known to the Duke of Wellington. His Grace, however, did not, for the reason before stated, think the proper moment had arrived for making any alteration in the disposition of his forces.”—SIBORNE, ii. 48, 49.

‡ “Blücher avait déjà ordonné la réunion de ses corps sur un premier avis, reçu par un tambour de la Vieille Garde, qui avait déserté la veille (12.) La présence de la Vieille Garde était un indice certain et suffisant pour donner l'éveil aux ennemis.”—JOMINI, *Campagne de 1815*, p. 146.

During the night of the 13th, the bright light in the heavens to the west revealed to the vigilant outposts of Ziethen the concentration of a vast force in their front, which circumstance they at once reported: and on the 14th, intelligence was received of the arrival of Napoleon and Jerome at headquarters, which was immediately forwarded both to Blücher and Wellington. Late on the evening of the same day, Ziethen reported to Blücher that "strong columns of all arms were assembling in his front, and that everything portended an attack on the following morning."* Upon receipt of this intelligence, the Prussian marshal immediately despatched orders for the concentration of his army at Ligny, which were despatched at eleven at night. Still no steps were taken by Wellington to collect his troops; and so ignorant were those nearest the enemy of the danger which was impending, that, on the morning of the 15th, when the firing began near Charleroi, the Belgian videttes, who formed the advanced posts, conceived it was the Prussian artillery practice to which they had become accustomed.†

"During the night of the 13th, the light reflected upon the sky by the fires of the French bivouacs, did not escape the vigilant observation of Ziethen's outposts, whence it was communicated to the rear that these fires appeared to be in the direction of Beaumont, and in the vicinity of Solre-sur-Sambre, and on the following day (14th) intelligence was obtained of the arrival of Napoleon and his brother Jerome. Ziethen immediately communicated this information to Prince Blücher and to the Duke of Wellington. Nothing, however, was as yet positively known concerning the real point of concentration, the probable strength of the enemy, or his intended offensive movements. Late in the day, Ziethen ascertained through his outposts, that strong French corps, composed of all arms, were assembling in his front, and that everything portended an attack on the following morning. Ziethen's communication of this intelligence reached Blücher between nine and ten o'clock on the night of the 14th: and simultaneous orders were despatched at eleven o'clock for the march of Bulow's corps d'armée from Liège to Hamut, of Pirch's from Namur to Sombreffe, and of Thielman from Ciney to Namur; while Ziethen was directed to await the advance of the enemy in his position upon the Sambre; and in the event of his being attacked by superior numbers and compelled to retire, to effect his retreat as slowly as circumstances would permit, in the direction of Fleurus, so as to afford sufficient time for the concentration of the other three corps in the rear of the latter point."—SIBORNE, ii. 54.

† "Early on the morning of the 15th, the Belgian troops which rested upon the Charleroi road, were surprised in their retreat, as they supposed, from the advance of the French army, when they heard a loud cannonade at a

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

Ziethen immediately warned Blücher of the invasion : but, by a strange oversight, he did not send similar information to the Duke of Wellington, who only heard of it from the Prince of Orange at three P.M. at Brussels, instead of half-past ten or eleven A.M., when it might have reached him, had it been sent direct.* So little did he expect an immediate attack that, on that very day (the 15th), and at the moment when Napoleon with his vast and concentrated army was already far advanced across the frontier into the space between the British and Prussian cantonments, he was so far from making any immediate preparations for a defensive struggle, that he was calmly writing a long letter to the Emperor Alexander at Brussels, detailing his plan for a general *offensive* campaign against Napoleon from the Alps to the sea, in which the first attack was to be made by the Russians and Austrians ; while he anticipated no greater task, in the outset at least, for the British and Prussian armies, than to reduce the strongholds of Maubeuge and Givet immediately in their front.^{1†} And for that very night, the 15th, he had himself accepted, and allowed his staff-generals at Brussels to accept, invitations to a great ball at the Duchess of Richmond's in that city, which they all

¹ See Wellington to Emperor Alexander, June 15, 1815. *Gen.* xlii. 479, 472. *Brialmont*, ii. 296, 297. *Charras*, 118, 121.

distance in the direction of Charleroi ; but, not having received the slightest intimation of the enemy's approach, they concluded that the firing proceeded from the Prussian artillery practice, which they had frequently heard before, and become accustomed to." *SIBORNE*, ii. 73.

* "The first account received by the Duke of Wellington was from the Prince of Orange, who had come in from the outposts of the army of the Netherlands to dine with the Duke at three in the afternoon." *Memoirs of the Duke of Wellington, given to Brialmont*, ii. App. 537, 538.

† "Je vois avec la plus grande satisfaction, que nous sommes tous d'accord sur la base générale du plan d'opérations ; c'est-à-dire, de limiter notre extension par la nécessité des subsistances pour des armées si vastes ; que l'armée d'Italie doit coopérer avec les autres, mais sur une base différente ; et que le centre de la grande armée d'opération, celle qui s'étendra d'puis le Rhin jusqu'à la Suisse, doit appuyer ou la droite ou la gauche, selon les circonstances. Ce centre sera composé des troupes de votre Majesté en entier ; le centre de l'armée du Maréchal Blücher, et de celle sous mes ordres ; la gauche, de celle sous les ordres immédiats du Prince Schvartzenberg. Pour ce qui nous regarde ici, je crois que nous sommes obligés de faire un grand effort de Maubeuge." *WELLINGTON to ALEXANDER at Vienna, Brussels, 15th June 1815*; *Gen.* xlii. 472.

attended. In fact, the Duke had positive orders *not* to commence hostilities, the plan of the Allies being that the invasion of France should commence, as in 1814, from the Upper Rhine, and that the Anglo-Belgian army should act only in co-operation.†

Although, however, both the British and Prussian armies were still in cantonments over an extent, for the two together, of seventy-five miles broad by twenty-five in depth, yet every arrangement had been made which skill and experience could suggest to render them capable of concentrating, and becoming ready either for offensive or defensive operations, on the shortest possible warning.‡ The troops were all warned to be ready to march at a moment's notice; and the position of their cantonments, spreading out like a fan, of which Brussels was the centre, was such as at once furnished them at the moment with the supplies of which they respectively stood in need, and at the same time facilitated their concentration within a very short period, not exceeding twenty-four hours. Wellington's left, under the Prince of Orange, was cantoned between Mons and Nivelles, with Nivelles, Braine-le-Comte, and Enghien for its rallying points: the right, under Hill, extended from Ath to Oudenarde, with Ath, Grammont, and Oudenarde for its rallying points.§

* "Le Duc de Wellington avait l'ordre positif de ne point commencer les hostilités. C'est Napoléon qui, venant de la bataille de Waterloo, en avait reçu les ordres des chefs de son armée." CHATELAIN'S *Mémoires*, vol. III.

† "The perplexities of the allied generals were enormously increased from this circumstance, viz. that the English were supplied from Ostend and Antwerp, the Prussians from Cologne and the Rhine, and that, placed on these divergent lines, they must unite to cover Brussels." *Wellington's Campaign*, by H. Martineau Greville, Henry V., p. 72.

‡ The detailed position of Wellington's army was as follows:—The left wing, under the Prince of Orange, consisting of Gode's and Alton's British, and Porpora's and Chassé's French-Belgian divisions, were cantoned between Mons and Nivelles, with Nivelles, Braine-le-Comte, and Enghien for its rallying points. The right wing, under Hill, consisted of Clinch's and Clibb's British, and Steinmetz's French-Belgian division, with Aubin's brigade, extended from Ath to Grammont, with Ath, Grammont, and Oudenarde for its rallying points. The reserve, consisting of Pictet's and Gode's British divisions, and the Beresford, Hanoverian, and Nassau contingents, were quartered in the neighbourhood of Brussels. The British contingent cavalry

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

Blucher himself was at Namur, and his powerful army, a hundred and ten thousand strong, was cantoned from Liege to Nivelles, where it came in contact with the British left. It consisted of four corps—viz. those of Ziethen, Pirch, Thielman, and Bulow; whose respective rallying points were Fleurus, Namur, Ciney, and Liege. But a considerable part of the British army was at Brussels; some were at Oudenarde on the Scheldt; and so little was an immediate attack anticipated in the direction of Charleroi, that the whole British cavalry was on the extreme right on the banks of that river, with headquarters at Ninove, between the army and the sea, with posts between that river and the Lys, for the benefit of the rich pastures which its meadows afforded. “Wellington,” says Jomini, “believed Napoleon to be still at Paris, and only learned the approach of his army on the passage of the Sambre. But his troops, which had not yet moved from their cantonments, extending from Oudenarde on the Scheldt to Nivelles, were warned and ready to start at the first signal.” Late on the evening of the 14th, General Bourmont deserted to the headquarters of Blucher from Napoleon’s camp, and confirmed the accounts previously received of the impending attack, which induced the Prussian general to issue immediate orders for the concentration of his army.* But no corresponding steps were taken on the part of the Duke of Wellington, who did not get that last intelligence till three o’clock on the afternoon of the 15th.¹†

¹ Welling.
Mem. to
Quarter-
Master
General,
June 15,
1815. *Gaz.*
xii. 472.
Jom. Camp.
de 1815,
148, 161.
Brialmont,
ii. 398, 399.
Charras,
118, 124.

was stationed at Grammont, Ninove, and the banks of the Dinder. The Dutch-Belgian horse were at Roculx and Mons; the Brunswick dragoons in the vicinity of Brussels.

* When General Bourmont was presented to Blucher, the latter expressed in strong terms his contempt for the faithless soldier. To appease him, and recall his attention to Bourmont’s principles, some of the officers in attendance pointed to the white cockade in his hat; but the Prussian commander replied with characteristic honour and rudeness—“*Einerlei war das Volk für einen Zeitel ansteckt! Hundsott bleibt Hundsott.*” (It is all one what a man sticks in his hat for a mark—a scoundrel remains a scoundrel.)—*RATSCHENK, Blucher’s Leben*, 263; *SIBORNE*, i. 56.

† The following reason for the Duke’s policy on this occasion is given in the *Memoirs* bearing Fouché’s name, though they are known to have been arranged

At daybreak on the 15th, the French army crossed the frontier, and moved on Charleroi. The Prussian troops which occupied that town evacuated it, after a sharp skirmish, and retired to Fleurus. The French forces passed the Sambre at Marchiennes, Charleroi, and Chate-

CHAP.

XCHII.

1-15.

11

The French

at daybreak

11. 1. 1.

11. 1.

by M. Alphonse de Beauchamps from the papers of that arch traitor :—" My agents with Metternich and Lord Wellington had promised marvels and mountains; the English generalissimo expected that I should at the very least give him the plan of the campaign. I knew for certain that the unforeseen attack would take place on the 16th or 18th at latest. Napoleon intended to give battle on the 17th to the English army, after having marched right over the Prussians on the preceding day. He had the more reason to trust to the success of that plan, that Wellington, deceived by false reports, believed the opening of the campaign might be deferred till the beginning of July. The success of Napoleon, therefore, depended on a surprise; and I arranged my plans in conformity. On the very day of the departure of Napoleon, I despatched Madame D., furnished with notes written in cipher, containing the whole plan of the campaign. But at the same time I privately *despatched orders for such obstacles at the frontier where she was to pass, that she could not arrive at the headquarters of Wellington till after the event.* This was the real explanation of the inconceivable security of the generalissimo, which at the time excited such universal astonishment." ¹

Extraordinary as this story is, it derives confirmation from the following statement by Sir Walter Scott, who had access to the best sources of information, which he obtained at Paris a few weeks after the battle :—" I have understood," says he, "on good authority, that a person, bearing, for Lord Wellington's information, a detailed and authentic account of Buonaparte's plan for the campaign, was actually despatched from Paris in time to have reached Brussels before the commencement of hostilities. This communication was *intrusted to a female*, who was furnished with a pass from Fouché himself, and who travelled with all despatch in order to accomplish her mission; but being stopped for two days on the frontiers of France, did not arrive till after the battle of the 16th. This fact, *for such I believe it to be*, seems to countenance the opinion that Fouché maintained a correspondence with the Allies; and may lead, on the other hand, to suspicion, that though he despatched the intelligence in question, he contrived so to manage that its arrival should be too late for the purpose which it was calculated to serve. At all events, the appearance of the French on the banks of the Sambre was at Brussels *an unexpected piece of intelligence.*" *Paul's Letters, Miscellaneous Works*, v. 79.— It is remarkable that Scott's sagacity had, in this instance, divined the very solution of the question which Fouché afterwards stated in his *Memoirs* as a fact. To the same purpose Grolman Damitz says: "Wellington believed that Napoleon would attempt nothing before the 1st July, and that his first operations would be directed against *the right* of the British. *He was in expectation of a despatch from Fouché*, giving him a detail of the plan of the campaign; and till he received it, he gave no credit to the accounts of any intended irruption by the enemy." — GROLMAN DAMITZ, i. 103; see also *Die Grosse Chronik*, iii. 128. On the other hand, Wellington says,—"Avant mon arrivée à Paris au mois de juillet, je n'avais jamais vu Fouché, ni eu avec lui communication quelconque, ni avec aucun de ceux qui sont liés avec lui." — WELLINGTON to DE MOURVILZ, Sept. 26, 1815; Gurwood, xii. 649. If this statement were inconsistent with the

11. 1. 1.
M. de 1815,
342.

CHAP.
XCH.
—
1s15.

let. It was evident that the enemy were taken unawares, and Napoleon conceived sanguine hopes of being able to separate the British and Prussian armies. With this view, Ney was despatched with the left wing, consisting of Reille's and d'Erlon's corps, and Kellermann's heavy

former, the Duke's high character for truth and accuracy would have rendered it decisive of the point; but in reality it is not so. It only proves that the English general had had no communication with Fouché or those whom he *knew* to be his agents. It does not prove that he was not in expectation of information from Paris, from persons whom he was *not aware* were agents of the French minister; and the wily character of the veteran police diplomatist renders nothing more probable than that Wellington's correspondents at Paris were, unknown to the English general, his secret agents. That he had such correspondents, and believed on the whole he would not soon be attacked, is proved by the Duke himself; for on the 13th June he wrote to Lord Lynedoch:—"We have accounts of Buonaparte's leaving the army and attacking us; but *I have accounts from Paris of the 10th*, on which day he was still there; and I judge from his speech to the Legislature that his departure was not *likely to be immediate*. I think we are now too strong for him here."

GURWOOD, xii. 462. On the night of the day on which this letter was written, Napoleon slept at Avesnes in his own camp on the Flemish frontier; and on the following evening, being the 14th, he issued to his troops the proclamation already given, immediately before the frontiers were crossed. The statement of the expected female spy given by Scott and Fouché is perhaps confirmed by an expression of Wellington's, which proves he did expect such a secret emissary; for in his letter of 14th May 1815, he said, addressing a M. Henoul, evidently a spy:—"Je vous prie de venir ici pour que je puisse m'habiller avec vous aussitôt que possible, et je vous envoie une somme d'argent pour les frais du voyage. S'il est possible, je crois que vous ferez bien d'arriver avec vous *la dépense question*." WELLINGTON à M. HENOU, *Brussels*, 14th May 1815; GURWOOD, xii. 383. Nay, so soonly was the Duke impressed with the idea that no immediate attack was in contemplation, that on the 15th June, *the very day* on which the French, at four in the morning, crossed the frontier, and burst into the midst of the allied cantonnements, he was calmly engaged in writing a long and able letter to the Emperor Alexander at Vienna, on the general plan of the campaign, already extracted, which was based on a general invasion of France by the Russians, Prussians, Austrians, and English, in three armies, operating from Flanders to the Swiss frontier, which concluded with the words:—"Le Maréchal Blücher écrit que la place de Givet ne lui servirait d'aucune utilité; mais je crois que nous avons des moyens suffisants pour tout ce que l'ennemi peut nous laisser." WELLINGTON à L'EMPEREUR ALEXANDRE, *London*, 15th June 1815; GURWOOD, xii. 470, 472. Nothing could be more proper than to make these general arrangements for future offensive movements; but they afford demonstration that an immediate desperate defensive struggle was at that time not contemplated. At the moment that this letter was written, Napoleon was far advanced across the frontier and had passed Charleroi, in his attack on the Prussian cantonnements; and in the course of the same evening intelligence of this arrived, and orders to collect the troops with all possible expedition were issued by the Duke. See GURWOOD, xii. 471, 472. A most manifest contradiction affords, at this point, concerning which there can be

cavalry, in all forty six thousand strong, with a hundred and sixteen guns and five thousand horse, to QUATRE BRAS: an important position, situated at the point of intersection of the roads of Brussels, Nivelles, Charleroi, and Namur, which became the rallying point of Wellington's army, and whither they all, when put in motion, tended. By the possession of this decisive post, the French might have cut off the communication between the British and Prussian armies, and have been in a situation to fall with a preponderating force on either at pleasure. Meanwhile Napoleon himself, with seventy-eight thousand men, marched towards Fleurus, right against the Prussian army, which was concentrating with all imaginable expedition, and falling back towards Liège. Ziethen slowly retired, contesting every tenable position, towards the general rallying point in his rear; but his loss was very considerable, and amounted during the day to twelve hundred men. A sharp action took place at Charleroi, and bloody skirmishes at Gossilies and Gilly; but though the Prussians fought bravely, they could not much retard the advance of their numerous assailants.

It is clear that both the allied generals were surprised in the outset of the Waterloo campaign: "Les ennemis," says Jomini, "étaient si mal informés de nos mouvements, que leurs armées n'osaient ni valoir ni se joindre rapidement. Bataille, vict. and. des corps le Charleroi, un autre le Namur, le 1^{er} et 2nd de l'armée Prussienne se retirèrent le 1^{er} et 2nd. L'armée de Wellington n'alla pas contre l'ennemi, les ennemis n'allaient pas contre eux. Ils ont été pris, Napoléon."—*Journal, Vie de Napoléon*, iv. 225. To the same purport it is stated by a gallant British officer, himself personally engaged in the outposts when the impetuous Napoleon came: "It is a historical fact which cannot be denied, that at daylight on the morning of the 15th June 1815, the allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington was *completely attacked*—*completely* by the French, led by Napoleon, who by this *completely* *completely* obtained the *completely* *completely* of encountering separately the Prussian army on the afternoon of the 16th at Fleurus, and the British army on the morning of the 18th at Waterloo, before these two forces could mutually combine against him, as they did at sunset on the 18th, after the two great battles, the 1st and 2nd of June. Napoleon by his extraordinary, and aided with admirable skill, prevented the intelligence of his movements from preceding his attack upon the contingents of the Allies."—*Sir Francis Hall, Memoirs of the Waterloo Campaign*, vol. lxxii. 292, 293. The opinion of a most able military writer, General Chrenitz, is strongly expressed to the same effect. See CHRENYTZ, viii. 52, 53; and *Practical Campaigning*, iii. 128. See also CHAMRAS, 123, 124; BARATHOUX, ii. 492, 493; and HANLEY.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

¹ Jom. iv.
625, 626.
Wellington's Orders,
June
15, 1815.
Gur. xii.
472, 476.
Charras,
91, 121.
Brialmout,
396, 402.
Muffling,
229, 230.

45.

Description
of the field
of Ligny,
and Blu-
cher's force
and disposi-
tions.

—
Atlas,
Plate 104.

It was in the afternoon of the 15th, at three, that Wellington received this intelligence at Brussels: orders were in consequence issued, between four and five o'clock, to the different divisions to assemble at their respective rallying points, so as to be ready to move to their left on the shortest notice, and to the Prince of Orange to concentrate two of his divisions on Nivelles: while on the receipt of later and fuller accounts, orders were despatched at ten o'clock to the troops in every direction to concentrate *on Nivelles*.^{*} After they had been sent off, the English general dressed and went with characteristic calmness and *sang-froid* to the ball at the Duchess of Richmond's, where his manner was so undisturbed, that no one discovered that any intelligence of importance had arrived. Many brave men were there assembled amidst the scenes of festivity, and surrounded by the smiles of beauty, who were ere long locked in the arms of death.¹†

Blucher's army, with the exception of the fourth corps under Bulow, which being stationed on the extreme left, between Liege and Hamut, had not yet come up, was concentrated on the forenoon of the 16th on the heights between Bry and Sombreffe, with the villages of St Amand and Ligny strongly occupied in its front. This position, though liable to many objections, had some advantages; for the villages in front afforded shelter to the troops; and the artillery, placed on the semicircular convex ridge between them, commanded the whole field of battle; while the slope behind, surmounted by the windmill of Bussy, formed a strong *point-d'appui* in case

* See the orders given in Appendix D, Chap. XCIII.

† "There was a sound of revelry by night,

And Belgium's capital had gathered then

Her beauty and her chivalry; and bright

The lamps shone o'er fair women and brave men;

A thousand hearts beat happily, and when

Music arose with its voluptuous swell,

Soft eyes looked love to eyes which spake again.

And all went merry as a marriage bell:

But hush! hark!—a deep sound strikes like a rising knell."

Childe Harold, Canto iii.

of disaster.* It was attended, however, by this inconvenience, that the whole Prussian force was exposed to the view of the French, while part of their army was concealed from the Prussians—an advantage of which Napoleon skilfully availed himself in the battle which followed. Although the fourth corps under Bulow, which was on the extreme left at Liege, had not yet come up, the Prussian field-marshal had assembled eighty-four thousand men, of whom twelve thousand were cavalry, with two hundred and twenty-four guns. The four brigades of Ziethen's corps, formed in the first line, defended Ligny and St Amand; those of Pirch were in the second, between Sombreffe and Brye, and were successively brought up to support the front. The left, under Thielman, which had only arrived at nine o'clock in the morning, extended towards Tongrinc. Blucher was well aware of the disadvantages, in a military point of view, with which the position of Ligny was attended, especially when defended by three-fourths only of his whole force; but his object in holding it was to secure his communication with Wellington, by whom he confidently expected to be supported before the conflict was seriously engaged. He had had a conference that morning at eleven with the English general at the windmill of Bry, from whom he had received promises of aid by an attack in flank on the French army at four o'clock.¹

Napoleon's force was less numerous: it consisted of seventy-eight thousand men, of whom twelve thousand

CHAP.
XIII.

1815.

1. St. Amand, 1.
163, 186.
Blucher's
Official
Account,
June 16.
Reischek,
Blucher's
Loben, 254.
290. Grosse
Chronik, 1.
169, 164.
171. Clause-
witz, viii.
64, 65, 67.
Charras,
152, 155.

* "La position des Prussiens était hérissée de difficultés sur son front, que couvrait le ruisseau de Ligny: la gauche s'étendait jusqu'aux environs de Sombreffe et Tongrinc; la droite, derrière Saint Amand. Ce grand bourg, formé de trois villages distincts qui portent le nom de Saint Amand le Château, Saint Amand la Hâte, et Saint Amand le Hameau, protégeait l'aile droite, dont le flanc appuyait à Wagnelle; la seconde ligne et les réserves étaient entre Sombreffe et Brye. Ainsi six grands villages, dont quatre étaient d'un abord difficile à cause du ruisseau, couvraient comme autant de bastions la ligne de l'ennemi; ses réserves et sa seconde ligne, placées en colonnes d'attaque par bataillons, entre Sombreffe et Brye, pouvaient en soutenir tous les points."—JOMINI, *Campagne de 1815*, p. 164.

CHAP.
XCHII.

1815.

46.

Force and
plan of at-
tack of Na-
poleon.

¹ Siborne, i.
133, 136.
Nap. ix.
96, 97.
Blücher's
Official
Account,
June 16,
1815. J. m.
iv. 626, 627.
Plotto, iv.
36, 38.
Gourg. Bat.
de Water-
loo, 59, 51.
Die Grosse
Chron. iii.
161, 174.
Vetter, ii.
299.
Charras,
126, 141.

47.

Battle of
Ligny. Des-
perate con-
flict in the
village of
that name.
June 16,

were cavalry, with two hundred and forty-eight guns.* The Emperor's orders to Ney had been to move early in the morning, and occupy Quatre Bras before the English army was assembled, leaving behind a division of infantry and one of cavalry near Marbais, to be at hand in case he required their assistance at Ligny. After inspecting the Prussian position, however, he sent, at two o'clock, fresh orders to Ney, directing him, after vigorously pressing back the Anglo-Belgians, to move with his whole disposable force on Bry, so as to fall on the rear of the Prussians and complete their destruction. The attack in front was not to be pushed home till Ney's guns in the rear showed that he had reached his destined point : and to give time for his co-operation, Napoleon waited with his army ready drawn up for some time. But soon the loud and increasing cannonade on the side of Quatre Bras, which was only four miles and a half distant, told clearly that a desperate combat was going on there ; while, if the Prussian army was to be attacked before Bulow came up, there was no more time to be lost ; the Emperor, therefore, at half-past two o'clock, gave the signal for attack.¹

The better to conceal his real designs, Napoleon made great demonstrations against St Amand on his left ; but meanwhile he collected his principal force, concealed from the enemy, opposite the Prussian centre at Ligny, which was to be the real point of attack : while, on his right, Grouchy, with Excelmans' and Pajol's corps of cavalry, was directed merely to hold in check the Prussian left. St Amand was carried, after a vigorous resistance by the 3d French corps under Vandamme, assisted by Gerard's division of Reille's corps ; and no sooner was the enemy's attention fixed on that quarter, whither reinforcements were directed by Blücher, who retook the village only to be again driven out by the French, than Napoleon's centre, consist-

* This includes Lobau's corps, however, 10,000 strong, which did not come up till the fate of the day was decided.

ing of the 4th corps, fifteen thousand strong, commanded by Gerard, issued from behind the heights by which it was concealed, crossed the streamlet of Ligny, and, pushing up the opposite bank, commenced a furious assault on the village of the same name. But if the attack was vehement, the resistance was not less obstinate: three times Ligny was taken by the impetuous onset of the French grenadiers, and three times the Prussians, with invincible resolution, returned to the charge, and with desperate valour regained the post at the point of the bayonet. Intermingled with the incessant discharge of musketry in the village, came forth alternately the war-cries of the opposite sides; and at every instant when the fire slackened, the loud shouts of “*En avant, Vive l’Empereur!*” or “*Vorwärts, hurrah!*” were heard above the roar of the artillery, which thundered from the opposite heights. Volumes of dark smoke, intermingled with flames, issued from the old castle of Ligny, and added to the awful character of the scene. Each army had behind its own side of the village immense masses of men, with which the combat was constantly fed: and at length the struggle became so desperate, that neither party could completely, by bringing up fresh columns, expel the enemy. Still they fought hand to hand in the streets and houses with unconquerable resolution; while the fire of two hundred pieces of cannon, directed on the two sides against the village, spread death equally among friend and foe. At six o’clock, after two hours’ furious combat, nothing was yet decided; and Blücher, by directing in person a fresh corps against St Amand, had retaken part of the village called St Amand la Haye, and an important height adjoining, commanding a large part of the field of battle.^{1*} So impressed was the veteran field-marshal with the importance of this last attack, that he gal-

CHAP.
XCVI.
1815.

Clarendon, vi.
89, 91, 103.
Grisse.
Chron. iii.
177, 178.
Simpson, i.
181, 182.
191, 192.
Gibbon, vi.
52, 53.
Napier,
97, 98.
Blücher, i.
101, 102.
A. G. G.
Philip, iv.
30, 31, 32.
iv, 128.
V. G. G.
143, 144.
Rus. G. G.
Blücher, i.
143, 144.
Clarendon,
143, 144.

* St Amand consisted of three parts: St Amand itself, and a group of houses to its left, called St Amand le Hameau, both of which the French at this time held; and St Amand la Haye, which lay beyond and between them, and which the Prussians had now recovered.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

48.
Napoleon's
attack on
the centre.

loped to the front and said to the leading column, "Now, my children! show yourselves: don't let the great nation lord it over you: forward, in God's name, forward!" So far the Prussian general was successful; but an attack which he directed from Wagnelle against the extreme French left, was repulsed with great slaughter.

Napoleon, however, no sooner saw this advantage than he ordered up fresh columns, and vigorously attacked St Amand la Haye, both in front and flank. By degrees Blucher's reserves began to be engaged, and his position became very critical; for the attack of the French centre continued with unparalleled vigour, and neither Bulow's corps had come up on the one flank, nor the much wished-for British succours on the other. Both parties, almost equally exhausted, despatched the most urgent orders to their other corps or allies to join them; that of Napoleon at this juncture was so pressing, that he declared to Ney that the fate of France depended on his instantly obeying it; * and he at the same time ordered d'Erlon's corps, twenty thousand strong, forming that marshal's reserve, forthwith to defile towards Ligny. Ney, however, so far from being in a condition to make the prescribed movement, was himself with difficulty contending against defeat at Quatre Bras. Meanwhile the fight continued with unparalleled vigour both in Ligny and St Amand. Every house in the former village, as at Saragossa, became the theatre of a separate and desperate conflict: the troops fought no longer in combined order, but personally, or in detached groups; and when ammunition failed, the bayonet or butt-end of the musket, nay, even the stones of the fallen houses, and the yet burning rafters of the roofs, supplied the rage of the combatants.¹ The entire village was

¹ Siborne, i. 200, 204.
Rauschnick, 264, 265.
Claus, viii. 83, 84.
Gourg, 51.
54. Kausler, 679. Jom. iv. 627.
628. Die Grosse Chron. iii. 183, 184.
Chartras, 148.

* "At this moment, Marshal, the armies are warmly engaged. His Majesty commands me to direct you instantly to envelop the right of the enemy, and fall on his rear: his army is lost if you act vigorously; the fate of France is in your hands. Do not lose a moment in making the prescribed movement, and march direct on the heights of Bry and St Amand, to contribute to a victory which will probably prove decisive."—SOULT to NEY, 16th June 1815, *a quarter past three*; CAPLEFIGUE, ii. 481, 482.

concealed in smoke, from whence were heard, above the rattle of musketry, the yells and cries of the combatants, the crash of falling roofs, and smashing of doors and windows. Presently the French artillery of the Guard was brought up, and opened a terrible fire on the village. The Prussian reserve batteries came also into play; and so furious was the cannonade, that it seemed as if, by an awful earthquake, the valley had been rent asunder, and Ligny had become the crater of a burning volcano.

At seven o'clock, d'Erlon's corps, which had been stationed by Ney in reserve two leagues from Quatre Bras, withdrawn thence by the positive orders of the Emperor, made its appearance on the extreme Prussian right, beyond St Amand. They were at first taken for Prussians, and excited no small alarm in the French army; but no sooner was the mistake discovered, than fear gave place to confidence, and Napoleon, now entirely relieved, brought forward his Guards and reserves for a decisive attack on the centre. The Hameau de St Amand, a group of houses forming a salient angle between St Amand and la Haye and Wagnelle, had been carried by storm by the Prussians of Tippleskirshen's brigade, and the French made the utmost efforts to retake it, as it was the key of that part of the position. Four times also had St Amand la Haye yielded to their impetuous assaults, and four times the loud hourrah of the Prussians told that they had regained the post. So vehement did the contest become at this point, that when the fire of the Prussians in the village began to slacken from having expended their ammunition, the 11th hussars, who were stationed in its rear, rushed into the midst of them and supplied them with their own cartridges: an act of devotion to which many of themselves fell sacrifices. Blücher's anxiety to retain this post, as well as Ligny, till the arrival of Wellington on the right or Bulow on the left, was extreme: and he incessantly fed the contest in the villages, but more especially that at St

CHAP.
XIII.

1-15.

19.
Description
of the
conflict in
and around
St Amand.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

¹ Rausch-
nick, 264,
265. Si-
borne, i.
203, 211.
222. Claus,
viii. 86, 87.
Vand. iv.
147, 150.
Grobman
Dantzig, i.
143, 145,
151.
Clayton,
153, 157.

50.

Final and
decisive
charge of
Napoleon's
Guards.

Amand on his right, with fresh troops, until at length his last reserves were engaged. "Forward, my lads! we must do something before the English join us," exclaimed the veteran field-marshal, as he cheered on his men to join the deadly strife: but, meanwhile, the expending of his last reserves did not escape the eagle eye of the French Emperor. "They are lost!" said he to Gerard, as he cast his eyes on the vacant ground behind Ligny: "they have no reserve remaining." Immediately the formidable infantry and cavalry of the Guard were ordered forward for the decisive charge, and directed upon the Prussian line immediately to the right of Ligny, so as to turn that important post.¹

Milhaud's terrible cuirassiers advanced at the gallop, shaking their sabres in the air; the artillery of the Guard under Drouot moved up, pouring forth with extraordinary rapidity its dreadful fire; and in the rear of all, the dense columns of the Old Guard were seen moving forward, with a swift pace and unbroken array. This attack, supported by the appearance of d'Erlon's column in the distance, and the opportune arrival of Lobau's, who coming up at this instant was posted in reserve on the right of Fleurus, proved decisive. Milhaud, with twenty squadrons of cuirassiers, charged home on the right flank of the 21st Prussian regiment, which, albeit wearied and sorely weakened by the contest, was yet coming up with an undaunted front to meet the advancing columns, and utterly overthrew it. The fugitives spread the alarm far in the rear. The few battalions of infantry posted behind Ligny began to retire; the bloodstained street of the village fell into the enemy's hands; and in the confusion of a retreat, commenced just as darkness overspread the field, the troops naturally fell into some degree of disorder. The cannon, in retiring through the narrow lanes behind Ligny, got entangled, and twenty-one pieces fell into the enemy's hands. The veteran Blucher himself, charging at the head of a body of cavalry to retard the

enemy's pursuit, had his horse shot under him, and he fell beneath it. "Now," said he to his aide-de-camp Nostitz, "I am lost." But that faithful officer stood by his side, and succeeded in the end in saving him. "Why have you saved my life," said Blücher to him, "to bring me into this strait?" The Prussian horse, overpowered by the French cuirassiers, were driven back, and the victorious French rode straight over the Prussian marshal as he lay entangled below his dying steed. A second charge of Prussian horse repulsed the cuirassiers; but they, too, in the dark, passed the marshal without seeing him, and it was not till they were returning that he was recognised, and with some difficulty extricated from the dead animal, and mounted on a stray dragoon horse. The loss of the French in the battle was about ten thousand men; while the Prussians were weakened by twelve thousand, and lost four standards and twenty-one pieces of cannon. But ten thousand more, almost entirely composed of the levies from the Prussian provinces on the Rhine, who were in secret inclined to Napoleon, dispersed after the action, and were lost to the allied cause.^{1*}

While this desperate conflict was raging on the left of the allied position, an encounter, on a less extensive scale, but equally desperate and more successful to the Allies, took place between Wellington and Ney at Quatre Bras. At midnight on the 15th, the drums beat and the trumpets sounded in every quarter of Brussels; at daylight the troops assembled at their several rallying points, and were rapidly marched off to meet the enemy. The Highland regiments, the 42d, 79th, and 92d, which had their rallying point in the Park and Place Royal,

The Prussian loss in the battle, according to their official account, was:

Killed.	66	3444
Wounded.	306	8265
	372	11709

and 16 guns.—*De Girona Chronicle*, 37, 207, 208. CHARRAS, the fiercest, 11,450 men. CHARRAS, 162, 163.

CHAP.
XVIII

188, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

51.
Mammals
Birds
Reptiles
Quadrupeds
Insects

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

were particularly remarked for the earliness of their muster, the discipline and precision of their movements, and the air, at once grave and undaunted, with which they marched out of the town. Quatre Bras was the point of union now assigned to the whole army; but as its distance from Brussels was not above eighteen miles, and other corps of the army, particularly the English cavalry and artillery, had, some twenty-five, some thirty miles to march, they arrived at different times; and Picton's division, with the Brunswickers, were first of those who came up from behind on the ground. A brigade of the Belgian troops had been assailed the evening before by Ney's advanced guard at Frasnes, and retreated to Quatre Bras, where, by the morning of 16th, above seven thousand of their countrymen were assembled under the Prince of Orange. The occupation by these troops of this all-important point was owing to the decision and promptitude of General Perponcher, who (in the absence of the Prince of Orange at Brussels) took upon himself to disregard Wellington's order, to concentrate his division on his right at Nivelles, and did so on his left at Quatre Bras; thus closing to Ney the direct road to Brussels, and preserving to the English general his communication with Blücher and the point of concentration for his army.* Had Ney attacked early and with vigour, he would probably have made himself master of this important point before the British troops arrived from Brussels.¹ But he moved with

¹ Die Grosse Chron. iii. 210, 213. Grolman Damitz, i. 199, 200. Plotho, iv. 47. Nap. Book ix. 103, 104. Gourz. 54. Wellington to Lord Bathurst, June 19, 1815. Gur. xii. 479. Charras, 172.

* Colonel Hamley, in the very able and acute criticism on the campaign of Waterloo, contained in his "Career of Wellington," has been the first to give this fact the prominence it deserves. He says:—"He (Wellington) then issued orders for the army to concentrate, not on Quatre Bras, but on Nivelles, seven miles to his own right of the road from Charleroi to Brussels. This singular mistake has never been explained, indeed has hardly been noticed. Yet it involved terrible consequences, for Napoleon's object being to insert the point of his wedge between the two armies, to concentrate at Nivelles was to assist him by making a great opening for his wedge. Had the assembly at Nivelles taken place, the ultimate concentration of the Duke's army must have been effected at some point other than Waterloo, because the French would have been at Waterloo before him."—*Wellington's Career*, by Lieut.-Colonel HAMLEY, p. 76, 77.—See also CHARRAS, p. 172; and BRIALMONT, ii. 422, *note*.

such circumspection, that it was not till noon that he advanced from Gosselies,* where he had passed the night, and it was half-past two before he had collected any considerable force in front of Quatre Bras, by which time Picton's division and the Brunswickers were approaching the field. But their whole force, with the Belgians, did not exceed at that time twenty thousand, including two thousand, nearly useless, Belgian and Brunswick horse,† with twenty-eight guns; and Ney had in all under his command more than double the number of troops, of whom five thousand were cavalry, with a hundred and ten pieces of cannon.‡

* Ney's orders were in these terms: "L'intention de sa Majesté est que vous attaquiez tout ce qui est devant vous: *qu'étant l'armée ennemie en avant pressée, vous vous rabattiez sur nous pour concourir à envelopper le corps ennemi entre Sombreff et Brié. Si ce corps était enfoncé auparavant, alors sa Majesté manœuvrerait dans votre direction, pour faciliter également vos opérations.*" *Au lieueuant deuant Flouvas, à deux heures après midi, le 16.* *Bonaparte, Campagne de 1815, p. 168.*

† Forces in the field at the beginning and during the action:—

Allied forces.	French forces.
6,832 Infantry,	8,891 Infantry.
150 Cavalry,	1,865 Cavalry.
<hr/>	<hr/>
6,982 and 16 guns.	10,756 and 22 guns.
Allied force at three o'clock.	French do.
6,832 Belgian Infantry,	16,348 Infantry.
1,082 „ Cavalry,	1,865 Cavalry.
4,644 British Infantry.	
2,582 Hanoverian Infantry.	
4,032 Brunswick Infantry.	
922 „ Cavalry.	
<hr/>	<hr/>
20,094 with 28 guns.	18,213 and 38 guns.

Kellermann came up with his cavalry and 12 guns about five o'clock, and when this was done the French had 5225 cavalry and 50 guns.—See *SALICRÚ*, l. 1. c. 1. 108; *CHARLES*, p. 59, 175, 177.

‡ French force under Ney originally:—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Guns.
2d Corps, Reille,	20,035	1,865	46
1st Corps, d'Erlon,	16,885	1,596	46
Kellermann's Cuirassiers,	—	3,366	12
Lefebvre Desnoettes's Light Horse of the Guard,	—	2,677	6
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total,	37,520	8,898	110
	<hr/>		
	46,328		

— Only half of this force, however, fought at Quatre Bras, the corps of d'Erlon

CHAP.
XCIII.
1815.
52.
Battle of
Quatre
Bras,
June 16.

It was well for the British corps that the French marshal did not concentrate his whole army together, and commence his attack with his united force ; for if so, they must inevitably have been crushed. But Napoleon's orders to reserve a large body in hand to strike the decisive blow against the Prussians at Ligny, led him to leave d'Erlon with nineteen thousand men in reserve near Gosselies, to be at hand to support the Emperor at Ligny. In effect, the approach of that corps, as already mentioned, had a material influence on the battle at that place, though they did not actually take part in it. Ney himself, with nine thousand foot, eighteen hundred and sixty cavalry, and twenty-two guns, commenced a little after two o'clock the attack at Quatre Bras. The Belgians, about seven thousand strong, were soon overthrown. The village of Piermont, the farm of Gemioncourt, part of the Bois de Bossu, were lost ; but, as they were retiring from the field, a broad line of red uniforms, to the inexpressible joy of the Prince of Orange, was seen on the road from Brussels ; and soon after, Picton's division and the Duke of Brunswick's men came up in haste and covered with dust. Instantly forming with great precision when they got in sight of the enemy, along the Namur road, Picton's two British brigades in front, his Hanoverian brigade in second line, and the Brunswickers in reserve, they prepared to receive the attack. It was now nearly three o'clock, and Wellington in person was on the ground. He had just galloped back from Bry, where he had, as already mentioned, had a conference with Blucher on their joint operations, and expressed his doubts to the Prussian general on the nature of the ground he had chosen for the battle. The Allies were now about twenty thousand strong : and the French, who had been joined by Jerome's division (7819 men), about eighteen thou-

being sent off to Ligny ; Gerard's division (4000 strong) of Reille's corps being detached with Napoleon ; and Lefebvre Desnoettes's cavalry left in rear at Fra nes. See CHARRAS, 57, 58, 184 ; GOURGAUD, p. 47.

sand; but the former had not above twenty-eight guns, and no horse except a regiment of Brunswick hussars, which gave the enemy at first a decided advantage. The Belgians, indeed, had eleven hundred cavalry on the field; but they never could be brought to face the enemy, and, when led forward to the charge, fled with such precipitation, in an early period of the action, that they swept the Duke of Wellington and his staff with them through Quatre Bras, and were not again seen on the field. The Duke now ordered the greater part of the Brunswickers to move up on his right, between the Charleroi road and the Bois de Bossu, whilst he caused Kempt and Pack to advance, bringing up their right shoulders, so as to occupy the ground between that road and the wood of Piermont. Two heavy French masses, consisting of Bacheluz's division, preceded by a cloud of skirmishers, advanced to meet Picton's men; the skirmishers drew off as the adverse lines approached; gradually the French fire slackened, and their columns began to waver: then, uniting with a shout, the British rushed on with lowered bayonets, and drove their opponents back in confusion to their original position.¹

Meanwhile, beyond the Charleroi road, and between it and the Bois de Bossu, Foy advanced against the Brunswickers, and his columns pressing vigorously on, were driving back their infantry, when the gallant Duke of Brunswick, putting himself at the head of his cavalry, led them on to the charge. Struck with a sudden panic, however, the horsemen turned and fled; the Brunswick infantry then fell back in disorder, and their Duke nobly fell while endeavouring to rally his men. Upon this the French cavalry rode with the utmost gallantry close up to the British infantry, now wholly denuded of horsemen, and assailed them with such rapidity, that the sabres were upon more than one regiment before they had time to form square. Pack's brigade, consisting of the Royals, 42d, 44th, and 92d in particular, being now deprived of

CHAP.
XVIII.

1815

1 Nap. Hist.
xv. 104.
105. A. 17.
42d to
Lord Ba-
d 180, June
19, 1815.
Gurw. xii.
479. Jom.
iv. 929.
Goult, 55.
Siborne, i.
105, 106.
Die Grosse
Chron. iii.
215, 217.
Charles.
175, 162.

53.
Vehement
charge on
the British
squares.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

all support on its right, was assailed at once both in front and flank. But his men upheld their noble character, and succeeded, after an arduous conflict, in repulsing the enemy on the left of the Charleroi road. The 42d were charged in the middle of a field of tall rye; two companies had not fallen back into the square when the lancers were upon them, and they were driven back upon it, followed by some of the horse, and were almost cut to pieces, with their brave colonel, Sir Robert Macara, who was killed on the spot. The French horsemen, however, paid dear for their success; for a well-directed volley from the remainder of the regiment stretched many of them on the plain, and the men, closing rapidly in, bayoneted such as had penetrated into the square. The 44th being suddenly assailed by lancers in rear, when engaged in front, and having no time to form square, performed the astonishing feat of receiving the cavalry *in line*, and defeating it by a single well-directed discharge of the rear rank, who faced about for that purpose.* At the same time the 28th, 32d, 79th, and 95th, forming Kempt's brigade, maintained their ground on Pack's left; and although the French troops, both cavalry and infantry, fought with the utmost fury, and repeatedly rode up to the very bayonets of the soldiers, calling out, "Down with the English!—no quarter—no quarter!" and the enemy's cannon with unresisted fire made dreadful havoc in the British squares, yet little ground was gained, and Quatre Bras was still in the hands of the allied troops, though the enemy's horse repeatedly rode up to its streets.¹

In no action of the war did the British combat to greater disadvantage, or with more desperate valour,

¹ Siborne, i.
118, 119.
Near Ob-
server, 10,
11. Nap. ix.
104, 106.
Wellington
to Lord Bathurst, June
19, 1815.
Garw. xii.
479. Jom.
iv. 629, 630.
Gourg. 55,
56. Grol-
man, i. 298.
Vetter, ii.
310, 312.
Chauris,
182, 183.

* The Colonel of the 44th, Hamerton, when he heard the rush of horsemen in his rear, calmly called out, "Rear rank, right-about face—Present—Fire." The effect of the volley *in line*, at twenty paces' distance, was very great; but some of the boldest of the lancers reached the bayonets, and one struck Ensign Christie severely in the face; but that heroic officer, amidst all the agony of the wound, preserved the colours by throwing himself on his face. SIBORNE, i. 119, 121.

than here, from two, when the battle commenced, until six o'clock, when Alten's division arrived. Confident in his great superiority, especially in cavalry and artillery, Ney pushed his advantage to the utmost. Anxious to fulfil the instructions he had received, and repulse the British before their reinforcements arrived, so as to be able to fall with the bulk of his forces on the Prussians when engaged with the Emperor at Ligny, he made the attack with all his accustomed vigour. Foy's division advanced in the direction of Quatre Bras; Bacheluz pushed on from the village of Piermont; while on the extreme French left, the wood of Bossu was carried, after a bloody combat, by Jerome. In consequence of the British having few cannon, and, after the flight of the Belgian and Brunswick horse, no cavalry, the whole weight of the conflict fell on the infantry, who had no resource but to throw themselves, with all possible rapidity, into squares. The opportune arrival of Kellermann, with his division of cavalry, nineteen hundred strong, on the field at this time, which raised his horse to above four thousand, enabled Ney to employ that arm with fatal effect. The 42d and 44th, now formed in square, were charged so frequently to the very bayonets of the soldiers, that nothing but their extreme steadiness saved them from destruction. The 28th was assailed suddenly on three faces at once, by cuirassiers and lancers. "28th, remember Egypt!" exclaimed Picton, who was in the inside: * and motionless the men stood with their muskets in their hands. Not a voice was heard in the square but that of the colonel, who called aloud, "Ready!" The high corn concealed the horsemen from the foot-soldiers; but soon a hollow rush was heard, the corn-blades bent suddenly forward, and the lances of the enemy appeared within twenty paces.¹ The word "Fire!" was then given by the colonel; † each front of the squares poured in a deadly volley, and the proud horsemen were instantly

CHAP.

XXIV.

1794.

1794.

1794.

Despatches.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

1794.

* See Chap. XXXIV. § 31.

† Sir Philip Boscawen.

CHAP.
XCHL

1815.

55.
Noble com-
bat of
Picton and
Kempt.

scattered in every direction : a rolling fire from the rear ranks completed their defeat.

Notwithstanding their heroic resistance, however, the combat, from the want of cavalry and the scanty artillery on the side of the British, was for long unequal. The Bois de Bossu, a post of great moment, as it entirely covered the English right flank, had been at length lost ; and the squares in the open fields, sorely reduced by the grape-shot of the batteries, could hardly close up with sufficient rapidity to withstand the repeated and desperate charges of Kellermann's horse. The men were becoming impatient under the dreadful fire of cannon to which, from being necessarily stationary through the want of cavalry, they were exposed, and repeatedly asked, " When shall we be at them ? " The heroic resistance of the 42d and 44th, now sorely reduced, was watched with intense anxiety by Picton, who, despairing of getting the Belgian horse, which had fled from the field, to face the enemy, and having no other cavalry at his disposal, resolved on the bold measure of charging the enemy's cuirassiers and lancers with infantry. For this purpose, he formed the Royals and 28th into column, and, placing himself with Kempt at their head, followed by the 32d, plunged headlong, with loud shouts, into the midst of the enemy's cavalry. They were immediately charged on all sides by lancers and cuirassiers : but, although entirely enveloped by their furious assailants, they repelled every attack by the precision of their fire ; and effectually took the pressure off the 42d and 44th. Viewed from a distance, the British squares could not be seen amidst the surging multitude of horsemen by which they were surrounded, until their places were made apparent by a sudden volley, which, like the explosion of a bomb, scattered the assailing squadrons in every direction.¹ But still the conflict was very doubtful ; and the Belgian infantry, seven thousand five hundred strong, were so panic-struck that they abandoned the field, leaving the British, Hanoverians,

¹ Die Grosse Chron. iii. 211, 217. Siborne, i. 127, 129. *Journ. Camp. de 1815.* 178, 179. Maxwells Wellington, iii. 166. *George.* 55. 56. *Grosin.* *Dum.* i. 207. *Chattas.* 161.

and Brunswickers, not above twelve thousand in all, to withstand above twenty thousand of French, including five thousand admirable horse.

CHAP.
XVII.
1815.

Despite all their gallantry, the situation of the British had now become very critical, when the two infantry brigades of the 3d division, under Lieutenant-General Count Alten, most opportunely arrived on the field about six o'clock, accompanied by two batteries of foot-artillery. This reinforcement, which added five thousand five hundred admirable soldiers and twelve guns to the British ranks, in some degree restored the equality of the opposite forces, as Ney had twenty thousand men and fifty guns; but his five thousand horse still gave him a vast advantage in that arm. Halket's brigade, which headed the reinforcement, was immediately directed towards the French left, between the wood of Bossu and the Charleroi road, while Kielmansegg's brigade, which followed, received orders to strengthen the extreme British left, where the troops which had so long fought with the cavalry were much reduced in numbers, and nearly exhausted by fatigue. Ney, upon perceiving this accession to the allied forces, despatched a peremptory order to d'Erlon, to join him with his whole corps without a moment's delay—a step which exercised, as will appear in the sequel, a most important, perhaps decisive, influence on the fate of the campaign. At the same time, he strongly reinforced his troops in the wood of Bossu, and, by a redoubled discharge from all his guns, prepared a fresh attack. The 42d and 44th were now formed into one square, and, with the 30th, which also got into the same formation, again repelled a formidable attack of French lancers. But the 69th was not equally fortunate: for, before the square could be completed, Kellermann's dragoons attacked and broke it, taking its colours; and, sweeping on, again assailed Picton's wearied bands, which only repelled their assaults by their unvarying steadiness in square.¹ The resistance was most vigorous at every

56.
Arrived of
Alten's
corps, &c.
the 3d.

1 Schomberg, l.
156, 149.
Journ. Camp.
de 1815,
178, 179.
Vid. et
Conq. xxiv.
179, 180.
Die Grossen
Chancen,
219, 222.
Charras,
184, 186.

CHAP.

XIII.

1815.

point; but the Allies, destitute of horse, were threatened with being turned on either flank; and Ney, deeming success secure, despatched the taken colours of the 69th as a harbinger of victory to the Emperor.

57.

Arrival of
the Guards
restores the
battle.

At length, at half-past six, two brigades of Guards, under Maitland and Byng, arrived with some other troops, which raised the Allies in the field to twenty-nine thousand men and sixty-eight guns. The men were covered with dust and dropping with sweat, after a toilsome march of eighteen miles from Enghien. They were immediately ordered by Wellington to retake the wood of Bossu, which they did in the most gallant style; but as soon as they attempted to debouch on the other side, their advance was checked by a tremendous fire of round-shot and canister from the French batteries; and they were driven back into the cover of the trees with great slaughter. A vehement charge of French horse on the disordered Guards, which followed, was repulsed by a volley from the men under cover of the ditch of the wood. Encouraged by this success, they held the post, and every effort of the enemy to expel them from it was defeated with heavy loss. Such, however, was the fatigue of the Guards with this obstinate conflict, that many fainted among the trees from absolute exhaustion, when in the act of cheering on their more robust comrades. This desperate struggle continued for nearly three hours, without any decided advantage being gained on either side; but, as night approached, it was evident that the enemy's attacks were growing weaker, while the successive arrival of the remainder of Cooke's Guards inspired fresh ardour in the wearied British.¹

¹ Grohn, Dan. i. 206. Siborne, i. 127, 154. Join. Camp. de 1815, 173, 179. Maxwell's Wellington, iii. 466, 467. Beamish, ii. 360. Charas, 169, 190.

58.

Desperate
resistance of
the British.

Still none of the cavalry had appeared, nor did the first brigade of British horse arrive on the ground till late in the evening; the greater part not till midnight, after the conflict had entirely ceased. Meanwhile Ney, with Reille's corps and the cuirassiers, was making the most desperate efforts to force the English from their

position. But such was the rapidity and precision of the British fire, that all his efforts proved ineffectual; and towards seven, when Alten and the Guards, and a troop of horse-artillery, had come up, it became evident that the weight of force had inclined to the British side. The French marshal, however, accustomed to victory, and trusting to the support of d'Erlon's corps, which he every moment expected to arrive on the field, continued his attacks with the utmost impetuosity. But the withdrawing of that powerful reserve, which would probably have changed the fortune of the day, without benefiting Napoleon, proved fatal to Ney. His last attacks were all repulsed with great loss; and at length stung to the quick by their failure, finding that d'Erlon had not come up, he sent a positive order for him to retrace his steps from Ligny, where he had produced an impression on the flank of the Prussians; but he did not arrive till after it was dark, and when the battle was already lost. Wellington, seeing the pressure on his wings and centre relieved, ordered a general advance; and the line, with loud shouts, moved forward to the position of the French, who retired with precipitation. Ney at nightfall retreated to Frasnes, a mile from the field of battle; and Wellington's men, wearied alike with marching and fighting, lay on the ground on which they had fought at Quatre Bras, surrounded by the dead and the dying.^{1*}

In this bloody combat, the British and Hanoverians had three hundred and fifty killed, two thousand three hundred and eighty wounded, and a hundred and eighty-one made prisoners. The loss of the Belgians and Brunswickers was thirteen hundred more—in all, five thousand two hundred men. The French loss amounted to four thousand one hundred and forty: and the fact of the repulsed army sustaining a smaller loss than the

CHAP.
XIII.

1815.

¹ Siborne, i.
158, 159.
Wellington
to Lord Bathurst, June
19, 1815.
Gurw. xii.
479, 480.
Journ. Camp.
de 1815,
177. Die
Grosse
Chen. iii.
222, 223.
Charnes,
190, 199.

50.
Lassenboth
2007.

* At the conclusion of the battle Wellington's army consisted of the Belgian and Brunswick cavalry 2,000 strong withdrawn from the battle, 1,129,700 men, with 68 guns; and Ney 21,570, with 50 guns. See Siborne, i. 159; and Charnes, 59, 175, and 177.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

¹ Gurw. xii.
4: 5. Bel-
gian Official
Account,
June 17,
1815. Ney's
Official
Account,
June 26,
1815.
Charras,
191.

victorious one, is easily explained by the circumstance, that during the greater part of the day the British infantry, without cavalry, and but little artillery, combated against the French, who had fifty guns and five thousand admirable horsemen in their ranks. No guns and few prisoners were taken on either side; for the French having commenced the combat with giving no quarter, and evinced unparalleled exasperation during the whole day, the British troops were driven into a sanguinary species of combat, alike foreign to their previous habits and present inclinations.¹

60.
Retreat of
the Prus-
sians to
Wavre.
—
Atlas,
Plate 93.

During the night of the 16th, Wellington received intelligence of the defeat of the Prussians at Ligny, and that they were retreating in great confusion in the direction of Wavre. Although, however, the troops of the Rhenish provinces, to the number of nearly ten thousand, left their colours and fled to Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle, before they halted, yet not a man was missing from the provinces of Old Prussia, and several fresh troops joined from that of Munster. Among these steady bands, the spirit of the men was neither tamed nor weakened. Unbroken confidence was placed in the aged chief who had so often led them to victory; and above all, in the energy with which he had been known on many former occasions to repair disaster. Nor was this confidence misplaced. Blucher, on this trying occasion, proved himself worthy of heading the vanguard of the mighty host which combated for the independence of Europe. Placing full reliance on the resources of his own mind, and on the stern resolution of his men, he directed his whole energies to the one great object—the concentration of the whole forces in both armies to crush Napoleon. His line of retreat was directed by Tilly and Gentinnes to Wavre, in order to be still in communication with the English forces. The reserve parks were brought up, in order to be ready for another battle; while Thielman's corps, which covered the movement, was to march upon Gem-

bloux, where, having formed a junction with Bülow, who was coming up from Hannut, the two united were to fall back upon Wavre. There, accordingly, upon the evening of the 17th, the whole Prussian army was actually concentrated; the battering train was withdrawn from Liège to Maestricht; and everything which skill or prudence could suggest was done to put the army in the most efficient state. “We have lost one battle,” said Gneisenau: “we must gain another.” Despatches were sent off to Wellington, announcing Blücher’s readiness “to co-operate in a general engagement on the following day in front of Waterloo, not with two corps only, but with his whole army, provided, if the French did not attack them on the 18th, they should attack them on the 19th;” and a noble proclamation was issued to his troops, which concluded with the prophetic words—“I shall immediately lead you anew against the enemy: we shall beat him, for it is our duty to do so.”⁶¹

The English general at once saw that he could not maintain his position at Quatre Bras, when his left flank was uncovered by the retreat of the Prussians, and also, that by retiring to Waterloo, he would be so near Blücher that they would be able to aid each other in case of attack. Accordingly, at ten o’clock next morning, the British army, which was by that time in great part concentrated, sixty thousand strong, at Quatre Bras, retreated through Genappe to WATERLOO. Napoleon, according to his usual custom, rode over the ghastly field of battle at Ligny on the morning after the conflict, and observed with satisfaction the great proportion which the Prussian dead, lying around that village, bore to the loss of the French. From that, after directing Grouchy, under whose orders he placed Vandamme’s and Gérard’s corps, with one of Lobau’s divisions, Excelmans’ corps of heavy cavalry, and one of Pajol’s light-horse divisions, to follow up the Prussians: he moved with his staff and Guards, Milhaud’s cuirassiers, Pajol’s light-cavalry, and the two

CHAP.
XXIII.

Vandamme,
Gérard,
Lobau,
Excelmans,
Pajol,
Guards,
221, 224.

61.
Retreat of
Wellington
to Water-
loo.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

remaining divisions of Lobau's corps to Quatre Bras, from which Wellington had recently before retired on his road to Waterloo.* His instructions to Grouchy were "to follow up the Prussians and complete their defeat." So rudely, however, had the French been handled on the field of battle on the preceding day, that no attempt was made by them to disturb the retreat of either army, excepting by a large body of lancers, which, about four o'clock in the afternoon, charged the English cavalry who were covering the retreat between Genappe and Waterloo. The day was oppressively hot, and the atmosphere close with the sulphurous clouds which bespeak an approaching thunder-storm. Not a drop of rain, however, had yet fallen, when, on the discharge of the first gun from the British horse-artillery on the right, the concussion seemed to rebound like an electric shock to the heavily charged mass above; a tremendous clap of thunder followed, and the rain instantly fell in such torrents, as in a few minutes to flood the ground, and for a period stop all movements on both sides.† When the weather cleared up, the English heavy cavalry, under Lord Uxbridge and Ponsonby, retired through Genappe, leaving the 7th hussars in that town to check the enemy. The French lancers in the first instance drove that regiment, supported by a few other squadrons which covered the rear, through the street; as, in spite of the gallantry of that distinguished corps, its light horses and the sabres of the riders were unequally matched, in a close charge, with the lancers of France.¹ This was in an especial manner the case in the narrow chaussée of Genappe, where the con-

¹ Siborne, i.
269, 271.
Gourz. 70.
71. Nap.
Book ix.
112, 114.
Charras,
216, 228.

* This division of his army made, according to Charras, the force under Napoleon in person, directed against Wellington, 72,447 strong, with 240 guns; that under Grouchy, following Blücher, 33,319 with 96 guns; and there remained, left at Ligny, Girard's division, 2397 with 8 guns.—See CHARRAS, 216, *note*.

† "Eripunt subito nubes cælumque, diemque,
Teucrorum ex oculis, ponto nox incubat atra.
Intonuere poli, et crebris micat ignibus æther:
Præsentemque viris intentant omnia mortem."

Æneid, i. 88.

flict took place, and where the lances, like the spears of the Macedonian phalanx, presented an impenetrable front. Major Hodge of the 7th, who bravely led his corps, and the commander of the lancers, were both killed in close fight, combating at the head of their men.

Lord Uxbridge, now the Marquess of Anglesea, no sooner perceived this, than he charged in person at the head of the first Life-Guards. These magnificent troops, albeit unprotected by armour, bore down upon the French horsemen with such vigour, as they were ascending the slope on the other side of Genappe, that the shock was irresistible, and in a few minutes the lancers were totally defeated, and driven with great slaughter headlong through the town. No farther serious attempt was made by the enemy to disquiet the retreat, which was conducted with perfect regularity and the utmost skill by the English general. Wellington retired with his whole troops to the front of the forest of Soignies, where he took up his position on either side of the high-road from Charleroi to Brussels, in front of the village of Waterloo, on ground which he had already selected and had surveyed as the theatre of a decisive battle. Napoleon followed with the great bulk of his forces, and arranged them nearly opposite to the English, on both sides of the high-road leading from Charleroi to Brussels, with headquarters at La Belle Alliance. Thirty-three thousand had been detached under Grouchy to observe the Prussians who were retiring towards Wavre, and the troops which had assembled at nightfall amounted to about seventy-four thousand men. Wellington was not equal in point of numerical amount, his whole force being only sixty-seven thousand six hundred men : but he was still more inferior in artillery and in the quality of part of his troops. His cannon amounted to only one hundred and fifty-six pieces, while the French had two hundred and forty-eight :¹ and the British, Hanoverians, and Brunswickers, in number about fifty-one thousand, could be alone relied

CHAP.
XVIII.

1815, June 18.
Waterloo.
The battle of Waterloo.
The English and Prussian
troops.
The French troops.
The result of the battle.

1815, June 18.
232, 271.
275. Well-
ington's
1, 114.
1815, June
19, 1915.
Gaw. 8. 1.
4, 4, 48.
181, 6, 12.
79, 71, Nap.
ix, 112, 114.
don't
6, 11, 6, 12.
Chap. 8.
11, 11, 11.
20.

CHAP.
XCHL.

1815.

63.
Results of
the cam-
paign in
favour of
Napoleon.

on for the shock of war—the remainder being composed of Belgians, for the most part disaffected or recently raised Nassau levies, upon whom little dependence could be placed in any serious conflict.*

Though the campaign had only as yet lasted two days, yet its result in the first instance had been eminently favourable to the French troops, and had worthily rewarded the skill and daring of their chief. With a force inferior upon the whole by fully seventy thousand men to his opponents taken together, he had succeeded in combating at Ligny with advantage, at Quatre Bras with superiority of force; and nothing but the extraordinary and unforeseen circumstance of d'Erlon's corps, nineteen thousand strong, having been marched at the decisive moment first from Quatre Bras to Ligny, and again from Ligny to Quatre Bras, without taking a part in either action, had prevented him from gaining in the very first day of the campaign what might have proved decisive success against *both* his opponents. Had d'Erlon's corps been thrown on the flank of Blücher when his last resources were exhausted, and Napoleon's Guard charged, the Prussian army would have sustained an irreparable defeat, possibly as disastrous as that of Jena. Had the same force been hurled against Pack's and Kempt's heroic brigades, when enveloped by Kellermann's cuirassiers at Quatre Bras, the English divisions engaged would have been destroyed before Alten's men or the Guards came up, or driven to an eccentric retreat, highly dangerous to themselves in presence of such a superiority on the enemy's part in cavalry and artillery, and probably fatal to the future communication of Blücher and Wellington. So great were the advantages gained by the admirably conceived irruption of the French Emperor into the space *between* the cantonments of the two allied armies, at the head of his own force, fully concentrated when each of theirs had a long distance to

* See Appendix B, Chap. XLIV.

go over before their troops could be drawn together. And such the dangers incurred by the allied commanders, and especially Wellington, in delaying the concentration of their forces, after those of the enemy had been all accumulated at a single point.*

But the advantage, well-nigh decisive, thus gained by Napoleon in the very threshold of the war, was lost by the stubborn and heroic resistance with which he was encountered at Ligny and Quatre Bras by the Prussians and English, joined to the extraordinary circumstance which led to both his armies being deprived of the powerful succour of d'Erlon's corps at the time when it was most required. And the skilful conduct of the allied generals in making a parallel retreat, as from the circumference of a circle still inclining towards its centre—Wellington to the front of the wood of Soignies, Blücher to the neighbourhood of Wavre—at once restored to them the advantage which the French Emperor had gained at the opening of the campaign. They were both now concentrated, and in a situation not only to give battle

CHAP.

XIII.

1815.

64.

The concentration of the Prussian and English armies, and the advantage gained by them.

* This was mainly owing, on Wellington's part, to the extraordinary dread which he entertained of being attacked on his right. "To the last," says Hanley, "the Duke's apprehensions for his own right, which never was menaced in the least, did not cease to haunt him and to influence his dispositions" (Hanley, p. 23). When Baron Mülling, the Prussian commissioner, gave Wellington the intelligence of Napoleon's attack on Charleroi on the 20th of June, on the 15th, and asked him whether, and where he would concentrate, he replied, "I shall, as General Von Zieten supposes, I will concentrate on my left wing. Should, however, a portion of the enemy's army come by Mons, I must concentrate more towards my centre. For this reason I must positively wait for news from Mons before I fix my rendezvous." Later in the day Mülling gave the Duke fresh intelligence of the French advance, and informed him of Blücher's concentrating at Sambre. "However, he could not resolve on fixing his point of concentration before receiving the expected news from Mons." . . . "The *Journal de l'Armée*," continues Mülling, "the Duke sent Clarysman and said, 'I have got news from Mons from General Demberg, who reports that Napoleon has turned towards Charleroi with all his force; consequently there is no longer any enemy in front of him; therefore orders for the concentration of my army at Nivelles and Quatre Bras are already despatched.'" Mülling, 229, 230. "Even then the point of concentration fixed on was Nivelles, seven miles to the right of the Charleroi road; so that, but for Perponcher's bold disobedience of orders, Ney would have found Quatre Bras well supplied the next morning." See *Ann. x. lvi. § 51*; *Cambray*, 123, 172; *Hanley*, 76; and *M. P. L. No. 223*, 267.

CHAP.
XCIII.

1815.

with their whole forces in a single field, but to aid each other in the most efficacious way if attacked separately by the bulk of his forces. That was the decisive circumstance. They had now regained, by their vigour and firmness, after the campaign began, the advantage of which, by his superior diligence in concentrating his troops, and rapidity in directing their movements, he had at first deprived them. If fully engaged in front now with either army, Napoleon was exposed to a flank attack from the whole weight of the other, entirely concentrated, not more than ten miles distant. Prudence in such circumstances would have counselled retreat to the French general, satisfied with the advantages already gained. But that was not the characteristic of the Emperor's mind, nor was it, perhaps, consistent with the necessities of his situation. Daring, hazardous advance, staking all on a single throw, had always been his policy, and it had so often proved successful in circumstances yet more hazardous, that he had the utmost confidence in its not failing him on the present occasion. And in truth his circumstances, political as well as military, at home and abroad, were now such that he had probably no alternative ; and with all Europe advancing against him, and a divided nation in his rear, his only chance of salvation was in a great stroke, which might paralyse the alliance by driving the English from its ranks.

APPENDIX.

CHAPTER XXIII.

NOTE A. p. 660.

PUBLIC INCOME OF GREAT BRITAIN FOR 1836.

Ordinary Revenue.

	Gross Produce.	Net Produce.
Customs,	£11,807,322 12 1 $\frac{1}{2}$	£9,070,551 13 7
Excise,	23,370,955 8 3 $\frac{1}{4}$	20,553,928 14 11
Stamps,	6,192,804 14 10	6,159,585 8 1
Land and Assessed Taxes,	7,611,358 4 4 $\frac{1}{4}$	7,099,16 16 11
Post Office,	2,349,549 0 10	1,755,898 2 1
Pensions and 1s. in the pound,	20,280 19 1	19,6 8 15 2
Salaries,	11,776 6 6	11,178 0 3
Hackney Coaches,	20,233 14 10	21,721 9 8
Hawkers and Pedlars,	21,591 10 2	18,516 9 0
Total permanent and annual duties,	<u>£51,914,572 11 5$\frac{1}{4}$</u>	<u>£45,188,368 4 4$\frac{1}{4}$</u>

Small Branches of the Hereditary Revenue.

Alienation Fines,	£11,760 15 5	£10,920 7 5
Post Fines,	6,380 4 6	6,284 15 2
Seizures,	9,415 7 2	9,145 7 2
Compositions and proffers,	626 15 4	626 15 4
Crown Lands,	<u>145,146 13 8</u>	<u>142,764 9 2</u>
Total,		

Extraordinary Resources.

War Taxes.	Gross Produce.	Net Produce.
Customs,	£2,841,406 1 7	£2,280,634 17 8
Excise,	6,737,028 19 0	6,667,776 18 6
Property Tax,	15,277,499 9 4	14,978,248 18 2
Arrears of Income Duty, &c.,	313 19 1	308 5 9
Lottery, net profit (one-third for the service of Ireland),	327,906 13 4	304,651 10 6
Monies paid on account of the Interest of Loans raised for the service of Ireland,	3,981,783 6 2	3,981,783 6 2
On account of balance due by Ireland on joint expenditure of the United Kingdom,	6,107,986 12 3	6,107,986 12 3
On account of the Commissioners for Grenada Exchequer Bills,	25,000 0 0	25,000 0 0
On account of the interest, &c., of a loan granted to the Prince Regent of Portugal,	28,585 1 6	28,585 1 6
Surplus Fees of Regulated Public Offices,	98,750 13 2	98,750 13 2
Imprest Monies repaid, and other Monies paid to the public,	107,836 16 10	107,836 16 10
Total War taxes,	36,607,455 8 4	34,751,301 15 5
Permanent do.,	50,114,583 11 6	45,188,368 3 9
Total without Loans,	86,722,038 19 10	79,939,669 19 2
Loans paid into Exchequer (including amount raised for service of Ireland),	39,421,959 2 0	39,421,959 2 0
Grand total,	£126,143,998 1 10	£119,361,629 1 2

—*Annual Register for 1816*, p. 420.

PUBLIC EXPENDITURE OF GREAT BRITAIN FOR 1815.

1. For interest of the National Debt, and charges of the Sinking-Fund,	£41,015,527 10 0
2. Interest on Exchequer Bills,	3,014,003 3 8
3. Civil List, Courts of Justice, Mint, Allowance to Royal Family, Salaries and Allowances, Bounties,	1,555,408 6 4
4. Civil Government of Scotland,	126,613 11 9
5. Other Payments in anticipation of the Exchequer Receipts—viz. Bounties for Fisheries, Manufactures, Corn, Pensions on the Hereditary Revenue, Militia, and Deserters' Warrants,	364,117 14 5
6. The Navy,	16,371,870 7 5
7. Ordnance,	3,736,424 17 3
8. Army—viz. :	
Ordinary Services,	£21,333,831 10 8
Extraordinary Services,	1,843,992 16 10
	23,177,824 17 6

9. Loans, &c. to other countries viz:

Ireland,	£7,277,022	s. 8
Austria,	1,796,229	s. 8
Russia,	3,241,919	7 0
Prussia,	2,382,823	14 8
Hanover,	203,500	6 4
Spain,	147,333	19 19
Portugal,	169,000	6 0
Sweden,	524,961	17 4
Prussia, Canton of Basle, Tessy, and Netherlands,	78,152	14 2
Minor powers, under arrangement with the Duke of Wellington,	1,721,991	s. 4
Mexico, &c.,	857,134	17 9

£18,311,118 4 9

10. Miscellaneous creditors,

3,374,118 4 8

Total, £21,685,236 8 9

Debt of 1861, which, although included in the account, form no part of the expenditure of Great Britain - viz. loan, &c. for Ireland, interest 41 per cent., and arrangement on Portuguese loan, Sinking Fund on loan to the East India Company, &c.,

7,490,534 4 8

Total, £29,175,770 13 1

= Annual Register for 1816, pp. 429, 430.

TABLE, SHOWING THE STATE OF THE NATIONAL DEBT OF GREAT BRITAIN
ON 1st FEBRUARY 1816.

I. *Funded Debt.*

	Total Capital.	Amount Paid.	Total Value.
Total debt of Great Britain,	£724,992,611	£25,991,785	£698,999,826
... Ireland, payable in Great Britain,	193,992,750	3,194,966	1,805,715
Total Amount of loans to the Emperor of Germany, payable in ditto,	7,502,633	225,979	1,557,55
Total amount of loans to the Prince Regent of Portugal, payable in ditto,	815,522	29,805	57,047
	£835,523,516	£28,558,565	£712,144,519
In the hands of the Commissioners for the reduction of debt,	193,992,750	1,211,776	...
Transferred to the Commissioners by purchasers of 45 annuities pursuant to Act 48 Geo. III. c. 112,	3,007,551	92,926	...
Total chargeable debt, British and Irish, payable in Great Britain,	£792,993,025	£27,761,267	£765,231,758

II. *Unfunded Debt.*

Exchequer—						Amount.	Outstanding.
Exchequer bills provided for, . . .						£19,772,800	
unprovided for, . . .						21,669,100	
						<hr/>	£41,441,900
Treasury—							
Miscellaneous services, . . .						530,535	
Warrants for army service, . . .						20,615	
Treasury bills, . . .						1,005,514	
						<hr/>	1,556,664
Army, . . .							1,030,109
Barracks, . . .							125,005
Ordnance, . . .							876,857
Navy, . . .							3,694,821
Civil list advances,
Total, . . .							<hr/> £48,725,356

Summary.

Total funded debt, . . .	792,033,425
Total unfunded debt, . . .	48,725,356

Grand total of national debt at the close of the war,	<hr/> £840,758,781 <hr/>
---	--------------------------

—*Annual Register for the year 1816*, pp. 434, 435.

PUBLIC FUNDED DEBT OF GREAT BRITAIN ON 1st FEBRUARY 1816.

An account of the progress made in the redemption of the Public Funded Debt of Great Britain at 1st February 1816 :

Funds.	Capitals.	Redeemed by Commissioners from 1st August 1786, to 1st February 1816.	Total sums paid by Commissioners.
Total stock created for sums borrowed, . . .	£1,000,986,526	£273,418,402	£172,009,352
Transferred to the Commissioners on account of land-tax redeemed, . . .	25,155,056		
	<hr/> £975,831,470		
Ditto for Purchase of life Annuities, per 48 Geo. III., . . .	3,097,551		
Redeemed by the Commissioners, . . .	273,418,402		
Debt of Great Britain, exclusive of Ireland, unredeemed at 1st February 1816, . . .	£699,315,517		
— <i>Annual Register for the year 1816</i> , p. 431.			

NOTE B and C, page 626 and 629.

ARMY WITH WHICH NAPOLEON ENTERED RUSSIA, ON THE 17th June, 1812.

CORPS.		1st Division.		2nd Division.		3rd Division.	
Number of Divisions.	Count.	Men.	Cannon.	Men.	Cannon.	Men.	Cannon.
1st Corps. Count Bernadotte.							
	1st division,	4,120	...	160	8		
	2d " "	4,100	...	160	8		
	3d " "	4,000	...	160	8		
	4th " "	4,000	...	160	8		
	1st division of cavalry,	...	1,500	120	6		
	Reserve of artillery,	160	8		
Force of 1st corps: men 18,840, cannon 46.							
2d Corps. Count Reille.							
	5th division,	5,000	...	160	8		
	6th " "	6,100	...	160	8		
	7th " "	5,000	...	160	8		
	9th " "	5,000	...	160	8		
	2d division of cavalry,	...	1,500	120	6		
	Reserve of artillery,	170	8		
Force of 2d corps: men 23,530, cannon 46.							
3d Corps. Count Vandamme.							
	10th division,	4,130	...	160	8		
	11th " "	4,300	...	160	8		
	8th " "	4,300	...	160	8		
	3d division of cavalry,	...	1,500	120	6		
	Reserve of artillery,	180	8		
Force of 3d corps: men 15,290, cannon 38.							
4th Corps. Count Gerard.							
	12th division,	4,000	...	160	8		
	13th " "	4,000	...	160	8		
	14th " "	4,000	...	160	8		
	6th division of cavalry,	...	1,500	120	6		
	Reserve of artillery,	150	8		
Force of 4th corps: men 14,260, cannon 48.							
6th Corps. Count L. Bon.							
	19th division,	3,700	...	170	8		
	20th " "	3,500	...	160	8		
	21st " "	4,000	...	160	8		
	Reserve of artillery,	280	14		
Force of 6th corps: men 11,770, cannon 38.							
Imperial Guard:—							
	Young Guard,	3,800	...	120	16		
	Chasseurs,	4,250	...	120	16		
	Grenadiers,	4,420	...	120	16		
	Light cavalry,	...	2,120	240	12		
	Cavalry of reserve,	...	2,040	240	12		
	Artillery of reserve,	480	24		

Reserve Cavalry under Marshal Grouchy.

Corps, Commanders, and Divisions.		Infantry.	Force of each Division. Cavalry. Artillerymen.		Guns.
1st Corps—Count Pajol,	{ 4th	1,820	120	6
	{ 5th	1,420	120	6
2d Corps—Excellmans,	{ 9th	1,300	120	6
	{ 10th	1,300	120	6
3d Corps—Kellermann.	{ 11th	1,310	120	6
	{ 12th	1,300	120	6
4th Corps—Milhaud,	{ 13th	1,300	120	6
	{ 14th	1,300	120	6
Total, . . .		85,820	20,460	7,020	350

Engineers, Pontoons, Sappers, Drivers, &c., . . . 9,184

Grand total, . . . 122,464

—GOURGAUD, *Campagne de* 1815, p. 150; VAUDENCOURT, iv. 108; PLOMB, iv. *Appendix*, pp. 8, 9; and NAPOLEON, Book ix. 71.

Charras makes the strength of the corps a little different, and his estimate is probably the more exact:—

	Men.	Guns.
1st Corps—d'Erlon,	19,939	46
2d Corps—Reille,	24,361	46
3d Corps—Vandamme,	19,160	38
4th Corps—Gerard,	15,495	38
6th Corps—Lobau,	19,465	32
Imperial Guard, Infantry,	13,026	...
... .. Cavalry,	2,735	...
... .. Artillery,	4,093	96
Reserve Cavalry under Grouchy:—		
1st Corps—Pajol,	3,946	12
2d Corps—Excellmans,	3,515	12
3d Corps—Kellermann,	3,679	12
4th Corps—Milhaud,	3,554	12
Engineers, Sappers, &c.,	3,500	...
—CHARRAS, p. 57-59.	128,988	344

NOTE D, p. 640.

Orders issued by Wellington upon the 15th June 1815, for the concentration of his army:—

(1.) Order issued between four and five in the afternoon.

“General Dornberg’s brigade of cavalry and the Cumberland Hussars to march this night upon Vilvoorde, and to bivouac on the high ground near that town.

“The Earl of Uxbridge will be pleased to collect the cavalry this night at Ninove, leaving the 2d Hussars looking out between the Scheldt and Lys.

“The 1st division of infantry to collect this night at Ath and adjacent, and to be in readiness to move at a moment’s notice.

“The 3d division to collect this night at Braine-le-Comte, and to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice.

“The 4th division to be collected this night at Grammont, with the exception of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which are to be moved to Oudenarde.

“The 5th division, the 81st Regiment, and the Hanoverian Brigade of the 6th division, to be in readiness to march from Brussels at a moment’s notice.

"The Duke of Brunswick's corps to collect at the village of the Pöschel, between Brussels and Vilvorde.

"The Nassau troops to collect at daylight to-morrow morning at the village of the Pöschel, and to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice.

"The Hanoverian brigade of the 5th division to collect at daylight to-morrow morning at the village of the Pöschel, and to be in readiness at daylight to-morrow morning to move towards the village of the Pöschel, and to halt on the high road between Alst and Asche on further orders.

"*The Prince of Orange is ordered to collect at Asche at daylight to-morrow morning, and to be in readiness to move the 3d division upon Nieuwe-Weert as soon as possible.*

"*This movement is not to take place until it is quite certain that the French army is not upon the road of the Prussian army, and that it is not the intention of the French army to move towards the Prussian army.*

"Lord Hill will be so good as to order Prince Frederick to collect at the village of the Pöschel with 500 men; and to collect the 1st division of the army of the Low Countries, and the Italian brigade at Sotteghem, and to be in readiness to move at daylight.

"The reserve artillery to be in readiness to move at daylight."

(2.) Order issued at ten o'clock at night:

"The 1st division of infantry to continue its movement from Brüssel to the village of the Pöschel.

"The 2d division to move from Enghien upon Brüssel to the village of the Pöschel.

"The 3d and 4th divisions of infantry to move from Asche and Gammert, and to continue their movements upon Enghien.

"The cavalry to continue its movement from Nindare upon Enghien.

"The above movements to take place with as little delay as possible."

— GERWOOD, xii. 472, 474.

WELLINGTON'S ARMY AT THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN.

Effective and Non-Effective.

British and King's German Legion,	13,133
Hanoverians,	15,290
Brunswickers,	6,808
Dutch and Nassau troops,	72,044
Total,	107,275

Under Wellington's orders, but who had not yet arrived at the opening of the campaign,—

Hanoverians,	4,000
Dutch,	12,000

Grand total, 123,275.

See GERWOOD, xii. 480; SIMPSON, i. 28; CHARRAS, p. 77; and PUGH, p. 15. Also PUGH, p. 15.

END OF VOL. XIII.

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



AA 000 003 297 9

